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SUMMARY 
 
 
This work is concerned with an analysis of the copyright protection of musical works. Musical works 
form part of the categories of works protected under copyright law. It would be easy to dismiss 
musical works as not warranting a serious study, as would for example, be warranted for “industrial 
property” rights such as patents and geographical indicators, or more “serious” copyrights such as 
architectural works and computer software. Such a perspective would however, not be cognisant of 
the significant contribution that the music industry, as part of the broader cultural and creative 
industries makes to the global economy. It has, for example, been shown that in 2013, the global 
cultural and creative industries contributed some US$2,250b, employing some 29,5 million people, 
with the music industry being one of the top three employers and with its revenues exceeding those of 
radio.1 A single successful musician can earn in excess of US$100m per annum,2 making the industry 
ripe for litigious claims. For this reason therefore a consideration of the legal rules that apply to the 
protection of musical works is crucial. There is currently no clear exposition and systematic analysis of 
the legal principles applicable to the field of music copyright and no work devoted to the in-depth 
delineation of the rights and sub-rights relating to musical copyright protection. 
This study seeks to address this research and knowledge gap by providing a historical and contextual 
analysis of the protection of musical works. The aim is to provide a complete picture of the milieu of 
music copyright protection to enable the reader to feel empowered in dealing with the subject-matter. 
This the writer does by mapping the historical development of music copyright protection in particular 
from eighteenth century England when the first copyright legislation was enacted, until the enactment 
of the British Copyright Act of 1911, which signalled the emergence of the “common law” copyright 
system. The writer then shows how this enactment shaped the development of modern music 
copyright law, and concludes by presenting a contextual consideration of the current South African 
law of music copyright and highlighting the challenges it is faced with. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Cultural Times 2015 
https://en.unesco.org/creativity/sites/creativity/files/cultural_times._the_first_global_map_of_cultural_and_creative_industries
.pdf (date of use: 16 January 2019). 
2
 See https://www.forbes.com/sites/zackomalleygreenburg/2018/12/04/the-worlds-highest-paid-musicians-of-2018-u2-
coldplay-ed-sheeran/#51661a4c4151 (date of use: 16 January 2019). 
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PART 1 – THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT IN 
MUSICAL WORKS 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction 
"The sole and end aim of figured-bass should be nothing else than God's glory and the recreation of 
the mind. Where this object is not kept in view, there can be no true music but only infernal scraping 
and bawling." – Johann Sebastian Bach (1685 – 1750) 
“But the mere truth won’t do. You must have a lawyer.” – Dr Allan Woodcourt to the wrongly-
accused George Rouncewell, in Charles Dickens’ Bleak House. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 
 
1 Research Problem 
1.1 Background 
Music is a form and means of entertainment. Its value derives from its aesthetic or pleasing 
properties and its appreciation from its ability to enrich (and to render worthwhile) moments of 
relaxation, leisure, fun and idleness.1 Apart from its relaxation function, music is also seen as having 
therapeutic value; as William Congreve is reputed to have observed, “Music has charms to soothe a 
savage breast, to soften rocks, or bend a knotted oak …”2 The association of music with light or 
relaxing moments should not, however, give the impression that music itself is a light subject not 
worthy of scholarly research; and neither should it engender a view of music as an economically-
insignificant commodity. Both in its art form and its legal analysis, music is a complicated subject 
that requires dedicated study. Whether it is with regard to Baroque art (or “serious”) music or the 
complexity of modern Jazz, on the one hand; or the complicated “world” of music copyright law,3 on 
the other; music proves to be not just mere fodder for light moments of entertainment but a complex 
and engaging subject meriting serious study and research. The fact that global music consumption 
is itself, a multi-billion-dollar industry with a sizable contribution to GDP means that the industry is 
naturally beset with entitlement disputes4 and makes the study of music copyright a worthwhile 
pursuit.  
Such a study is even more urgent and pertinent for South Africa – a country which is, in many ways, 
truly in transition. In line with this, the South African entertainment sector is also in a state of 
significant transition. South Africa’s entertainment sector – comprising the music, film, literary, 
theatrical, television and live entertainment industries – is worlds apart from the sombre years of 
apartheid’s rule, when cultural boycotts were the order of the day stymying development of the 
sector.5 Today’s entertainment sector in South Africa is vibrant, ambitious and economically relevant 
- and one which many artists aspire to be part of. Beyond any doubt, there are more persons and 
                                               
1
 This should not, however, be seen as suggesting that music has no role in “active” or commercial life. Music’s soothing 
qualities makes it an indispensable component of commercial life, where it is used daily to create the right ambiance for 
customers and employees. It is in fact this use of music that contributes a large part of the income earned by owners of 
music copyright, in the form of performing rights royalties.  
2
 See for example Tunajek https://www.aana.com/docs/default-source/wellness-aana.com-web-documents-(all)/music-
soothes-the-mind-and-body.pdf?sfvrsn=132c4bb1_2 (date of use: 27 May 2018). The phrase was adapted by Berman AJ 
in Southern African Music Rights Organisation v Svenmill Fabrics (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 608 (C), at para 17, where he 
quipped: “Music, to misquote William Congreve, hath charms to soothe a factory staff.” 
3
 In respect of the complexity of music copyright law Loren “Understanding the Complexity of Music Copyrights in the 
United States”, in Yu Intellectual Property 161, notes: “… [T]he world of music copyrights is one of the most complicated 
areas within copyright law. … The complexity stems from the historical development of the music industry and the 
corresponding process of regulatory accretion that responded to the changes in the industry.”   
4
 For the use of the term “entitlement” in relation to copyright infringement cases see Pitt Direct Licensing (at 83 and 84), 
who refers to “an infringement lawsuit seeking industry entitlement fees”(at 84). Emphasis added. 
5
 For a discussion of the cultural boycott of South Africa see Beaubien 1982 AT (29:4) 5, writing on “The Cultural Boycott 
of South Africa”; see also Johannesburg Operatic and Dramatic Society v Music Theatre International & Others Patent 
Journal March 1969 223, where the Copyright Tribunal was approached for the obtaining of a compulsory licence as a 
result of this boycott. 
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entities actively participating in the modern South African entertainment industries than at any other 
time in South Africa’s history.6  
The South African entertainment sector has furthermore gained international exposure and interest 
through such achievements as the winning of the Oscar award by the film Tsotsi, the nomination of 
films like District 9, Yesterday and various submissions in a number of categories.7 Unlike its 
inauspicious cousin, the music industry - the film industry has since 2004 been recognised in, and 
received support from government’s industrialisation plan for the creative industries created to 
provide “an additional financial incentive for the production of both foreign and domestic large 
budget film and television projects in South Africa.”8 Nevertheless, recent achievements in the music 
industry are a testimony to the great potential that this industry wields.  
Such achievements include the attainment of five Grammy awards by the isicathamiya9 group, 
Ladysmith Black Mambazo, including one as recent as 2018;10 the attainment of three Grammy 
awards by a fairly new Soweto group, the Soweto Gospel Choir,11 and a recent Grammy Award to 
the South African flautist, Wouter Kellerman. Other artists such as Lira, Thandiswa Mazwai, the 
entrepreneurial Cassper Nyovest, the self-made Cape Town-based band, Die Antwoord and the 
current “sensation”, Sho Madjozi, have contributed in placing modern South African music on the 
map. In 2010 South Africa was the country of honour at the Marché International du Disque et de 
l’Edition Musicale (MIDEM), the world’s premier music industry conference. Perhaps partly as a 
result of some of these developments12 government took a decision to include the music industry 
within its Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) as part of its new industrialisation plan, the so-called 
“New Growth Path”.13  
As a study focus the music industry is particularly appealing for other important reasons: For one 
thing, it is one of only a few industries where participation in the industry is not dependent upon 
                                               
6
 See in this regard a Department of Arts and Culture document, ‘Mzansi’s Golden Economy. Contribution of the Arts, 
Culture and Heritage Sector to the New Growth Path’, at 9, where it is noted that ‘[t]he South African music industry is a 
hive of innovation and creative talent, populated by hundreds of small and medium-sized entrepreneurs …’. Available at 
http://www.info.gov.za/view/DownloadFileAction?id=146493 (date of use: 12 June 2012) / 
http://nfvf.co.za/home/22/files/Policies/Mzansi%20golden%20economy.pdf (date of use: 20 February 2019). 
7
 http://www.filmcontact.com/news/south-africa/oscar-history-south-africans-can-be-proud (date of use: 22 February 2019). 
See also “Tsotsi puts SA film in spotlight”, available at http://www.southafrica.info/about/arts/tsotsi070603.htm. (Date of 
use: 05 June 2012). 
8
 See in this regard Grealy P et al, ‘Financing of Films’, in ‘Entertainment’, Law of South Africa (LAWSA), at 440. See also 
generally http://www.thedti.gov.za/financial_assistance/financial_incentive.jsp?id=7&subthemeid=26  and “South Africa’s 
film industry”, available at http://www.southafrica.info/business/economy/sectors/film.htm (date of use: 12 June 2012). 
9
 Isicathamiya is defined as ‘a type of secular a cappella choral singing developed in South Africa by migrant Zulu 
communities. The music became widely popular outside of Africa in the late 20
th
 century when it was picked up and 
promoted by the world-music industry.’ http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/1565404/isicathamiya (date of use: 13 
June 2012). 
10
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ladysmith_Black_Mambazo (date of use: 20 February 2019). 
11
 https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soweto_Gospel_Choir (date of use: 20 February 2019). 
12
 One other obvious reason is the pressure exerted by the creative industry and their demand to have their concerns 
addressed by government. In this regard a meeting between the creative industry and certain high-profile government 
officials, including the State President, was held on 17 November 2009, where an undertaking was made by the State 
President to attend to various concerns of artists. See in this regard http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=779 
and http://www.polity.org.za/article/sa-zuma-address-by-the-president-of-south-africa-to-the-report-back-meeting-with-
performing-artists-cultural-industry-sector-johannesburg-17112009-2009-11-17. (Date of use: 17 June 2012). 
13
 Also as part of government’s New Development Plan (NDP). See in this regard 
http://www.thedti.gov.za/news2013/ipap_2013-2016.pdf (date of use 28 March 2015).  
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large capital investments or high levels of education. This is unlike the film industry, where large 
capital investments and high professional skills often precede the success of any project. In the 
music industry raw talent, whether in the form of natural talent or acquired skills, is often all it takes 
to make a successful career, as many of the greatest singers of all time have proved.14 In view of 
this the music industry has been recognised as being a labour-intensive industry having a potential 
to contribute significantly to economic growth and employment. The role of intellectual property 
rights in generating revenues for the music industry has been recognised and in this regard it has 
been said that “there are a few South African industries better placed to take advantage of the global 
shifts towards knowledge-based, export-oriented growth and that draws on local competencies as a 
source of competitive advantage, than the music industry.”15  
Music’s role as a means for economic development in its own right as well as through supporting 
economic activity in other sectors has also been recognised. In this regard it has been reported that 
the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) was to formulate a Music Industry Strategy and Action 
Plan, in conjunction with the Department of Arts and Culture (DAC) and the Industrial Development 
Corporation (IDC).16 Further to this, a recent study of the World Intellectual Property Organisation 
(WIPO) has shown that music, theatrical productions and operas contribute up to 5.71% to GDP 
when compared to other core copyright industries, with copyright collecting societies contributing 
1.05% of this.17 To understand how significant this is, the role that music plays in other core 
copyright industries such as motion pictures and video, radio and television and advertising 
agencies and services needs to be recognised. It should furthermore be noted that the majority of 
collecting societies are those operating in the field of music, and thus the contribution of collecting 
societies to GDP should not be seen as completely detached  from the contribution of the music 
industry in general. Thus, as observed above, music plays a vital economic role not only in respect 
of the music industry itself but also in respect of supporting economic growth in other sectors. Within 
the South African context itself collections in respect of authors’ rights for the same period grew by 
5.4% in 2009, totalling some ZAR277.7 million, with local authors’ rights accounting for 95% of the 
collections, representing a 6.5% increase.18 In 2018 collections for performing rights alone19 totalled 
R488,9 million before deductions,20 showing the significance of the market.21 
                                               
14
 This is not to suggest that artists do not need to have education. Often a level of education and / or training, especially 
that relating to business and financial management, is crucial to ensuring that artists are able to manage their affairs and 
finances well, thus hopefully escaping the “poor artist” syndrome. Having indicated this it needs to be emphasised however 
that, as a requirement for participation and recognition in the industry, education and large financial investment are not the 
requisites. The remarkable story of Cassper Nyovest, who, with sheer entrepreneurial zest, has performed feats that some 
could have only thought of, including filling stadiums with single-handed effort, looms large. See in this regard 
https://www.okayafrica.com/cassper-nyovest-biggest-south-african-hip-hop-artist/ (date of use: 21 February 2019). Another 
remarkable story is that of “Sho Madjozi”, who, without a record label, shot to fame in recent times, largely through the use 
of social media, and became the first South African female musician to win the BET Award. See in this regard 
https://www.iol.co.za/the-star/news/look-sho-madjozi-gets-a-big-welcome-home-after-bet-win-28361612 (date of use: 01 
July 2019).  
15
 http://nfvf.co.za/home/22/files/Policies/Mzansi%20golden%20economy.pdf (date of use: 20 February 2019) 
16
 https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/dtiipap2012-151.pdf (date of use: 20 February 2019). 
17
 “WIPO Studies on the Economic Contribution of the Copyright Industries”, at 13, available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/creative_industry/pdf/economic_contribution_analysis_2012.pdf. (Date of use 13 June 2012). 
18
 Informa 2010 Music & Copyright at 22. 
6 
 
South Africa’s recording industry, noted for its “competitive capability in musical production”, ranked 
17th in the world in 2007.22 It has also been noted that, unlike the developed markets of Europe and 
North America, South Africa’s recorded-music sales grew steadily year-on-year until 2008,23 this 
decline arguably as the result of the recession. Another interesting trend relates to the fact that, 
although international repertoire has traditionally accounted for the majority of music sales in South 
Africa, this dominance declined from 74% in 2000 to 57% in 2008, with an even more significant 
decline of 54.1% in 2009.24  A further study revealed that the copyright industries generally 
contributed 4.8% of GDP and 4.08% of employment in South Africa in 2013.25 This is a significant 
contribution and is higher than that of agriculture, with an average contribution of 2% of the GDP.26 
The copyright industries can therefore, no longer be ignored and demand more focus and 
development.  Regarding the music industry in particular, attention needs to be given to dealing with 
the constraints identified in relation to the development of this industry, in particular constraints 
relating to “problems of intellectual property protection” and skills development.27 These skills, it is 
suggested, include the crucial skills of lawyers, prosecutors and judges equipped with the necessary 
knowledge and expertise regarding the operations, nuances and idiosyncrasies of this flamboyant 
yet GDP-contributing industry.  
1.2 Statement of the Problem  
The foregoing has highlighted the positive trends of growth that can be associated with the 
entertainment (or creative) industries at large and the music industry in particular. The post-
apartheid era has seen a notable growth of the music industry, both in terms of an increase in the 
numbers of persons and entities involved in the industry, the contribution of the industry to the 
economy, and the development of new styles of music.28 
As would be expected, the proliferation of activity in the industry has inevitably resulted in a complex 
and increasingly litigious environment, as more people and entities assert their rights and others feel 
aggrieved and deprived of their rights. This situation is further borne out by the fact that there has, 
                                                                                                                                                              
19
 I.e. the rights under s 6(c) – (e) rights  of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (the Copyright Act or the Act) administered by the 
Southern African Music Rights Organisation (SAMRO). 
20
 With R336,8 million available for distribution to members after deductions. 
21
 See the SAMRO Annual Integrated Report for 2018, available at 
https://www.samro.org.za/sites/default/files/SAMRO%202018%20Integrated%20Report.pdf (date of use: 20 February 
2019). 
22
 “WIPO Studies on the Economic Contribution of the Copyright Industries”, at 13, available at http://www.wipo.int/ip-
development/en/creative_industry/pdf/economic_contribution_analysis_2012.pdf. (Date of use 13 June 2012). 
Unfortunately South Africa lost this global ranking in 2012, when it lost its value by 5.8 % and fell beyond the Top 20 
Global Market ranking, with the explanation for this being that “the government has not focused on protecting IP Rights.” 
https://www.ifpi.org/south-africa.php (date of use: 02 July 2019). 
23
 Informa Music & Copyright 17 – 18. 
24
 Id at 18. 
25
 “WIPO Studies on the Economic Contribution of the Copyright Industries 2014” 
https://www.wipo.int/export/sites/www/copyright/en/performance/pdf/economic_contribution_analysis_2014.pdf (date of 
use: 20 February 2019). 
26
 With a GDP contribution of 2.14% in 2016. See https://www.southafricanmi.com/south-africas-gdp.html (date of use: 20 
February 2019). 
27
 As highlighted in the Industrial Policy Action Plan. http://www.thedti.gov.za/news2013/ipap_2013-2016.pdf (date of use 
28 March 2015) 
28
 With Kwaito music being the most ubiquitously South African sound of the post-apartheid era.  See in this regard 
https://www.southafrica.com/blog/kwaito-music-in-south-africa/ (date of use: 12 January 2019). 
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post 1994, been a steady increase in cases dealing directly with disputes relating to the music 
business appearing before our courts, adding to the handful of cases appearing in our law reports 
prior to 1994.29 This is a welcome development which is leading to a growing, albeit still limited, body 
of case law – a crucial step towards the development of a veritable jurisprudence in this important 
area of the law.  
Some of the cases that have come before our courts in recent times are: South African Broadcasting 
Corporation v Pollecutt,30 an enlightening case which highlights the nature of copyright as a bundle 
of rights, and the interplay between different areas of law (namely copyright, performers’ rights and 
the law of property) applicable to intellectual property works and expressions;31 Morris v Benson and 
Hedges,32 which dealt with the important question of a reasonable royalty paid in lieu of damages for 
copyright infringement; Disney Enterprises Inc v Griesel NO & Others;33 Pulkowski v South African 
Broadcasting Corporation Ltd & Another,34 which dealt with the effect of a “cession” of copyright on 
the cedent’s ability to institute infringement proceedings; Feldman NO v EMI Music SA (Pty) Ltd / 
EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) Ltd,35 which dealt with the question of joinder of co-authors in a claim 
for damages arising from copyright infringement; Gallo Africa Ltd and Others v Sting Music (Pty) Ltd 
and Others,36 which dealt with the jurisdiction of South African courts in respect of foreign copyright, 
where the defendant was an incola; Shapiro and Galeta v South African Recording Rights,37 which 
dealt with the liquidation of a collecting society, and which is important from the point of view of 
providing insight into the workings of collecting societies in South Africa.38  
More recently, a number of cases dealing generally with the question of the reasonableness of 
licence fees payable for the exploitation of so-called “needle-time” rights39 have appeared before the 
                                               
29
 Apart from the English decisions that applied in South Africa prior to its independence from British rule on 31 May 1961, 
some of the cases dealing with music-related disputes prior to 1994 are Performing Rights Society Ltd v Berman & 
Another 1966 (2) SA 355 R; Performing Right Society Ltd v Butcher & Others 1973 (1) SA 562 R; Gramophone Co Ltd v 
Music Machine (Pty) Ltd & Others 1973 (3) SA 188 (W); South African Music Rights Organisation Ltd v Trust Butchers 
(Pty) Ltd 1978 (1) SA 1052 (E); Southern African Music Rights Organisation Ltd v Svenmill Fabrics (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 
608 (C); RPM Record Company (Pty) Ltd v Disc Jockey Music Company (Pty) Ltd, Case No: 21081/84, TPD; Priority 
Records (Pty) Ltd v Ban-Nab and TV1; Gramophone Record Co (Pty) Ltd v Ban-Nab Radio and TV 1988 (2) All SA 69 (D); 
CCP Record Company (Pty) Ltd v Avalon Record Centre 1989 (1) SA 445 (C); Sunshine Records (Pty) Ltd v Frohling and 
Others 1990 (4) SA 782 (A) and S v Nxumalo 1993 (3) SA 456 (O).   
30
 1996(1) SA 546 (A). 
31
 See further in this regard Visser 1997 Juta’s Bus. L 81. 
32
 2000 (3) SA 1092 (W). 
33
 895 JOC (T). While this was a case dealing with the attachment of property ad fundandam jurisdictionem (in this case 
intellectual property in the form of certain trademarks), it has significance for copyright in musical works because in 
confirming the attachment order the court in effect agreed to the continuing application of the doctrine of the reversionary 
interest inuring in copyright provided for in British colonial copyright legislation,  to modern South African copyright law; for 
which see Dean 2006 DR 16.   
34
 2008 ZAGPHC 440. 
35
 2010 (1) SA 1 (SCA). 
36
 2010 (6) SA 329 (SCA). 
37
 Unreported case no: 14698/04, South Gauteng High Court. The writer wishes to note that the citation of this case is not 
accurate, as the name of the respondent is not given in full. The full name of the respondent was South African Recording 
Rights Association Limited (with the acronym SARRAL). This is the same case in which an intervening application was 
made earlier, as reported in Shapiro v South African Recording Rights Association Ltd (Galeta Intervening) 2008 (4) SA 
145 (W) [Emphasis added].  
38
 See the discussion in Chapter 6 infra. 
39
 The expression “needle-time” is defined as “the time in any period in which any recording may be included in a 
broadcast or cable programme service.”’ See Davies and Cheng Intellectual Property Law 101. Needle-time rights are 
essentially the “‘remuneration rights” in respect of the exploitation of the broadcast and communication to the public of 
sound recordings provided for in international neighbouring rights treaties such as the International Convention for the 
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courts and the Copyright Tribunal (in this respect representing a “resuscitation” of the Copyright 
Tribunal).40 These cases include National Association of Broadcasters v South African Music 
Performance Rights Association and Others,41 a case dealing with the question of the jurisdiction of 
the Copyright Tribunal to hear matters relating to licensing disputes; South African Music 
Performance Rights Association v National Association of Broadcasters and Others (Copyright 
Tribunal),42 a case concerned with a dispute relating to the process to be undertaken by the 
Copyright Tribunal when adjudicating needle-time rights licensing disputes, which was essentially 
the first appearance before the Copyright Tribunal in respect of needle-time rights; South African 
Music Performance Rights Association v National Association of Broadcasters and South African 
Music Rights Organisation,43 the first ruling of the Copyright Tribunal on the merits in respect of a 
needle-time rights licensing dispute;44 and Foschini Retail Group (Pty) Ltd and 9 (Nine) Others v 
South African Music Performance Rights Association,45 a needle-time rights licensing dispute 
brought by a group of retailers.  
Another set of needle-time cases was concerned with disputes between owners of copyright in 
sound recordings (and the intervention of the Registrar of Copyright) with regard to the 
administration of the performer’s share in needle-time royalties.  These include South African Music 
Performance Rights Association and Another v Mr Kadi Petje N.O. and Others,46 an application for 
the review of the decision of the Registrar of Copyright to reject distribution rules required in terms of 
the Needle-time Regulations, and Southern African Music Rights Organisation v South African 
Music Performance Rights Association and Others,47 a matter seeking an interim interdict preventing 
SAMPRA from distributing any royalties in terms of its newly-approved distribution plan, pendente 
lite.48   
                                                                                                                                                              
Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organisations (Rome Convention) of 1961 (in art. 
13 thereof) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) of 1996 (art. 15 thereof). In South Africa needle-
time rights were introduced through an amendment of both the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (the Copyright Act) and the 
Performers’ Protection Act 11 of 1967 (the Performers’ Protection Act) in 2002, and the promulgation of the Regulations on 
the Establishment of Collecting Societies in the Music Industry, Notice No. 517, GG No. 28894 of 1 June 2006 (the 
Needle-time Regulations). Although the needle-time rights cases dealt primarily with matters relating to sound recordings 
and performers’ rights, the cases are worth mentioning here as the principles applicable to the administration of sound 
recordings also have relevance on musical works. Furthermore, these cases provide important guidelines as to how the 
courts and the Copyright Tribunal will approach disputes relating to copyright licences. 
40
 Apart from the Johannesburg Operatic and Dramatic Society referred to supra at n 8, no cases had appeared before the 
Copyright Tribunal in South Africa. 
41
 Unreported case no: 2020/2009, North Gauteng High Court. 
42
 Reference No. 00002 [2009]. An attempt to appeal this decision to both the High Court and the Supreme Court of 
Appeal was dismissed with costs. See National Association of Broadcasters v SA Music Performance Rights Association 
and Another, unreported case no: 138/10, Supreme Court of Appeal (where reference to the High Court appeal is made). 
43
 Copyright Tribunal hearing, reference no: 00002(R). 
44
 This ruling was successfully appealed in National Broadcasting Association v South African Music Performance Rights 
Association and Another [2014] 2 All SA 263 (SCA). An attempt by the South African Performance Rights Association 
(SAMPRA) to appeal the SCA’s decision to the Constitutional court was dismissed in South African Music Performance 
Rights Association v National Association of Broadcasters and Others Case No: CCT 59 / 14 on the ground of bearing “no 
prospects of success.”   
45
 [2013] ZAGPPHC 304. 
46
 Unreported case no: 9085/2010. 
47
 Unreported case no: 42008/13. 
48
 This matter was later withdrawn following an agreement between SAMRO and SAMPRA to end the dispute. See in this 
regard http://www.samro.org.za/news/articles/sampra-samro-reach-agreement-needletime-rights-impasse-support-and-
blessing-principle (date of use: 15 October 2018). 
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It is true that, when compared to other jurisdictions such as the United States of America, (where it 
could be humorously said that there is an oversupply of cases of this nature), the body of case law 
dealing with music-related disputes in South Africa is still miniscule. The growth trend is however, 
encouraging, and with the continuing growth of the industry, both in terms of its contribution to the 
GDP and the numbers of persons and entities involved, this trend is poised to continue. Which is 
where the problem lies: the growth of the entertainment and in particular the music industry would 
require an adequate supply of lawyers – attorneys, advocates, law academics and judges – who are 
skilled in this area of law and who can confidently advise, render opinions and give pronouncements 
on the intricate and complex legal issues arising from music industry relationships. The present 
reality is that not many legal professionals in South Africa possess this speciality or even display an 
interest in this area of law. This is borne out by the fact that unlike in other jurisdictions, there is an 
almost deafening silence in our law journals relating to articles dealing with music rights issues.  
However, perhaps the major indicator of this situation is the fact that no South African law faculty 
offers a programme in Music Law or Music Rights Law as of the time of writing this work - in spite of 
the fact that many specialised areas of law have developed in recent years and are taught at 
university level (including aviation law, cyber or information technology law, water law, space law, 
sports law etc.).49 When issues relating to the legal aspects of music copyright are dealt with, they 
are generally dealt with in passing or in a cursory manner, as part of the general treatment of 
copyright law. This is in contradistinction to a number of major universities internationally, which 
offer formal programmes in Entertainment (including Music) Law, both at undergraduate and 
postgraduate levels.50 Furthermore, apart from a brief introductory section in the Law of South 
Africa,51 not a single academic text book exists in South Africa which deals with this area of law.52   
It is the writer’s conjecture that the combination of factors such as the fact that the South African 
music industry was for many years a small market that could, perhaps, not sustain many 
                                               
49
 The writer is aware of the fact that both the Universities of Cape Town and Johannesburg have in the past offered short 
programmes in Entertainment Law. These programmes however focussed on Film and Television law, rather than Music 
Law. The University of Johannesburg programme was eventually changed into a seminar on Introduction to Entertainment 
and Media Law. See in this regard 
http://www.uj.ac.za/EN/Faculties/law/coursesandprogrammes/Documents/Intro%20to%20Entertainment_Media%20Law%
20Oct%202011%20WEB.pdf. (Date of use: 18 June 2012). It does not however appear that these programmes are 
continuing as of the time of submission of this thesis. 
50
 Some of the international universities offering formal programmes in Entertainment Law include, in the United States of 
America, the University of California (UCLA) Law School, Southwestern Law School, Stanford Law School, Loyola Law 
School, Cardozo School of Law and the University of Miami School of Law. In the United Kingdom the most well-known 
programme is that offered by the University Of Westminster School of Law. Further to this, the School of Oriental and 
African Studies at the University of London offers, amongst others, an elective in Legal Regulation of the Music Industry as 
part of its LLM programme, while the University of Derby offers an elective in The Law of the Music Industry, also as part of 
its LLM programmes. In Australia Monash University, the University of Melbourne and the University of Technology 
Sydney all offer programmes in or relating to Entertainment Law.  
51
 Grealy P et al, ‘Entertainment’, in Joubert WA (ed) Law of South Africa (LAWSA) Volume 8(2) 2ed, at 403. The section 
deals briefly with the following areas forming part of Entertainment Law: Film and Television Production and Exploitation 
Law; Restrictions on the Content of Films and Television Programmes; Financing of Films; Statutory Protection of 
Performers; Music Law [although in fact Music Law would also encompass the protection of performers]; Sports Law; 
Entertainment and Advertising and Protection of the Arts. 
52
 The writer is aware of two textbooks that have been written on the subject of the music business. The first one, South 
African Music Law, Contracts and Business, written by Advocate Nick Matzukis, while a very useful and informative guide 
to the music industry, was not, in the opinion of the writer, written with critical academic rigour. The second work, The 
South African Music Business, by Jonathan Shaw, while it is more academically oriented, has little legal analysis as it 
focusses mainly on marketing matters. 
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practitioners, and the fact that no formal course of study and very few scholarly articles have been 
available in this area of law, inter alia, has led to a situation where not many can claim expertise in 
this area of law in South Africa. With no comprehensive academic exposition of the applicable law 
and thus no elucidation of the pertinent legal principles, many an aspirant practitioner in this area of 
law and business would have few places to get assistance. This is further exacerbated by the fact 
that the law relating to the protection of music rights is based mainly on copyright law, an area of law 
recognised as “technical” and “arcane” in its own right by no less an eminent person than a judge of 
the Supreme Court of Appeal.53 This situation is aptly captured by Thall in his seminal work, “What 
They’ll Never Tell You About the Music Business”, where he observes: 
… Unlike participants in other industries, the major players in industries in the area of intellectual 
property (music, theatre, film and television) often enter the business with neither a clear 
understanding of its workings or history nor means to obtain the information which would convey such 
knowledge to them.
54
 
This, Thall argues, gives rise to the need for persons aspiring to participate in the music industry to 
“know the difference between surface and substance; between truth and lie; between reality and 
myth …”55        
Dealing with a similar concern, Du Plessis, in a two-part series appearing in TSAR,56 highlights the 
importance of counsel, when representing clients in music rights matters,  being au fait not only with 
the facts of the case but also both [the dynamics] of the music industry and the settled norms in the 
industry.’57 In this regard Du Plessis argues that “… the perceived prejudice that may potentially 
befall the songwriters, may not lie in the ability of the courts to make a proper ruling, but in the 
inability of counsel to argue their cases.”58 Analysing the case of Sunshine Records v Frohling,59 “the 
leading case relating to the music industry”, Du Plessis argues that counsel could have argued the 
case differently60 by analysing the contract in question and correctly identifying it as embodying not 
only a recording contract with a performer, but also a publishing contract with a songwriter and a 
performance (management) contract.61 Du Plessis further opines that counsel should therefore not 
                                               
53
 Harms ADP in King v South African Weather Services 2009 (3) SA 13 (SCA), at paragraphs 5 and 16 respectively. The 
arcane nature of copyright is recognised even in the United States of America, a more developed and complex jurisdiction, 
where it is said of judges that “[g]iven the breadth of their efforts, they lack the luxury of time to delve deeply into what for 
many judges is an arcane subject.” Patterson and Linderberg The Nature of Copyright at 6. 
54
 Thall What They’ll Never Tell You About the Music Business at ix. 
55
 Thall ibid at xii. The confusion that can often arise as a result of the lack of understanding of the nuances that 
characterise the music industry and the different layers of rights involved can be illustrated by the error evident in a recent 
text titled A Guide to Intellectual Property Law, by Peter Ramsden (Juta 2011 Claremont). At 35 – 36, when discussing 
copyright in sound recordings and particularly the new section 9A of the Copyright Act dealing with needle-time royalties, 
the author concludes by suggesting that the regulations relating to the  royalties provided for in section 9A are dealt with in 
section 14 of the Act. This is however not correct because the royalties provided for in section 14 and the regulations 
promulgated pursuant thereto relate to “records of musical works”, and not the public play of sound recordings. Rather it is 
the Needle-time Regulations referred to earlier (see supra n 42) that apply in respect of the public play of sound 
recordings. 
56
 Du Plessis 2007 TSAR 1 112 and Du Plessis 2007 TSAR 2 321. 
57
 Du Plessis 2007 TSAR 2, at 330. 
58
 Ibid. 
59
 1990 (4) SA 782 (A). 
60
 Du Plessis 2007 TSAR 1, at 124. 
61
 Id at 124 - 125. 
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have argued the case on the ground of restraint of trade as set out in the Magna Alloys62 case, but 
on elements of slavery and unconscionability in the contract, lack of consensus regarding the 
songwriter’s / publishing contract and misrepresentation.63  
The crisp point, according to Du Plessis, seems to be the ability to scrutinise a contract in order to 
determine if there may be various contractual issues, in particular pertaining to “the transfer of 
different form [sic] of copyright”, which may be contained in one document.64 In what could not have 
been a more succinct capturing of the crisp issue, Du Plessis concludes: 
The position of the songwriter in South Africa is often confused with that of a recording artist / 
performer. The seriousness of the implications of copyright issues in songwriters’ publishing contracts 
is therefore often overlooked. From the discussion of the music industry, and specifically the recording 
industry, coupled with the confusion that sometimes exists between the positions of that of the 
songwriter and the artist / performer, and the risks that are borne by the recording companies, a well-
drafted standard contract by an established and reputable record company, where the songwriter and 
artist / performer and their respective roles are defined, may very well be more suitable than a 
personally drafted contract, overlooking detail that may have dire consequences for the songwriter.
65
 
Du Plessis’ articles raise very crucial issues that highlight the importance of having experienced 
counsel when dealing with music rights matters. As the case of Pollecut66 has illustrated, it is often 
not easy to deal with the many “different and distinct intellectual property rights that have to be taken 
into account”67 in complex copyright matters. Inexperienced counsel would find it difficult to plough 
through the complexity and to decipher the different nuances, as appears to have been the case in 
the situation discussed by Du Plessis. The music industry is a global, billion-dollar-a-year industry 
and often much is at stake. Expertise is therefore essential to successfully litigate disputes arising 
from this industry. If the lawyers for the Solomon Linda deceased estate did not have this expertise, 
they would not have been able to tackle the global giant conglomerate, Walt Disney Enterprises, 
rendering it necessary to settle the matter.68 
There can be many shades and twists in disputes relating to music, requiring the sharp and incisive 
mind of counsel having the experience and expertise to deal with these matters. Thus whereas in 
the Pollecut69 case the issue was about the use of one contract document in relation to a number of 
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 Magna Alloys & Research v Ellis 1984 (4) SA 874 (A). 
63
 Du Plessis 2007 TSAR 2op cit note 50 at 125 – 126. 
64
 Du Plessis 2007 TSAR 1 47. 
65
 Ibid at 330 – 331. By quoting from Du Plessis the writer does not express full agreement with Du Plessis’ argument here.  
In particular the writer is under no illusion about the graciousness of record companies (one of which was said to be ‘too 
grasping’ in the case under discussion – Sunshine Records v Frohling, supra n 62, at 55), which would ensure fair terms in 
contracts. It is the writer’s experience that generally record companies (as do many other service companies in the music 
business) seek to maximise their interest to the detriment of those of the artist. Nothing would therefore, in the writer’s 
opinion, take the place of an experienced and knowledgeable attorney / legal practitioner when seeking to defend the 
interests of the artist. In any case it is not, or should not be, for record companies to make determinations that relate to 
songwriters as they are not involved with musical works but sound recordings (although there has been a trend in recent 
times for record companies to take interest in music publishing through the use of the so-called 360 degree record deals). 
66
 South African Broadcasting Corporation v Pollecut 1996(1) SA 546 (A). 
67
 Id at para 3. 
68
 See in this regard Dean 2006 DR 16. 
69
 South African Broadcasting Corporation v Pollecut 1996(1) SA 546 (A). 
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different and complex intellectual property relations, the American case of Cortner and Silberman v 
Israel and Others70 highlighted “the confusion that can occur when lawyers indiscriminately use 
multiple contracts (some on standard forms) in the transfer of copyright interests without giving 
careful consideration to the consequences of their action.”71 On the other hand, Showalter highlights 
the difficulty that often arises in respect of proving damages in music rights cases, requiring the legal 
representative to have skills “in forensically investigating and quantifying claims”.72 In the same vein, 
there is a need to have a balanced number of judges that can expertly rule on disputes of this 
nature, as well as academics that can contribute to the building of a body of literature on this 
subject-matter. This therefore highlights the need to go to the basics: has the complex universe and 
full ambit of the legal construction of the concepts of “music” and “musical work” been properly 
unravelled?  
In summation therefore, this thesis seeks to address the research and knowledge gap arising from 
the lack of a comprehensive, analytical and systematic exposition of the rules and legal principles 
applicable to the copyright protection of musical works. This also entails explaining concepts and 
usages arising from practice that cannot be mastered by the bare reading of copyright legislation, 
including the proper delineation of the applicable rights and sub-rights. Thus for example, while 
copyright legislation simply refers to the reproduction right in musical works, it is not immediately 
obvious that this right is a complex, multi-pronged right with various segments or fragments (what 
the writer terms “sub-rights”), with their own idiosyncrasies applicable to particular sectors of the 
music reproduction market (e.g. print reproduction, mechanical reproduction, synchronisation etc.). 
This study seeks to highlight such nuanced connotations, in addition to providing a systematic 
exposition of the different components applicable to the copyright protection of musical works 
through a historical and contextual analysis. 
As pointed out above, the existence of a research and knowledge gap often leads to the lack of 
astuteness on the part of lawyers representing clients, and even on the part of judges, to respond 
adequately when confronted with the intricacies of music rights disputes. Du Plessis’ articles dealt 
with above highlight the situation with regard to legal counsel who may not be completely au fait with 
the nuances of music rights disputes; however, the effect of this can also be seen in some of the 
court rulings dealing with this subject-matter. The case of South African Music Performance Rights 
                                               
70
 732 F .2d 267 (2d Cir. 1984). 
71
 Ibid at para 1. 
72
 Showalter 2011 74 Tex. B.J. 210. Others have highlighted the important and unique role of lawyers in the music 
business. Passman All you need to know About the Music Busines, at 57, says of the role of lawyers that “[t]hey are very 
involved in structuring deals and shaping artists’ business lives.” Biederman et al Law of the Entertainment Industries 
seem to affirm this when they observe (at xi), “The role of law in the entertainment industries is often one of anticipation. … 
In fact, the analysis of law as applied to the entertainment industries is often one of assessing how incomplete and 
inadequate the anticipation has been. From that vantage point, the entertainment lawyer must assay the damage and 
construct a method of dealing with the inadequacies to obtain the best result in an imperfect system.” This important role of 
lawyers experienced in matters relating to the music business was also highlighted in the English decisions of Clifford 
Davis Management Ltd v WEA Records Ltd [1975] 1 All ER 237 (CA); O’Sullivan v Management Agency and Music Ltd 
[1985] 1 QB 428 (CA) and Silverstone Records v Mountfield, Zomba Music v Mountfield [1993] EMLR 152 and [1993] 
EMLR 171 (unreported judgment), where it was shown that the absence of independent legal advice resulted in inequality 
of bargaining power and rendered the agreements unenforceable.   
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Association (SAMPRA) v National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and Another,73 which was the 
first Copyright Tribunal referral to deal with the merits of a needle-time rights licensing dispute, is an 
example in this regard. In this case the Tribunal was called upon to make a determination as to the 
royalty that SAMPRA, the referrer, was eligible to charge NAB members for their broadcast of sound 
recordings belonging to record companies affiliated to the Recording Industry South Africa (RiSA), 
the sole member of SAMPRA at the time. 
 In the case the Commissioner of Copyright, constituting the Tribunal (Sapire AJ), took the view that 
“there are three copyright owners” in relation to recorded music, namely (i) “the composers of the 
music and the lyrics, who … SAMRO represented”, (ii) the manufacturers of the recordings and (iii) 
the performers.74 Based on this conclusion the Commissioner, noting that the rate that SAMRO 
charged broadcasters for their use of musical works (3.5%) was “the only operating guideline”, 
observed that while there was a need for some correlation, “the rate to be applied for the royalty 
payable to performers and record manufacturers need not be the same”.75 In this regard the 
Commissioner rejected the NAB’s contention that composers should get a greater royalty than 
record labels and performers. The Commissioner reasoned that the contention that composers 
contributed more to the popularity of a recording was “difficult to accept as a rule … [as the] 
popularity of a sound recording could in many cases, be attributable to the talents of the 
performer”.76  
Clearly based on this the Commissioner accepted, without questioning, SAMPRA’s contention that 
the rate payable for needle-time rights had to be “more than twice the amount paid to the 
composer”, as needle-time royalties had to reward both the record manufacturer and the 
performer”.77  Accordingly the Commissioner awarded SAMPRA a royalty rate of 7%, “representing 
in approximate terms, twice the rate applicable using the SAMRO formula”.78 The Commissioner’s 
ratio in this regard was clearly faulty.79 It is submitted that it is this (perceived) inability of certain 
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 Copyright Tribunal hearing, reference no: 00002(R); referred to above, n 46. The second respondent was the Southern 
African Music Rights Organisation (SAMRO). 
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 Id at 2 – 3. 
75
 Id at 13. 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid. 
78
 Id at 15. 
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 The ruling was successfully appealed in National Broadcasting Association v South African Music Performance Rights 
Association and Another [2014] 2 All SA 263 (SCA), where the Appeal Court approved a maximum rate of 3% (see para 
75), which Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-58 have, in turn, castigated as being “arrived at in a fairly 
arbitrary manner.” There are several reasons in the writer’s opinion that Sapire AJ’s decision in the Tribunal matter was 
faulty, which highlighted poor astuteness in dealing efficiently with music copyright matters as a result of the research and 
knowledge gap mentioned in this work: (a) Sapire AJ’s characterisation of the rights involved was faulty. As indicated 
Sapire AJ took the view that there are three “copyright owners” in respect of recorded music, namely “the composers of the 
music and lyrics”, “the manufacturers of the recordings” and “the performers”. This however is a poor characterisation of 
the matter. While it is true that different copyright works are embodied in recorded music, as elaborated upon further below 
(see paragraph 6 on Scope and Delimitation), it needs to be understood that recorded music is in essence, a “record”, as 
defined in the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, as amended (the Copyright Act or the Act), and refers to the material embodiment 
of a sound recording. The copyright embodied in recorded music is thus primarily copyright in the sound recording, which 
is generally owned by the record label either in terms of paragraph (c) of the definition of “author” in s 1(1) of the Copyright 
Act; or in terms of s 21(1)(c) of the Act. This observation is instructional also from the point of view that what the Tribunal 
was concerned with was the payment of royalties in relation to needle-time rights, i.e. in this case, the broadcast of sound 
recordings. 
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members of the judiciary to competently adjudicate matters relating to intellectual property rights that 
has led to the trend where many intellectual property contracts make provision for the referral of 
disputes to arbitration rather than to the courts. While this is a positive development in certain 
respects, on the flip side it has the potential of depriving the legal system of the development of a 
rich and reliable jurisprudence – something direly needed in the area of music copyright.  
2 Research Questions 
                                                                                                                                                              
(b) A better characterisation or delineation is to say that while recorded music entails the physical embodiment of a sound 
recording in a “record”, the sound recording itself embodies other copyright works, namely a musical work and often, a 
literary work (in the form of lyrics). Thus in the end, three distinct copyright works capable of being owned by three or more 
different persons, exist in recorded music. It is not that there are three copyright owners in recorded music, but that there 
are three copyright works or copyrights capable of being owned by three or more different persons. All three copyright 
works could be owned by one person, as in the case of the singer-composer-producer, who writes the lyrics of his songs, 
composes the music, and independently records the music, without the aid of a recording company.  Or they could be 
owned by more than three persons, as in the case of works that are co-authored or otherwise co-owned by more than one 
person.  
(c) In light of this, to say that the composer of the music and the lyrics is a copyright owner in respect of recorded music is 
a misleading statement and a poor delineation of the rights involved. The composer of the musical works has no interest in 
the copyright in a sound recording, unless he or she also meets the requirements of author of the sound recording in terms 
of s 1(1) of the Act, or owns the copyright in terms of s 21(1)(c) of the Act.  Furthermore, as indicated, the copyright in a 
musical work (“music”) is separate from the copyright in the lyrics, so the owner thereof is not necessarily one person. 
(d) It was clearly incorrect to say that performers are copyright owners in respect of recorded music. Again, unless the 
performers also met the requirements of author of a sound recording in terms of s 1(1) or owner of a sound recording in 
terms of s 21(1)(c) of the Copyright Act, it is common cause that performers have no copyright interest in recorded music, 
and only receive protection as performers under the Performers Protection Act 11 of 1967, as amended (the Performers’ 
Protection Act), which is a neighbouring or related rights legislation. 
(e) The reference to “record manufacturers” as being one of the three owners of copyright in recorded music is itself 
problematic. Record manufacturers are not necessarily copyright owners in sound recordings. For example, s 14 of the 
Copyright Act refers to a manufacturer of records, but it is clear that this is not a reference to the owner of copyright in 
sound recordings. It is rather a reference to a person who manufactures records of a musical work or an adaptation 
thereof, where records of the work had previously been made for commercial retail. Moreover, in practice owners of 
copyright in sound recordings do not necessarily manufacture the records of such sound recordings themselves. 
Traditionally manufacturing plants such as Compact Disc Technologies (CDT) would manufacture records on behalf of 
record labels. The record labels would then distribute the records to the market (e.g. to music retail stores), or engage 
record distribution companies to do so. It is to be noted that CDT has since been taken over by CTP Digital Services, for 
which see http://ctpds.co.za/about/ (date of use: 04 July 2019).   
(f) Further to the above, the judge clearly displayed a poor understanding of the functioning of collecting societies (or as 
they are also popularly known, collective management organisations or CMOs). An astute awareness of the collective 
management system, which has been a part of the copyright system for over two hundred years, and in particular an 
understanding of the functioning of performing rights societies, the most well-known and established collecting societies, 
would have assisted the judge not to easily accept the submission by SAMPRA that SAMPRA should be given double the 
rate used by SAMRO, because while SAMPRA had to pay royalties to both record companies and performers, SAMRO 
only had to pay royalties to composers. With such knowledge the judge would have known that performing rights societies 
generally administer copyright on behalf of both composers and publishers of musical works. However, even without such 
intricate knowledge of the functioning of performing rights societies the judge should have, based purely on the provisions 
of the Copyright Act (and also in light of the contention that record labels had to share their royalty with performers), 
probed whether the composers would not be sharing their royalties with other entities – especially since the Act makes 
provision for the assignment of copyright or granting of licences.  
(g) Lastly, it is submitted that the honourable judge should have been prompted to interrogate SAMPRA’s submissions 
purely on the basis that SAMPRA was, at the time, only accredited to represent the rights of owners of copyright in sound 
recordings (i.e. record labels), in terms of reg 3(1)(a) of the Needle-time Regulations (see supra n 42). It was only later that 
SAMPRA was reconstituted to represent both owners of copyright in sound recordings and performers, in terms of reg 
3(1)(c) of the Needle-time Regulations. Seeing that the court papers clearly identified SAMPRA as being accredited in 
terms of reg 3(1)(a) the judge should have probed the basis of SAMPRA’s contention that the royalty it was to received 
would be shared with performers, especially since reg 3(1)(b) makes provision for a collecting society that represents 
performers. At least the judge should have probed if the latter collecting society was in existence, and it would have 
become apparent that SAMRO, the second respondent, was at the time accredited to represent performers in terms of reg 
3(1)(b), which it did through the a trust termed Performers Organisation of South Africa (POSA) Trust. Importantly, it is 
noted that s 5(4)(a) of the Performers Protection Act, which SAMPRA seems to have relied upon, provides that a 
performer who has authorised the fixation of his performance is, “in the absence of any agreement to the contrary”, 
deemed to have given the record label that made the fixation the exclusive right to receive needle-time royalties on his 
behalf (provided that the record label shares such royalties with the performer). However, the Tribunal should not have 
easily accepted SAMPRA’s contention that the royalty it sought would be shared with performers, without first determining 
if and to what extent there were any “agreement[s] to the contrary”.  
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Based on the foregoing, the crisp research question to be answered in this work is: What are the 
essential elements that constitute the protection accorded to musical works under South African 
copyright law? What are the historical roots to this protection, and what is the context within which 
such protection is given today? What are the trends in this regard and does current copyright reform 
provide assurance regarding the ongoing protection of musical works and the sustainability of the 
music industry at large? 
3 Aims of the Study  
3.1 The main objective of this research is to provide a systematic, analytical and contextual 
exposition of the law relating to the protection of musical works in South Africa, highlighting all 
pertinent and conceivable issues that those seeking to understand this area of law are likely to be 
confronted with, whether such issues arise from the law or from practice. In this regard legal 
research is concerned with an enquiry into particular legal rules and principles in order to add new 
knowledge or to bring about advancement in the science of law. However it needs to be noted that 
“systematic fact-finding”, or finding and ascertaining the law on a particular subject-matter, where 
this is obscure, is an integral part of legal research.80 This research undertakes to realise both 
objectives. 
3.2 In relation to the foregoing the study aims to develop a thorough, critical analysis of the 
applicable rules and principles in order to fill the gap that exists in the research literature and the 
case-law jurisprudence. It is the writer’s conviction that this gap arises from the fact that not enough 
attention has been given to elaborate on the application of the provisions and principles of copyright 
law to the protection of musical works. This is as a result of an apparent lack of interest in the 
subject-matter, which itself would be as a result of the fact that not much is known about the field; 
but secondly it is because the courts have not been presented with many opportunities yet to 
adjudicate on matters relating to the subject-matter, although there is a growing positive trend in this 
regard. The writer is of the view that a historical and contextual analysis will assist greatly in filling 
this gap. It needs to be acknowledged in this regard that the South African Copyright Act is (as are 
many copyright legislations generally), a general piece of legislation granting copyright protection to 
a number of works (e.g. musical works, literary works, cinematograph films, computer programs), 
whose exploitation has given rise to large-scale industries. In their application in those various 
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 Jain expresses this point more pointedly when he writes: “… In a strict sense legal research is understood as limited to 
those works which contribute to the advancement of legal science (that is excluding such materials as text-books and case 
books, etc.). This is a too narrow a view of research and we need not adopt such a restricted definition of legal research. 
… [T]he fact-finding is not so easy as it may seem. First, a researcher has to go into the different statutory provisions and 
the rules made thereunder. Secondly, he may have to examine the mass of case-law which may have accumulated on the 
point in issue, and it is not an easy matter to derive a clear-cut legal proposition from the tangled mass of case-law.” Jain 
1972 J.I.L.I. 490. Emphasis added. Vibhute and Aynalem 30 – 31 add to this in the following manner: “… [A] systematic 
effort is required to ascertain or find law on a given subject / topic. … It is a matter of common experience that … 
legislative instruments are scattered and not easily traceable. … A plethora of judicial pronouncements of different higher 
judicial institutions including of the apex court adds to the difficulty in the ascertainment of law. … Finding law on a 
particular topic or subject thus, is not a simple task, as it seems to be. It involves intensive analysis of legal instruments 
and judicial pronouncements. …” Emphasis added. Vibhute and Aynalem 2009 
https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/legal-research-methods.pdf (date of use: 05 July 2019). 
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industries, the rights afforded by copyright are often subject to fragmentation, which itself has led to 
the segmentation of the relevant markets (see Chapter 8 below).  
The music industry is an example of an industry which is driven by the exploitation of copyright 
works (i.e. musical works, literary works, in the form of lyrics, and sound recordings, with our interest 
being in the first two). Perhaps the phenomenon of copyright fragmentation and segmentation is 
more prevalent in the music industry. This has given rise to primary and secondary markets of 
exploitation, especially in respect of the reproduction right and the performing right, as highlighted in 
Chapters 2, 3 and 6. Copyright legislation is concerned with setting out the general principles of the 
the idiosyncrasies of the different segments and fragmented markets of the different copyright 
industries. It is thus left to the courts to fill the missing gaps and to interpret the law with specific 
regard to these industries. As indicated above, the South African jurisprudence in this regard is still 
developing and gaps still remain with regard to the clear understanding of the subject-matter. Part 2 
of this Study seeks to provide a contextual analysis of the subject-matter, to assist in this regard. 
3.3 The study also aims to contribute to the reform process in relation to copyright law, by providing 
various recommendations in this regard. During the process of writing the thesis a very important 
development with regard to the reform of South Africa’s copyright legislation took place, in the form 
of the publication of proposed amendments to the Copyright Act.81 The first version of the Bill was 
published in the government gazette on 27 July 2015, with an invitation for comments from the 
public.82 Several other versions of the Bill have since been published, culminating in the version 
passed by the National Assembly on 05 December 2018 and approved without changes by the 
National Council of Provinces on 28 March 2019.83 This approval by the two houses of Parliament 
was despite intense lobbying against the Bill’s approval. The Bill currently awaits signature by the 
President in order to come into force.  
The Bill has proven to be extremely controversial and has polarised views between those who have 
passionately hailed it as a welcome development and those who, with equal passion, perceive it as 
constituting a threat to the interests of rights-holders.84 The writer has seen the need to comment on 
the Bill also, and to analyse the impact that it is likely to have on the development of music copyright 
in South Africa if it comes into law in its current form. Such analysis is evident in different parts of the 
thesis but more particularly in Chapters 7, 8 and 9. In Chapter 9 the writer provides some in-depth 
critical analysis of various provisions of the Bill that have a bearing on the protection of musical 
works and proposes recommendations for improvement.   
3.4 Lastly, the writer hopes that the afore-mentioned undertaking will result in a useful reference 
work where the critical aspects of the law relating to the protection of musical works  - addressing all 
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 Parallel developments with regard to the amendment of the Performers’ Protection Act have also taken place, but this 
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 See http://www.thedti.gov.za/gazzettes/Copyright_Amendment_Bill.pdf (date of use: 05 July 2019). 
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 Version B13B-2017, available at https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 04 July 2019). 
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conceivable issues attendant thereto – can be found in one place for easy access by lawyers, 
judges, law students, artist representatives and other music industry practitioners whenever the 
need arise. The writer also hopes that the work shall provide resource material from which 
academics and other researchers can further develop this and related areas of law. 
4 Points of Departure, Hypotheses and Assumptions 
4.1 Points of Departure 
4.1.1 There is a need for an important developing nation such as South Africa, to have a developed 
exposition of the law relating to music rights, in view of the rapid growth of the South African music 
industry, the proliferation of participants in this industry and the growing contribution of this industry 
to the GDP. 
4.1.2 There is a need for South Africa to “get the ball rolling” with regard to developing a 
jurisprudence on entertainment law in general and music rights law in particular, which other related 
African jurisdictions can draw from. At a time when there is an emphasis on the harmonisation of 
laws in Africa,85 it is incumbent upon South Africa as one of the leading economies in Africa and as 
the country with the most-developed form of the music industry, to provide a lead by developing a 
veritable jurisprudence that others can draw from, particularly in relation to those African jurisdictions 
whose intellectual property laws are, like South Africa, traditionally derived from British law. 
4.1.3 While it is possible to find scattered references to the law relating to music rights and some 
focussed references in selected cases,86 there is currently no comprehensive, systematic exposition 
of the subject-matter dealing with the nature, history and contextual application of the law in South 
Africa. 
4.2 Hypotheses 
4.2.1 It is possible to make a thorough, systematic exposition of the law relating to the protection of 
musical works in South Africa. 
4.2.2 In this regard although there is limited literature in this area of law, there is however, an 
adequate (albeit not exhaustive) body of case law and statutory enactments to build from, bolstered 
by a comparison of laws applicable in specific foreign jurisdictions. Such regard to foreign law would 
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 For a discussion of the various initiatives made at harmonising African laws see Ferreira-Synman and Ferreira 2010 73 
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be consistent with the Constitution, which provides that foreign law may be used when interpreting 
the Bill of Rights.87   
4.3 Assumptions 
4.3.1 Although considered to be an arcane subject, the law of copyright (and related rights) is 
increasingly becoming an established area of study in South Africa alongside the broader field of 
intellectual property law, eliciting growing academic interest, with a growing body of scholarship in 
relation thereto.88 
4.3.2 What is still lacking is the development of specialised branches of law deriving from the main 
area of copyright and related rights, e.g. a focus on the law relating to literary publishing, the law 
relating to the protection of music rights, the law relating to the protection of films and television 
programmes and the law relating to the protection of theatrical and other performances – in short, 
the law relating to copyright and related rights in the entertainment industries or what could be 
broadly termed “Entertainment Law”.89 
4.3.3 Such an exposition of law, in particular with regard to the protection of music rights, is 
possible.  
5 Significance of the Study 
This study is extremely significant in that: 
5.1 There is at present, to the writer’s knowledge, no formal, single, comprehensive study on or 
exposition of the subject-matter, which those having an interest in the subject-matter, or simply 
wishing to review it can refer to; 
5.2 There is a need for such a reference work, in view of the fact that the music industry is 
experiencing rapid growth and disputes relating to music rights are likely to escalate; 
                                               
87
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5.3 Pursuant to Du Plessis’ arguments dealt with above,90 it is important to have a comprehensive 
study of the subject-matter to ensure that there is clarity regarding the various obscure layers and 
areas intrinsic to this subject-matter, to ensure that counsel representing clients in this area of law 
can do so with an adequate sense of confidence. In the same breath, judges who had no prior 
exposure to this area of law can have a good reference work from which to analyse the facts before 
them; and 
5.4 A study of this nature is academically justified. Such a study is likely to spark interest in the 
subject-matter and encourage further studies in this and related areas of law. This will lead to a 
growing body of literature in this area of law as well as provide law students with more options 
regarding their choices of a law career. 
6 Scope and Delimitation 
6.1 The aim of this study is to provide a comprehensive analysis of the principles relating to the 
protection of musical works. In this regard it needs to be noted that the work does not attempt to 
deal broadly with the subject of Music Rights; nor is it an attempt at discussing the broader subject 
of Music Law or for that matter, Entertainment Law. It is submitted that albeit at times subtle, a 
distinction can be drawn between these various concepts. 
6.2 The expression “Music Rights” (or Music Rights Law) needs to be understood from the point of 
view of the concept of “bundle of rights” which is used in relation to copyright. This concept links the 
various rights associated with the exclusive acts relating to the exploitation of copyright in a work, 
back to the work in which the copyright subsists. Although the various rights can be exploited 
separately or even owned by different persons, they are however, linked to one work in which 
copyright subsists and are in fact, fragments of the copyright subsisting in such a work. A similar 
position would apply when dealing with the bundle of rights in respect of related rights (i.e. rights 
which, though they are not copyright “rights”, are analogous to copyright, e.g. rights in respect of the 
performance of a musical work). In dealing with this concept Dean and Karjiker91 have observed: 
Copyright in respect of any particular work comprises in effect a monopolistic right to a number of 
different acts. The sum total of all these rights constitutes a whole copyright. … The copyright in each 
category of works in fact consists of a ‘bundle’ of rights. 
6.3 Thus strictly speaking, when reference to “Music Rights” or “Music Rights Law” is made, it is in 
fact a reference to the bundle of rights that are associated with the copyright and related rights 
applicable in respect of music. This expression, “copyright and related rights applicable in respect of 
music” needs to be well understood. First, it makes it explicit that when referring to the term “music” 
(as understood popularly to refer to recorded music) we are in fact dealing with both copyright and 
related rights. Secondly, it then needs to be understood that more than one category of copyright 
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works are involved in recorded music, namely, copyright in the musical work, copyright in the sound 
recording of the musical work and often, copyright in the lyrics forming part of the musical work.92 
Thirdly, the term “music” as dealt with here is not only concerned with copyright works but also with 
related rights in the form of a recorded performance of the musical work. In this sense therefore the 
term “music” as understood popularly refers to “the sound recording of the performance of a musical 
work.” In this regard the expression Music Rights or Music Rights Law falls squarely within the 
domain of copyright (and related rights) law, albeit what could be termed applied copyright and 
related rights law. The principles that are applicable and that therefore need to be considered are 
those applicable to copyright and related rights.  
6.4 While it is accepted that the exploitation of copyright and related rights often involves the use of 
contractual arrangements,93 it must however be noted that the subject of “Music Rights” or “Music 
Rights Law” is in fact, limited to a discussion of the principles applicable to copyright and related 
rights law. It is left to the broader field of “Music Law” and the even broader rubric of “Entertainment 
Law” to deal with other areas of law. When employing the terms “Music Law” or “Entertainment 
Law”’ the implication is that one is dealing with something more than just an exposition of principles 
of copyright and related rights. Under such circumstances regard has to be had to other principles of 
law applicable to the music and entertainment businesses, thus including copyright, related rights, 
principles of contract law, etc. Thus in defining “Entertainment Law”’ Grealy et al have observed 
succinctly that “at its most general level [entertainment law] concerns those legal principles which 
govern activities within the entertainment industry”.94 
6.5 Entertainment Law is the broader rubric and Music Law is a component of Entertainment Law. 
As with Entertainment Law, it can be said that Music Law is that branch of the law that is concerned 
with those legal principles which govern activities within the music industry. These legal principles 
relate to many varied areas of law, and as Grealy et al have noted, because the industry is in a 
constant state of development “‘the legal principles which apply in existing areas of our law will, in 
the absence of legislation, need to be visited with a view to their application within the emerging 
entertainment context.”95 
6.6 Having highlighted the foregoing, it then needs to be noted that the present work is only limited 
to a consideration of musical works (and by implication, literary works in the form of lyrics). This 
therefore is the scope and delimitation of the work. The work thus deals with the subject of Music 
Rights Law only in a limited sense (i.e. limited to a consideration of copyright in a musical work and 
copyright in a literary work). It does not at all deal with the broader subjects of Music Law or 
Entertainment Law, as a comprehensive consideration of these subjects would extend the scope of 
the work far beyond any manageable bounds. Having indicated this, it needs to be noted that in 
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certain instances, where the context requires, limited references to or discussion of the position 
applicable in respect of sound recordings and / or performers’ rights will be made.   
7 Research Methodology  
7.1 Introduction 
To understand the research methodology used in this thesis a brief outline of the approach used in 
legal research methodology would be useful. Although some have charged that debates regarding 
the theory or philosophy of law (i.e. jurisprudence) could be seen as “theorists talking past one 
another”,96 the general, succinct description of research methodology as “a way to systematically 
solve the research problem”97 is equally true for legal research. A research methodology entails the 
use of certain methods and / or types and elements of research in conducting particular research, as 
well as providing the justification for doing so.98 The study of legal doctrine (or rather doctrinal 
research or methodology, also termed “black-letter law” and “research in law”), has been the 
mainstay of traditional legal scholarship – its “fodder”, as some have called it.99 The prominence of 
the study of legal doctrine as a focus area in legal research methodology is evident from the fact that 
legal research methodologies are described simply as either doctrinal or non-doctrinal.100 Thus the 
way to systematically solve or resolve legal research problems is either through the use of doctrinal 
or non-doctrinal methods (or, as the writer will submit, a combination of these methods).  
Doctrinal legal research is concerned with the research of legal doctrines through the analysis of 
statutory provisions and case law by the application of the power of legal reasoning; in this regard 
the focus is largely upon the law itself “as an internal self-sustaining set of principles which can be 
accessed … with little or no reference to the world outside of the law.”101 It has been said that legal 
doctrine is a mainly hermeneutic (i.e. interpretational) discipline also entailing empirical, 
argumentative, logical and normative elements.102 Jain has argued that it is the normative character 
of law and the need for stability and certainty in this regard that makes doctrinal research of primary 
concern to a legal researcher.103  
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Non-doctrinal legal research on the other hand falls within the broader domain of “law-in-context” (or 
what Westerman categorises within the rubric of “legal science” generally); a legal tradition which is 
said to have emerged in the late 1960s, where the starting point is not law but problems in 
society.104 This tradition uses concepts, categories and criteria “that are not primarily borrowed from 
the legal system”, so that while the law may provide a solution or part of the solution, “other non-law 
solutions, including political and social-rearrangement, are not precluded and may indeed be 
preferred.”105 It entails the idea of “contextualism” and a move away from being overly concerned 
with doctrinal classification; instead understanding phenomena from the context of the case in 
question.106 This causes facts and rules “to fuse into one” towards the balancing of interests – 
“rather than applying law on the basis of legal positions”. The disciplines used in non-doctrinal legal 
research may include historical studies, sociological research, philosophy, political theory and 
economy.107  
In a report on the state of legal education and research in Canada Arthurs proposes a taxonomy of 
legal research methodologies that not only delineates between doctrinal methodology (“research in 
law”) and interdisciplinary methodology (“research about law”), but further delineates between 
aspects of those methodologies that relate to what he terms pure research and those relating to 
applied research.108 In this regard Arthurs identifies legal theory research (i.e. jurisprudence, legal 
philosophy etc.) as constituting the pure doctrinal methodology, while what he terms “expository 
research” (i.e. research on conventional treaties and “black letter law”) amounts to applied doctrinal 
methodology.109 On the other hand, the pure interdisciplinary methodology is characterised by what 
Arthurs terms “fundamental research”, which comprises such fields as sociology of law, critical legal 
studies, law and economics etc.110 This is to be contrasted with the applied interdisciplinary 
methodology, which relates to law reform research, i.e. socio-legal research or “law in context”.111  
Some of the research methods used to determine the research methodology of a particular research 
include the following contrasted elements:  (a) Whether the research is descriptive or analytical; (b) 
whether the research is applied or fundamental; (c) whether the research is quantitative or 
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quantitative; or (d) whether the research is conceptual or empirical.112 These methods are then used 
as appropriate within certain research paradigms or models, e.g. the evolutive and evaluative 
models; the identificatory and impact models; the projective and predictive models; the collative 
model; the historical model; and the comparative model.113  
7.2 The Research Methodology used in this Thesis 
Having provided the afore-mentioned background it becomes important to map out the methodology 
used in this research. At the outset the writer wishes to note that a doctrinal methodology is an 
integral part of this thesis. This is more evident in parts of Chapter 3, in Chapter 4 and in Chapter 7. 
However, it is clear in reading the thesis that the doctrinal methodology is not the only methodology 
used in the work. There is a clear leaning towards the realm of the interdisciplinary methodology in 
the “applied” sense, as postulated by Arthurs, i.e. through the use of the socio-legal or “law in 
context” approach.114 This is evident throughout the thesis, but more particularly in this introductory 
Chapter, in parts of Chapter 4, in Chapter 5, in Chapter 6 and in Chapter 8. This was to be expected 
since this study proposes a contextual approach. 
However this research does not delve into the fundamental aspects of the interdisciplinary 
methodology, within the mould of the “sociology of law” discipline,115 nor does it, in its use of aspects 
of interdisciplinary methodology, veer away completely from the doctrinal methodology. It does not, 
in particular, “embrace the epistemologies and methodologies of the social sciences.”116 Thus no 
surveys, questionnaires, interviews or other forms of obtaining quantitative data were used in this 
research. It is more a situation where “a doctrinal researcher” gets his social policy, social facts and 
social values from “his own experience, observation, reflection and study of what others have done 
before him in a similar or same kind of situation”, as Jain has postulated.117 It is an 
acknowledgement that “[i]n practice, even doctrinal analysis usually makes at least some reference 
to other, external, factors”, such as when “an uncertain or ambiguous legal ruling can often be more 
easily interpreted when viewed in its proper historical or social context, or when the interpreter has 
an adequate understanding of the industry … to which it relates.”118   
This is exactly the position with regard to the current research. It is research steeped in the doctrinal 
tradition, where the writer is nevertheless persuaded that the subject-matter can best be understood 
through the occasional reliance on socio-legal analysis and the use of a historical and contextual 
approach. Indeed it can be confirmed that the writer has an adequate understanding of the music 
industry, having in the past worked within the music industry where he occupied a senior 
                                               
112
 See in this regard Kothari Research Methodology 2 – 4; Vibhute and Aynalem 2009 
https://chilot.files.wordpress.com/2011/06/legal-research-methods.pdf at 16 – 17 (date of use: 05 July 2019). 
113
 For an elaboration on these models please see Vibhute and Aynalem id at 102 – 108. 
114
 Arthurs Law and Learning 63 – 71. 
115
 See Arthurs ibid. 
116
 Chynoweth P, “Legal Research”, in Knight and Ruddock (eds) Advanced Research Methods 31. 
117
 Jain 1982 J.I.L.I 350 – 351. 
118
 See Chynoweth P, “Legal Research”, in Knight and Ruddock (eds) Advanced Research Methods 30. 
24 
 
management position; and having been consulted to advise on matters relating to music copyright 
and copyright law reform.119 The writer draws on this experience while also bringing in the 
perspective of practices in other jurisdictions and also highlighting the impact of historical 
developments, while ensuring a continued adherence to the doctrinal methodology.   
In light of the above the research methods used in this thesis are clearly descriptive, in the sense of 
highlighting “what has happened or what is happening”,120 a method “exemplified in a wide range of 
disciplines, such as empirical and socio-legal research, legal history and much writing in textbooks 
and case commentaries.”121 It is however, also avowedly analytical, as it is concerned with a probe 
into the causes of the phenomena in question, using and analysing existing information to critically 
evaluate the subject-matter.122 While maintaining its doctrinal foundation, the study also constitutes 
applied, contextual research in the sense used by Arthurs but particularly because it is concerned 
with finding solutions for problems facing society and thus depicts a practical context.123 The study is 
thus in this regard, not concerned with fundamental theoretical questions of law. As a doctrinal study 
it is concerned with expository, black law research rather than being a jurisprudential treatise.124  
As indicated above, the research is concerned with qualitative rather than quantitative analysis, i.e. it 
is concerned with probing the reasons or motivations for particular phenomena, e.g. the probe as to 
why the performing right was not fully exploited in Britain prior to the enactment of the Statute of 
Anne (see Chapter 2 infra).125 Moreover, the fact that the study is not concerned with fundamental 
theoretical research does not mean that it is not concerned with a conceptual enquiry. It has been 
observed that legal issues are considered within a particular conceptual framework of legal doctrinal 
research, which itself gives rise to the very categories, concepts and forms of the legal subject-
matter or area of law being researched.126 Keeping within the conceptual framework wards against 
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delving too deep into the empirical realm of the sociology of law, where the analysis is no longer an 
inward-looking “research in law” but rather an outward-looking “research about law”.127 
Another method that runs like a thread throughout the thesis and in fact marks the thesis’s foray into 
the law-in-context methodology, is the explanatory method. This is because there is a view that 
because legal doctrine is normative, its systematisation cannot be explanatory but is rather 
justificatory.128 Where therefore the explanatory method is used this would be seen as something 
beyond or outside doctrinal methodology. The explanatory discipline used here is one which uses 
legal doctrine to provide a historical, sociological, psychological, economical and similar explanation, 
or even “internal logic” to “explain[ ] why a rule is a valid legal rule in a given society”.129 At some 
level the explanatory method is seen as being “the aim of legal sociology than of legal doctrine.”130 
Reference was made above to the different models used in legal research methodology. Of these 
models it is the evolutive method, the predictive method and more importantly the historical method 
that are relevant for this work. Vibhute and Aynalem describe the evolutive method as one used 
“when a researcher endeavors to find out how a legal fact, rule, concept, an institution or the legal 
system itself [including the development of a given law] come [sic] to be what it is today.”131 In this 
regard it is submitted that this model could clearly be subsumed within the historical paradigm. This 
model has been used in this thesis for example when the analysis of the evolution  of the performing 
right is dealt with in Chapter 2 below, as well as the discussion with regard to historical development 
of the institution of “collecting society” in Chapters 2 and 7 below. Regarding the predictive model, 
Vibhute and Aynalem observe that this is used when the researcher anticipates or highlights the 
possible misuse of a proposed law or legal measure as a way of influencing legislative changes.132 
This has been done in this research when highlighting the possible negative effects of the Copyright 
Amendment Bill 2017, currently awaiting the President’s signature, if it is passed into law in its 
current state (see in this regard in particular Chapter 6, Chapter 8 and Chapter 9).133   
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The main thrust of this work is that it is a historical and contextual analysis of the protection of 
copyright in musical works. In this regard it needs to be noted that although many doctoral studies 
employ a comparative model, such a model does not form the main thrust of this work. As indicated, 
comparative analysis is a component of the descriptive method.134  Seeing that this work uses the 
descriptive method also, it goes without saying that comparative analysis would also be used. In this 
regard the observations of Zweigert and Kӧtz are apt: 
… [A]ll legal history involves a comparative element: the legal historian … is bound to make 
comparisons, consciously if he is alert, unconsciously if he is not. … Legal history and comparative 
law are much of a muchness; views may differ on which of these twin sisters is the more comely, but 
there is no doubt that the legal historian must often use the comparative method and that if the 
comparatist is to make sense of the rules and the problems they are intended to solve he must often 
investigate their history. …
135
 
In light of this, comparative analysis is evident throughout the work in all chapters, with some 
chapters displaying a more focussed attention to such an approach (e.g. Chapters 7 and 8). The 
main thrust of this work however is a historical and contextual analysis making use of the above-
mentioned methods and also employing the evolutive and predictive methods where appropriate. 
The aim it to place the protection of musical works within a historical and contextual context and to 
paint a coherent picture in this regard. Part 1 of the study is mainly concerned with a historical 
analysis, while Part 2 is mainly concerned with a contextual analysis, although contextual analysis 
and the explanatory method can be detected throughout the thesis. This however, remains steeped 
and finds is rootedness in the doctrinal methodology. 
It would seem that a historical and contextual approach, rather than a simply comparative approach, 
is one that the courts themselves have preference for.136 In this regard Chaskalson P observed in 
the Constitutional Court ruling of S v Makwanyane:137  
In dealing with comparative law, we must bear in mind that we are required to construe the South 
African Constitution, and not an international instrument or the constitution of some foreign country, 
and that this has to be done with due regard to our legal system, our history and circumstances, and 
the structure and language of our own Constitution. We can derive assistance from public 
international law and foreign case law, but we are in no way bound to follow it. 
 
In the same vein, when considering the question as to what constituted fair dealing in the case of 
Moneyweb v Media24138 Berger J observed: 
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most appropriately be solved under the given social and economic circumstances.” Id at 11. 
136
 I.e. it would seem that, regardless of a comparative methodology, a historical and contextual approach is imperative. 
137
 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC), at para 39. See also paras 34 and 35 in this regard. Emphasis added.  
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… Both sides referred me to decisions and writings from several foreign jurisdictions on the meaning 
of the phrase “fair dealing”. I understand that foreign authorities are referred to for guidance only. I 
also accept that I must be cautious in considering foreign law because its jurisdiction has its own 
particular history and, in many cases, is bound or influenced by domestic statutory precepts. I 
therefore I intend, for historical reasons, to focus on English authority.
139
 
As a final observation under this section the writer wishes to highlight the following technical 
information with regard to the thesis: 
1. When referring to himself throughout the thesis the writer uses the word “writer”, but uses the 
word “author” or “authors” when referring to the author or authors of a material being 
considered;  
2. Where a word, phrase or other construction is italicised within quoted text, the writer has 
chosen not to use the phrase “italics in original text” but to leave the situation as is. However, 
where the writer has himself italicised a word, phrase or other construction from any quoted 
text, the writer indicates this through the use of the words, “Emphasis mine”; and 
3. Where quoted text contains a footnote, the writer has chosen to remove the footnote from 
the quoted text, to prevent confusion. 
8 Framework of the Study 
PART 1 – THE HISTORICAL DEVELOPMENT OF COPYRIGHT IN MUSICAL WORKS 
Chapter 1 – Introduction  
This section provides the rationale for the study, including the statement of the problem. 
Chapter 2 – The Historical Development of Music Copyright Up to the Early 1900’s  
This section seeks to trace the historical development of music rights protection and the progressive 
recognition of the different sets and bundles of rights that are today acknowledged as constituting 
music rights. The Chapter is of particular relevance to South Africa as it traces the historical 
development of the copyright system in the United Kingdom. This system of copyright was 
applicable to South Africa during the colonial rule, and forms the basis of modern South African 
copyright law. 
Chapter 3 – The Further Development of Music Copyright: The Role of Technological 
Developments and the Imperial Copyright Act 
This section seeks to analyse the further development of music copyright especially in relation to the 
development of the reproduction right in response to technological developments; and further seeks 
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 Moneyweb (Pty) Limited v Media 24 Limited and Another [2016] ZAGPJHC 81. 
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 Id at para 103. Emphasis added. 
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to analyse the role of the British Imperial Copyright Act with regard to the modern-day construction 
of the concept of “musical work” and the reframing of the performing right from its understanding in 
English law prior to this. Modern South African copyright law has its foundation in these 
developments.  
Chapter 4 – The Historical Development of Music Copyright in South Africa 
This section traces the historical development of music copyright law in South Africa from the 
colonial period to the enactment of the Act of 1916. It highlights the colonial laws applicable to South 
Africa prior to the 1916 Act, and also considers the laws of the different republics prior to the 
establishment of the Union of South Africa.  
PART 2 – THE MODERN PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHT IN MUSICAL WORKS 
Chapter 5 – General Principles of Copyright Protection with a Focus on Music 
Copyright Protection 
This section seeks to analyse certain general principles relating to copyright protection, applying 
them to the protection of copyright in musical works. 
Chapter 6 – The Nature and Functioning of Collecting Societies: A Contextual 
Analysis 
Collective Management of Copyright plays a pivotal role in the protection of copyright in musical 
works and this section seeks to highlight this, with a focus on contemporary application. 
Chapter 7 – The Protection of Musical Works under the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 
This section probably represents the main thrust of this work, as it seeks to provide an exposition of 
current copyright law with regard to the protection of musical works, while also considering the 
possible effect of the Copyright Amendment Bill currently before Parliament.  
Chapter 8 – Digital Technology and Music Copyright’s Continuing Struggle for 
Survival  
This section seeks to highlight the continuing tussle between copyright protection and technological 
developments in the modern, digital era, and how copyright law has responded and is responding to 
these challenges.  
Chapter 9 – Conclusion 
Chapter 12 is a recap of the matters raised in the thesis with the proposal of recommendations, 
especially in light of developments arising from the Copyright Amendment Bill. 
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Chapter 2: The Historical Development of Music Copyright up to 
the Early 1900’s  
“We are concerned with the law of to-day, not with the law of the Middle Ages. The only reason for 
going back into the past is to come forward to the present, to help us to see more clearly the shape 
of the law to-day by seeing how it took place.”1 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Windeyer J in Attorney-General (Vict) v Commonwealth (1962) 107 CLR 529, at 595. 
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2.1 Introduction 
Music, it would seem, is as old as mankind itself. From the pre-diluvian era, where we are told of 
one Jubal, who was “the father of all such as handle the harp and organ”,2 and throughout the 
centuries, music has always invoked deep feelings and emotions amongst all. In this regard music 
has clearly been the most non-discriminatory force of all. It has provided the necessary ambience for 
occasions of celebration, mourning and ceremony alike. Furthermore, its appeal has been 
experienced equally by all: whether those living in opulent royal courts, those in the remotest 
primitive villages, the privileged and the impoverished alike - with no distinction between male or 
female. 
The legal protection of music is however not as old.3 This notwithstanding, it is noteworthy that the 
earliest form of copyright protection is associated with music or a form thereof - as also is the 
bloodiest copyright battle ever fought - literally. The story is told4 of how, in the 560s AD, St. 
Columba, having borrowed Abbot Fennian’s prized Psalter,5 sat up all night to furtively copy the 
Psalter. Upon discovery of this, an infuriated Fennian demanded that St. Columba deliver to him the 
pirated copy, a plea which St. Columba was not disposed to accede to. Abbot Fennian then 
appealed to King Dermont (or Diarmed), who ruled in favour of the Abbot, declaring, “La gache boin 
a boinin”.6 Not willing to accept the outcome, and armed with the Psalter copy as a talisman, St. 
Columba summoned men to fight against the king in the pitched Battle of Cúl Dreimhne, where 
thousands of the king’s men were killed.7 This deadly battle makes the later infamous courtroom 
copyright battles, including the well-referenced Battle of the Booksellers8 - “[a] warfare … costly, 
prodigious, and protracted”9 – fade in comparison. 
                                               
2
 Genesis 4: 21, King James Bible. 
3
 It has been noted that Roman law recognised three types of rights, namely real rights, personal rights and personality 
rights, but did not recognise intellectual property rights. Writings and letters were treated like plants and things sown. 
Writing acceded to the owner of the paper on which it was written, and painting acceded to the material on which it was 
laid with no protection for copying, although at times some recognition was given “of the value of the labour that went into 
the writing or the painting”. Ramsden  Guide to Intellectual Property Law at 1 and 3. To this Dean Application of the 
Copyright Act 209 adds: ‘Although even in the days of the Roman Empire reproduction of books took place … no 
economic interest in such reproduction existed. Copies were made to order and “publishers” were not required to make 
any financial outlay or investment in advance which needed to be protected. … It was not until the discovery of the printing 
press that there was any impetus to provide any form of protection to publishers. …’ 
4
 See Birrell Law and History of Copyright 41 – 42; McFarlane Performing Right 15 -16. 
5
 A Psalter is defined as “a collection of Psalms for liturgical or devotional purposes” http://www.merriam-
webster.com/dictionary/psalter (date of use: 24 September 2013). In the Biblical text, many of the psalms are set to music. 
6
 Meaning “To every cow her calf”, and accordingly, “to every book its copy”. See Birrell Law and History of Copyright 42. 
See also Patry Copyright Law and Practice 4. 
7
 See Breithiὐn http://www.sanart.org.tr/PDFler/70a.pdf 2 (date of use: 23 September 2013);  
http://www.donegaldiaspora.ie/people/colmcille (date of use: 25 September 2013). 
8
 The expression “Battle of the Booksellers” refers to a series of court battles that raged for some thirty years from around 
1743 in Midwinter v Hamilton (1748) Mor 8295 and finally settled in 1774 in Donaldson v Beckett (1774) 17 Cobbett’s Parl 
Hist Eng 953 (1813), available at www.copyrighthistory.com/donaldson.html (date of use: 15 November 2017), when the 
House of Lords declared that copyright is a creature of statute and accordingly confirmed its limited term of protection and 
the release of works into the public domain. The court cases arose when the Scottish booksellers started reprinting works 
that fell under the Statute of Anne, when the term of protection provided for under the statute started expiring in 1731. The 
London booksellers, the original publishers of the works, turned to the courts after failing to persuade parliament to extend 
the term of protection, arguing that a common law copyright subsisted in the works in spite of the expiry of the term of 
protection under the Statute of Anne, since the Statute of Anne merely supplemented and did not substitute this common-
law copyright. As Rose has observed, this period “was dominated by the commercial struggle between the patriotic Scots, 
who were proud of their growing printing and publishing trade, and the booksellers of London, who wanted to maintain their 
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In the following discussion the writer seeks to present a crucial analysis of the historical 
development of the bundle of rights relating to musical works that developed over time but are today 
well-known and recognised in copyright legislations throughout the world. Such a historical analysis 
does not merely perform a pedantic function, but is necessary in understanding the nature of the 
rights concerned because, as observed, “when examining copyright law … a page of history is worth 
a volume of logic …”10 It is the writer’s conviction that often injustice is caused by a lack of 
understanding of the historical context in which certain legal concepts and / or scenarios 
developed.11 Thus it is often necessary to move beyond a merely textual or literary analysis to a 
consideration of the historical development of the concepts to gain more understanding of their 
meaning.12 This analysis is relevant for South Africa as South Africa’s copyright law has its 
rootedness in the laws of other countries, in this case the law of England – with our courts 
continuing to rely on English decisions today. The analysis will thus serve to provide a historical 
context to the rights protected by modern copyright law in South Africa, which, in the case of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
centralized control of all publishing in Britain.” Rose Authors and Owners 68. The judgment in Donaldson v Beckett settled 
the matter, signalling the end of this wave of litigation. See further in this regard Birrell Law and History of Copyright 99 – 
138; Feather A History of British Book Publishing 76 – 83; MacQueen Copyright, Competition and Industrial Design 1 – 6; 
Gaines Contested Culture 61 – 65. 
9
 Birrell Law and History of Copyright 99. 
10
 Eldred v Ashcroft, 537 US 186, 200 [2003]. See also Garnett, Davies and Harbotte Copinger and Skone James 34, 
noting: “It is helpful to an understanding of the modern law of copyright to study its history – to see how it has developed 
from its origins to the present day.” Dealing with the importance of history in the understanding of music copyright Carrol 
2005 Florida Law Review 910 – 911 has observed: “… A central question for how the law should respond to music 
copyright owners’ initiatives is whether to focus on the future of copyright law generally or on the future of music copyrigh t 
more specifically. History is relevant to how this question should be answered. … An understanding of … history supports 
arguments that disputes concerning music copyright may be better resolved with tailored solutions rather than through 
broad changes in copyright law as a whole. History also supplies authority for arguments about how copyright has evolved 
and should evolve. …”, further calling for a better understanding of “the nuances of music copyright’s evolution”. 
11
 Thus, as highlighted in Chapter 1, in the case of South African Music Performance Rights Association (SAMPRA) v 
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) and Another 2013 BIP 411 (CT) the Commissioner of Patents, sitting as the 
Copyright Tribunal as contemplated in s. 29(1) of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978 (as amended), was easily persuaded to 
accept a misleading argument suggesting that “because needle time royalty, apart from that payable to the composer, has 
to reward both the record company and the performer the rate should be than [sic] more than twice the amount being paid 
to the composer, to be [sic] sufficiently reward both the record manufacturer and the recording artist” (at 13). Accordingly 
the commissioner, acknowledging that this was based on “the limited information available”, felt justified to approve as 
reasonable a royalty rate of 7% of net income, “representing in approximate terms, twice the rate applicable using the 
SAMRO formula”, in favour of SAMPRA (to be shared between record companies and performers), while it was 
acknowledged that the Southern African Music Rights Organisation (SAMRO) used a current rate of 3.5% (at 15). It is 
submitted that if the commissioner had used a contextual, or rather historical analysis, he would have realised that the 
performing right represented by SAMRO is, by its nature and historical development, a right due to both composers and 
publishers, and would be deserving of a similar, if not higher rate as the one approved in favour of SAMPRA.  On appeal in 
National Association of Broadcasters (NAB) v South African Music Performance Rights Association (SAMPRA) and 
Another 2014 (3) SA 525 (SCA) the SCA appeared to recognise this, and bemoaned the fact that the rate proposed by the 
commissioner in favour of SAMPRA appeared to be based on a “purely arbitrary” consideration, stating (at para 71): “It 
certainly was never suggested, with substantiation, by any of the witnesses that owners of copyright in sound recordings 
were entitled to rate their talents at twice the rate received by composers.”  
12
 In this regard the words of Schreiner JA, emphasising the importance of context in statutory interpretation in a dissenting 
judgment in Jaga v Dӧnges NO and Another; Bhana v Dӧnges NO and Another 1950 (4) SA 653 (A), at 662 – 663, are 
instructive: “Certainly no less important than the oft repeated statement that the words and expressions used in a statute 
must be interpreted according to their ordinary meaning is the statement that they must be interpreted in the light of their 
context. … Often of more importance is the matter of the statute, its apparent scope and purpose, and within limits, its 
background.” Emphasis added. Schreiner’s judgment was cited with approval by Ngcobo J in Bato Star Fishing (Pty) Ltd v 
Minister of Environmental Affairs and Tourism and Others [2004] ZACC 15 at para 89. In this case Ngcobo J made it clear 
that “[t]he technique of paying attention to context in statutory construction is now required by the Constitution, in 
particular, s 39(2)” (at para 91). Emphasis added. This is in line with the purposive approach of statutory interpretation 
required by the Constitution. This in fact is not a completely new position. Thus in Dadoo Ltd v Krugersdorp Municipal 
Council 1920 AD 530 at 554 the court observed: “… It is true that owing to the elasticity which is inherent in language it is 
admissible for a Court in construing a statute to have regard not only to the language of the Legislature, but also to its 
object and policy as gathered from a comparison of its several parts, as well as from a history of the law and from the 
circumstances applicable to its subject-matter.” Emphasis added. 
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reproduction right, have remained largely unchanged. Even where there have been changes in the 
nature of the rights, as in the case of the performing right, an understanding of the historical 
development of the concept of “performing right”13 – part of the undertaking in this chapter – would 
be crucial in understanding the full dynamics of its application today. 
2.2 The Historical Development of the Print Right and the Performing 
Right 
As alluded to in Chapter 1, the concept of “Music Rights” is in fact, a reference to the bundle of 
rights that relate to the different works that are relevant in respect of musical copyright (i.e. literary 
works, in the form of lyrics, musical works and sound recordings) and the rights of music performers. 
This bundle was developed in a period of over two hundred years and its development was not 
without controversy and confrontations. The bundle commenced with the simple right of copying 
(from which the word “copyright” emanated), and was extended to include other rights in respect of 
particular works and related expressions, often in response to developing technology.14 This section 
seeks to provide a necessary analysis of the historical development of Music Rights, from the 
earliest legal recognition of such rights to the modern day. The main focus nevertheless is on rights 
relating to musical works, in line with the objective of this thesis. 
2.2.1 The Development of the Reproduction Right: Print Rights and the Publishing 
Industry 
2.2.1.1 Background 
The stage for the formal, international recognition of copyright would not be set until almost about 
1450 with Johannes Gutenberg’s invention of moveable type.15 The discovery of the printing press 
made it easy to print multiple copies of books and other writings, ushering in a new era from the 
earlier one where the writing and copying of manuscripts was a long and arduous manual process, 
usually carried out by monks like St. Columba.16  In this regard Dean observes: 
The introduction of the use of a printing press brought about a radical change in the distribution of 
books because now prior investments which needed to be recouped by means of the sale of copies of 
the books in large numbers took place.
17
 
                                               
13
 Which, in its full ambit today, in fact entails more than one right. See the detailed discussion under paragraph 2.2.2 
below. 
14
 See Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 35. 
15
 See Dean Application of the Copyright Act 4, noting: “The development of the printing press by Johannes Gutenberg 
towards the middle of the 15
th
 century was the event which sparked off the beginnings of the concept of copyright.” See 
also generally in this regard Deazley, Kretschmer and Bently (eds) Privilege and Property xvi. In addition to the invention of 
movable type, “the emergence of a sense of individualism” and rapid economic expansion driven by international 
merchants who organised annual trade fairs are considered to be two other factors that “combined to turn copyright into a 
legal issue.” Frith and Marshall (eds) Music and Copyright 22. 
16
 See Ramsden Guide to Intellectual Property Law 3. 
17
 Dean Application of the Copyright Act 209. 
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After the discovery of the printing press many efforts were made, mainly by the printer-publishers, to 
have legal protection in respect of works of authorship, which prompted the commencement of a 
system of “proto-copyright” - printing privileges and letters patent which became “a progenitor of 
modern copyright”.18 Providing more clarity on this Kostylo has observed: 
In contrast to modern copyright and patent, early privileges were conceived as a form of municipal 
favour (gratiae) and an exception to the law (priva lex) rather than the recognition of the author’s 
inherent rights. Such privilegia took various forms, from exclusive monopolies permitting the 
inventors or introducers of a new technology the right to exploit their trade or engage in other 
productive activity, to printing privileges bestowing the publishers or authors with the exclusive rights 
to print and sell a work. These two types of privileges would later be identified as patents for 
inventions and proto-copyrights respectively …
19
  
The Crown privilege, issued by the monarch to printers against payment of a fee, granted monopoly 
rights for a limited period or even in respect of particular books, and in essence became “the 
defining economic instrument of late feudalism”.20 Venice is dubbed “the home of the first printing 
privileges”, where a printing privilege was granted to Johannes of Speyer in 1469;21 printing 
privileges were thereafter granted in Milan (1480s), Germany (1501), France (1507) and England 
(1518), amongst other jurisdictions.22 In this regard it has been reported that Venice also granted the 
earliest known privilege for exclusive rights to print and sell music, which was granted to Ottaviano 
dei Petrucci on 25 May 1498 by the Venetian signoria.23 Similarly, Germany is reported to have 
issued letters patent in respect of the works of authors and composers circa 1500.24 In Britain it has 
been noted that two types of printing patents were granted in respect of music printing – namely one 
for psalm books and another for other music.25 In this regard it has been further noted that 
competitive publishing of music only applied in respect of psalm books, which had become “part of 
the English Stock of the Stationers’ Company”, and “not until the late seventeenth century would the 
unauthorized publication of musical works become worth while”.26    
A discussion of this topic would not be complete without elaborating further on the role played by the 
Stationers’ Company of London, formed as a minor guild of writers, illuminators, bookbinders and 
booksellers in 1403 and receiving royal charter from Queen Mary in 1557.27 They were to play a 
major role in the events that led to the enactment of the Statute of Anne in 1710 – the first copyright 
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 Frith and Marshall (eds) Music and Copyright 25, and the sources cited therein. 
19
 Kostylo J “From Gunpowder to Print: The Common Origins of Copyright and Patent”, in Deazley, Kretschmer and Bently 
(eds) Privilege and Property 2. Bold emphasis added. 
20
 Frith and Marshall (eds) Music and Copyright 23. Apart from the Crown privilege privileges were also often granted to 
individual creators through the court system. Ibid. Some composers who had access to the Crown also received Crown 
privileges, e.g. Handel, J.C. Bach and Thomas Arne; although some found it difficult to exploit the privilege because of 
being “firmly locked into restrictive relationships”, such as those forbidding the author from publishing his works. Id at 24 – 
25.  
21
 See Kostylo J “From Gunpowder to Print: The Common Origins of Copyright and Patent”, in Deazley, Kretschmer and 
Bently (eds) Privilege and Property 2 – 5.  
22
 Frith and Marshall (eds) Music and Copyright 23. 
23
 Ibid. 
24
 Ibid. 
25
 Hunter 1986 Music & Letters 270. 
26
 Ibid. 
27
 Frith and Marshall (eds) Music and Copyright 23. 
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statute.28 The right granted to members of the Stationers Company (or simply, “stationers”) was the 
right to print a new book – namely one that had not been printed before – and it was secured by 
registering one’s claim before the Stationer’s Company Wardens and having the ownership of the 
book (if approved), registered in the Stationers’ Register.29 In this regard it is also important to note 
that, apart from the monopolistic right granted to members of the stationers in relation to the printing 
of works (in this way “[safeguarding] the right to copy”), the sovereign received from the stationers 
not only payment: even more noteworthy, the privilege granted became a system of censorship, 
because the sovereign insisted on having to approve the work before it was printed.30 All works 
published by the printers had to receive official approval and had to be registered, failing which the 
printer concerned would be punished by decrees of the Star Chamber.31 The Star Chamber had 
powers of search, confiscation and imprisonment, unobstructed by the interference of parliament.32 
In 1640 the Star Chamber was abolished, in essence making it lawful to publish any kind of material 
without censure. As a result of “[t]he scandalous nature of some libelous publications”, the English 
parliament passed a number of ordinances that prohibited the printing of a book unless the book 
was lawfully licensed and entered into the register of the Stationers’ Company.33 They also, amongst 
others, prohibited the printing of any licensed book without the consent of the owner, in essence 
recognising a perpetual, common-law right of ownership in respect of such books.34 This was to 
become significant much latter in the Battle of the Booksellers, as the English booksellers would try 
to use the existence of this common law right to reassert their rights of ownership to works whose 
Statute of Anne copyright term had expired. Eventually a Licensing Act was passed in 1662 with 
similar provisions relating to the printing of books, with specific provisions preventing the printing of 
books that were “contrary to the Christian faith”.35  
The Licensing Act was extended by a number of Acts of parliament until it expired in 1679. This is 
because the system had fallen into disrepute as a result of high prices and a lack of availability of 
books arising from the power of members of the Stationer’s Company “to claim copyright in 
perpetuity’; and further as a result of growing sentiments regarding freedom of the press.36 With the 
expiration of the Licensing Act the Stationer’s Company passed its own byelaws (ordinances) which 
asserted their common-law right of ownership in respect of their books – albeit such byelaws were 
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 Compare Deazley, Kretschmer and Bently (eds) Privilege and Property xv – xvi, who mention six “key points” in the 
“intellectual history of copyright law”, namely the invention of the printing press; the feudal system of printing privileges; the 
Stationers companies of Basel and London; the first copyright statutes (England in 1710 and the USA in 1790); the 
recognition of authors’ rights in France (1791/1793), Prussia (1837) and the UK (1842), and the enactment of the Berne 
Convention (1886). 
29
 Hunter 1986 Music & Letters 270. 
30
 See Dean Application of the Copyright Act 4. It has in fact been noted that the Stationers’ Company’s royal charter “was 
an attempt by the Catholic Queen Mary to control the spread of heretical material.” Frith and Marshall (eds) Music and 
Copyright 23. See also Dean Id at 5. The clear objective of Queen Mary, a convert to Catholicism, was “to prevent the 
propagagion of the reformed religion”. Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James on Copyright Law 36. 
31
 Dean Id at 5.  
32
 Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James on Copyright Law 36. 
33
 Id at 36 – 37. 
34
 See ibid. 
35
 Id at 37. 
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 Ibid. 
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only binding on members of the Stationers’ Company.37 In 1684 Charles II issued a new charter in 
favour of the Stationers’ Company, and in 1685 a new Licensing Act was passed with a seven-year 
term, which was extended in 1692 for two additional years, until 1694.38  
Influenced by “the spirit of the Age of Enlightenment”, in which government censorship, abusive 
monopolies and a lack of protection for authors were frowned upon – and aided by arguments 
“purportedly drafted by John Locke” – the British parliament refused to renew the Licensing Act after 
its expiration in 1694.39 This resulted in the springing up of many independent printers who acted in 
competition to the Stationers, “[giving] rise to widespread copying and anarchy … in the printing 
field.”40 The Stationers’ Company began to repeatedly lobby parliament for a new Licensing Act, this 
time employing a rhetoric that suggested that they had concern for the plight of authors.41 In fact 
however, the Stationers, whose beneficence authors were, for the most part, forced to rely upon, 
were “a group not contemporaneously associated with generosity”.42 In this regard it has been noted 
that the typical author-publisher relationship in this period “involved nothing more than the sale of a 
manuscript” secured by a single payment.43 Thus it has been succinctly observed that “[t]he 
Stationers’ Hall Book … provided no institutional recognition of authors’ rights.”44 Thus a stationer 
would sell the right to print a book to other stationers “without reference to the author.”45 
2.2.1.2 The Statute of Anne: The Advent of Copyright and the Reproduction Right 
The agitations of the Stationers yielded results, and the first Copyright Act, the Statute of Anne, 46 
was passed in 1709, coming into force on 10 April 1710. The Statute of Anne was hailed as not only 
the first copyright statute in the world, but also as the first such statute to recognise authors as “the 
fountainhead of protection”.47 The preamble to the Statute of Anne described it as “[a]n act for the 
encouragement of learning, by vesting the copies of printed books in the authors or purchasers of 
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 Id at 38. 
38
 Patry Copyright Law and Practice 10. 
39
 Ibid. It was in fact, that House of Commons that, “without division”, rigorously resisted the renewal of the Licensing Act  
when it was presented to it along with other laws that were ‘“lately expired and expiring which [were] fit to be revived and 
continued’” – in spite of attempts by the House of Lords to persuade them to change their thinking. See Deazly On the 
Origin of the Right to Copy 1 – 31. 
40
 Dean Application of the Copyright Act 5. See also Baloyi 2012 SA Merc LJ 221. 
41
 “The booksellers argued that failure to continue exclusive rights of printing had resulted in disincentives to writers. 
Without some form of protection to encourage authors, the public interest would be harmed by the decreased flow of 
works.” Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James on Copyright Law 38. 
42
 Patry Copyright Law and Practice 7 – 8. In similar fashion Hunter 1986 Music & Letters 274 has observed that “[many] 
composers were in a much more difficult position and were forced to depend on publishers who generally cared only for 
their own business interests.” In this regard Baloyi 2012 SA Merc LJ 221 and 224 suggests that certain modern music 
publishers – what he terms “‘banking operation’ publishers” – act in a similar way to the Stationers’ Company. 
43
 Hunter 1986 Music & Letters 271; Frith and Marshall (eds) Music and Copyright 24. Sometimes however, as noted by 
Hunter (ibid), payment would be in the form of a number of copies of the printed work being given to the author. 
44
 Frith and Marshall ibid. 
45
 Hunter 1986 Music & Letters 271. The stationers traded in these “copyright shares” with other stationers, and the 
practice eventually became “a significant portion of the trade of the major stationers”. Music publications however largely 
fell “outside of the purview of the Stationers’ Company” as it had become a distinct speciality by 1700. Ibid.  
46
 8 Anne, c. 19 (1710) (Statute of Anne), available at Avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/anne_1710.asp (date of use: 15 
November 2017). 
47
 Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James on Copyright Law 39. Others have, however, countered this 
proposition. Thus Harms JA  has remarked in Biotech Laboratories v Beecham Group and Another 786 JOC (A), at Par 11, 
‘By the wording of the Act  an author owned the copyright of his work, but the action of having it published gave the 
bookseller fourteen years exclusive rights in the work …’. 
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such copies, during the times therein mentioned.”48 In respect of works already in print, the Statute 
of Anne conferred upon the author, bookseller, printer or any other person who acquired or 
purchased the copies of a book or books “the sole right and liberty of printing such book or books” 
for a period of twenty-one years from the coming into force of the statute.49 Furthermore, the statute 
conferred on the author of “any book or books already composed, and not printed and published, or 
that shall hereafter be composed”, and his assignees or assigns, “the sole liberty of printing and 
reprinting such book and books”, for a period of fourteen years from the coming into force of the 
statute. At the expiry of the term of fourteen years, the rights would return to the authors, if they 
were then living, for another term of fourteen years. 50 In this way the Statute of Anne recognised the 
public domain. 
Furthermore, in respect of non-printed works, copyright infringement would occur were any 
bookseller, printer or other person, to “print, reprint, or import, or cause to be printed, reprinted, or 
imported”, any such books without the consent of the proprietor. In the case of works that were 
already printed, copyright infringement would occur if such persons were to “sell, publish, or expose 
to sale, or cause to be sold, published, or exposed to sale”,51 any such books, “knowing the same to 
be so printed or reprinted”, without the consent of the proprietors.52 The remedy for such an 
infringement was a forfeiture of the copies and one penny for every sheet found in such person’s 
custody, to be shared equally between the Queen and her heirs and successors, on the one part, 
and the person who instituted the proceedings.53  
It was necessary to highlight the foregoing in order to emphasise the fact that, at this stage, the right 
introduced by the Statute of Anne was a reproduction right – “the right to copy”.54 Furthermore, the 
right related to books or copies, i.e. printed works. In essence thereof, the reproduction right 
introduced by the Statute of Anne was a print right.55 Furthermore, it is important to note that the 
print right was linked to and associated with the right to publish the work, or to sell it or expose it for 
sale. This makes sense because the right to print, without the right to publish the printed works,56 
would be incomplete. Over time, the publishing right evolved to become a stand-alone right, within 
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the copyright bundle of rights - apart from and outside of the print right (or the general reproduction 
right). Today the publishing right has become a very important, crucial and lucrative right in the 
music industry – driving a massive, billion-dollar global industry. Likewise, the print right was, with 
time, to become an important source of income for composers and music publishers. At this stage 
however it was explicit in the Statute of Anne that the right only applied in respect of “books and 
other writings”.57  Because of this, and the fact that the law was passed in response to the petitions 
of booksellers, composers and music sellers had uncertainty as to the status of music under the 
Act.58 This uncertainty remained until clarity was given in the case of Bach v Longman (discussed 
further below). 
Meanwhile the agitations of the English booksellers re-surfaced after 1731, when the copyright 
protection accorded to books and other literary property under the Statute of Anne came to an end. 
Scottish printers and those from the provinces started printing new editions of “old books” – i.e. 
books whose statutory protection under the Statute of Anne had expired - prompting the Stationers 
to seek injunctions from the Court of Chancery – an equity court - to prevent the new entrants to the 
market from printing and selling the books.59 It has been noted that the Stationers preferred to seek 
relief from the Court of Chancery because this court appeared to be too prone to grant injunctions 
on the assumption of the existence of a common law right of copyright, in spite of the expiry of the 
term of protection under the Statute of Anne.60 While the Stationers succeeded in obtaining 
injunctions from the English equity courts, the question of law remained unresolved and with time, 
the Scottish booksellers “grew in importance” and obtained legal advice that assured them that the 
Stationers’ claims regarding the continuation of a common-law copyright were “mere bluff and 
brag”.61   
Further to the foregoing, the Scottish courts were not keen to uphold a position that supported the 
existence of a common-law copyright, and “sent these pursuers [i.e. the Stationers] empty away … 
repulsed with expenses”.62 Thus when the London booksellers sought relief at the Scottish Court of 
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Session in Midwinter v Hamilton in 1743,63 the court refused to accede to the London booksellers’ 
arguments. This officially marked the commencement of the infamous Battle of the Booksellers64 
which was to rage for some thirty years.65 The most-important cases in this battlefield were Millar v 
Taylor66 and Donaldson v Beckett.67  In the Millar case the King’s Bench considered, for the first 
time, the nature and purpose of copyright, arriving at the conclusion that there was, indeed, a 
common law right to literary property which was not affected by the Statute of Anne.  Such a right, 
the court held, was revived after the expiration of the term of protection provided for in the Statute of 
Anne.   
Notwithstanding the foregoing, in Hinton v Donaldson and Others68 the Scottish Court of Session 
refused to follow the ruling in Millar, asserting that Scottish law made no provision for a common law 
right to literary property. Similarly, as observed, “[p]erpetual copyright was the law of England for five 
years only.”69 In a surprising move, the English House of Lords followed a ruling similar to the Hinton 
ruling, in Donaldson v Beckett,70 denying the existence of a perpetual copyright and affirming the 
existence of a public domain – in this way doing away with the earlier English decisions. This case, 
“probably the most celebrated of all copyright cases” and “uniquely dramatic [and] enthralling the 
contemporary literary scene”,71 brought to an abrupt end the protracted “Battle of the Booksellers”, 
with the Scottish booksellers winning the day. Consequently, “[p]ublishers continued to publish 
works … but did so only with authorisation from the authors of the works and arguably for the mutual 
benefit of [the parties]”.72  In this regard it has been observed that “[i]n no other European country 
had the author and his assigns fared so well” as did English authors under the Statute of Anne.73  
The above developments however did not resolve the question as to whether the Statute of Anne 
applied in respect of musical works. This question did not, in fact, immediately arise. This is 
because, as observed, the majority of music composers were professional performers who largely 
depended on the custom and goodwill of rich patrons for their survival - unlike literary authors whose 
survival depended on the publication of their works.74 In this way musicians therefore felt that they 
could survive without having to rely upon the copyright system.75 It is thus clear that uncertainty 
about the application of the Statute of Anne in respect of musical works was not the only deterrent 
                                               
63
 Decided in 1748. Midwinter v Hamilton 1748 Mor. 8595.  
64
 Aptly called the “Battle of the Booksellers for Perpetual Copyright” by Birrell, id at 99.   
65
 For a discussion of the court cases decided in this period, commencing and ending with Midwinter v Hamilton and 
Donaldson v Beckett respectively, see Yamada “Pirate” Publishing 31 – 81. 
66
 (1769) 4 Burr. 2303. 
67
 (1774) 4 Burr. 2407. 
68
 1773 Mor. 8307. 
69
 Birrell Law and History of Copyright 141. 
70
 Supra n 67. 
71
 Frith and Marshall (eds) Music and Copyright 28. 
72
 Baloyi 2012 SA Merc LJ 222. 
73
 Birrell Law and History of Copyright 141. 
74
 Carrol 2005 Florida Law Review 925 – 926. 
75
 In this regard Hunter 1986 Music & Letters. 272 observes, “Writing was not the way for an author or composer to make a 
living before the second half of the eighteenth century, unless the creator were Pope, a playwright or a composer of 
theatre music”; further quipping: “Indeed, to have made money from writing was hardly accepted, at least among 
gentlemen.” Emphasis added. 
39 
 
preventing musicians from placing reliance on the statute. As alluded to,76 the control of the 
distribution market and the ability to enter the market quicker than others were seen as being more 
beneficial than relying on copyright protection.77 Thus it has been observed that composers 
“embraced copyright reluctantly.”78 
It appears that successful composers trusted the system of printing privileges better than the 
protection provided under the Statute of Anne, choosing to “[seek] legal vindication for proprietary 
claims in their music through petitions for printing privileges.”79 Postulating on the reasons for this 
Carrol has made the following observation: 
… Conceivably, privileges may have been preferable to composers because privileges often provided 
ex ante protection to all of the composer’s works whereas copyright was effective on a per-work basis 
and normally did not vest registration and deposit took place. Alternatively, royal privileges may have 
been a valuable status signal that would not have been easily sacrificed in favor of copyright. Finally, if 
composers would have had difficulty obtaining deposit copies, privileges may have been more 
attractive. …
80
  
Where composers were non-committal in relation to asserting their rights under the Statute of Anne 
it has been observed that music publishers were, in fact, hostile to the legislation.81 It is said that this 
is because they, unlike their literary rights counterparts, remained eligible for royal printing patents 
even after the lapse of the Licensing Act in 1794.82 The considerations regarding the importance of 
lead time in getting contemporary works into the market were the same for music publishers as they 
were for composers;83 besides this however, music publishers benefitted from the lapse of the 
Licensing Act, as this “reduced the burden of state censorship while leaving the prospect of 
exclusive economic rights intact.”84 Thus after the Statute of Anne was enacted only a few music 
publishers registered their works; for the rest, they “carried on as if the Act did not apply to music 
and as if composers had no initial entitlement to control reproduction of their work.”85    
2.2.1.3 Bach v Longman and the Recognition of Print Rights in Musical Works 
Notwithstanding the foregoing, a point in time came “when music’s value as a resource had arisen 
sufficiently to make the administrative costs of copyright socially worthwhile” – to use an expression 
used by Carrol.86 This moment came when “the general public also … started to become an 
important patron of music” with the introduction of public concerts with paid admission and annual 
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music meetings, together with opera (music theatre) for the upper classes.87 As observed, “[t]he 
growth and spread of the music festival intensified the demand for nationally recognized singers and 
players”, fueling a growth for printed music and “[creating] new opportunities for freelance music 
composition.”88 For many composers publication of their musical compositions was a way of 
increasing demand for their public performances.89 However, in the course of asserting their rights, 
these composers were soon to find themselves at loggerheads with the London music sellers, who 
“were not inclined to respect any claims of royal privilege, whether they be made by rival publishers 
or composers.”90 The probable reason for this is that “[u]ntil 1777 unauthorized publication in the 
sense of the printing of a composer’s work without his approval was not illegal except in a very few 
limited circumstances.”91 This clearly arises from the uncertainty as to whether “books” or “writings” 
extended to music compositions.92 
Composers also lacked resources and the will to pursue litigation; consequently they tried to protect 
themselves by issuing public warnings against unauthorised publication of their works and by “a 
sporadic series of cases during the course of the century”.93 Reference will only be made to a few of 
these cases here.94 In one case John Gay, composer of a sequel to The Beggar’s Opera titled Polly, 
which he had printed as a book comprising of the music and words bound together, sought and 
obtained a preliminary injunction in the Court of Chancery, against more than twenty printers and 
booksellers who had printed copies of the book without Gay’s permission. Gay had entered the title 
of the book in the Stationer’s Register at the time of first printing, and none of the defendants had 
contested the fact that Polly was a protected work under the Statute of Anne. Another case involved 
the musician Thomas Augustine Arne, who had obtained a royal privilege in 1741, after which he 
issued a public warning against the unauthorised use of his compositions. When certain of his 
works, including his popular masque Comus, were printed without his permission, Arne instituted 
proceedings, relying on not only his royal privilege but also on the Statute of Anne and the 
Engraving Act.95 In their defence, the defendants argued, inter alia, against the continued legitimacy 
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of the royal printing privilege, and argued that “neither the Statute of Anne nor the Engraving Act 
applied to printed music.”96  
It has been noted that “[b]y the early 1770’s, the pressure to resolve the question of music copyright 
had begun to grow.”97 One case in which permanent relief was obtained apparently on the basis of, 
inter alia, the Statute of Anne, was Pyle v Falkener.98 As observed, “the outcome of Pyle’s action 
would depend on how the word ‘writings’ in the preamble to the Act was to be interpreted, and on 
whether privileges provided valid copyright protection.”99 Because the court in Pyle did not express 
an opinion on the merits, merely granting a permanent injunction, it was left to another court to 
specifically deal with the question whether the expression “writings” in the preamble to the Statute of 
Anne applied in respect of musical works. Such a determination was made in the case of Bach v 
Longman, where, for the first time, the rights of authors of musical works (in the sense of printed 
music) were recognised under the Statute of Anne.100 
Bach v Longman 
The case was initiated by two famous composers, JC Bach and CF Abel, in the King’s Bench, and 
concerned the question whether a music composition fell within the ambit of the Statute of Anne.101 
Providing a useful background to the case Hunter makes this observation: 
Unlike the example of authors and artist-engravers, it was in the courts that composers first 
established copyright of music … C.F. Abel and J.C. Bach, as the leaders of the London music scene 
… were probably the only composers with sufficient position to effect the changes necessary to 
provide composers with copyright protection equal to that enjoyed by authors. …
102
 
Both Bach and Abel had obtained Crown privileges protecting their published music – Bach in 1763 
and Abel in 1760. Both publishers were in conflict with the publisher, James Longman, who had 
published their works without authorisation. It has in this regard been noted that “it was the imminent 
expiration of Abel’s privilege in 1774 that no doubt prompted the two to take their case before the 
courts.”103 Attempts to lobby parliament for the amendment of the Statute of Anne in 1735 and 1737, 
which in both cases would have extended the application of the statute to “the Author or Authors of 
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any Book or Books of Musick”, had been unsuccessful.104 Concomitant to instituting the court 
proceedings Bach and Abel had, themselves, being unsatisfied with the progress of the case, joined 
the London booksellers in petitioning the House of Commons statutory protection, particularly in light 
of the fateful decision in Donaldson v Beckett. On their part Bach and Abel sought clarity regarding 
the status of music under the Statute of Anne.105 It appears that no positive outcome came from this 
and so their only hope was in the case underway.     
Nevertheless, Destiny did plan a favourable outcome for the composers – and for all composers of 
all time – forever charting a new course for music copyright. In a judgment that was quickly 
dispensed the eminent Lord Chief Justice Mansfield,106 having remarked that the words of the 
Statute of Anne were ‘very large’, providing, as they did, protection for ‘books and other writings’, 
opined: 
Music is a science; it may be written, and the mode of conveying the ideas, is by signs and marks. A 
person may use the copy by playing it; but he has no right to rob the author of the profit, by multiplying 
copies and disposing of them to his own use. If the narrow interpretation contended for in the 
argument were to hold, it would equally apply to algebra, mathematics, arithmetic, hieroglyphics. All 
these are conveyed by signs and figures. There is no colour for saying that music is not within the 
Act.
107
 
Thus the year 1777 marked the first official recognition, in Great Britain, of the first bundle of music 
rights, namely the reproduction right in musical works, in the form of PRINT RIGHTS. In this way 
England led the way in the development of this important right in musical works, which, with time 
and in response to technological developments, developed into a fully-fledged reproduction right 
covering many forms of music reproduction (e.g. mechanical reproduction, film synchronisation, 
radio transcription and in current times, digital reproduction). The Bach decision and the formal 
recognition of print rights in music was so significant, particularly for the Anglo-American market, 
that for over a hundred years, the manufacture and sale of printed music in the form of “sheet 
music”108 became the modus operandus – the dominant way in which the music industry operated. 
The English courts’ affirmation of the fact that a single sheet of music constituted a “book” as 
contemplated in the Statute of Anne and subsequent legislation no doubt also aided the 
development of the music publishing industry.109 In this regard the sale of sheet music was used in 
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conjunction with, and to facilitate the live performance of music. Thus Kohn and Kohn have 
observed: 
Before digital downloads and records, before motion pictures and television programs, before AM and 
FM radio, before even player pianos and music boxes, the music business was composed of live 
performances and the creation and distribution of printed music to facilitate those performances – 
better known as, sheet music. In the 1890, [sic] when the modern music industry first emerged, the 
music business was essentially the sheet music business, with sheet music … selling in the 
millions of copies. While during the twentieth century the music industry saw its revenues shift from 
the sale of printed music to the licensing of public performances and mechanical reproductions, 
printed music in the twenty-first century is beginning to make a comeback. …
110
 
The phenomenal growth of the music publishing industry, in particular in the Anglo-American world, 
can be attributed to this recognition of print rights.111 This is perhaps best demonstrated by the Tin 
Pan Alley phenomenon,112 which undoubtedly spawned the modern music publishing industry and, 
arguably, the modern music industry itself. The protection accorded to print rights in musical 
compositions under the Statute of Anne (as per the ruling in Bach v Longman) persisted until the 
statute was replaced by the Copyright Act 1842, also termed Talfourd’s Act.113 Apart from providing 
protection to musical (and dramatic) works in respect of “performing rights” (for which see paragraph 
2.2.2 below) the 1842 Act protected “sheet of music” under the term “book”. This Act also, for the 
first time, accorded a statutory definition to copyright, providing that “all copyright shall be deemed 
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personal property, and shall be transmissible by bequest, or, in the case of intestacy, shall be 
subject to the same law of distribution as other personal property” (s 25).  
The scope of protection and the infringement provisions under the Act were essentially the same as 
in existing legislation, and registration of copyright works at Stationers’ Hall was still provided for; 
failure to register a work did not however, affect the subsistence of copyright, but no infringement 
proceedings could commence without such registration (ss 11 – 14). A new feature of the Act is that 
it extended the term of protection to the life of the author and seven years after the author’s death, 
or forty-two years from first publication of the work (whichever was longer), or where the work was 
published after the author’s death, forty-two years from publication (s 3). Another innovative aspect 
of the Act was the introduction of a post-mortem system of compulsory licensing which provided 
that, if, after the author’s death, the owner of the author’s copyright refused to publish the work, then 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council could grant a licence “in such manner and subject to 
such conditions as they may think fit”, to ensure that the work was published (s 5).114  
It would be noteworthy here to refer to the fact that the system for the protection of the rights of 
authors in the “copyright system” of the Anglo-American jurisdictions developed divergently from the 
“authors’ rights” or droit d’auteur system of Continental Europe.115 Thus while England can be said 
to be the originator of the copyright system, France would fit the description in respect of the 
author’s rights system.116 In this regard it is notable that while England’s lead was with regard to the 
copyright system and the reproduction right in particular, France led in the area of performing rights 
and collective management in particular (see the discussion below under 2.2.2). In France authors’ 
reproduction rights were only recognised after the French Revolution with the passing of the Decree 
of 19 – 24 July of 1793, which for the first time granted property rights to authors of all kinds of 
manuscripts, music composers, painters and designers (illustrators), effectively doing away with the 
system of privileges that had existed since the sixteenth century.117  
The law of 1793 granted exclusive rights to authors to sell and distribute their works in France, and 
all printed copies produced and published without their written authorisation could be confiscated by 
the police.118  This law was preceded two years back by the Decree of January 13 – 19 1791, which 
granted authors protection in respect of their “performing rights” (for which see the discussion below 
under 2.2.2). Of these laws it has been observed:  
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These two decrees, which recognized the personal right of the author and designated him as the 
proprietor of his work, established the basic principle of the ‘droit d’auteur’. … [T]he two decrees 
“enabled the courts to develop the theory and practice of the ‘droit d’auteur’ without any further 
legislation for a century and a half …”
119
 
It seems however, that it was to be in the area of collective management that French authors would 
find real protection. This is because the abolishment of the Paris book guild as a result of the law of 
1791 brought about a situation where “legal control of printing rights ceased to exist … [and] Paris 
was flooded with pirate publications from an increasingly disorganized book trade”.120  Thus in spite 
of the existence of these laws, users continued to use the works of authors without compensation, 
largely because the authors were not able to effectively monitor the various usages of these 
works.121 And so enters the enthralling world of the Performing Right in musical works …  
2.2.2 The Development of the Performing Right 
2.2.2.1 The Recognition of the Performing Right in France 
As indicated, just as copyright and the reproduction right emerged from England, so the performing 
right and the system of collective management of authors’ rights emerged from France. In fact it was 
in the year 1777 – when the Bach v Longman decision was handed down in England, for the first 
time recognising print rights in respect of musical works – that the performing right was recognised 
in neighbouring France. It would be useful, before considering this matter further, to provide a brief 
overview of the meaning of the expression “performing right”.   
Firstly it needs to be understood that the expression “performing right” is technically only used in 
respect of musical works – and the expression is itself technical.122 Although the expression 
“performing right” has traditionally been used in relation to the right of “public performance” or 
“performance in public”, it should, because of the historical significance of its development, not be 
used in reference to the performance of all copyright works generally (whether artistic works, 
dramatic works, cinematograph films or even a sound recordings). Rather it is properly used in 
reference to the performance of musical works, and more specifically in respect of so-called small 
rights (“petits droits”). It would be correct to refer to the general right of public performance in 
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respect of all works eligible for this right (e.g. dramatic works, musical works, films, computer 
programs123) as a “performance right”. It would however, be remiss to refer to it as a “performing 
right” in respect of all these works: it is a performing right only in respect of musical works.124 This is 
significant for understanding the historical development of this right.  
In this regard the musical works concerned are termed small rights musical works – where the 
expression “small rights” is synonymous to the expression “performing rights”.125 Secondly, and 
more specifically, small rights refer to the non-dramatic public performance of musical works, as 
distinguished from the dramatic performance of musical works – the so-called grand rights (“grands 
droits”). Some have of course, accorded the expression “performing right” to the right of public 
performance of dramatic or dramatico-musical works (i.e. the grand rights or “grands droits”), as in 
the expression “grand performing rights”126 Nevertheless it is clear that the prefix “grand” is in this 
regard, necessary to make it explicit that the reference is to the public performance of dramatic and 
dramatico-musical works. A similar qualification is however, not necessary when referring to the 
public performance right in respect of musical works: it is not necessary (though some do so), to 
express the right as “small performing rights” because the expression “performing rights” is 
automatically seen as referring to rights in musical works. A further elaboration of this is made below 
in the discussion of the development of the performing right in England.   
The distinction between small rights and grand rights is however, often not easy to make, as at 
times, certain musical performances with a dramatic element would still fall within the ambit of 
performing rights, while certain dramatic performances of musical content would fit the description of 
grand rights.127 As Bradford has observed: “The ongoing search for a standard definition of these 
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47 
 
terms [i.e grand performance right and small performance right] has perpetually befuddled the legal 
profession, the music industry and performing entities at large.”128  Leaffer provides a simplified 
distinction below: 
Generally, a performance is nondramatic when it is removed from a dramatic context and unrelated to 
a large plot structure. Alternatively, a dramatic performance occurs when it is used to develop a story 
line. The entire drama need not be developed to render a performance dramatic, so long as the 
performance takes place within a dramatic context and carries forth a plot.
129
     
Ficsor elucidates further on this, quipping that small rights musical works “are those which, as a rule, 
are managed fully collectively”, while grand rights musical works “are those which, as a rule, are 
licensed individually” (although partial collective management involving collecting societies is 
sometimes used to administer such grand rights).130 Ficsor further notes, aptly, that the use of the 
adjectives “small” and “grand” has no bearing on the economic importance of the rights – observing 
correctly that in many countries the value of performing rights (i.e. small rights) exceeds that of 
grand rights. He then concludes that the adjectives are used merely ‘[to] reflect the historical fact 
that “grand rights” had already been exercised when “small rights” were recognized … and, initially, 
the category of “grand rights” was considered more important.”131 
Thirdly, it is important to note that performing rights are generally almost always administered 
through collective management because the “[n]ondramatic performances number in the millions 
daily and it would be impossible to police without a performing rights society.”132 In contrast, 
dramatic performances are generally controlled and licensed by the copyright owner himself, as they 
occur with less frequency. It has in this regard been observed that because they are often 
advertised, it is easy for the copyright owner to control them.133 One other reason mentioned as to 
why it is preferable for copyright owners to control the licensing of dramatic or dramatico-musical 
works is that they “present greater problems of artistic control.”134 
Lastly, it needs to be appreciated that while the performing right began purely as a right in respect of 
the public performance of musical works, it has, over the years, evolved into a complex right 
encompassing not only the public performance of a musical work but also its broadcasting, 
transmission in a diffusion service (i.e. cable transmission) and more recently, in the digital 
environment, its communication and making available to the public.135 This expansion of the right is 
however, no different from the manner in which, propelled by technological developments, the 
reproduction right has also evolved to include a panoply of sub-rights, as discussed in Chapter 3 
below. 
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The foregoing served to lay the foundation and to provide the context necessary to understand the 
current discussion. Within the above context it is necessary to note that it was the dramatic 
performance right – the grand droit – that was achieved in France in 1777 and not the performing 
right.136 A group of some twenty authors, led by the ever-energetic play-wright, Pierre de 
Beaumarchais – credited with being “the first to express the idea of collective management of 
copyright”137 – led the charge for the recognition of public performance rights for musical works in 
the dramatic genre.  These authors created a bureau of theatre legislation (the Bureau de legislation 
dramatique) and on 3 July 1777, formed the first collection agency, Agence Framery, raising 
arguments that “if a work has an economic life, its author must be associated with the revenues that 
it generates.”138 Subsequent to this, and with the influence of Beaumarchais, the French Constituent 
Assembly passed the decree of January 13 – 19, 1791, which established the public performance 
right in respect of dramatic works – the grand droit. This was followed by the decree of July 19 – 24, 
1793, which granted authors an exclusive reproduction right in respect of their works, as referred to 
above.139  Commenting on this, Szendy opines:  
… [T]he revolutionary laws of 1791 and 1793 … [brought] a shift of music toward the paradigm of 
theatre. While, during the time of Matheson and Zacharias, musical law was essentially conceived 
according to the model of literature, the French Revolution made it swing to the side of the theatre. A 
major event, it can be read explicitly in the title of the famous decree of January 13 – 19, 1791, relative 
“to theatres and to the right of representation and performance of dramatic and musical works.” …
140
  
This seems to suggest that it was at this stage in France that the focus shifted from print rights – a 
category of rights that had not found much success in France as it had in England – to performance 
rights in the theatre system. Of course the works would still be printed but the primary purpose was 
not to sell the printed music to the public, but to have it performed in public. This law was the first 
ever recorded recognition of the performing right in musical works, and as observed, “[t]here is little 
justification for the performing right … prior to the eighteenth century…”141 The shift to theatrical 
performance in respect of authors’ works is, in fact, what would lead to the momentous events that 
took place some fifty years later, in 1847: This is because, despite the law of 1791 granting 
exclusive rights to authors in respect of the public performance of their works, the authors remained 
frustrated because concert promoters and other music users “[continued] to perform musical works 
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without offering compensation to the composers”.142  It had to take another court battle – this time in 
France – before the recognition of authors’ performing rights would be cemented. This happened 
when, in 1847, the composer Bourget successfully sued the Les Ambassadeurs, a concert café, for 
using his composition without compensation.143 
With this victory Bourget teamed with playwrights Victor Parizot and Paul Henrion, with the 
assistance of Colombier, and in 1850 formed a union to collect payments for public performance of 
musical works.144 This union morphed into the still-existing Société des Auteurs, Compositeurs et 
Editeurs des Musique (SACEM) on 28 February 1851, giving rise to the first system of “full collective 
management”.145 The SACEM model would be replicated in many European and other countries, 
bringing a revolution in the system of collective management of authors’ rights and projecting the 
performing right to becoming the most-important music right in much of nineteenth century Europe. 
Not so in the Anglo-American world… 
2.2.2.2 The Recognition of the Performing Right in England 
In England the system of collective management and performing rights in particular was embraced 
rather reluctantly. This is because it was somehow believed that  
the money made by publication, which was much larger in England than in France, was so good that 
the composers were satisfied with it, and they considered that if the performing right were exercised, it 
would seriously interfere with the profits accruing from publication.
146
 
A prominent publisher of the late seventeenth century, John Boosey,147 was so confident of this 
position that he claimed that composers of the time would happily wave their claim to a performing 
right, even if it were made available to them. Boosey argued that composers were in fact, “in the 
habit of paying singers handsomely to sing their songs” as they reckoned that this gave 
advertisement to their songs, so that “the composers would not dream of exacting a royalty for that 
performance.”148 Ehrlich takes the argument further, reasoning that it was “the idiosyncrasies of 
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English music publishing, and its market” – in which contractual relationships between publishers 
and composers was not congenial, and the composers had a weak bargaining position and lacked in 
“esprit de corps” – that gave rise to this situation.149 Ehrlich contrasts this situation with the 
conditions in France, where authors were more active and united and took the lead in the 
recognition of the performing right. Ehrlich contends that, in the absence of author activism, the 
publishers themselves would be expected to have championed the recognition of the performing 
right in England. He then concludes that the only reason why music publishers did not do this is “the 
prevailing opinion among them that the balance of advantage lay elsewhere: in sales of sheet 
music”, observing: 
More than in any other country, apart from the USA, where, significantly, performing right also had to 
wait until 1914, music publishing in England depended upon sales rather than performance.
150
 
Perhaps the importance and potential of revenue generation from printing, even for works meant for 
the stage, is best illustrated by the case of Macklin v Richardson.151 In Macklin, the defendants had 
employed someone to attend a performance of the author’s work, which, though performed on 
numerous occasions since its production, had never been published by the author. The defendants 
published one Act of the transcribed play in their magazine, arguing that, because the play had been 
publicly performed, the public performance “gave a right to any of the audience to carry away what 
they could, and make any use of it”; and further that the plaintiff did not suffer any damage “as he 
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has, and will continue to receive the advantage arising from the representation upon the stage”.152 
The court (per Lord Commissioner Smythe) rejected this argument, ruling: 
It has been argued to be a publication, by being acted; and therefore the printing is no injury to the 
plaintiff: but that is a mistake; for besides the advantage from the performance, the author has another 
means of profit, from the printing and publishing; and there is as much reason that he should be 
protected in that right as any other author.
153
 
Macklin was accordingly granted a perpetual injunction against the defendants, who were also 
ordered to pay his costs. Bathurst, who was sitting with Smythe in the hearing, made this 
observation: “The printing [of the work] before the author has, is doing him a great injury”.154 This is 
instructional, especially in view of the fact that the work was meant for stage, because it illustrates 
the value that was placed in the printing of even such a work (which would not normally derive its 
commercial value from print rights).155 The prevailing position at the time was that, while the author 
could control the performance of his unpublished work under the common law, once a play was 
published the existing legislation did not prevent anyone from performing it without the author’s 
authorisation.156 In view of this, when the right of public performance was eventually recognised, it 
was seen as a right separate and distinct from copyright. This position followed the understanding of 
the times as perhaps reflected by Aston J, speaking for the majority in Millar v Taylor, after 
rhetorically confirming that, in purchasing a literary composition “at a shop”, the purchaser would not 
have thought that he bought the right to be the printer and seller of the work: 
… The improvement, knowledge, or amusement, which he can derive from the performance, is all his 
own: but the right to the work, the copy-right remains in him whose industry composed it.
157 
 
In this regard Deazley has observed: 
The public performance of print works, whether literary, artistic, or indeed musical, was simply not 
conceived as falling within the protection provided by copyright as traditionally understood. Until this 
point in time copyright, whether one considered it a common law or a purely statutory right, operated 
to prevent the unauthorised reproduction of a work in the same medium in which the protected work 
was given tangible form. Books, engravings and musical scores were all considered to be, and 
protected as, print phenomena …
158
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The first statutory recognition of the right of public performance in England was in relation to 
dramatic works.159 Deazley160 recounts the events that led to this recognition of the right: Two of the 
major metropolitan theatres, Covent Garden and Drury Lane had carried out a number of 
prosecutions against various minor theatres for performing so-called “legitimate drama” (i.e. spoken 
drama), thus violating patents initially granted to them in 1662. When certain theatrical managers 
were convicted and fined a large sum as a result, the managers, together with “performers and 
spectators alike”, felt the need to petition parliament for a change in the laws relating to dramatic 
performances. This cause was taken up by Edward Bulwer-Lytton, a novelist and would-be popular 
dramatist, who proposed the formation of a Select Committee to enquire into “the state of the laws 
affecting dramatic literature, and the performance of the drama”. In this regard Bulwer-Lytton 
bemoaned the state of the English laws dealing with dramatic literature, arguing how “infinitely more 
harsh and consistent” the laws were compared to those prevailing in France. He made the case that 
the House of Commons had been “indifferent” to the state of dramatic copyright, “which ought to be 
the most sacred of all” property, and charged, quite emotionally,161 that if Shakespeare himself was 
still alive, his plays would be “acted every night all over the kingdom”, “and Shakespeare himself, the 
producer of all, might be starving in a garret.”162     
As Deazley recounts, it seems that this emotional deference to Shakespeare achieved its intended 
objective, as the House yielded to the petition and appointed the proposed Select Committee under 
the chairmanship of Bulwer-Lytton. In the hearings that ensued the desirability of the French system 
of protection for dramatic rights was a recurring theme and the French model was scrutinised to 
highlight its benefits. These efforts led to the enactment of the Dramatic Literary Property Act of 
1833, which, as Deazley observes, was “a variation of [the] French model”. The act came to be 
popularly known as the “Bulwer-Lytton’s Act” as a result of Bulwer-Lytton’s involvement in its 
enactment.163 The Act made it explicit that it applied in respect of dramatic works – it applied to “the 
author of any tragedy, comedy, play, opera, farce, or any other dramatic piece of entertainment”. It 
thus did not apply to musical compositions.  
The Act in essence extended the protection granted to literary works in terms of the 1814 Act in 
respect of “printing and reprinting”, to dramatic works, but went further in that it granted a right of 
“representing, or causing to be represented, at any place or places of dramatic entertainment 
whatsoever”.164 The Act applied in respect of both published and unpublished works,165 and it 
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applied in both the United Kingdom and its dominions. Any person who infringed this right was, in 
respect of each unauthorised “representation” made, liable to pay the greater of “an amount not less 
than forty shillings”; “the full amount of the benefit or advantage arising from such representation” or 
“the injury or loss sustained by the plaintiff”, “together with double costs of suit”. It has been 
observed that as a result of this statute, “for the first time it was possible to make a realistic attempt 
to enforce dramatic copyright in the provincial theatres.”166   
In light of the foregoing, it is contended that the protection granted in the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act was in 
respect of grand rights (as discussed above) and not performing rights as the term is understood 
today.167 It granted to the author as his own property, “the sole liberty of representing, or causing to 
be represented”, a dramatic work belonging to him, “at a place of dramatic entertainment”.168  This 
distinction is however, often not maintained and grand rights are also lackadaisically designated as 
a “performing right” in the English literature.169 If we were merely concerned with the grammatical 
meaning of the English phrase “performing right” this would be easy to establish. It can easily and 
without much contestation be explained as “the right to perform”, and in a general sense this is what 
the right is concerned with. Nevertheless, in the legal sense it would be important to understand the 
legal meaning imputed to the phrase. To do this it would in turn be important to understand the 
historical framing and development of the right. As D’Alton has observed: 
Given the similar contemporary usage of the terms it is important to maintain the distinction, 
particularly when considering the historical development, as they arise in different historical periods for 
different reasons.
170
 
In this regard it is submitted that the best understanding of the historical development of the right is 
to be found in its earlier genesis in France – in particular in the distinction made between grands 
droits (grand rights) and petits droits (small rights), as dealt with above. D’Alton has in this regard 
noted that  
… [SACEM, i.e. the French performing right organisation, and the first full collective management 
organisation operating in the area of musical works] … had a profound effect upon the establishment 
and acceptance of a public performance right within common-law jurisdictions.
171
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As indicated, grand rights relate to the public performance of dramatico-musical works while small 
rights - also known as performing rights - relate to the public performance of pure (i.e. non-dramatic) 
musical works.172 This is how the rights were understood and delineated when they were developed 
in France. In the first formal treatise of the subject of collective management commissioned by the 
World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Dr. Mihály Ficsor, a former Deputy Director-General 
of WIPO in charge of copyright and related rights, makes this distinction clear.173 The distinction is 
also clear from the work of Gavin McFarlane, who has studied the historical development of the 
performing right from an English perspective.174 While McFarlane’s deliberation on the performing 
right prior to the formation of the Performing Right Society (PRS)175 clearly and admittedly relates 
the concept to the public performance of dramatico-musical works (which was, in essence, the effect 
of the English legislation at the time), his reference to the concept after the formation of the PRS is 
purely in relation to small rights musical works.176 In this regard the author observes: 
While this book is an account of the development of the performing right itself, from this point forward 
a large part of the history must be traced from the development of PRS. This is not to render the rest 
of the work simply a history of PRS: however the Society was the only organisation in Britain 
attempting to collect in respect of performing rights on such a vast scale. It fought most of the major 
battles to establish the principles, and by virtue of its operations became extremely well known. …
177
 
In this way the understanding of the concept of “performing rights” as a technical concept in English 
jurisprudence was henceforth framed within the context of “musical works” rather than dramatic or 
dramatico-musical works – thus bringing the concept within the distinction contemplated in the 
French system with the use of the concepts grands droits and petits droits.178 Partly owing to “the 
absence of a similar operation in the field of dramatic literature”, and perhaps also as a result of the 
guidance of its first general manager – the erstwhile general manager of the London agency of 
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SACEM179 – PRS was to champion the development of the performing right in English law as a right 
in small rights musical works, à la French petits droits.180 It is submitted that the modern usage of 
the phrase “performing rights” in colloquial speech aligns with this understanding of the performing 
right. In other words, if one were to mention the expression “performing right” or “performing rights 
society” what would immediately come to the minds of persons familiar with the workings of the 
music industry is that this is a reference to small rights musical works. It would be unlikely for such 
persons to ask the question: “Which performing right are you referring to?” This position has also 
been taken into account by certain national legislations. Thus the expression “performing rights 
society” is defined in the US Copyright Act as: 
… an association, corporation, or other entity that licenses the public performance of non-dramatic 
musical works on behalf of copyright owners of such works, such as the American Society of 
Composers, Authors and Publishers (ASCAP), Broadcast Music, Inc.. (BMI) and SESAC, Inc.
181
 
However, if a person were to mention the phrase “performance rights” without elaboration it is likely 
to elicit the question “which performance rights?”; this is because in this context the phrase could be 
a reference to rights in musical works (i.e. the performing rights dealt with here); a reference to 
rights in sound recordings (the so-called needle-time rights); a reference to the performance of 
dramatico-musical works (the grand right) or even a reference to the performance of any other 
copyright work in which such a right subsists. In spite of this however, this interchangeable or 
unqualified use of the two expressions lingers on in textual analyses today. A proper analysis would 
reveal the fact that this largely arises from the bungled development and limited understanding of 
the performing right in England from its recognition in the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act until the issue was 
resolved through the enactment of the 1911 Copyright Act and in particular, the formation of the 
PRS – to which issue we must now return.  
There is ample authority to support the position that the “performing right” was less understood 
before the formation of the PRS in England.182 One could ascribe this situation to a strained or 
contrived development of this right in respect of musical works in English law. The Bulwer-Lytton’s 
Act was clearly not meant to apply to small rights musical works and composers of opera and 
musical works were able to benefit from it only if their works “were an integral part of [a] dramatic 
work”.183 As highlighted above, the recognition of the right was championed by the minor theatres 
and playwrights and not by the formal music publishing industry. As indicated, music publishers 
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were hostile to the recognition of the right, as they felt that it would encroach upon lucrative print 
music sales; and composers, who had less protection in England than they had in France, could not 
take up this cause.184 Nevertheless, even with dramatic authors the protection provided by the Act 
was not always certain. Thus it has been acknowledged that “… the operation of the Act was far 
from straightforward.”185 
As stated above, protection under the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act was in relation to “representing, or 
causing to be represented, at any place or places of dramatic entertainment whatsoever”.186 The Act 
did not use or include the word “performing” or the phrase “performing right”, thus clearly implying 
that the intention was not to protect musical works. This is also confirmed by the fact that the 
subject-matter of protection was clearly designated as “dramatic pieces”, which included a tragedy, 
comedy, play, opera or farce. Even with this however, it has been observed that the Act still did not 
bring clarity regarding what constituted the performance of a dramatic work, giving rise to questions 
as to the meaning of “dramatic piece”, “place of dramatic entertainment” and “representation”.187 In 
relation to musical works an opportunity was lost when the Literary Copyright Act 1842 (the 
Talfourd’s Act, discussed above in relation to print rights) was passed. This Act purported to extend 
the protection (“benefits”) granted to dramatic works under the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act to musical 
compositions. Sections 20 and 21 of the Act granted to the authors of “any dramatic piece or 
musical composition”, “the sole liberty of representing or performing, or causing or permitting to be 
represented or performed” such dramatic piece or musical composition.   
The effect of sections 20 and 21 of the Talfourd’s Act was that in respect of print rights, musical and 
dramatic works were protected as “books”, and in respect of public performance rights they were 
protected separately as either “musical composition” or “dramatic work”.188 In essence sections 20 
and 21 of the Talfourd’s Act created two rights – one a copyright in respect of print rights, and the 
other a public performance right, and these rights were seen as being “quite distinct from one 
another”.189 In relation to the works the rights were nevertheless the same and expressed in a 
similar manner. It is the writer’s submission that the lumping together of the public performance right 
relating to dramatic works, with the right applicable to musical compositions, led to a confused 
understanding and characterisation of the performing right in English law prior to the setting up of 
the PRS. Whereas in France the two rights developed separately and in different historical periods – 
and were accordingly distinctly identified as either a grand droit, in the case of dramatic works and a 
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petit droit (or performing right), in respect of non-dramatic musical works – this was not the case in 
England. This lack of distinction between the two rights in legislation caused confusion with regard 
to the correct legal characterisation of the performing right.190 
To illustrate the point further: under the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act protection was given in respect of 
“dramatic pieces”. Thus musical works were only protected to the extent that they satisfied the 
definition of “dramatic work”.191 This is the grand droit. The fact that a musical composition was part 
of a dramatic piece did not imply that it would always be protected however. Thus in the case of an 
opera, which is a dramatic piece mainly characterised by words (the libretto), the court was not 
concerned about the fact that “the music of the piece was the main object of attraction” and “the 
words were a mere vehicle for the music”, ruling that the words were protected by the Act as being 
“a part of a dramatic piece”, while not seeing the need to enquire if there was any infringement of the 
musical composition.192 The situation was no better under the 1842 Talfourd’s Act. When a case 
was brought before the courts193 which should have confirmed if non-dramatic musical works were 
indeed protected under the statute, the court avoided answering the question by ruling that the work 
was a dramatic piece.  
The case concerned a song, “The Ship on Fire”, where the only dramatic action exhibited was 
expressed by the singer, who sang the song while seated at the piano, and where there was no 
costume or scenery associated with the performance. The defendant alleged that because the 
performer merely performed the words of the music composition what was performed was a “song” 
and not a ‘musical composition – furthermore, it was not a dramatic piece because the building in 
which it was performed was not a “place of dramatic entertainment”’. The essence of the case was 
therefore a determination of whether the performing right in respect of musical works applied in 
respect of all places of public performance, or if it was only limited to a performance in a place of 
dramatic performance. As can be recalled, the Talfourd’s Act extended protection to musical 
compositions while the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act extended protection to dramatic pieces if they were 
presented at a place of dramatic entertainment. The defendant furthermore argued that the 
performance did not infringe the musical composition because the composition needed to have the 
same dramatic character as the dramatic piece contemplated in the 1833 Act (it being argued that 
the 1842 Act merely brought musical compositions within the operation of the 1833 Act).  
Considering the facts of the case one would have expected that the court would rule that the 
performance was of a musical composition and thus infringed upon the composer’s performing right. 
Certainly this is how this matter would have been resolved today, and, it is submitted, this is how the 
                                               
190
 The confusion was apparently also evident in the manner in which the right was licensed. In this regard it has been 
noted: “… [T]he conception of performing rights in Britain at this time was similar to that of sheet music sales”, by which is 
meant the fact that the target user was the performer, while in France the target user was the venue in which the 
performance took place. Brown and Davison Sound of the Silents 251. 
191
 In this regard “a mere common, ordinary musical song , which required neither acting nor scenery for its production” 
was held not to be a dramatic work. See Fuller v Blackpool Winter Gardens (1895) 2 Q.B. 429, at 442. 
192
 Planché v Braham (1838) 4 Bing. N.C. 17. 
193
 Russell v Smith (1848) 12. Q.B. 217. 
58 
 
matter would have been resolved if the infringement would have occurred in France at the time. 
However, reflective of the fuddled state of the conception of the “performing right” in English law at 
the time, the court found the work to be a dramatic piece, thus ruling that because of this, the 
building in which the work was performed was a place of dramatic entertainment. According to the 
court, the feeling that the song induced was enough to constitute it a dramatic work rather than a 
musical work: “It moves terror and pity and sympathy, by presenting danger, and despair, and joy, 
and maternal and conjugal affection”, the court observed, stating further that “[t]he nature of the 
production places it rather in the representative than the narrative side of poetry”, thus making it 
“dramatic in its widest sense”, by which was meant “any piece which on being presented by any 
performer to an audience would produce the emotions which are the purpose of the regular drama, 
and which constitute the entertainment of the audience.” 
Commenting on the impact of this case McFarlane has observed:  
This was one reason for the reluctance of the performing right owners for many years thereafter to 
exercise the right. There was considerable uncertainty following Russell v. Smith as to whether (a) a 
musical composition had also to contain a dramatic element, as in an opera or an operetta, and (b), 
whether the unauthorised performance had to be given in a theatre for the 1842 Act to bite. …
194
 
Other cases which were decided after the Russell decision perpetuated the confusion created by 
Russell, deeming musical compositions that would have ordinarily been considered to be small 
rights musical works (and it is submitted, would have been so deemed if the cases were decided in 
France at the time), to be dramatic pieces.195 From this it would appear that the conception of the 
performing right in English law (prior to 1912) was that of a performance involving dramatic 
entertainment as conceived in the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act. Thus writing in 1902 MacGillivray defined 
“performing right” as: 
the exclusive right of representing or performing in public dramatic or musical works.
196
  
This of course arose from combining the protection granted in respect of dramatic works under the 
Bulwer-Lytton’s Act, with that granted in respect of musical compositions under the Talfourd’s Act. In 
contrast Scrutton, writing in 1903 – and in what the writer considers to be a more correct description 
of the expression as it was used at the time – saw the need to call the performing right an “acting 
right” (thus implying that it was concerned with non-dramatic musical works); and suggested that the 
term should be limited to being called either a “play-right” or more preferably, a “stage-right”.197 The 
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problem, it is submitted, arose from the fact that a distinction was not made between the public 
performance right relating to musical compositions and that relating to dramatic works, when 
protection was extended to musical compositions in the Talfourd’s Act. It is in this regard to be 
recalled that when providing protection to dramatic works the form of exploitation under the Bulwer-
Lytton’s Act was expressed as “representing or causing to be represented”. When the Talfourd’s Act 
extended protection to musical compositions the expression “performing or causing to be performed” 
was added, but no distinction was made between dramatic works and musical compositions in this 
regard. In other words, instead of specifically stating that the act of “representing or causing to be 
represented” related to dramatic works, and the act of “performing or causing to be performed” 
related to musical compositions – thus maintaining the distinction made between the grand droit and 
the petit droit in French law – both expressions could henceforth be used interchangeably in respect 
of either work.198  
It is submitted that had a clear distinction been made between these two forms of exploitation at this 
stage – with the concept of “representing” being limited to dramatic performance and that of 
“performing” being limited to non-dramatic musical performance – a proper jurisprudence relating to 
the concept of “performing right” would have been developed in English law at that stage. For 
example, as Alexander has noted, the relationship between copyright and the right of representation 
was not well understood, and there was ongoing confusion in this regard.199 In Planché v Braham200 
the expression “representation” was held to mean “the bringing forward on stage or place of 
dramatic representation”, including the singing of one or more songs from a theatrical piece.201 Yet 
the fact that the terms “represent” and “perform” were used interchangeably in relation to both 
dramatic works and musical compositions begs the question why a musical composition not 
intended for or performed on stage or “place of dramatic representation” would be considered to be 
a “dramatic piece”.202  
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Regarding the charge of confusion in English law relating to these concepts the writer is not alone. 
Writing in 1912 Bowker made this observation: 
The English law as to dramatic and musical copyright and playright and performing right, has been 
most confusing if not contradictory, and authorities differ, as do MacGillivray and Scrutton, in its 
interpretation.
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As McFarlane has observed, by the mid-nineteenth century there was a “general dissatisfaction with 
the whole condition of the law of copyright”, which is why a Copyright Commission was convened in 
1875/6 under the chairmanship of Lord John Manners to address the issue.204 McFarlane 
specifically mentions the “restricted operation of the performing rights” as being one area of 
dissatisfaction leading to the formation of the Commission205 – confirming the view expressed in this 
discussion. McFarlane reports that “[a]t the end conclusion of their deliberations [the 
Commissioners] handed down a searing indictment on the state of the law” and the treatment of the 
rights of “printed publication” and “public performance” in particular; prompting McFarlane to 
observe: “… [I]t is doubtful whether the extent of the concepts involved was fully understood at the 
time.”  The writer’s contention is that at least in respect of the performing right, the nuances relating 
thereto were not fully understood or appreciated. During the hearings conducted as part of this 
Commission, it was submitted that it was not clear, in relation to the protection of musical 
compositions under the 1842 Act (the Talfourd’s Act) 
whether the draftsman of the 1842 Act intended this only to apply to dramatico-musical works such as 
operas, but it does appear that the interpretation that was being put on it was that all musical works at 
this time were caught, if the performance were in a place of dramatic entertainment.
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This makes it clear that the ambit of the performing right as contemplated in British copyright law 
prior to the enactment of the Copyright Act, 1911 was of a limited and confused state.207 Because of 
                                                                                                                                                              
v Martin because the statute made it clear that certain performances at certain places (e.g. private and domestic 
performances), thus a representation had to be a “public” representation, i.e. “a representation to which any portion of the 
public are freely admitted with or without payment.” In the case Bowen LJ acknowledged (at 849): “We have to construe a 
statute which it is not easy to interpret; the subject matter is difficult, and the words used are vague.” The court’s emphas is 
on a representation having to be a “public representation” was nevertheless a precursor to the modern understanding of 
the right of public performance and would be used to expand on this concept. See for example Harms Ltd and Chappell v 
Martans Club Ltd [1927] Ch 526 where Duck v Bates was applied and Jennings v Stephens [1936] Ch 469 where it was 
distinguished.  In the United States it seems that a better understanding of the concept of “dramatic composition” existed 
around the time of Wall v Taylor. In the case of Fuller v Bemis, related by Bowker Copyright 177 – 178 the US Circuit Court 
in New York held that a dramatic composition had to “tell some story”, further observing: “The plot may be simple … but it 
must repeat or mimic some action, speech, emotion, passion, or character, real or imaginary. A series of graceful 
movements, combined with an attractive arrangement of drapery, lights, and shadows, telling no story, portraying no 
character, depicting no emotion, is not a dramatic composition.” 
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this state of affairs it has been observed that “only the owners of the performing right in what were 
felt to be unarguably dramatic works were attempting to enforce that right.”208 In other instances no 
confusion existed: it was expressly argued that petits droits, while recognised and used in France 
were not suitable for England and were “impossible” there – a situation of “autres pays, autres 
moeurs”.209 This attitude was perpetuated by the activities of Harry Wall,210 who had used 
                                                                                                                                                              
Fuller v Blackpool Winter Gardens [1895] 2 Q.B. 429, where the court confirmed the judgment of the lower court that a 
song sung in character costume was not a dramatic piece – thus curtailing the prevailing trend where musical 
compositions seen as being meant for the stage, whether theatre or music hall, would be deemed to be dramatic pieces. In 
the case Esther MR observed that the determining factor for whether a song is a dramatic piece or not is the “character of 
the composition when it was first written and published”, arguing: “If the dress of the singer could have that operation, the 
singer and not the author of the song would be the person who caused it to be a dramatic piece.” The court reviewed the 
previous cases where songs were held to be dramatic pieces and (quite defensively) observed that it was “not necessary 
to determine whether each of these cases was rightly decided or whether the reasons given in each for holding the song to 
be a dramatic piece [were] satisfactory”, arguing that each case had to be decided on its own attendant circumstances. For 
a song to be a dramatic piece, Smith LJ observed, “it must be such a song that for its proper representation, acting, and 
possibly scenery, formed a necessary ingredient”. Emphasis added. Thus it appears that at this stage a clearer distinction 
between the grand droit (in the form of a dramatico-musical work) and the petit droit (in the form of non-dramatic musical 
works) was beginning to develop. As MacGillivray A Treatise Upon the Law of Copyright 209 has observed: “There must 
be more than the dramatic flavour, there must be the dramatic form; that is to say, the work must be so constructed as to 
be obviously intended for reproduction by means of acting with scenic effect.” Emphasis added. The word “reproduction” 
used here is perhaps better expressed by the word “adaptation” – but adaptation was not, at this stage, an identified act of 
exploitation of a copyright work.      
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underhanded means to enforce the performing right in musical works. Wall’s activities led to 
widespread antagonism to the system of performing rights in musical works, “soured public opinion 
for a generation, and perpetuated opposition to its future use, however restrained and 
scrupulous”.211  
Wall’s unscrupulous actions formed part of the evidence given during the 1875/6 Copyright 
Commission and eventually led to the enactment of two statutes, namely the Copyright (Musical 
Compositions) Act 1882 and the Copyright (Musical Compositions) Act 1888. On face value these 
statutes appeared to lend credence to the performing right in musical works; this can be seen as 
one positive outcome from Wall’s controversial practices, where in reaction the performing right was 
brought to the spotlight and parliament was forced to closely consider it. The Preamble to the 1882 
Act made it explicit that it was enacted to “to amend the law relating to copyright in musical 
compositions, and to protect the public from vexatious proceedings for the recovery of penalties for 
the unauthorised performance of the same” – an unequivocal reference to Wall’s dubious activities. 
A prominent feature of the 1882 Act was its requirement (sections 1 – 3) that, if the owner of a 
performing right wanted to exercise (i.e. retain) the performing right, he was obliged to ensure that a 
notice stating that the performing right was reserved was printed on the title page of every published 
copy of the musical work.212 What would prove to be a shortcoming of the Act was the fact that it 
applied in respect of compositions first published after the passage of the Act. 
A further provision (section 4) related to the fact that, where the plaintiff failed to recover more than 
the statutory penalty contemplated in the 1833 Act, the cost payable would be at the discretion of 
the trial judge. This was seen as a measure to deter Wall and others like him from pursuing his 
vexatious litigation at the pain of not being able to recover his costs. It has however been observed 
that this objective was not achieved as Wall “appear to have been fairly active in the country courts”, 
at times using the strategy of instituting multiple infringement actions which enabled him to recover 
more than the minimum statutory penalty, thus, it appears, escaping the provisions of section 4 of 
the 1833 Act (as the provision appears to have been applicable only where he was not able to 
recover the minimum penalty fee).213 As a consequence, the Copyright (Musical Compositions) Act 
1888 was enacted to deal with this loophole, and in its preamble made it explicit that it was 
“expedient to further amend the law relating to copyright in musical compositions and to further 
protect the public from vexatious proceedings for the recovery of penalties for the unauthorised 
performance of the same”, thus recognising the persisting activities of Wall.  
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In section 1 the 1888 Act made it explicit that, despite the provisions of the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act, the 
penalty or damages for the unauthorised performance of a musical composition was at the absolute 
discretion of the trial judge, and that if the justice of the case so demanded, the judge could award 
an amount less than the penalty stipulated in the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act or even award a nominal fee. 
The Act also made it explicit that it applied in respect of works published both before and after its 
passage, thus preventing a situation where the unscrupulous activities of Wall and his ilk would 
continue unabated in respect of works published before the Act. The Act further dealt a blow to Wall 
by exempting certain persons from liability for infringement of the performing right, namely the 
proprietor, tenant or occupier of any place where an unauthorised performance took place, unless 
such person wilfully caused or permitted the unauthorised performance and knew that the 
performance was unauthorised (section 4).214  
These amendments finally put an end to Wall’s activities, but, it has been observed, also “put an end 
to the effective operation of the performing right”, which Wall had exploited “to the fullest permissible 
limit” – with composers, who were intended to be the beneficiaries of the system, suffering the 
most.215 It had to take changes in the manner in which music was being consumed in the United 
Kingdom, largely as a result of piracy and technological developments, to change the mind-sets of 
music publishers to be more welcoming to the significance of the performing right. The advent of the 
gramophone at the turn of the twentieth century greatly reduced the demand for concert-hall 
entertainment; this, coupled with the ease with which sheet music could be “photographed or 
lithographed” and sold cheaply by street hawkers resulted in great losses for the music 
publishers.216 This prompted parliament to pass the Musical (Summary Proceedings) Copyright Act 
of 1902, which gave powers of seizure and destruction of pirated copies. The effectiveness of the 
legislation was however, limited as it made no provision for criminal sanctions. Another problem was 
the difficulty in finding “any substantial person” to proceed against for infringement.217 In 
desperation, members of the Music Publishers Association made an announcement in April 1905 
that they would no longer accept music for publication nor enter into new agreements for the 
payment of singers of new publications.218  
This situation led to the passing of the Musical Copyright Act 1906, which introduced criminal 
sanctions for printing, reproducing, selling, exposing or offering or possessing for sale any printed 
copies of sheet music, or possessing any plates for purposes of making unauthorised copies of such 
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music. Police were authorised to enter premises and to search for pirated copies. While the piracy 
legislation was effective in stamping out piracy and in fact persisted until it was repealed in the 1956 
Copyright Act, the advent of mechanical reproduction of musical works using the new gramophone 
technology meant that sheet music sales was no longer a viable source of revenue for the music 
publishers. This “acted … to bring to an end the complaisant attitude of the music industry to the 
performing right”, so that both music publishers and composers “began to think of the performing 
right as a possible source of income.”219 At the time Britain was thinking seriously about introducing 
reforms to its copyright laws, particularly as a result of its involvement in the preparatory work of the 
Berne Convention of 1886.220  
While Britain ratified the Berne Convention in December 1887, this did not give rise to a 
comprehensive reform of UK copyright law. It was the 1908 revision of the Berne Convention in 
Berlin (the Berlin Act) that prompted the formation of a Copyright Committee in 1909 to consider and 
make recommendations to UK copyright law to ensure compliance with the Berne Convention.221 
The 1909 Committee studied the text of the Berlin Act article by article, and in the end 
recommended the enactment of an Act to consolidate and amend UK copyright law in conformity 
with the requirements of the Berne Convention. Accordingly the Copyright Act 1911 received royal 
assent on 16 December 1911, repealing all previous legislation relating to copyright with the 
exception of the Musical (Summary Proceedings) Copyright Act of 1902 and the Musical Copyright 
Act 1906 and a section from the Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862. More relevantly, section 1(2) of the 
new Act introduced a simple and more effective right of performing the work in public, without 
encumbering it with convoluted concepts like “representation”, “place of dramatic entertainment” and 
“dramatic piece”. This development made it easy for the aptly-named Performing Right Society 
(PRS), one of the world’s major performing rights societies today, to be formed in 1914.222  
2.2.2.3 A Closer Consideration of the History of Collective Management of Copyright in 
Musical Works 
In the foregoing discussion we alluded to the fact that the right of public performance was, from the 
early days, construed within the system of collective management. In much later times and through 
the influence of technology the right of reproduction (in the form of the mechanical right) would also 
be largely administered through the system of collective management.223 It is important, in 
completing this chapter on the historical development of music copyright, to also consider the 
historical development of the system of collective management of rights.  
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(a) The Historical Development of the Collective Management of Public Performance Rights 
As alluded to earlier, the well-rehearsed history of the system of collective management of copyright 
traces the origin of the system to 18th century France. At the centre of the quest for the recognition of 
authors’ rights and the organising of authors into a formidable collective force was the versatile 
Pierre Augustin Caron de Beaumarchais – author, playwright, musician, publisher and many other 
things.224 This earlier quest was concerned with the public performance of musical works in the 
dramatic field. Beaumarchais contested the fact that actors, rather than authors, held a prominent 
position within the Comédie Française – the French state theatre which “held a monopoly on the 
performance of plays” and “pressured authors to abandon their rights.”225 Beaumarchais argued that 
an author should be associated with the revenues generated by such author’s work in the work’s 
economic life, and on this basis he, together with twenty other writers, created a bureau of theatre 
legislation (Bureau de legislation dramatique) in 1777, which gave rise to a collection agency, 
Agence Framery.226 This agency evolved into the Société des Auteurs et Compositeurs Dramatiques 
(SACD) in 1829, essentially “the first society dealing with collective management of authors’ rights”, 
which at the time related to the rights of authors of plays and other dramatic works.227  
Using his strong political connections, Beaumarchais’s struggle for the recognition of authors’ rights 
yielded fruits in 1791, when France passed the first law on author’s rights, thus recognising the 
concept of authors’ rights “for the first time anywhere in the world.”228 The 1791 law, which 
recognised the right of public performance, was followed in 1793 by a law recognising the authors’ 
rights of reproduction.229 Equally enamouring, albeit sobering, is the history of collective 
management in the area of musical works. The importance of collective management in this area 
had become more and more apparent - in spite of it being understood that the laws of 1791 and 
1793 applied to musical works, promoters of concerts and other music users (e.g. theatre owners) 
continued to publish musical works without authorisation and to perform the works without paying 
compensation to the authors.230 The stated reason for this is that the composers “[found] it 
impossible to keep an account of all the occasions and places at which their works were played.”231 
This is the very need that collective management was designed to solve. As further observed: 
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There was nothing that the rights owners could do individually to protect themselves, so their only 
recourse was to set up an association whose aim was to create a centralized collection and 
distribution mechanism to ensure that its members received fair remuneration for the use of their 
works.
232
 
The opportunity to do so came from an unsuspecting incident, in what has been called a “piquant 
slice of French social history.”233 It seemed like any other day when, in 1847, Ernest Bourget, a 
composer, went to Les Ambassadeurs, a concert café, to order sugar water.234 While there, Bourget 
was infuriated to notice that some of his compositions were being performed without his 
authorisation and without compensation, while he himself was required to pay an inflated fee for the 
sugar water 235 Consequently he refused to pay for the sugar water unless he himself was paid for 
the performance of his compositions. When the manager of Les Ambassadeurs refused to do so, 
Bourget successfully brought action against the café at the business court of the Seine (Tribunal de 
Commerce de la Seine) , and Les Ambassadeurs was prevented from using Bourget’s compositions 
without compensation and its manager ordered to pay a substantial sum of damages.236   
Armed with this victory, Bourget, with the assistance of others,237 formed a union, the Agence 
Centrale pour la Perception des droits des Auteurs et Compositeurs de Musique in 1850, which 
evolved in 1851 into the first collecting society in respect of musical works, Société des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs et Editeurs des Musique (SACEM), one of the largest performing rights societies in 
the world today. In this regard Ficsor has observed: 
Great new possibilities were opened for composers and text-writers of non-dramatic musical works by 
that court decision. It was clear, however, that they would not be able to control and enforce their 
newly identified rights individually. That realization led to the foundation of … the still functioning … 
SACEM …”
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In this regard it is important to note that the formation of SACEM, and other performing rights 
societies that were formed afterwards, signalled, for the first time, the advent of a system of “fully 
developed collective management”.239 Neither SACD, in the area of dramatic works, or SGDL in the 
area of literary works, were fully-fledged CMOs.240 To date, the fullest system of collective 
management is that represented by authors’ performing rights societies.241 Thus although collective 
management of mechanical rights is an important area in the collective management of musical 
works, it too is not a system of full collective management.242 This is an important observation that 
needs to be taken into account by policy makers, legislatures and courts in Africa and other 
developing countries when seeking to understand the operations of CMOs.243  
After the formation of SACEM in France similar CMOs sprang up in other European countries. 
These include SIAE in Italy (1882); AKM in Austria (1897); the predecessor to SGAE in Spain (1899) 
and the predecessor to GEMA in Germany (1903).244 SACEM “became the prototype for all such 
organizations”245 In this regard it has been curtly observed that “SACEM … had no counterpart 
anywhere in the world up to the last years of the 19th century.”246 The system of collective 
management arrived even much later in the Anglo-American world, with both ASCAP (USA) and the 
PRS (UK)247 formed in 1914.248 Prior to this SACEM had operations in the UK through appointed 
agents, albeit in respect of the performance of foreign and not British music.249 Other performing 
rights societies were formed in Poland (1918); Czechoslovakia (1919); Uruguay (1919); Belgium 
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(1922); Sweden (1923); Switzerland (1923); Canada (1925) and Portugal (1925),250 amongst others, 
culminating in the formation of CISAC251 in 1926. In this regard it has been observed: 
Cooperation developed rapidly among those organizations through bilateral contracts of mutual 
representation of each other’s repertoires, and they felt the need for an international body to 
coordinate their activities and contribute to a more efficient protection of authors’ rights throughout the 
world.
252
  
McFarlane observes that it was the Italian society SIAE, which represented both dramatic and non-
dramatic musical works, that “brought together representatives of societies operating in both these 
fields” to form CISAC, which was “open to all societies operating in the field of authors rights.”253 The 
formation of CISAC was a major milestone in the collective management of authors’ rights. As has 
been observed: “The fundamental objective of CISAC member societies – their basic rationale and 
very raison d’être – is collective management of authors’ rights.”254 According to its statutes, CISAC 
is “an international, non-governmental, not for profit organisation” domiciled in France.255 The role of 
CISAC in organising authors’ societies worldwide and in promoting the efficient administration of 
authors’ rights is evident from its stated purposes.256 Today CISAC is comprised of 239 (two 
hundred and thirty nine) member societies in 121 (one hundred and twenty one) countries, and can 
correctly make the claim of being “the world’s leading network of authors’ societies.”257  
(b) The Historical Development of the Collective Management of Mechanical Rights 
Alongside performing rights societies, mechanical rights societies have played a pivotal role in the 
collective management of musical works. The concern here relates to the reproduction of musical 
works. This development happened against the backdrop of the well-known decision of the US 
Supreme Court in the case of White-Smith Music Publishing Company v Appollo Company, decided 
earlier in the year.258 As discussed in Chapter 3 infra, the Supreme Court in this case refused to 
recognise the authors’ right to authorise the mechanical reproduction of musical works by means of 
piano players and player pianos. The US Congress was swift in responding,259 enacting the US 
Copyright Act, 1909, which introduced the concept of mechanical rights in US copyright law, 
securing copyright in the exploitation of musical works through “the parts of instruments serving to 
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reproduce mechanically the musical work.”260 Two years later the UK followed suit through the 
enactment of the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911.261  
It can be contended that the embracing of mechanical rights in the Anglo-American world greatly 
boosted the nascent field of mechanical rights and served to profile it internationally, as these 
markets unquestionably shaped and championed the new music recording industry.262 Because the 
recording industry became more active and effective in the Anglo-American world, it was only 
natural that the mechanical right would thrive better in these markets, just as the performing right 
had found its best expression in Continental Europe.263  Nevertheless, France’s role is the 
development of collective management in the area of mechanical rights cannot be ignored. It is 
reported that after Vives won the case for the recognition of mechanical rights in France, he 
successfully instituted other cases against record companies and began collecting mechanical 
royalties. He eventually sold his agency to one Vaseille, who founded a collecting society named 
Societe Generale de L’Edition Phonographique (EDIFO).264 Vaseille in turn sold his shares in EDIFO 
to one George Delavenne, credited with “building a really effective and far-reaching organization.”265  
Thus EDIFO is credited with helping to form the Mechanical Copyright Licences Company 
(MECOLICO) in the UK, which was formed “in anticipation of the Copyright Act of 1911”;266 
furthermore, EDIFO established branches in Turin, New York and Buenos Aires and formed 
AMMRE in Berlin.267 In 1924 MECOLICO merged with the Copyright Protection Society (CPS) to 
form the Mechanical-Copyright Protection Society (MCPS), the UK mechanical rights society which 
is still in existence today.268 Particularly, under the directorship of Alphonse Tournier, who “spread 
the gospel of mechanical rights throughout Europe”, EDIFO helped form mechanical rights societies 
in Switzerland, Scandinavia, Yugoslavia, Belgium and Romania.269 It can however be said that it 
was the formation of BIEM270 as a pan-European collecting agency in 1927, with Tournier as its 
director, that represents the zenith of EDIFO’s exploits.271  
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After the formation of BIEM EDIFO started to experience a downward spiral. This was particularly as 
a result of declining revenues due to the negative impact of the Great Depression on the recording 
industry; and concerns from members regarding the management and financial strategy of 
EDIFO.272 This led to the liquidation of EDIFO in 1935, with the Union Syndicale de Defense 
Professionelle des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs (USACE), formed earlier as a result of 
dissatisfaction with the running of EDIFO, taking over much of the repertoire once administered by 
EDIFO.273 USACE formed the Societe Civile des Auteurs, Compositeurs et Editeurs pour le Controle 
des Droits de Reproduction Mecanique (ACE), which, with the assistance of SACEM, evolved into 
the extant Societe pour L’Administration du Droit de Reproduction Mecanique des Auteurs, 
Compositeurs et Editeurs (SDRM),274 formed in 1935.275 Of this organisation it was noted:  
The creation of [SDRM] was the culmination of a protracted and often frustrating fight with the 
emergent French recording industry to secure for rights owners payment for the mechanical 
reproduction of their works.
276
 
It has been noted that this fight ‘“involved a peaceful revolution” at the end of which the concept of 
mechanical rights was implanted, “discreetly, peacefully but profoundly” in people’s minds.’277 As 
indicated above, EDIFO helped found MECOLICO in the UK, which eventually led to the founding of 
the MCPS, and also established a branch in New York. In the United States however it is the Harry 
Fox Agency278 that has played a prominent role in the administration of mechanical rights. The 
predecessor to the Harry Fox Agency was formed in 1927 by the National Music Publishers’ 
Association (NMPA, formerly the Music Publishers’ Protective Association, itself founded in 1917 to 
prevent the practice of music publishers having to give payola to vaudeville theatres for performing 
their music279).280 When the agency was first formed it was only concerned with the administration of 
the publishers’ synchronisation rights in relation to the use of musical works in films.  In 1936 the 
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activities of the agency were extended to include the licensing of electrical transcriptions of radio 
programs, and in 1938 this was extended to include the licensing of mechanical rights in sound 
recordings.281  
An anecdotal account associates the name Harry Fox Agency to a Russian immigrant named Harry 
Fox, a man who entered the music publishing business in 1906 and later worked for the Music 
Publishers’ Protective Association as a clerk, handling synchronisation rights.282 Fox was eventually 
“given the task of licensing recordings, collecting mechanical royalties, and then distributing those 
royalties to the appropriate publishers – along with continuing the other services the NMPA had 
already instituted.”283 In this regard it is stated: 
By 1938, Harry Fox had been elevated to the position of General Manager for the NMPA … Over time, 
the administration of these duties [i.e. mechanical rights licensing] became associated with him, and 
the area was collectively known as the Harry Fox Office. He remained the head of the company until 
his death in 1969, after which the Harry Fox Agency was officially incorporated as a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of the NMPA …
284
 
The operations of the NMPA and the Harry Fox Agency were henceforth “merged” until the Harry 
Fox Agency was again separately managed in the year 2000.285 Meanwhile the Harry Fox Agency 
relinquished its administration of synchronisation rights, handing the function back to the publishers 
themselves, and only continued with mechanical licensing and other functions such as reciprocal 
representation of rights within the BIEM and CISAC systems.286 It has recently been announced that 
the Harry Fox Agency was acquired by SESAC, one of the three US performing rights societies287 - 
thus ending over eighty years of the NMPA’s control of the agency.288  
As concluding remarks for this section it would be useful to highlight certain notable differences 
between the collective management of performing rights and that of mechanical rights, in particular 
in the Anglo-American system. In the first instance it can be said that while the collective 
management of performing rights often represents a system of “full collective management” of 
rights, as Ficsor terms it – where authors grant to the collecting society “full authorization … to 
exercise their exclusive rights”,289 often based on an assignment of rights – the collective 
management of mechanical rights is often a more limited system of rights administration where the 
rights-holders (often music publishers) retain much control on the exercise of the rights.290 Secondly, 
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and related to the first observation – while the control of music publishers is conspicuous in relation 
to mechanical rights societies,291 it is understood that performing rights societies “[were] founded by 
authors and composers who had then ‘admitted the publishers’”, thus making it necessary “‘not [to] 
curtail the benefits of authors and composers’”.  Thus the CISAC Statutes and Professional Rules 
make it mandatory for authors (creators) to be admitted as members of a performing rights 
society.292  
In light of the foregoing, performing rights societies (PROs) have thus typically been termed 
“authors’ societies”, and in this regard it has been observed: “The raison d’étre of an author’s society 
is the collective management of authors’ rights.”293 In this regard the system of reciprocal 
representation of the rights of authors across the world – where one PRO enters into reciprocal 
agreements with other CISAC-member PROs, to represent the rights of their members in its territory 
and for them to represent the rights of its members in their territories – is more prevalent and 
established in the performing rights environment.294 In contrast, the prevalent practice in the Anglo-
American system is that mechanical rights societies may only enter into reciprocal agreements in 
relation to the rights they administer if the publisher has specifically mandated the collecting society 
to do so, or where the author is not signed to a publisher.295 
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2.3 Conclusion 
In the foregoing discussion the writer traced the early development of music copyright from its 
existence as part of the Medieval system of royal privileges, culminating in the formal recognition of 
the copyright system with the passing of the Statute of Anne. The discussion particularly highlighted 
the divergent courses followed by French and British law in this development. In this regard it was 
demonstrated that, while England was the architect of the copyright system and the reproduction 
right in printed works, France championed the development of the performing right. The year 1777 
was an important one in this history, with the right of public performance (albeit, at this stage, in 
relation to dramatic and dramatico-musical works) being cemented in France and the right of printing 
and publishing musical compositions being recognised in England.  
More conspicuously, the study highlighted the historical struggle of English copyright law to 
formulate a clear understanding of the proper contours of music copyright in general, and a proper 
understanding of the ambit of the performing right in musical works, in particular. In part because of 
the influence of the Dramatic Literary Property Act, 1833 (the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act), it would appear 
that musical works were framed within the construct of dramatico-musical works and thus for some 
time, protection would not be granted until a musical composition was also performed in a “place of 
dramatic entertainment”. The enactment of the Literary Property Act, 1842 (the Talfourd’s Act) and 
subsequent legislation did not succeed in resolving the problem, and not until 1911 was the matter 
resolved. To the contrary, while ambiguity and an improper delineation of the rights involved led to 
an uphill struggle in the formulation of English music copyright law, “the first French literary property 
rights, sufficiently well-defined and broad in scope, remained in their almost original formulation for 
more than one hundred and fifty years.”296  
When one man, Harry Wall, dared to exercise a proper performing right in musical works in England, 
this was based on ulterior motives and was thus mired in controversy, engendering public apathy.297 
The legislature’s response to this was short of exemplary, being reactive rather than principled and 
thus further crippling the proper development of the performing right. It was left to the Imperial 
Copyright Act, 1911, to usher a new era for the protection and proper delineation of copyright in 
musical works and the amalgamation of the performing right with the system of music copyright. 
Wall’s effect on the development of the performing right in England, to be felt for some time 
thereafter, is attributable to the hostilities and difficulties experienced by the PRS in its initial attempt 
to enforce the performing right. In this regard it has been stated: 
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He more than any other single reason explains the time lag between the commencement of the 
collection of royalties in their respective countries for French and British composers.
298
 
We then reflected on the origins and development of the system of collective management of 
copyright, when it dawned upon rights-holders that the effective enforcement of their newly-won 
rights could only be realised through joint effort. We noted in this regard the slow pace in the 
implementation of the system of collective management of copyright in the United Kingdom as 
compared to the position in France; and the reasons that informed this situation. Collective 
management of rights in musical works was eventually to become a formidable system of rights 
management by rights-holders which remains extant, vibrant and potent to this day. In this regard it 
has been observed that “[f]or many authors / composers in Africa collective management is the only 
system from which they can ever hope to earn royalties.”299 
The historical understanding of the development of music copyright undertaken herein is, it is 
submitted, necessary for the full understanding of the scope of musical copyright today. It is also 
necessary for understanding the reasons for the manner in which music copyright is currently dealt 
with. While going back to Medieval times in order to understand this historical development might 
appear excessive, we can, in this regard, agree with the words of Windeyer J in Attorney-General 
(Vict) v Commonwealth:300 
We are concerned with the law of to-day, not with the law of the Middle Ages. The only reason for 
going back into the past is to come forward to the present, to help us to see more clearly the shape of 
the law to-day by seeing how it took shape.  
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Chapter 3: The Further Development of Music Copyright: The 
Role of Technological Developments and the Imperial Copyright 
Act  
“Sound policy, as well as history, supports our consistent deference to Congress when major 
technological innovations alter the market for copyrighted materials. Congress has the constitutional 
authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the varied permutations of competing 
interests that are inevitably implicated by such new technology.”1 
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3.1 The Role of Technological Developments in the Further Development 
of the Reproduction Right in Musical Works 
3.1.1 Introduction 
The advancement of technology has always presented problems in relation to the protection of 
copyright and music rights in particular.2 Just as the meaning of “books and other writings” in the 
Statute of Anne was interpreted to extend to printed music in Bach v Longman, and just as the 
meaning of “author” was extended to include a music composer, so it has become necessary over 
the years to extend or re-interpret copyright law to include new forms of musical exploitation.3 Over 
the years various technologies have had a major impact on the development of copyright law. 
Writing on how new forms of reproduction have affected the development of copyright law, Skone 
James has observed: 
Copyright is a right whose legal recognition has closely followed every expansion in the forms of 
reproduction. It originally arose from the creation of the art of printing and, though recognised in 
England as having subsisted at common law, it was not of practical importance until the production of 
printed copies of literary works gave rise to the first Copyright Act in the reign of Queen Anne. The 
production of printed copies of musical notation gave rise to the copyright protection of music and a 
parallel development gave rise to the protection of dramatic works. As a natural consequence of 
protecting the reproduction of musical and dramatic works, followed the protection of performing rights 
in such works. The next development was the creation of mechanical or semi-mechanical means of 
reproducing works … The last development of this kind which had occurred before the Act of 1911 
was the manufacture of gramophone records …
4
 
In the twentieth century the major technologies that have had a major influence on the development 
of copyright law are recording technology, film technology, radio technology and television and video 
technology. An understanding of the historical development of these technologies is useful in 
understanding the concomitant development of copyright law in response to these technological 
developments. Accordingly, a brief account of these technological developments is provided here. 
Thereafter it is shown how these technologies have shaped the development of copyright law, in 
particular the reproduction right. This analysis will be helpful in understanding the full nature of the 
reproduction right in musical works in South Africa today, and the technologies that have shaped the 
development of this right. It needs in this regard to be mentioned that, after it was shaped in this 
manner, the reproduction right in musical works has remained largely unchanged throughout the 
world, especially in common-law jurisdictions.5 It will more particularly highlight how this right is 
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 In this regard Yu 2015 http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2632914 1 observes that “copyright law co-
evolves with changing technological developments [and] its history is naturally filled with repeated challenges to its 
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 See in this regard Carrol 2005 Florida Law Review 907 generally, and at 956 – 961 in particular. 
4
 Skone James 1957 Copyright Soc’y U.S.A. 119 – 120. 
5
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use of the phrases “mechanical right” and “transcription right” – even though music is no longer produced by mechanical 
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applied in the music industry, in particular how the right has been fragmented to cover segments of 
the music reproduction market (e.g. the mechanical reproduction market; the synchronisation market 
etc.)6 – something that one will not be able to appreciate from a simple reading of the Copyright Act.  
3.1.2 An Overview of the Historical Development of Technologies Affecting Music 
Reproduction 
3.1.2.1 The development of recording technology  
In the area of mechanical reproduction, the early technologies that gave rise to the necessity to 
adapt copyright law were: (i) the music box, invented in 1796 by Antoine Favre, a Swiss 
watchmaker; (ii) player pianos,7 popular from the 1800s to the 1920s; and (iii) the phonograph and 
gramophone, developed in the late 1800s.8 In particular because of the increasing use of player 
pianos with their use of perforated rolls instead of sheet (i.e. printed) music, the market for sheet 
music was in the decline during this period. As a result music publishers sought to extend the 
protection given in respect of sheet music, to the new piano rolls.9 It was however, Thomas Edison’s 
invention of the phonograph and Berliner’s subsequent invention of the gramophone that brought 
matters to a head. This situation is well-captured by Copinger, as follows: 
In the year 1886, the date of the Berne Convention, the only mechanical means generally known for 
reproducing music were musical boxes and Barbary organs. When, therefore, at the request of the 
Swiss delegates to the Conference of Powers which preceded that Convention, it was, in the interests 
of a national Swiss industry, declared by Article 3 of the Final Protocol that mechanical reproduction of 
musical airs should be no infringement of copyright, musical composers did not feel that they were 
abandoning rights of any great value to themselves. But when instruments were invented capable of 
reproducing not one or two tunes, but any number of tunes, and even the words of songs, by means 
of perforated rolls, discs and cylinders, and it was found that these evidently supplied a public need 
and met with a ready market, composers became perturbed. …10   
Although the “earliest known” device for producing and reproducing music mechanically – the “Banu 
Musa” or hydraulic / water organ – “remained the basic device to produce and reproduce music 
mechanically until the second half of the nineteenth century”,11 it was Edison’s 1877 invention of the 
cylinder phonograph, itself modelled upon Scott de Martinville’s12 phonautograph of twenty years 
earlier – which revolutionised the industry for the mechanical reproduction of musical works.13 This is 
because while earlier devices could only record music, it was Edison’s invention that introduced the 
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 Kohn and Kohn Music Licensing 720 – 722. 
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technology of replaying the recorded sound.14 Edison’s phonograph was perfected by Emile Berliner, 
who, in 1899, invented the gramophone and replaced Edison’s rotating cylinder phonograph with the 
flat disc vinyl phonograph record. Berliner’s flat disc phonograph record “essentially finalized the 
now-common disc design seen in records everywhere”15 and in fact, signalled the advent of what is 
today a gigantic music recording industry with networks spanning the entire globe.16 The market was 
ripe for the introduction of mechanical rights in musical works.  
3.1.2.2 The development of film technology 
Copyright law was also required to adapt in response to the fledgling film industry, which showed 
itself to be a force to be reckoned with at the turn of the twentieth century.  Although our interest is in 
how film technology impacted upon the development of music rights, it would be important to 
understand how film technology itself evolved to give rise to the need for music rights protection. 
Although films were recognised as a work eligible for copyright protection in their own right as early 
as the 1908 revision of the Berne Convention, the technology for film developed over time. In this 
regard it is important to note that the earlier development of photography was essential in the 
development of cinematography.17 The earliest demonstration of motion picture technology 
happened in California in 1877 through the so-called Muybridge photographs. Eadweard Muybridge, 
an English photographer, used twelve equally-spaced cameras to photograph a galloping horse in a 
sequence of shots in order to demonstrate that at some stage, all four hooves of a galloping horse 
left the ground.18 To counter criticisms, Muybridge gave lectures on animal locomotion throughout 
the United States and Europe, using a zoopraxiscope, “a lantern he developed that projected 
images in rapid succession onto a screen from photographs printed on a rotating glass disc, 
producing the illusion of moving pictures.”19 This was the precursor to the modern cinema.  
Later developments gave rise to single cameras capable of taking a sequence of photographs at 
regular rapid intervals. In this regard the name of Thomas Edison again features, and it is he who is 
credited with inventing the motion picture camera – the Kinetograph – in 1889, although his camera 
in fact relied on earlier technologies.20 The first film projection machine, the Phantoscope, was 
developed by Charles Francis Jenkins with the financial assistance of Thomas Armat.21 Armat, who 
later bought rights to the Phantoscope, perfected his own version of the Phantoscope and later sold 
the rights to manufacture the machine to Thomas Edison. With Edison’s involvement the 
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 Ibid. 
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 Ibid.  
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 For the concept of global networks in respect of the recording industry see Watson 2012 
https://dspace.lboro.ac.uk/dspace-jspui/bitstream/2134/21415/1/Pre-pub%20version%20with%20title%20page.pdf 
generally. (Date of use: 15 October 2017). 
17
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Phantoscope, now marketed as the Edison Vitascope, paved the way for emergence of a viable film 
industry.22 At this stage motion pictures were still “silent pictures” with no synchronised recorded 
sound and with the music “supplied either by a piano player or by an orchestra”.23 
 The development of technology to synchronise recorded sound to films, and in particular the use of 
music in synchronisation with the soundtrack of the film, introduced a new source of income for 
owners of copyright in musical works through the issuing of synchronisation licences, namely the 
permission to synchronise music in timed-relation to the soundtrack of a film.24 This was made 
possible through Warner Bros. Pictures’ Vitaphone system, which they had bought from AT&T and 
used to synchronise music and sound effects in the film, Don Juan in 1926, albeit without speech at 
this stage.25 The inclusion of a presentation of the filmed remarks of Will Hayes, the director of the 
Motion Picture Producers and Distribution Association of America, in the film, and Al Jolson’s 
audible remarks in the 1927 film, The Jazz Singer, marked the birth of “talking pictures” or “talkies”.26 
The development of this technology was described in the case of Alden-Rochelle, Inc., et al v 
American Society of Composers, Authors and Publishers et al27 as follows: 
… At first the sound part of talkies was recorded on phonograph discs which were so operated that 
they synchronized with the pictures projected on the screen on the screen. Later, the speech of the 
actors, the music and sound effects, were recorded on the “sound track” of the film, which paralleled 
the pictures, so that when the pictures were projected on the screen the sound was heard by the 
audience. …
28
 
Film had an early history in South Africa also. A 1910 account refers to a bioscope visit that had 
“such a good reception” that a second visit was organised, paid and proved successful, with the 
pictures “clearly shown …and … free from flicker, being evidently carefully selected.”29 Moreover, 
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the account goes further to show that two theatres existed in the Rand, with the one presenting 
“biograph and vaudeville”, and a new theatre presenting “picture shows and vaudeville” at regular 
intervals, and already “[raking] in the shekels during the holidays.”30  
3.1.2.3 The development of radio technology 
The introduction of radio and television technologies ushered in the high-tech entertainment 
industries of the twentieth century, where recording and film technologies were taking to a higher 
level.31 Recording technology was adapted for radio in the form of electrical transcriptions,32 while 
film technology became the platform for the new television industry. It has been observed that the 
invention of radio technology cannot be ascribed to one person, but rather to “continuous 
contributions from a variety of inventors over the span of time beginning in 1873 to about the start of 
the twentieth century” – beginning with James Clark Maxwell, who introduced the concept of 
electromagnetic energy as a form of energy existing in waves.33  This concept was validated by 
Henrich Hertz, who conducted experiments proving the existence of electromagnetic waves which 
were later termed the Hertzian waves.34 Hertz was nevertheless not interested in the Hertzian waves 
as being a source of communication and “did not appreciate the monumental practical importance of 
his discovery.”35  
It was left to Guglielmo Marconi, credited as being the “father or radio”, to perfect the art of radio 
telegraphy, securing the world’s first patent in this regard in 1896 and later developing the first 
practical radio-signalling system and the first transoceanic transmission.36 In 1906 an American 
inventor, Lee de Forest, invented the vacuum tube (audion), and is credited with contributing to the 
beginning of the electronic age.37 It was the Joseph Horne Company that facilitated the commercial 
use of radios from its primary use as wireless communication for the military. This the company 
achieved by beginning to sell radio receivers through newspaper adverts. This, coupled with the first 
informal transmission of sports results, music and talk by Frank Conrad in the early 1920’s from a 
make-shift “radio station” located at his garage, became the breeding ground for American 
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broadcasting.38 In South Africa it has been observed that the history of broadcasting “can be traced 
back to 1923, when the first wireless broadcast was made in Johannesburg”, leading eventually to 
the formation of the national broadcaster, the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).39 
3.1.2.4 The development of television and video technology 
Early television technology was based on radio technology and used the model for broadcast 
radio.40 In this regard it has been observed that “the period of transition from radio to television that 
is associated with the 1950s in western countries saw the wholesale recycling of radio programmes 
as the basis for new television shows.”41 Prior to this the Russian, Boris Rosing, had experimented 
with the technology of transmitting images in the early 1900s, with John Logie Baird and Charles 
Francis Jenkins developing a system of mechanical television in the early 1920s.42 It was however, 
the demonstration of electronic television in 1927, when Philo Taylor Farnsworth successfully 
scanned images with a beam of electrons, that marked the beginning of modern television.43 The 
Radio Corporation of America (RCA), which had dominated radio, invested in the development of 
electronic television and made its first regular television broadcasts in 1939, during which year it 
also started selling television sets.44 It was only around 1949 however, that commercial television 
began in earnest.45  
Synchronisation technology played a major role in the development of television, just as it did in the 
case of film.46 While it has been said that at its early development television, like radio in the 1920’s, 
“initially traded on being a live medium” – essentially “radio with pictures” – “[i]t did not take 
broadcasters long … to realise that they needed a method of recording content ‘offline’ for 
subsequent transmission, and of recording live broadcasts for future use.”47 This is where 
synchronisation became relevant. Television producers began to increasingly rely on film-originated 
material and recorded film-based television programming capable of being used at different times. 
Telecine technology using the telecine machine for transferring motion-picture film into video 
became crucial for non-live television programming.48 Music inevitably became an integral part of 
synchronised television programming, and this trend came to a head during the era of “music 
television” in the 1980s, championed by MTV.49 It has been observed that television has transformed 
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radio’s content and role; and although broadcast radio remained “the most widely available 
electronic mass medium in the world”, its importance has not matched that of television.50  
The development of video technology is very much related to the development of television 
technology. Video technology itself is a relatively-new invention, coming to the fore when the 
television industry started using videos in the late 1950s.51 Earlier video cameras were huge 
machines mounted on wheeled pedestals and comprised of vacuum tubes that could get extremely 
hot.52 Over time the cameras became smaller and portable, culminating in the VHS and Betamax 
tape formats of the 1970s and the “camcorders” of the 1980s.53 Under UK law in terms of the 
Imperial Copyright Act it has been observed that a video tape recording would be protectable under 
the Act as a series of photographs on the ground of it being produced by “a process analogous to 
photography”, since both processes use a process of light “to produce a permanent record of an 
image.”54 In the United States the so-called Betamax case55 provides a good illustration of how the 
introduction of technology – in this case video technology – has often created tension with regard to 
copyright protection. When Sony developed the Betamax video tape recording format in the 1970s 
the television networks were concerned that these videotape recorders (VTRs) facilitated the home 
recording by VTR consumers of television programmes in which they held copyright.  
In 1976 Universal Studios and Walt Disney Productions instituted proceedings in the US District 
Court for the Central District of California. They sought no relief from the Betamax consumers but 
alleged that Sony and the distributors of the VTRs were liable for copyright infringement because of 
their marketing of the VTRs. They thus sought money damages and an equitable accounting of 
profits from Sony et al, as well as an injunction against the manufacture and distribution of the 
Betamax VTR.56 In 1979 the District court ruled in favour of the Betamax manufactures, denying 
relief to the television networks. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit overruled the District court’s decision, 
ruling that Sony et al were liable for contributory infringement of copyright.57 Upon appealing to the 
US Supreme Court, the court, in a narrow majority (5-4) held in favour of Sony et al, ruling that 
private, non-commercial time shifting58 at home amounted to fair use and thus did not infringe 
copyright. The court made the following important observations in relation to the interaction of 
technology with copyright law: 
                                                                                                                                                              
“filmed insert,” “promotional film or clip or video or simply promo,” “song video or clip,” “film clip”) go back as far as the 
beginnings of film, mainly created as a marketing device to promote the sales of a song or a film. However, in the 1980s, 
driven by MTV’s use of them, they gained a higher status as a form of artistic expression worthy of consideration 
completely on their own merits, beyond their value for marketing.” 
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… From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in response to significant changes in 
technology. Indeed, it was the invention of a new form of copying equipment – the printing press – that 
gave rise to the original need for copyright protection. Repeatedly, as new developments have 
occurred … it has been Congress that has fashioned the new rules that new technology made 
necessary. …
59
   
In the dissenting judgment a history of US copyright law and how it was extended to provide 
protection for new forms of usages, and the impact of new technology in general, was recounted: 
This Nation’s initial copyright statute was passed by the First Congress. Entitled “An Act for the 
encouragement of learning,” it gave an author “the sole right and liberty of printing, reprinting, 
publishing and vending” his “map, chart, book or books” for a period of 14 years. … Since then, as the 
technology available to authors for creating and preserving their writings has changed, the governing 
statute has changed with it. By many amendments, and by complete revisions in 1831, 1870, 1909, 
and 1976, authors’ rights have been expanded to provide protection to any “original works of 
authorship fixed in any tangible medium of expression,” including “motion pictures and other 
audiovisual works.” …
60
   
Proof of actual harm, or even probable harm, may be impossible in an area where the effect of a new 
technology is speculative, and requiring such proof would present the “real danger … of confining the 
scope of an author’s rights on the basis of the present technology so that, as the years go by, his 
copyright loses much of its value because of unforeseen technical advances.” … When the use is one 
that creates no benefit to the public at large, copyright protection should not be denied on the basis 
that a new technology that may result in harm has not yet done so. …
61
 
3.1.3 The Further Development of the Reproduction Right in Response to Technological 
Developments 
3.1.3.1 The Development of the Mechanical Right - a Response to Recording Technology 
(a) The Recognition of the Mechanical Right in France and in International Law 
In Chapter 2 an account was given of how the performing right took root and flourished in France, as 
compared to the situation in Britain. It was also pointed out that the market for printed music and 
print rights was not as successful in France, and in this regard the Anglo-American world took the 
lead. What is also evident is that, unlike in the case of performing rights, developments regarding 
the recognition of authors’ rights in the area of mechanical reproduction (as opposed to the manual 
copying of sheet music) also had a late arrival, not only in France but elsewhere also. In France 
attempts to construe the law of 1793 as being also applicable to mechanical reproduction faced 
resistance.62 France had entered into a commercial treaty with Switzerland dated 30 June 1864, in 
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which it undertook to pass a law to exclude mechanical reproductions from the ambit of the 1793 
decree.63 This law was passed in 1866. In this regard the following has been noted: 
The process of winning recognition of the fact that mechanical reproduction of copyright works in 
France was covered by the decree of 1793 was also complex and protracted. In May, 1866, at the 
behest of a Swiss government anxious to protect its developing music box industry, the French 
government passed a law which provided that the manufacture and sale of instruments which 
mechanically reproduced music in the private domain did not constitute an unauthorized use and was 
not in breach of the law of 1793.
64
  
The terms of this 1866 law found their way into the Berne Convention when it was enacted in 
1886.65 In this regard the Final Protocol of the 1886 Convention stated under No. 3, after an 
“animated discussion”: 
It is understood that the manufacture and sale of instruments for the mechanical reproduction of 
musical works in which copyright subsists shall not be considered as constituting an infringement of 
musical copyright.
66
 
At the 1896 Paris revision of the Berne Convention the question of the authors’ rights to authorise 
the mechanical reproduction of the works again came to the fore. In explaining the rationale for the 
granting of immunity in respect of mechanical reproduction of copyright in the Final Protocol of the 
1886 Convention the French delegation observed that  
the Berne Convention had in mind those instruments which included their own notation and had a 
reproduction capability limited to certain airs. The immunity should not … apply in fairness to 
instruments which were capable of playing an infinite number of airs by introducing – in the form of 
perforated cards – notations which are external to them, movable and unlimited in number. There was 
no longer a fusion between instrument and notation, the latter being but an edition in a particular form, 
which could not be lawful without the author’s consent.
67
 
Presumably the Swiss music box fell within the category of instruments where “there was … fusion 
between instrument and notation”. Since then however there had been wide-reaching technological 
developments in the area of mechanical reproduction of musical works, where indeed the 
instruments manufactured involved “notations which [were] external to them”. Berliner’s perfection of 
the phonograph by introducing the flat disc phonograph revolutionised recording technology and in 
essence paved the way for the development of the modern recording industry. In light of this 
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development it is reported that a retired French tax official named Vives instituted proceedings 
against Pathe-Marconi, a recording company, on behalf of a group of music publishers, in 1903, 
under the conviction that France’s 1866 law did not apply in respect of music recordings. Vives 
argued that records were not “mechanical instruments” but “[constituted] a form of musical 
reproduction which was covered by the law of 1793.”68 The music publishers had authorised Vives to 
administer their mechanical reproduction rights, at his own risk, in return for forty percent of any 
proceeds derived from that. Vives lost the 1903 proceedings and appealed in 1905, succeeding on 
appeal. Regarding this it has been noted: 
This decision constituted the first recognition by French jurisprudence that royalties were due to rights 
owners for the mechanical reproduction of their works on phonographic cylinders and discs – a major 
advance on the Berne Convention of 1886.
69
 
The question as to what rights authors had in respect of the use of their works through the new 
mechanical devices came to a head at 1908 Berlin conference convened to revise the Berne 
Convention.70 In the discussions that ensued in this regard the following was observed:  
Since 1896 the manufacture of mechanical musical instruments has undergone an unexpected 
development; substantial industries have formed in various countries, and thousands of copies of 
pieces of music in ever increasing numbers have been reproduced.
71
 
Accordingly the German delegation called for the reconsideration of the issue and in the end 
managed to sway opinions. Thus Final Protocol No. 3 of the 1886 Convention was replaced by 
Article 13 of the 1908 revision, which provided the following: 
The authors of musical works shall have the exclusive right of authorizing: (1) the adaptation of those 
works to instruments which can reproduce them mechanically; (2) the public performance of the said 
works by means of these instruments. 
Thus the mechanical right in musical works was finally recognised in international law. In 
justifying the insertion of this new provision the following observation was made: 
The right of the author and the right of the inventor of instruments must not be weighed against each 
other; the latter may have achieved wonders, shown true genius, but his right stops at that of others; 
he cannot appropriate a raw material which does not belong to him and, in this case, the raw material 
is precisely the musical expression. It matters little what method is used and how difficult it may or 
may not be to read the disk or the cylinder, the musical expression is nonetheless incorporated in that 
disk or that cylinder. Why should the author’s consent not be just as necessary for this particular type 
of incorporation as it is for the reproduction of a musical work by means of printing? We see no reason 
to make a distinction. Authors thus suffer a material injury, since large profits are made from the 
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reproduction of their works without them receiving any remuneration; their interest seems to be at 
least as deserving as that of the manufacturers. …
72
 
(b) The Recognition of the Mechanical Right in the United States of America 
In America it was the significant growth of in particular, player pianos, that provided the conditions 
necessary for the recognition of the mechanical right.73 The hope that music publishers had “that 
their copyrights would prevent unauthorized embodiment of a performance of a musical composition 
in player piano rolls or other mechanical devices” was nevertheless dashed in the US Supreme 
Court case of White-Smith Music Publishing Company v Appollo Company,74 where this issue came 
to a head.75 In the case the ‘appellee’ was involved in the manufacture of piano players and player 
pianos, musical instruments adapted to be used with perforated rolls of music. The appellant 
instituted proceedings, alleging that the appellee was infringing its copyright in two musical 
compositions published in the form of sheet music. It was alleged by the appellant that the appellee 
had used perforated rolls, in conjunction with the piano players or player pianos and through a 
particular mechanism, to ‘reproduce in sound the melody recorded in the two pieces of music 
copyrighted by the appellant.’76 Upon analysis of the facts, the parties’ submissions and the law, the 
court dismissed the appeal and upheld the decision of the court a qou. On arriving at its judgment 
the court held:77 
When we turn to the consideration of the act it seems evident that Congress has dealt with the 
tangible thing, a copy of which is required to be filed with the Librarian of Congress, and wherever the 
words are used (copy or copies) they seem to refer to the term in its ordinary sense of indication 
reproduction or duplication of the original. … We cannot conceive that the amendment of … the act 
…providing a penalty for person publicly performing or representing any dramatic or musical 
composition for which a copyright has been obtained [referring to the recognition of performing rights 
in the act], can have the effect of enlarging the meanings of the previous sections of the act which 
were not changed by the act. … What is a copy? … “A copy is that which comes so near to the 
original as to give to every person seeing it the idea created by the original.” …  
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The court went further to note that while it was true, broadly, that ‘a mechanical instrument which 
reproduces a tune copies’, this was ‘a strained and artificial meaning’.78 On remarking as to why it 
did not consider the perforated roll to be a copy of sheet music the court noted: 
After all, what is the perforated roll? The fact is clearly established in the testimony … that even those 
skilled in the making of these rolls are unable to read them as musical compositions, as those in staff 
notation are read by the performer. … [T]hey … are not intended to be read as an ordinary piece of 
sheet music, which to those skilled in the art conveys, by reading, in playing or singing, definite 
impressions of the melody. These perforated rolls are parts of a machine which, when duly applied 
and properly operated in connection with the mechanism to which they are adapted, produce musical 
tones in harmonious combination.
79
  
 
In response to White-Smith the US Congress enacted the Copyright Act of 190980, ‘an act to amend 
and consolidate the acts respecting copyright’. The Act introduced the concept of mechanical 
rights, providing, with respect to the author’s exclusive right to ‘print, reprint, publish, copy, and 
vend the copyrighted work’, a further exclusive right ‘to make any arrangement or setting of [the 
copyrighted work] or of the melody of [the copyrighted work] in any system of notation or any form of 
record in which the thought of an author may be recorded and from which it may be read or 
reproduced’.81 More particularly these provisions secured copyright in respect of the exploitation of 
musical works through ‘the parts of instruments serving to reproduce mechanically the musical 
work.’82 The Act introduced the system of payment of mechanical royalties to authors under a 
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system of compulsory licensing, an in this regard it was observed that this concept ‘grew out of a 
concern in Congress that the music industry was going to develop into a gigantic monopoly …’83 
(c) The Recognition of the Mechanical Right in the United Kingdom 
The reason the recognition of the mechanical right in the United Kingdom is discussed after 
discussing the recognition of the right in the USA is because the right was recognised a little bit later 
in the United Kingdom, to be particular, two years later in 1911. While British publishers and 
composers had, for a long time, benefitted immensely from revenues derived from sales of sheet 
music, by the turn of the twentieth century this source of income began to dwindle as a result of 
rampant piracy of copies of sheet music, technological developments arising from the invention of 
the gramophone record, and the concomitant new practice of “[m]ass production and trans-Atlantic 
sales techniques”.84 This, together with the decline of concert outlets and the growing recognition of 
the importance of a proper performing right, led to “a realisation that a review of copyright law was 
required, both in order to conform with the international requirements of the Berne Convention, and 
to rationalise the confused jumble of legislation … which then existed.”85    
The courts’ ruling in Boosey v Whight86 in relation to the question of perforated rolls had also 
compounded the situation. In this case it was held that perforated rolls did not infringe rights in sheet 
music. On appeal87 the Master of the Rolls, similar to the ruling of the US Supreme Court in the 
White-Smith88 case, made this observation: 
The plaintiffs are entitled to copyright in three sheets of music …. It means that they have the 
exclusive right of printing or otherwise multiplying copies of those sheets of music …. But the plaintiffs 
have no exclusive right to the production of the sounds indicated by or on those sheets of music; … 
nor to any mechanism for the production of such sounds or music. The plaintiff’s rights are not 
infringed except by an unauthorised copy of their sheets of music. … The defendants have taken 
those sheets of music and have prepared from them sheets of paper with perforations in them, and 
these perforated sheets, when put into and used with properly constructed machines or instruments, 
will produce or enable the machines or instruments to produce the music indicated on the plaintiff’s 
sheets. But is this the kind of copying which is prohibited by the copyright act; or rather is the 
perforated sheet made as above mentioned a copy of the sheet of music from which it is made? Is it a 
copy at all? Is it a copy within the meaning of the copyright act? … [T]o play an instrument from a 
sheet of music which appears to the eye is one thing; to play an instrument with a perforated sheet 
which itself forms part of the mechanism which produces the music is quite another thing.
89
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As a result of the Boosey ruling, the Musical Copyright Act, 1906,90 enacted to combat the rampart 
problem of piracy that had arisen at the turn of the century, was explicit in providing that “‘pirated 
copies’ and ‘plates’ shall not, for the purposes of this Act, be deemed to include perforated music 
rolls used for playing mechanical instruments, or records used for the reproduction of sound waves, 
or the matrices or other appliances by which such rolls or records respectively are made.”91 An 
attempt in Newmark v National Phonograph Co.92 to convince the court that the Boosey decision 
was nullified by the enactment of the Musical (Summary Proceedings) Act, 1902,93 was not 
successful, with the court holding that a phonographic record was not a “sheet of music” as 
contemplated in the Talfourd’s Act. In Mabe v Connor94 the court upheld the Boosey principle, going 
further to state that a pianola roll was not a musical work as contemplated in the Musical (Summary 
Proceedings) Act, 1902 and thus could not be subjected to a seizure as a pirated copy under that 
Act. Another attempt in Monckton v The Gramophone Co.95 to argue that, in spite of the existing 
regime for copyright protection not providing relief, mechanical contrivances infringed a composer’s 
common law copyright, was also met with resistance by the court. 
The combination of these developments led to the enactment of Copyright Act, 1911 (so-called 
Imperial Copyright Act), which, in section 1(2)(d), provided that the author’s “sole right” included the 
right, in respect of literary, dramatic or musical works, “to make any record, perforated roll, 
cinematograph film, or other contrivance by means of which the work may be mechanically 
performed or delivered”96, and to authorise such action. This development was far-reaching in that it 
recognised the fact that musical works could be infringed by their unauthorised use by means of the 
new technologies of recording, perforated rolls and film, “or other contrivances by means of which 
the work may be mechanically performed or delivered”. Thus a new ray of hope that composers 
could now recover the losses experienced through the decline of the sheet music industry and its 
replacement by new technologies, emerged. The use of perforated rolls in conjunction with player 
pianos, and to a limited extent, the use of the phonograph and the gramophone, were the main form 
of commercial music exploitation after the demise of the sheet music industry.97 As observed, during 
this period the music business was dominated not by major record labels but by song publishers and 
                                               
90
 1906, 6 Edw. VII. c. 36. 
91
 Section 3, Musical Copyright Act,1906 ibid. 
92
 (1907) 23 T.L.R. 439. 
93
 1902, 2 Edw. VII. c. 15. 
94
 (1909) 1 KB 505. 
95
 (1912) 106 L.T. 84. 
96
 Section 1(2)(d), British Copyright Act, 1911 (also known as the Imperial Copyright Act). This Act was incorporated holus 
bolus into the Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act of 1916 in South Africa, in Schedule 3 thereof.  
97
 In this regard, although phonograms and gramophones were already in existence and the first commercial musical 
recordings were introduced in 1889, it has been observed that “the automatic player piano called the pianola, which used 
perforated rolls … for many years rivalled the gramophone in popularity.” See Chanan Repeated Takes 34. See also Hull 
Recording Industry 2. Regarding the gramophone and phonograph the following was said: “… Prior to the 1920’s, when its 
attitudes began to soften, the musical establishment saw the gramophone as an abomination, as a mere toy, that had 
about as much capacity of producing real music as nursery soldiers …. Concerns were also expressed about the impact 
the phonograph would have on active music-making …. An allied concern was the fact that the technology of recording, 
prior to its electrification in the mid-1920s, was not conducive to musical reproduction of the highest quality and involved 
many auditory compromises. …” Symes B. J. Music Ed. 2004 164 – 165. See also 
https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/music/inside/cron.html (date of use: 14 March 2018). 
90 
 
big vaudeville and theatre concerns.”98 This trend continued until it was interrupted by the 1929 
Great Depression and the maturing of sound recording and radio technology.99 
This development came about mainly as a result of the 1908 revision of the Berne Convention, 
which required that authors were to be given protection in respect of the reproduction of their works 
by mechanical means.100 As has been observed, section 1(2)(d) of the Imperial Copyright Act “in the 
simplest fashion completely [covered] the control of mechanical reproduction in conformity with the 
convention of Berlin.”101 The majority of the parliamentary committee formed to report to the English 
Parliament regarding the changes that needed to be made to ensure compliance with the Berlin text 
of the Berne Convention were in favour of granting composers full control in this regard.102 Fierce 
lobbying from the manufacturers of the mechanical devices and contrivances however, led to the 
introduction of a form of compulsory licensing in respect of mechanical reproduction.103 This was 
effected through section 19(2) of the Imperial Copyright Act, which in essence required a composer 
who had given a licence to someone to reproduce his work mechanically and where copies of the 
work had been issued to the public pursuant to such a licence, to do so in respect of another person 
who subsequently wanted to reproduce the work mechanically, upon payment of certain prescribed 
royalties. 
(d) The Continuing Significance of the Mechanical Right 
The coming onto centre stage of the three music-intensive technologies of sound recording, audio-
visual technologies (film, television and video) and radio completely revolutionised the twentieth-
century music sector and led to its rapid global expansion. In English common-law jurisdictions this 
was made possible through the three rights introduced in section 1(2)(d) of the Imperial Copyright 
Act, namely the mechanical right (the sole right to make any record); the synchronisation right (sole 
right to make any cinematograph film, relevant for film, television and video) and the electrical 
transcription right (the sole right to make any contrivance by means of which the work may be 
mechanically performed or delivered, relevant for radio broadcasting).  
It is however, the mechanical right and recording technology that have had the most far-reaching 
impact for the music industry in the twentieth century, resulting in music record sales growing to 
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$14.6 billion with 1.2 billion records sold by the end of the century.104 The mechanical right, and in 
particular the compulsory licensing system associated with it, facilitated the use of musical works by 
means of records, so that, as observed, record companies did not have to compete for a song but 
only for the performance of the song.105 This also created a balance between the interests of music 
publishers as owners of copyright in musical works, and record labels as owners of copyright in 
sound recordings106 : record labels could use musical works once they were used by another record 
label – without the need for prior authorisation. Outside performing rights, mechanical rights have 
consistently remained a large and important source of income for owners of copyright in musical 
works.107 This trend has continued in spite of the advent of digital technology and the negative 
impact it has generally had on the recording industry.108 What has, in fact happened in many cases 
is that the mechanical right has been extended to include digital usages such as downloads, 
ringtones and interactive streams.109 The recent ruling by the US Copyright Royalty Board (CRB) in 
which the Board increased the mechanical royalty rates payable to songwriters, from 10.5% to 
15.1% - an increase of 43.8% representing “the biggest rate increase granted in CRB history” – is 
another indicator of the continuing relevance of mechanical rights in the music industry value 
chain.110  
3.1.3.2 The Development of the Synchronisation Right – a Response to Film, Television and 
Video Technology 
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An account was given above of the developments that led to the maturation of cinematography or 
film technology. It was shown that this began with the perfection of a technique for the sequencing of 
photographs to give an illusion of motion. In light of this, it comes as no surprise that 
“[c]inematograph films were not protected as such in either British pre-1911 registration nor in South 
African pre-1916 legislation” and that in both cases, “they were regarded as series of photographs, 
each individual frame being a photograph and thus an artistic work, their musical scores … treated 
as musical works and their scripts … treated as dramatic works.”111 In pre-1912 British legislation 
photographs were protected under the Fine Arts Copyright Act, 1862;112 musical works protected 
initially under the Statute of Anne and subsequently under the Literary Copyright Act, 1842 (the 
Talfourd’s Act) and dramatic works under both the Dramatic Literary Property Act, 1833 (the Bulwer-
Lytonn’s Act).113 
Taking cognisance of the intensive developments taking place in the field of cinematography at the 
turn of the twentieth century, article 14 of the 1908 Berlin revision of the Berne Convention 
introduced protection for films (“cinematograph productions”) and made the following provision: 
… Cinematograph productions shall be protected as literary or artistic works, if, by the arrangement of 
the acting form or the combinations of the incidents represented, the author has given the work a 
personal and original character.  
Without prejudice to the rights of the author of the original work the reproduction by cinematography of 
a literary, scientific or artistic work shall be protected as an original work. 
The above provisions apply to reproduction or production effected by any other process analogous to 
cinematography. 
In like fashion, section 14 of the 1908 revision introduced protection to authors, in the following 
manner: 
Authors of literary, scientific or artistic works shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the 
reproduction and public representation of their works by cinematography. 
This provision was thus broad enough to include usage of the works by means of synchronisation 
with the soundtrack of a film. At this stage however, the technique for synchronisation was at its 
infancy stage and would only become popular in the 1920s with Warner Brothers’ Vitaphone. UK law 
was equally forward-looking in making it possible for synchronisation rights to be protected,114 so 
that, as Kamina has observed, in the United Kingdom:  
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The introduction of sound films in the late 1920s did not create problems in terms of protection; the 
soundtrack (the optical recording of sounds on the film strip) could be protected as a ‘contrivance by 
means of which sounds may be mechanically reproduced’ under section 19(1) of the 1911 Act …
115
 
This of course is a reference to the protection accorded to the soundtrack recording itself, but 
section 1(2)(d) of the Imperial Copyright Act also accorded protection in respect of the use of a 
musical work for purposes of making a cinematograph production, as fully dealt with below. The 
approach of the Imperial Copyright Act, in line with the provisions of article 14 of the Berne 
Convention, was to accord protection not to the film strip or film recording, but to the various 
copyrightable elements of which the film production is comprised (e.g. the “cinematic” dramatic 
work, the sequence of photographs, the musical work, the sound recording).116 Under the Imperial 
Copyright Act a cinematographic production “where the arrangement or acting form or the 
combination of incidents represented give the work an original character” was protected as a genre 
of a dramatic work.117 “Cinematograph” was defined to include “any work produced by any process 
analogous to cinematography”.118 This wording was similar to that used in the Berne Convention. 
 In essence therefore, films under the Imperial Copyright Act were protected either as dramatic 
works or photographs (as “artistic works”), depending on whether or not it had a plot and actors.119 
Thus while in the case of a feature film (or fiction) with dramatic action two copyrights would have 
subsisted (i.e. in both of the dramatic work and the photographs); in the case of a documentary film 
without a plot and actors protection would only have vested in the individual frames of the film’s 
photographs.120 The two forms of protection for film have been said to be cumulative, so that “a film 
which could not meet the requirements of originality for a dramatic work could still be protected a 
series of photographs.”121 With the incorporation of the Imperial Copyright Act into South African 
copyright law legislation South Africa also followed a similar course of action.122  
Prior to the enactment of Imperial Copyright Act the position with regard to the use of “music in 
picture theatres” was not clear. Writing in 1911 prior to the enactment of the Imperial Copyright Act, 
Bennett observed: 
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Pictures require the enlivening influence of music to increase their attractiveness, and many 
showmen, on the plea that a piano or gramophone was a subsidiary part of the performance, 
introduced automatic musical instruments, only to find that the law quickly stepped in and prohibited 
their use. There is still a doubt as to the legal position, and the exhibitors who desire to keep clear of 
the “myrmidons of the law” would do well to save the expense of ultimate legislation, and apply to the 
licensing authorities for the license.
123
 
As indicated, in addition to making provision for the protection of cinematograph films as a 
protectable copyright work (albeit as either a dramatic or photographic work), section 1(2)(d) of the 
Imperial Copyright Act granted to authors of copyright in musical works the sole right to make a 
cinematographic film “by means of which the work may be mechanically performed or delivered, and 
to authorize any such acts”. This therefore was the introduction of the synchronisation right in 
musical works in the United Kingdom, where the use of musical works in synchronisation with the 
motion picture would need to be authorised by the author of copyright in the musical work. This the 
Imperial Copyright Act did at a time when synchronisation of sound and music with motion pictures 
was not a common practice yet. This recognition of the rights of authors of copyright in musical 
works at the time of introduction of protection for cinematograph films again demonstrates the 
attention given to rights in musical works under the Imperial Copyright Act, after the controversy of 
the earlier centuries. Furthermore, unlike in the case of mechanical rights, where compulsory 
licensing was possible, the synchronisation licence was to be a privately-negotiated licence between 
the copyright owner and the user (i.e. the film producer).124  
Seeing that the United States dominates the global film industry and thus practices from that country 
have had a major influence on international practices, it would be important to also consider the 
development of the synchronisation right in that country. In the United States the synchronisation 
right became prominent after the advent of “talking pictures” (“talkies”) towards the end of the 
1920’s, as described above under 3.1.2.2. Earlier in 1923 theatre owners had, following a number of 
lawsuits instituted by ASCAP, the US performing rights organisation (PRO), procured a blanket 
licence for the public performance of musical works used in conjunction with films.125 This prompted 
the film studios to engage in-house composers to compose music on a “work-for-hire” basis, as a 
way of avoiding having to pay for existing musical works.126 When synchronisation technology was 
introduced, synchronisation licences were required in addition to the public performance licences. 
To avoid this, the film studios acquired music catalogues from a number of music publishers who 
were members of ASCAP, but the independent music publishers continued to demand payment for 
synchronisation rights.127 In relation to this it would be important to bring to light the impact that the 
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acquisition of the music catalogues of ASCAP-member publishers by the film studios – in a quest to 
avoid paying for synchronisation rights - has had an impact on another equally important right, 
namely the right of public performance of musical works incorporated in films. This arose from a 
collusive practice that emerged between the major studios, ASCAP, ASCAP’s members and the 
music publishers whose catalogues were controlled by the studios.   
In respect of rights in new musical compositions the major studios would, in the case of composers 
who were ASCAP members, only require the composers to assign to them the synchronisation 
right.128 In the case of non-ASCAP members however, the studios required the composer to also 
assign to them the public performance right at the time of assigning the synchronisation right. This 
practice was brought to light by the testimony of Harry Fox, a representative of the Harry Fox 
Agency which was mandated by the studios to negotiate these licences, in the Alden-Rochelle case: 
The acquisition of the synchronization rights from the copyright owners of musical compositions is 
generally arranged by Mr. Fox, who has operated an agency for that purpose since 1937. He testified 
that when he is asked by a producer to obtain the rights for a musical composition which is to be 
incorporated in a motion picture he gets in touch with the owner of the copyright.  … If the copyright of 
the musical production is owned by a person who is not a member of Ascap, Fox tells the owner that 
both the synchronization rights and the right to publicly perform the music of the film are to be 
acquired by the producer. … There is no separate figure fixed for the performance rights and another 
figure for the synchronization rights, in making the deal. … If the owner of the copyright is a member of 
Ascap, Mr. Fox does not include the performance rights in acquiring the synchronization rights for the 
producer. The producers know, of course, that the performing rights have a value distinct from the 
synchronization rights, because of their ownership of music publishing corporations, which are 
members of Ascap, and through which the producers derive considerable revenue from Ascap’s 
separate licensing of the performance rights to the exhibitors. …
129
 
The Alden-Rochelle court held that this arrangement between ASCAP and its members and those 
members’ arrangements with the motion picture producers was unlawful and in breach of the US 
anti-trust laws.130 This brought to an end the practice in the United States whereby a performing right 
licence was required from ASCAP and other PROs whenever movie theatres exhibited a film in 
which musical works were performed. In providing its ratio decidendi the Alden-Rochelle court made 
the following observations: 
Almost every part of the Ascap structure, almost all of Ascap’s activities in licensing motion picture 
theatres, involve a violation of the anti-trust laws. … The combination of the members of Ascap in 
transferring all their non-dramatic performing rights to Ascap, is a combination in restraint of trade and 
commerce, which is prohibited by § 1 of the anti-trust laws. … And by barring a member from 
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assigning the performing rights to the motion picture producer at the same time that the recording right 
is assigned, the channels in which the films may be marketed is narrowed to those exhibitors who 
have a license from Ascap covering the performing rights of the Ascap music synchronized on the film. 
That result is accomplished through an unlawful combination with the motion picture producers in 
violation of § 1 of the anti-trust laws. …
131   
As a result of the Alden-Rochelle judgment the practice of source licensing in the United States was 
established, in terms of which “the PROs are prevented from licensing public performance rights 
directly to movie theatre owners”, and instead, film producers are required to procure performing 
rights at the same time as the synchronisation rights, “and pass the performance rights along to the 
theatres that will be showing their films.”132 This means therefore that movie theatre owners and 
other exhibitors of films are not required to procure a public performance licence, as the right would 
have been transferred to them by the studios. Unlike in the United States however, the recognition 
of the synchronisation right in South Africa and most other countries, including the United Kingdom, 
has not affected the obligation of movie theatres and other users to procure a public performance 
licence from PROs for the use of musical works in theatres and other places of public performance.  
3.1.3.3 The Development of the Electrical Transcription Right – a Response to Radio 
Technology 
Section 1(2)(d) of the Imperial Copyright Act granted the author the sole right not only to make “any 
record, perforated roll, [or] cinematograph film” in respect of the work, but also to make “any … 
other contrivance by means of which the work may be mechanically performed or delivered.” This 
couching of the section broadened the scope of usages that would require the prior authorisation of 
the author by not limiting these to records, perforated rolls and cinematograph films. When 
therefore, with the advent of radio, it became more convenient to record music-for-radio by means of 
electrical transcriptions (ETs) instead of using commercial records, this provision in the Imperial 
Copyright Act safeguarded the rights of authors of musical and lyrical works. As with the case of 
sound recordings and films therefore, the Imperial Copyright Act was forward-looking in this regard. 
The ingenuity of the Imperial Copyright Act becomes more evident when considering perceived 
deficiencies in the US Copyright Act, 1909, as noted in a 1949 Billboard article: 
… Because of the length of time [the US Copyright Act, 1909] has been in force and because of the 
great strides made in the field of science since its enactment, the statute has become inadequate in 
many respects. … Since 1909 there have been developed new rights with respect to music. There are 
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for instance the motion picture synchronization right, the right to manufacture an electrical transcription 
and the television right. These rights could not possibly have been specifically provided for in 1909 for 
they were not known at that time. When the Congress of 1909 incorporated the compulsory license 
provision in the copyright statute it necessarily had in mind certain types of mechanical devices which 
were then in existence, namely the phonograph record and the player piano roll. It could not have had 
in mind an electrical transcription of which a very limited number of pressings are made, not for the 
purpose of sale, but for the purpose of radio advertising and other public performance for profit, 
because the device was not then in existence. Yet there are persons who believe that the antiquated 
compulsory license provision actually extends to and permits the manufacture of electrical 
transcriptions. …
133
     
In contrast, UK copyright law did not see the need for change until 1956 when a new Copyright Act 
was enacted. The major changes in this regard were in regard to the recognition of broadcasts as 
sui generis works, particularly in light of the maturation of radio broadcasting and the emerging 
television broadcasting industry.134 In the report of the Gregory Committee which led to the 
enactment of the 1956 Act, it was made explicit that UK law was in compliance with international 
treaty law in relation to copyright protection. Furthermore, the recognition of rights in sound 
recordings and films was taken as a fait accompli and the need for protection was seen in relation to 
broadcasts.135 Similarly the legislation did not see the need to specifically provide for electrical 
transcription rights. Section 1(2) of the Imperial Copyright Act was clear: copyright was defined as 
“the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material form 
whatsoever”, thus including ETs.   
ETs were a type of “instantaneous recording” made by a “direct to disc process”, which became 
popular in the radio days of the 1930s and 1940s.136 The distinction between ETs and normal 
recordings was that ETs were made for radio broadcasting and not for sale to the public; and “had 
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higher quality audio than was available on consumer records.”137 ETs have been used for 
introductory music themes for radio shows, musical compilations for syndicated radio programs and 
background music for radio commercials.138 To use music in this way radio stations needed to 
procure an electrical transcription licence, which gave rise to electrical transcription rights as a genre 
of the reproduction right in musical works. Recounting the origin of ETs in the United States Browne 
and Browne have observed: 
ETs evolved from long-playing records designed for talking movies. Most broadcasters considered 
recorded programming inferior to live programming, but transcriptions were less expensive than live 
talent. The term “electrical transcription” originated as an attempt to evade government regulations 
requiring broadcasters to announce phonograph records. Technically, stations that played electrical 
transcriptions were not playing records and did not have to announce ETs as such.
139
 
It has been observed that ‘“electrical transcriptions were indispensable from the mid ‘30s to the late 
‘40s,”’ at one stage being estimated to have an annual market value of $10 million and being seen 
as a good source of income for performers (e.g. from recording commercial jingles for spot 
announcements).140 The use of ETs was however, not without controversy. In the USA radio stations 
and other users of transcription records lobbied strongly for legislation against the rights of 
composers and performers to receive payment for the recording and use of electrical 
transcriptions.141 Furthermore, in the early 1940s the American Federation of Musicians (AFM), 
under its president, the notorious James Caesar Petrillo, introduced an industry-wide ban for the 
recording by AFM members of what he termed “canned music”.142 Petrillo believed that the use of 
electrical transcriptions was responsible for the decline in employment opportunities for AFM 
musicians in relation to live performances.143 In a bid to force radio stations and other record users 
to employ union musicians rather than using recording musicians Petrillo announced that ‘the 
140,000 members of his … organization [would] not make “records, electrical transcriptions or any 
other form of electrical reproduction of music”’; but excluded recordings for motion-picture 
soundtracks and private recordings for home use – “provided that the recordings did not find their 
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way onto the airwaves or commercially issued records.”144 This resulted in some radio networks 
prohibiting the playing of recorded music until much later.145 
Reference was also made to a “triangular dispute” that existed between users of music records, 
performers and composers, and it was lamented that composers were receiving “double payment” in 
that, apart from being paid for electrical transcription rights, ‘they [were] already paid through 
ASCAP for broadcasts of their music, whether “live” or “canned.”’146 The loser in this triangle was the 
performer, seeing that “[b]roadcasters were] naturally opposed to any addition to the $3,500,000 
annual fees paid to ASCAP”, while ASCAP was itself “militantly hostile to any increase in the 
strength of a rival for this radio revenue.”147 ETs, which were preferred for having less surface sound 
than commercial recordings and for their suitability for spot advertising; and remained indispensable 
for about fifteen (15) years, were ironically displaced by commercial recordings. This happened in 
the era of the radio “disc jockey” (DJ), when studio consoles began to incorporate tape recorders 
and recording stores began to send free music records to the DJs.148  
In spite of the foregoing, the concept of electrical transcriptions rights has persisted and is now used 
not only in respect of radio programming but in respect of any form of audio-only recording of 
musical works “for purposes other than distribution to the public for private use”.149 In this regard 
although electrical transcription rights are also concerned with the reproduction of musical works by 
means of sound recordings, they must not be confused with mechanical rights.150 Today electrical 
transcription licences are used to license the usage of musical works through radio broadcasts 
(themes, introductions, syndicated radio programs, commercial advertising); background music 
services (e.g. DMX, Muzak, Playnetwork); digital jukebox services; in-flight use in airlines; ringbacks 
and server copies used to facilitate music streaming or transient copies.151  
3.1.4 The Recognition of the Rights of Performers and Owners of Copyright in Sound 
Recordings   
3.1.4.1 Introduction 
Although this thesis is primarily concerned with the protection of musical works, an analysis of the 
historical development and the impact of technology would not be complete without also considering 
the evolution of rights in sound recordings. This need further arises from the fact that sound 
recordings have been the main “carrier” and means of exploitation for musical works since the 
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technology was developed in the nineteenth century. In international copyright law the rights of 
performers and producers of sound recordings (also termed “phonograms”) are generally referred to 
as “neighbouring rights” or “related rights” (or so-called droits voisins du droit d’auteur, in French).152  
It has been observed that, in the narrow sense, these expressions are used to refer to the rights 
provided for under the Rome Convention for the Protection of Performers, Producers of 
Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations.153 The expressions can nevertheless be used in a 
broader sense to include protection for other newly-introduced rights, such as those relating to the 
protection of published editions and databases.154 We are of course, for present purposes, only 
concerned with the rights of performers and producers of sound recordings. In this regard it is also 
important to note that in England and many common-law jurisdictions the rights of producers of 
sound recordings are generally protected as copyright.155 There has also been a trend among 
certain common law jurisdictions to grant a copyright or copyright-type protection for the rights of 
performers. Thus in England it has been observed that “[t]he property rights that performers now 
enjoy … are equivalent to copyright”.156 In South Africa however, performers’ rights do not find 
protection under the Copyright Act157 but in related legislation, namely the Performers Protection 
Act.158  
3.1.4.2 The Historical Development of Rights in Sound Recordings and Performances 
In the discussion on the development of the mechanical right above the fierce lobbying of the 
manufacturers of the mechanical devices and contrivances used to reproduce musical works in the 
United Kingdom was referred to. This, as indicated, led to the introduction of a system of compulsory 
licensing of recordings, as long as copies of such recordings had been issued to the public.159 The 
further effect of the manufacturers’ lobbying however was the introduction of s 19(1) of the Imperial 
Copyright Act, which accorded to the owners of the “original plate” the right to be recognised as the 
author of such plate.160 Such protection was however, “in like manner as if such contrivances were 
musical works”, thus according to the owners of the mechanical contrivances the same exclusive 
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rights (namely the rights to production, reproduction, public performance, publication and translation) 
as those accorded authors of musical works.161 Section 19 of the Imperial Copyright Act was 
dedicated to dealing with this new phenomenon of “mechanical instruments”. In this regard UK law 
had an early recognition of rights in sound recordings. This is unlike the situation under the US 
Copyright Act, 1909, which did not recognise the rights of the manufacturers.162 Federal recognition 
of the rights of owners of copyright in sound recordings did not take place in the United States until 
1972.163  
The Imperial Copyright Act went further than just according protection to sound recordings made 
after the commencement of the Act. Although in general the Act made no provision for the 
retrospective protection of works made prior to 1912 (except with regard to the regime for the 
granting of substituted rights for copyrights that passed through the 1912 Gateway164), an exception 
was created in this regard in relation to sound recordings.  As indicated above, while British 
publishers and composers had benefitted immensely from revenues derived from sales of sheet 
music, rampart piracy at the turn of the twentieth century coupled with the advent of the new 
technology of mechanical reproduction brought much consternation to British rights-holders. The 
situation was exacerbated by the fact that, unlike in neighbouring France, performing rights were not 
a viable source of income for British rights-holders as a result of poorly-drafted laws. The very 
existence of the British music industry was therefore under threat. This may explain why the British 
legislature exhibited much interest in the new recording technologies and clearly saw them as a way 
of salvaging the beleaguered UK music industry.165 The exception in relation to the retrospective 
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sound recordings was an important precedent. It indicated that copyright would be flexible enough to offer protection to all 
works in whose creation new technical possibilities for artistic expression had been used. …” Emphasis added. It is also 
important to note nevertheless that this emphasis on entrepreneurship and commercial exploitation has been ascribed to 
British copyright law from its inception. See Torremans id at 9. It has been pointed out that Britain attempted, without 
success, to introduce copyright protection in respect of sound recordings during the deliberations relating to the 1908 
Berlin Revision of the Berne Convention; and faced similar failure when attempting to do so during the 1928 Rome 
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application of copyright in sound recordings was provided for in terms of section 19(8) of the 
Imperial Copyright Act, which provided: 
… [W]here a record, perforated roll, or other contrivance by means of which sounds may be 
mechanically reproduced has been made before the commencement of this Act, copyright shall, as 
from the commencement of this Act, subsist therein in like manner and for the like term as if this Act 
had been in force at the date of the making of the original plate from which the contrivance was 
directly or indirectly derived. 
This means that sound recordings that had been made soon after recording technology was 
perfected at the turn of the twentieth century would have been retrospectively protected under the 
Imperial Copyright Act in this manner. Under such circumstances the first owner of the copyright 
was the person who was the owner of the original plate at the commencement of the Act.166 Thus 
where the original owner of the plate had transferred ownership of the original plate to another 
person or entity, such other person or entity would be the owner of the new copyright under the 
Imperial Copyright Act. In this regard it needs to be emphasised that this retrospective protection did 
not apply in respect of rights in the musical works embodied in the mechanical contrivances. The 
case of Boosey v Whight and related cases167 had made it explicit that the use of musical works in 
such contrivances did not amount to a reproduction of the musical works. Another proviso relating to 
the retrospective conferment of copyright in sound recordings related to the fact that copyright was 
not conferred in this manner in respect of a contrivance where its making “would have infringed 
copyright in some other contrivance, if this provision had been in force at the time of the making of 
the first-mentioned contrivance.”    
Internationally the question as to the nature of rights that should be accorded performers and record 
producers raged. In respect of performers the need for protection arose from the fact that the new 
recording technology made repeated exploitation (or “an exact and faithful recording”) of a 
performance possible.168 Furthermore, while it was easy for the United Kingdom to accord copyright 
protection to commercial enterprises, there were “serious theoretical problems” with accepting such 
a position in countries that had embraced the author’s rights system, such as Germany and 
France.169 Through collaborative work between Germany and Austria to find a solution to these 
theoretical problems Austria became the first author’s rights jurisdiction to adopt a law that 
distinguished between authors’ rights and related rights.170 Eventually other authors’ rights 
jurisdictions would follow Austria’s example. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Revision of the Convention (together with attempting to introduce, in respect of performing artists, an exclusive right of 
broadcasting and an author’s right in relation to mechanical recording); it being argued, particularly by France, that these 
matters fell outside the ambit of the Berne Convention. See Von Lewinski International Copyright Law 87 – 88.  
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 Proviso to s 19(8). 
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 See the discussion supra under paragraph 3.1.3.1(c). 
168
 Dworkin and Taylor Blackstone’s Guide 126. 
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 See Sterling World Copyright Law 20 – 21. 
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 The Austrian Law of 1936. See in this regard Sterling id at 21. 
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Meanwhile the Brussels Revision conference of the Berne Convention passed resolutions requiring 
member countries to study ways in which sound recordings could find international copyright without 
however, affecting authors’ rights.171 A Standing Committee of the Berne Convention was 
accordingly formed and met regularly from 1949, leading to the enactment of the Rome Convention 
in 1961. This convention, for the first time in international law, accorded protection to the rights of 
performers, producers of phonograms and broadcasting organisations. Prior to the enactment of the 
Rome Convention protection for performers was fragmented and diverse, with several authors’ 
rights countries granting protection on the basis of a legal fiction where the performer was seen as 
being the author of an adaptation of a literary or musical work; while English law merely accorded 
criminal law protection to performers, through a 1925 legislation.172 
The distinct protection of sound recordings as a work under UK copyright law was confirmed in the 
judgment of the Chancery Division in the case of Gramophone Co. Ltd. V Stephen Carwardine & 
Co.173 The major significance of this ruling however, was that it was argued that “since a performing 
right existed in a musical work, logic dictated that there should also be a performing right in a sound 
recording.”174 In the Cawardine case the court made the following observation (per Maugham J): 
I will observe in the first place that the company is given a copyright in the record ‘in like 
manner as if the record was a musical work.’ It is also to be noted that it has a term of 
copyright of fifty years from the making of the original plate.
175
 
Thus the right of public performance in respect of sound recordings (commonly-known as “needle-
time” in contemporary parlance176), was recognised in the United Kingdom. The Cawardine case 
was in fact a test case brought by the EMI recording company, through its subsidiary the 
Gramophone Company, against Cawardine’s Café for the unathourised playing of records 
embodying sound recordings owned by the Gramophone Company.177 Following the Carwardine 
decision Phonographic Performance Limited (PPL) was formed to represent the recording industry 
and to issue licences in respect of the public performance of sound recordings. With the advent of 
broadcasting technology the right came to apply in the broadcast environment also, and it is from 
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 Sterling ibid; Von Lewinski International Copyright Law 89. 
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 The Dramatic and Musical Performer’s Protection Act, 1925. See also Von Lewinski id at 87 
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 [1934] 1 Ch 450. 
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 Wagenaar and Marx 2012 Obiter 308. 
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 The expression “needle-time” itself came to be used when the right of public performance in respect of sound 
recordings was extended to include usage of sound recordings in broadcasts. In this regard the expression was used to 
refer to “‘stylus-on-vinyl time’ – the time allotted to playing records on air”; limited to 22 hours a week across all BBC 
channels in the 1950s. See www.bbc.co.uk/radio1/johnpeel/sessions/ (date of use: 27 April 2018); also Osborne A History 
of the Analogue Record 129.  In s 135A(5) of the UK Copyright Act, 1988 needle-time is defined as “the time in any period 
(whether determined as a number of hours in the period or a proportion of the period or otherwise) in which any recordings 
may be included in a broadcast or cable programme service”. Prior to this the public performance right in sound recordings 
applied in respect of the public play of sound recordings in jukeboxes, discotheques and other places of public 
performance. See Billboard 28 Oct 1972 at 56. See also Von Lewinski International Copyright Law 213, where this right, in 
relation to the Rome Convention, is explained as including the “the playing of commercial phonograms to the public (eg in 
discotheques, bars, restuarants, supermarkets, and any other place open to the public where the sounds from the 
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the use of sound recordings in broadcasts that the term “needle-time” arose. In this regard, until the 
late 1980’s the essence of the needle-time system in the UK was to limit or restrict the use of sound 
recordings through broadcasts.178 As observed: 
 
In essence the system was based on an agreement, made between the major record companies 
(acting via PPL) and broadcasters (of which the most important was always the BBC) through which 
the latter agreed to pay PPL a fee for the use of a specified amount of recorded music on their outlets 
for the duration of the contract.
179
 
The concept of needle-time is thus “a throwback to the time when sound was relayed from a vinyl 
record via a stylus on a record player.”180 The restrictive system of needle-time was enforced in the 
United Kingdom until the Monopolies and Mergers Commission (MMC) enquiry of 1988, which ruled 
that needle-time restriction was an anti-competitive system and had to be abolished.181 Henceforth, 
although “needletime continued to exist in [sic] as a system of charging for hours of usage … the 
[PPL] was unable to impose restrictions on the amount of time that recorded music could be used 
for.”182 Accordingly, since the introduction of Section 175(1) of the UK Broadcasting Act, 1990, which 
introduced the needle-time provisions into the UK Copyright Act, the system of needle-time used in 
the UK is now known as a system of “use as of right of sound recordings in broadcasts and cable 
programme services”183 United States law does not recognise a right of public performance in 
respect of sound recordings except in so far as this relates to the digital performances of sound 
recordings.184  
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South Africa at the time. See in this regard Dean 1990 http://www.spoor.com/home/index.php?ipkArticleID=274 (date of 
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3.2: The Impact of the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911, in the Reframing of 
Copyright in Musical Works 
3.2.1 Introduction 
The impact of the Imperial Copyright Act in the reframing or more appropriately, proper framing of 
copyright in musical works, in the common law system of copyright, needs to be considered more 
closely.185 The discussion in Chapter 2 highlighted not only the state of confusion in which pre-1912 
British copyright found itself, but more particularly, how such confusion affected musical copyright. 
No clear distinction existed between small rights musical works and grand rights, in contrast with the 
French position where this clear distinction existed. Nowhere was this state of confusion in respect 
of musical works more evident than in the case of the performing right. The interpretation of the 
ambit of this right by nineteenth century British courts showed a bias towards dramatico-musical 
works as opposed to non-dramatic musical works. One of the great achievements of the Imperial 
Copyright Act is that it disentangled the concept of performing right from the dark jungle of 
jurisprudential incoherence in which it was framed. Such incoherence included the use of odd 
concepts like “place of dramatic entertainment”, “dramatic piece” and “representation” – which 
created uncertainty to owners of copyright in musical compositions as to whether or not the right 
was also intended to protect musical compositions; and made them reluctant to exercise the right.186 
The Imperial Copyright Act disentangled this confusion by creating a simple, yet potent right “to 
perform … the work or any substantial part thereof in public”.187         
The enactment of the Imperial Copyright Act and the extension of its provisions to the various 
overseas British territories had a significant and far-reaching impact on the law of copyright. In 
essence, it forged and formulated a new global copyright system that has come to be known as the 
“common law system” of copyright, distinct in formulation from the authors’ rights (droit d’auteur, 
German Urheberrecht) system championed by Beaumarchais in France and adopted widely in 
Continental Europe.188 One way in which the Imperial Copyright Act was able to achieve this is that it 
                                                                                                                                                              
Court of Appeals overturned the judgment of the district court. See Flo & Eddie Inc. v Sirius XM Radio 2015 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 80535 (S.D. Fla, 2015) and Flo & Eddie Inc. v Sirius XM Radio 15-1164-cv (2d Cir. 2017), respectively. Meanwhile 
the California district court ruling was taken on appeal. On the legislative front the Fair Play Fair Pay Act 2015, aimed at 
introducing a public performance right for sound recordings in relation to terrestrial broadcasting and other forms of public 
performance; as well as doing away with the exemption of pre-1972 sound recordings from federal copyright protection, 
has faced an uphill battle but was recently reintroduced in Congress.  See https://www.congress.gov/bill/115th-
congress/house-bill/1836 (date of use: 27 April 2018).  
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limited the ability of the dominions to effect modifications when incorporating the Act into their 
domestic laws. Thus section 25 provided that, where a dominion elected to declare the Act to be in 
force within its territory, it had to do so “without any modifications or additions”, except where the 
modifications or additions related exclusively to procedure and remedies or where necessary to 
adapt the Act to the circumstances of such dominion. In this way the British Parliament ensured that 
the confusion that existed previously where the state of copyright law was not clear, would be 
removed, and ensured that there would be commonality in the substantive aspects of the copyright 
laws of the various British dominions and possessions, with the law of the motherland.  
By formulating particular acts of exploitation based on the type of work concerned and only making 
provision for a common way of exploitation in respect of all works where appropriate, the Imperial 
Copyright Act shows that the Legislature fully applied its mind to these matters.189 The fact that 
several of these forms of exploitation in respect of the various works have remained unchanged in 
many modern copyright laws within the common-law tradition displays the foresight and attention to 
detail exercised by the British Parliament in this regard.190 The Act itself had a great impact on the 
development of modern copyright law and ensured an accelerated “catching up” with technological 
developments, thus according protection in respect of new types of works not protected prior to 
1912. Some of the works protected, which aided the development of the entertainment industry in 
general, are “[s]tories reduced to a material form in a cinematograph film or music reduced to a 
material form in a gramophone record or other mechanical contrivance”,191 with sound recordings 
also specifically protected as a separate category of work, and also paving the way for the 
recognition of cinematograph films as a separate category of work.192   
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 For example, the act of exploitation provided for in section 1(2)(b) of the Act (i.e. converting the work into a novel or 
other non-dramatic work) relates only to a dramatic work; the act of exploitation provided for in section 1(2)(d) (making a 
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In the area of musical works the main way in which the Imperial Copyright Act made a contribution is 
in its proper legal characterisation of musical works as a category of copyright work distinct and 
separate from dramatico-musical works. Gone were the days when the law made provision for the 
copyright protection of “books” or literary property, with musical compositions being seen merely as 
a genre of “books”; or when it was not clear if the performing right would only be applicable to a 
musical composition if it had dramatic character and was performed in a place of dramatic 
entertainment. Indeed musical works were so intricately intertwined with dramatic works in their pre-
1912 legal characterisation that it was necessary to extricate them, if they were to have a separate 
legal development as separate category of copyright work. Scrutton perfectly captures the manner in 
which pre-1912 musical works were conceived in the following observation: 
Musical compositions in the English law go hand in hand with the drama, probably on account of the 
double nature of each as adopted to printing and to public performance, and also because they shade 
into each other gradually through operas and songs in character. And on any musical composition 
questions may arise as to the copyrights or performing rights in the air, the words, or the 
accompaniment, which may be in different hands, while the words of the song may have the character 
of a dramatic piece.
193
 
As Deazley observed however, “[w]ith the emergence of new sound recording technology the 
analogy between the song and the book had … broken down and the existing legislation contained 
no provision for preventing these oral (as opposed to printed) reproductions.”194 The Imperial 
Copyright Act brought certainty to this situation by providing for the separate status of a musical 
work as a work eligible for copyright protection, distinct from a literary work (even in the form of 
lyrics) and a dramatic work. Thus section 1(1) of the Act made it explicit that the protections 
provided for under the Act applied to “every original literary, dramatic, musical and artistic work”. 
Furthermore, as already alluded to, the acts of exploitation in respect of the various works dealt with 
in section 1(2) were carefully formulated so that they did not all apply in respect of all works at all 
times, but were generally specified to apply only in respect of particular works. These developments 
are important for South Africa because, starting with the 1916 Act,195 modern South African 
copyright law has largely been shaped by English law.196 An understanding of these developments 
will thus add value in understanding the nature of the modern South African copyright protection of 
musical works, including in particular and understanding of the performing right. 
3.2.2 Formulating a Proper Performing Right 
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As indicated, under the Talfourd’s Act, the public performance of a dramatic work and a musical 
composition would equally and interchangeably be described as a “representation” or a 
“performance”. This, as indicated, created a lot of confusion as to the proper nature of the right. 
Section 1(2) of the Imperial Copyright Act resolved this problem by introducing a straightforward 
right of public performance in respect of all works, while making it explicit in paragraph (c) that 
dramatization as a form of public performance (i.e. converting a work into a dramatic work) was only 
possible in respect of works of literary character.197  
In light of the foregoing, a song could never per se, under the Imperial Copyright Act, be seen as a 
dramatic work (or using the description under the old legislation, a “dramatic piece”), merely 
because it was performed in a place of dramatic entertainment, or because “[t]he plaintiff, by his 
powers of singing, acting and characterisation, had made [the] song a thing of value”, as held under 
the old legislation in Clark v Bishop.198 Under the Imperial Copyright Act only the dramatization of a 
novel or similar literary work could convert such work into a dramatic work; the dramatization of a 
song by a singer – without a plot structure, storyline or dramatic context - could not have had such 
effect. Having indicated this, in spite of the provisions of section 1(2) of the Imperial Copyright Act 
the confusion that existed in relation to the meaning of the performing right persisted until the issue 
was clarified by the courts. Thus Duncan, commenting on the performing right in South Africa and 
acknowledging that there had, by 1925, been no judicial interpretation of the words “in public” 
contained in the Imperial Copyright Act, appeared to still view the performing right within the prism of 
the past era, stating: 
… [I]t certainly does seem that the Legislature, in protecting performance “in public,” intended to 
protect the performing rights to the same extent as they were previously protected by virtue of the 
construction placed by the Courts on the words “place of dramatic entertainment” in the Act of 1833.
199   
He was, in this regard, relying on the decision of the court in Duck v Bates.200 This of course could 
not have been further from the truth but it was left to the courts to clarify the issue. The courts did 
this in a number of cases, some of which are dealt with below: 
3.2.2.1 Harms (Incorporated), Limited & Another v Martans Club, Limited201 
As indicated, by 1925 there had been no judicial interpretation of the meaning of the words “in 
public” used in section 1(2) of the Imperial Copyright Act. This situation was to be dealt with a year 
later in the Martans Club decision, apparently the first English decision to address this question. The 
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Martans Club decision is important in that it provided clarity on the difference between the protection 
provided for in respect of the right of “representation” applicable in pre-1912 English legislation and 
the right to perform the work in public provided for under the Imperial Copyright Act. As indicated 
above, the performing right in pre-1912 English copyright legislation was shrouded in controversy 
and was in dire need of proper framing. In this regard the Martans Club decision in essence became 
a bridge that made it possible to transition from the old thinking in relation to the performing right, to 
a modern articulation of the right as understood within the auspices of the Imperial Copyright Act.202 
The transitional nature of the Martans Club decision is evident from the fact that the court itself could 
not completely resist the lure of the word “representation” used in the pre-1912 legislation when 
dealing with the performance under consideration – in spite of it seeking to clarify the difference 
between the new and old regimes for the protection of the performing right.203 
The facts of the case were as follows: The plaintiffs were copyright owners in America of a musical 
play and a musical work forming part of the play (titled “That Certain Feeling”); and their publishing 
company (Chappell & Co. Ltd). Defendant were owners of the Embassy Club, a private social and 
dancing “high class club”204 comprised of 1800 members, whose activities were not open to the 
public (although members could introduce guests upon payment of a fee). On 4 March 1926 the 
musical work comprised in the musical play was performed by the club’s orchestral band where 150 
members had dined and 50 guests were present at the subsequent performance and dancing. The 
rules of the club placed no limit on the number of guests that could be introduced. The plaintiffs 
alleged that the performance was “in public” as contemplated in the Imperial Copyright Act and 
claimed an injunction and damages. The defendants however, denied that the performance was in 
public. The court a quo held that the performance was indeed a performance in public and thus 
constituted an infringement of the plaintiff’s copyright.  
On appeal the defendants argued that the judge of the lower court had erred in that he “thought that 
whatever was not private or domestic must be public if done in the presence of a number of 
persons; that he considered the matter too much from the point of view of the composer; and that he 
relied strongly on the decision in Duck v. Bates … in which the question arose upon different words 
of another Act.”205 It is interesting that counsel for the defendant acknowledged here that the framing 
of the performing right in pre-1912 legislation was different from its framing under the Imperial 
Copyright Act. The defendant nevertheless believed that a strict interpretation of the words “in 
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public” used in the Imperial Copyright Act meant that the performance that took place at the club 
was not public because: 
The defendant club is a social club and its premises are private. No member of the public is entitled to 
enter upon the club premises. The essential element of clubs is privacy; they are private associations, 
and the buildings they occupy are private premises. How can anything done in a club be said to be 
done in public?
206
 
These questions were important because they provided a basis for understanding the modern 
performing right, especially in light of the fact that the central question as to whether a performance 
(or “presentation”) was in public or not in pre-1912 British legislation was whether or not the 
performance took place in a place of dramatic entertainment (a point the defendant’s counsel 
emphasises). The defendant argued that “what was done in this club, although not domestic or 
private, was not in public”, further arguing that section 2(3) of the 1911 Act made it possible for a 
person to make profit in private without infringing copyright.207 In conclusion the defendant argued 
that the word “public” as used in the Imperial Copyright Act meant “the general public”.208  
In its judgment the court (per Lord Hanworth M.R.) acknowledged that the words “in public” were 
“not easy words to define”, adding that “[t]hey are commonly used in connection with a number of 
activities, which concern the community at large and which are of a far-reaching nature or effect.”209 
The court also acknowledged that the protection of musical compositions under the Imperial 
Copyright Act differed from protection granted in earlier legislation.210 The court nevertheless agreed 
with the decision in Duck v Bates that the right given to the author was a valuable right and not mere 
sentimental protection; and further agreed with the court a quo and various other earlier decisions 
that what constitutes a public performance largely depends upon the facts of each case.211 The 
learned judge highlighted the following as being some of the tests applicable in determining the 
question if a public performance had taken place: 
1. First, it had to be determined whether there had been any injury to or interference with the 
proprietary rights of the author. In this regard profit was “a very important element.”212  
2. Secondly, one needed to find out if there was an admission of any portion of the public, namely 
“the public who would go either with or without payment – the class of persons who would be likely 
to go to a performance if there was a performance at a public theatre for profit”.213  
3. Thirdly, one needs to consider if the performance was a domestic one, in the sense of being 
“private and domestic, a matter of family and household concern only.”214  
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4. Fourthly, one needed to consider where the performance took place, “bearing in mind that the 
place need not be one which is kept habitually for the exhibition of dramatic entertainments.”215 
The last requirement in particular signalled a departure from the old era, where performance at a 
place of dramatic entertainment was a crucial requirement to determine if public representation took 
place. Relying on these tests the court came to the conclusion that the persons present when the 
performance was made were members of the public, because “[i]f it were possible to get round the 
Copyright Act by such a performance – if an author had no means of asserting his right in such a 
case – it appears … that a very serious inroad would have been made upon his property.”216 Rather 
under section 2(1) of the Imperial Copyright Act the protection granted to the author “is large”.217 In a 
concurring judgment Sargant L.J. found that the right of the author was made clearer in the Imperial 
Copyright Act by the direct language used in the Act, which expressly granted to the author a sole 
right which was “not to be lightly defeated or affected by the acts of others in derogation of that 
grant.”218 The learned judge observed that the current case was “infinitely stronger in favour of the 
plaintiff than in Duck v. Bates”, seeing that in return to the annual membership subscription and the 
entrance fee paid by guests “capable of becoming members of the club”, the members and guests 
were entitled to the performance of music.219 Thus the Martans Club case established a strong 
foundation for the treatment of the performing right in the new regime of the Imperial Copyright Act. 
3.2.2.2 Performing Right Society, Limited v Hawthorns Hotel (Bournemouth), Limited220 
A second case that dealt with the question whether the performance in question constituted 
performance in public in accordance with section 2(1) was the Hawthorns Hotel case.221 In this case 
the court provided a clearer, more succinct articulation of the performing right under the Imperial 
Copyright Act, with no nostalgic drift to the language of “representation” used in pre-1912 
legislation.222 
In this case the defendant, a “high class unlicensed residential hotel”, had engaged an orchestral trio 
to play music to its guests in the hotel lounge. On 20 November 1932 the orchestral trio performed 
two musical works in which the sole right of public performance belonged to the plaintiff. Amongst 
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the audience was an “emissary”223 of the plaintiff and his friend, who had been sent by the defendant 
to find out if the orchestral trio would play musical works belonging to the plaintiff. It was determined 
in the case that “any respectable member of the public who was prepared to pay the price charged 
by the defendants either for consuming meals in their hotel, or for staying there, was at liberty to 
listen to the music performed by the trio engaged by the defendants.”224 The only question to be 
determined was whether the performance of the two musical works was a performance in public or 
not, within the meaning of the words of the section 2(1) of the Imperial Copyright Act. 
The plaintiff argued that profit was a material consideration in this regard, contending that “where 
there is a commercial element the performance cannot be a private performance.”225 The plaintiff 
further contended that people did not cease to be members of the public simply because they were 
visitors at a hotel, and further that music was included in the price of the dinner because anyone 
who had dinner at the hotel (or booked a room), could listen to the music.226 The defendants, relying 
on Duck v Bates, countered and argued that the performance was “of a domestic or quasi-domestic 
nature”.227 They further argued that the plaintiff’s emissary and his friend “were not genuine 
members of the public but were there to watch the interests of the plaintiffs”; and inferred that the 
plaintiff had not proven that it had suffered enjoy – a necessary requirement in action for breach of 
copyright.228 In his succinct judgment Bennett J held in favour of the plaintiff, ruling that, since any 
respectable member of the public who booked to stay at the hotel or paid for dinner could listen to 
the music performance, the performance was in public and thus infringed the plaintiff’s statutory 
rights.   
3.2.2.3 Jennings v Stephens229 
The Jennings case is a leading and very important case in the modern framing of the performing 
right in English law. It is also a case that has shaped the understanding of the concept of public 
performance of musical works in several other common-law jurisdictions, including South Africa, 
introducing the criterion of the character of the audience.230 It needs to be noted in this regard that 
the case was not concerned with musical works but rather with a dramatic work. Nevertheless the 
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principles coming forth from the case equally apply to musical works, in particular because the right 
of public performance in respect of dramatic works under the Imperial Copyright Act is based on the 
same provision as that applicable in respect of musical works, i.e. section 2(1) of the Act. 
In the case the defendant - a president of a dramatic society, was sued for performing the plaintiff’s 
play (dramatic work) at a woman’s institute meeting, without authorisation of the plaintiff. The 
institute, part of a network of similar institutes existing throughout England and Wales, was formed 
for purposes of holding monthly meetings of a social and educational nature, particularly to 
encourage music, drama and dancing.. Every female in the village in which an institute existed was 
expressly or tacitly invited to become a member. The play in question was performed at a regular 
monthly meeting of the institute in question (the Duston Women’s Institute) held on 23 February 
1933 at the village hall, where there were sixty-two (62) members (out of 109 members).  
No charge was made for admission but an annual subscription for a small amount was applicable. 
The performance was rendered by members of the institute of a neighbouring village, for no 
consideration, but “as a return” for services rendered to their institute by the president of the Duston 
Women’s Institute. Only members were admitted to the meetings because a circular of the National 
Federation of Women’s Institutes had advised that inviting visitors changed the character of a 
performance from being a private one, to being a public one, even if no fee was charged. On this 
basis the defendant argued that the performance that took place on 23 February 1933 was no a 
performance “in public”.231 
The court acknowledged the complication arising from the fact that the Imperial Copyright Act did 
not define the expression “in public”.232 It is also noteworthy that in the case (obviously because it 
dealt with the dramatic right) the court affirmed the historical roots of the English concept of 
“performing right” in the protection of dramatic works.233 More relevantly, the court clarified the 
observation, made by earlier courts that the determination of the question whether a performance is 
in public or not “is a question of fact”. The court observed that such statement was “not in a strict 
sense correct”, as the question must involve both law and fact, ‘law in the sense that the true 
meaning of the words “in public” must be ascertained as matter of law, and fact in the sense that it 
must be determined whether the facts of the case do or do not fall within that meaning.”234 In this 
regard Lord Wright M.R. observed: 
“The public” is a term of uncertain import; it must be limited in every case by the context in which it is 
used. It does not generally mean the inhabitants of the world or even the inhabitants of this country. In 
any specific context it may mean for practical purposes only the inhabitants of a village or such 
members of the community as particular advertisements would reach, or who would be interested in 
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any particular matter, professional, political, social, artistic, or local. … Thus it is clear that by “public” 
is meant … “a portion of the public.”
235
 
The departure by Lord Wright M.R. from the earlier position where the emphasis was on the fact that 
the determination of the question whether a performance was in public or not was a matter of fact – 
to a position that stated that it is a matter of both fact and law, is noteworthy. This is because, in the 
writer’s opinion, it illustrates the departure under the Imperial Copyright Act from pre-1912 
legislation, with regard to the legal characterisation or articulation of the performing right. Under the 
pre-1912 legislation (the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act and the Talfourd’s Act) public performance (or rather 
public representation) was legally characterised to involve the use of a place of dramatic 
entertainment, amongst others. Even though, in Duck v Bates, which dealt with the pre-1912 
legislation, the court developed the important test of distinguishing between what is private and 
domestic / quasi-domestic vis-à-vis what is public, it still mattered where the performance took place 
– a factual consideration. Thus, in the writer’s opinion, the court’s finding in Duck v Bates, namely 
that the performance was private, did not only depict the fact that the case was a “border line” case 
– as reiterated in the Jennings ruling - but was in many ways inevitable, seeing that “the 
representation of the play was not made in a place destined for public entertainment.”236 
The Jennings decision is also crucial in that it considered all the other main authorities dealing with 
the question of what constitutes “public” or “in public” dealt with above, in order to formulate a 
clearer articulation of the meaning of the expression. In doing so the court’s ratio depicts an 
evolution in understanding of the expression, that in turn depicts a shift in meaning made possible 
by the Imperial Copyright Act. Thus, in commenting on Bowen L.J.’s observation in Duck v Bates, 
that despite a distinction being made between domestic or quasi-domestic performances and public 
performances, certain “entertainments” of that nature (referring in particular to a private club) could 
still infringe the author’s right – Lord Wright M.R. referred to that observation as a “rather cryptical 
and non-committal expression”.237 Clearly Bowen L.J. could not provide a more emphatic articulation 
of the principle with the concept of a “place of dramatic entertainment” – namely “[a place] where 
dramatic entertainments are represented to which the public are admitted”238 - still looming large. To 
Brett M.R. in Duck v Bates “there [had to be] present a sufficient part of the public … otherwise the 
place where the drama is represented [would] not be ‘a place of dramatic entertainment’ within the 
meaning of the statute.”239 To Lord Wright M.R. however numbers were not a determinant as a 
portion of the public “can be very small indeed”.240 It cannot be denied however that Duck v Bates 
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set the right tone for the development of the concept of “public” or “in public”, and with Jennings and 
the Imperial Copyright Act the time was ripe for a mature expression of the performing right. 
Arriving at the important conclusion that the true criterion for determining if a performance was in 
public or not is the character of the audience, Lord Wright M.R. summed up the position as follows: 
The presence or absence of visitors is … not the decisive factor, nor does it matter whether the 
performance is paid or gratuitous, nor is it conclusive that admission is free or for payment, nor is the 
number of the audience decisive.
241
  
This observation by Lord Wright M.R. is noteworthy in the light of current developments where it 
appears that government is pursuing a new policy direction where considerations of commerciality 
shall be uttermost in determining whether particular acts constitute infringing action or not.242 On the 
basis of this analysis Lord Wright M.R. came to the conclusion that the performance under 
consideration was a public performance, arguing:  
… [I]f the performance … is held not to be a performance in public, the rights of owners of dramatic 
copyright in music or copyright in lectures all over the country will be seriously prejudiced; their plays 
will be liable to lose novelty, and the public demand for performance will be affected; the public 
appetite will be exhausted. … If that were not a performance in public, and might be repeated 
indefinitely all over the country, the performing right would not be of much value.
243
 
Even more emphatically the court observed that “[i]t is the duty of the court to protect the rights of 
authors, composers and lecturers, according to a fair construction of the statute.”244 This resonates 
with the words of Sargant L.J. in the Martans case, where the learned judge, in giving his concurring 
judgment, observed succinctly: “… the aim of the Act [referring to the Imperial Copyright Act] is the 
protection of authors of musical works or composers.”245 The protection of authors was thus, in the 
eyes of these early justices, a fundamental aspect of copyright legislation. This observation by the 
learned judges might have become somewhat of a tired or clichéd statement. Nevertheless it is 
important to reiterate it amidst a growing trend to construe the law of copyright as being concerned 
with so-called “users’ rights”, or rather to equate authors’ rights with such users’ rights246 – 
something alien to the edifice of copyright law as constructed through the Berne Convention system. 
The observations of Lord Wright M.R. were reiterated by Romer L.J. and Greene L.J. in their 
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concurring judgments, but the two justices also highlighted other aspects of what constitutes a 
performance in public that are worth considering. 
Romer L.J. sought to deal with the meaning of the expression “in public” by gleaning the difference 
between this expression and the expression “in private”. He first observed that the expression “in 
public” can safely be construed as meaning “not in private”.247 On elaborating on this Romer L.J. 
made a very important observation on the subject, worth repeating: 
… I think the meaning of the two phrases can best be ascertained by considering what is the essential 
difference between the two performances [i.e. performance “in public” and performance “in private”]. In 
the latter case the entertainment forms part of the domestic or home life of the person who provides it, 
and none the less because of the presence his guests. They are for the time being members of his 
home circle. In the former case, however, the entertainment is in no sense part of the domestic or 
home life of the members of the audience.  It forms part of what may be called in contradistinction their 
non-domestic or outside life.  … The home circle may, of course, in some cases be a large one. The 
section of the public forming the audience may in some cases be a small one. But this can make no 
difference … Nor, with all deference to those who think otherwise, can I agree that it makes any 
difference … whether the performers are strangers or members of the domestic circle. The performers 
at what is unquestionably a private performance are frequently paid. The performers at what is 
unquestionably a public performance frequently give their services for nothing. Nor can an 
entertainment that is private when given by members of the home circle cease to be private when 
given by strangers. …
248
 
In elaborating further on this matter Romer L.J. further made another very important observation, 
namely the fact that it does not matter what the nature of the entertainment is, or the place where 
the entertainment is given.249 In this regard he expressed these timeless words: “A private 
entertainment may be given in a private house. A public entertainment may be given in a private 
house”, further reiterating Lord Wright M.R.’s observation that the true criterion is the character of 
the audience.250 On this basis Romer L.J. agreed with Lord Wright M.R. that the performance in 
question was in public, since the members of the societies “were in no way bound to one another by 
any domestic or quasi-domestic tie”, and their monthly meetings “formed part no of the domestic, 
that is of the private life of a member, but of her outside, that is to say, of her public life.”251 
Greene L.J. provided clarity on what is meant by the position that the question whether a 
performance is “in public” is a question of fact. He reasoned that this meant that the facts of the 
particular case need to be first determined, but once those facts have been determined the question 
becomes one of law. ‘… [T]he meaning of the phrase “in public” is a question of law, and the 
question whether the facts when ascertained fall within the words is also a question of law …’252 
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Greene L.J. brought another important angle to the judgment. – he introduced the concept of the 
copyright owner’s public. In this regard he observed: 
The question may … be usefully approached by inquiring whether or not the act complained of as an 
infringement would, if done by the owner of the copyright himself, have been an exercise by him of the 
statutory right conferred upon him. In other words, the expression “in public” must be considered in 
relation to the owner of the copyright. If the audience considered in relation to the owner of the 
copyright may properly be described as the owners’ “public” or part of his “public,” then in performing 
the work before that audience he would, in my opinion, be exercising the statutory right conferred 
upon him; and anyone who without his consent performed the work before that audience would be 
infringing his copyright. If the performance is such that, if given by or on the authorisation of the owner 
of the copyright, it would have been a performance before an audience which, in relation to the owner 
and in respect of that performance, formed part of his “public”, the fact that the performers perform for 
their own pleasure and improvement and the pleasure of their friends appears to me irrelevant. … 
Once it is appreciated that the wrong of infringement is defined by reference to the statutory right of 
the owner of the copyright, and that accordingly the question of what the words “in public” means is to 
be examined primarily in the light of the relationship of the audience to the owner of the copyright, and 
not in the light of the relationship of the audience to the performers, the difficulties in the present case 
appear to me to be removed. …
253
 
These words by Green L.J. and the other observations by his brothers have had an abiding impact 
of the understanding of the concept of “in public” in relation to the performing right. It provided the 
most clear statement of the proper contours of the performing right under the Imperial Copyright Act, 
and became the standard for shedding light on the meaning of the expression in the future court 
decisions of many common-law jurisdictions.254 Our own courts, in the leading South African case 
dealing with this question, followed and relied heavily on the Jennings case in arriving at a 
decision.255 
3.2.3 Reframing the Meaning of “Musical Work” 
The significance of the Imperial Copyright Act in clarifying the position regarding the legal meaning 
of a musical work – thus removing the enigma that existed pre-1912 – is well illustrated by the 
Redwood case.256 This case dealt with three questions relating to the effect of the provisions of the 
Imperial Copyright Act, the main one (and relevant one for present purposes) being what was 
termed “the collective work point”.257  
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The Redwood case was, in the same manner as the Lion Sleeps Tonight case,258 concerned with 
the reversionary interest contemplated in the proviso to section 5(2) of the Imperial Copyright Act.259 
Section 5(1) of the Act provided that the author of a work was the first owner of copyright in a 
work.260 The general provisions of section 5(2) then provided that the author could assign his 
copyright, either in whole or in part, and either generally or subject to territorial limitation, and either 
for the whole term of copyright or for a part thereof; as well as grant any interest in the copyright by 
licence. Then came the proviso incorporating the reversionary interest, which stipulated as follows:   
Provided that, where the author of a work is the first owner of the copyright therein, no assignment of 
the copyright, and no grant of any interest therein, made by him (otherwise than by will) after the 
passing of this Act, shall be operative to vest in the assignee or grantee any rights with respect to the 
copyright in the work beyond the expiration of twenty-five years from the death of the author, and the 
reversionary interest in the copyright expectant on the termination of that period shall, on the death of 
the author, notwithstanding any agreement to the contrary, devolve on his legal personal 
representatives as part of his estate, and any agreement entered into by him as to the disposition of 
such reversionary interest shall be null and void ... 
The present discussion is not as such, concerned with the reversionary provision but with the 
second part to the proviso. This second part provided that nothing in the proviso was to be 
construed “as applying to the assignment of the copyright in a collective work or a licence to publish 
a work or part of a work as part of a collective work.” An American woman, Miss Stern, who had 
become aware of the provision relating to the reversionary interest, obtained from the estates of 
various deceased authors the right to represent them in relation to the reversionary interest, which 
she was convinced had reverted to these estates. She made a proposal to the publishers of the 
works of such deceased authors, numbering between thirty and forty thousand, requiring them to 
pay to the estates fifty percent of the royalties obtained from the usage of the works for the past six 
years, and to retain fifty percent for the next ten years, after which they would no longer be entitled 
to control the usage of the songs. When the publishers refused to accede to this demand, a 
company, Redwood Music Ltd, was formed and the rights concerned assigned to it, with the 
objective of starting court proceedings to test the validity of Miss Stern’s contentions. 
The crucial question before the court was whether a song of which one person had written the words 
and another composed the music fell within the definition of “collective work” as contemplated in 
section 35(1) – seeing that the second part to the proviso to section 5(2) excluded collective works 
from the operation of the reversionary interest. In answering this question, the court raised a number 
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of points which clarified the position regarding the nature of a musical work under the new 
dispensation ushered in by the Imperial Copyright Act. It will be recalled that in pre-1912 British 
copyright law the protection of musical compositions was framed within the mould of dramatic 
performance. As Scrutton observed at the time, “[m]usical compositions in the English law go hand 
in hand with the drama”.261 Real protection for musical compositions as musical works per se was in 
relation to their status as printed works or sheet music; once the form of exploitation shifted into the 
performance area, then the musical work would often be subsumed into the rubric of “dramatic 
piece.” Today what was termed a “dramatic piece” in this context would be best described as a 
dramatico-musical work, where “copyright in each contribution to [the] dramatico-musical work (e.g., 
literary work, music, lyrics) may be claimed separately”, in addition to “a copyright in the dramatico-
musical work as a whole … as a single work.”262 Thus in this case, the copyright in the individual 
musical work (or any of the other constituent works of the dramatico-musical work), would remain 
intact and would not be affected by or subsumed into the dramatico-musical work. 
This was achieved in the Imperial Copyright Act by the introduction of the concept of “collective 
work”. As Copinger observed, the expression “collective work” was “a useful one to indicate a class 
of works which differ in principle” from other ordinary works.263 The expression “collective work” was 
defined in section 35(1) of the Imperial Copyright Act as: 
(a) an encyclopaedia, dictionary, year book, or similar work; (b) a newspaper, review, magazine, or 
similar periodical; and (c) any work written in distinct parts by different authors, or in which works or 
parts of works of different authors are incorporated.
264
    
The appellants in the Redwood case argued that a song – i.e. a creation comprised of words and 
music – was a collective work as contemplated in section 35(1) of the Imperial Copyright Act and 
was thus exempted from the application of the reversionary provisions of the proviso to section 5(2) 
of the Act. The court countered, observing that an “essential ingredient” of a collective work is that it 
has “copyright of its own”, “in addition to the copyright of each of the parts which constitute or are 
incorporated in the collective work”.265 This is not the position in relation to a song where the words 
are written by one person, and the music by another. In such a case copyright subsists separately in 
the words and in the musical composition, but “[i]t follows that the song itself has no copyright”.266 A 
collective work is “something which by original collocation or arrangement has a copyright of its own” 
and thus a song, in which the two copyrights comprising it are separate and distinct, is not a 
collective work; since “[t]o ‘marry’ the two in the form of a song did not constitute a third copyright in 
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musical work, or both, depending on the circumstances of each case.  
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the song as a ‘work’”..267 Furthermore, unlike the position in American law, where copyright in the 
song “as such” is recognised, “English law does not admit the existence of a single copyright in a 
song as an entity” subsisting apart from the copyright in the component literary and musical 
works.268 It is submitted that this position applies equally in South Africa.269 
Lord Keith suggested that it was possible to call a song a “hybrid collective work” (i.e. “one which 
partakes of more than one of the characteristics of ‘literary dramatic musical and artistic’ mentioned 
in s 1 of the Act”), but that this would be “a collective hybrid work which does not engender a 
collective work copyright distinct from the copyrights in the individual parts”.270 However, while a 
“simple song” could not become “a hybrid collective work” which engenders copyright, “a 
complicated work comprising musical and literary components such as an opera”, could. This, it is 
submitted, would be true of other dramatico-musical works such as music plays, pantomimes, 
revues etc.271 The Redwood case without doubt went a long way in clarifying the difference in the 
way in which musical compositions were treated in pre-1912 British legislation, and the way they are 
treated in modern copyright law, commencing with the Imperial Copyright Act. It made it clear that a 
song was not a single dramatic piece (i.e. a dramatico-musical work) as would have been the case 
under the old British legislation; and further that there was no independent copyright in the song as 
an entity but that it was instead, a composite work comprising of two distinct works, namely a 
musical work and a literary work, in which copyright subsists independently. 
It is submitted that this reframing and “freeing” of musical copyright was only made possible by the 
ingenious and straightforward manner in which musical and other copyright works were dealt with 
under the Imperial Copyright Act. Further British legislation followed the tradition of categorising 
musical works as separate, distinct works, and this also found its way in the new common-law 
system of copyright. Thus section 2(1) and (2) of the British Copyright Act, 1956272 clearly made a 
distinction between copyright in musical works and copyright in literary works, making it easy for the 
court, in commenting on the protection of songs under the 1956 Act, to make the now-common and 
clichéd observation:  
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There are two copyrights in the song: one in the music (the “musical work” …), and one in the lyrics 
(the “literary work” …).
273
 
This may not seem to be a major feat today, but viewed against the backdrop of the state of 
confusion that existed in pre-twentieth century British copyright law in relation to the protection of 
musical works, it indeed represents a phenomenal shift. Based on this historical development the 
British legislature was able, in the Copyright Act of 1988,274 to, for the first time in English copyright 
law,275 with less effort, proffer a proper definition of the expression “musical work”, which it defined 
as:  
a work consisting of music, exclusive of any words or action intended to be sung, spoken or performed 
with the music.
276
 
Such a definition was indeed ripe for expression. Although it has been observed that the South 
African Copyright Act of 1978 “departed from [British legislation] in several respects and … really 
amounts to our legislature departing on an independent course in the field of copyright law”, 277 the 
influence of British legislation on our law is evident from the definition of “musical works” in the 1978 
Act. While previous South African copyright legislation (including the Copyright Act of 1965278) did 
not, similar to pre-1988 British legislation, provide a definition of the expression “musical works”, the 
South African Copyright Act defines this expression in exactly the same manner as the UK 
Copyright Act, 1988, does.279 This definition was inserted by section 1(q) of Act 125 of 1992, and 
was thus clearly borrowed from the British Act enacted some four years earlier. The words of Jacob 
LJ in Hyperion Records Ltd v Sawkins280 in relation to the definition of musical works in the UK 
Copyright Act, 1988, are apt: 
The definition of “music” is not a definition at all – its obvious purpose is just to separate out lyrics or 
choreographical directions or the like. They go into a different “box” for copyright purposes, for 
instance lyrics into literary works and choreographical works into “dramatic works”. …
281
 
While the words of Jacob LJ clearly reflect a lamenting tenor – apparently because the definition did 
not satisfy the need that the learned judge wanted to address – the words themselves confirm the 
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line of argument advanced in this discussion, namely the fact that musical works were, beginning 
with the enactment of the Imperial Copyright Act, expressed in their pure, small rights form, separate 
from literary copyright and dramatic copyright.   
3.3 Conclusion 
In the preceding discussion the writer illustrated how the advent of new technologies and the 
enactment of the Imperial Copyright Act, together with its elucidation by the courts, became the two 
single-most important catalysts in the development of the modern protection of music copyright in 
the English common-law system. This is because these developments shifted music copyright 
protection from the befuddled state in which it existed in pre-1912 English legislation, providing more 
clarity and setting the tone for the modern protection of music copyright. In the area of the 
reproduction right this was done by making it explicit that the right of reproduction was not limited to 
the printing of works, in an era where the technique of printing was replaced by new technological 
ways of reproducing copyright works. At the international level, beginning with the Berlin revision of 
the Berne Convention in 1908, and in national legislations such as the US Copyright Act of 1909 and 
the UK Imperial Copyright Act of 1911, it was recognised that copyright law had to be adapted in line 
with technological developments to ensure that it remained relevant as a form of protection for 
rights-holders. In this way the reproduction right was extended to encompass the new recording 
technology (mechanical right), the new film, television and video technologies (synchronisation right) 
and the new radio technology (electrical transcription right).  
Of its own right the Imperial Copyright Act sought to provide clarity to the confused manner in which 
the performing right was framed in pre-1912 English legislation, which had led to many composers 
not seeing the performing right as a viable source of income for them. This was in contrast with the 
position in France where the performing right had become a major source of income for rights-
holders. In this regard the Imperial Copyright Act disentangled the concept of performing right from 
the incoherent state in which it existed, where it was connected to fuzzy concepts such as “place of 
dramatic entertainment”, “dramatic piece” and “representation”. Instead the Act reframed the 
performing right by providing for a simple, “yet potent” right in section 1(2) of the Act.282 The 
interpretation of this right by the courts to show that it differed from the limited protection provided for 
in pre-1912 English legislation, cemented the relevance and efficacy of the modern-day performing 
right. Thus the leading English decision of Jennings v Stephens continues to be relied upon by many 
common-law jurisdictions in defining the contours of the performing right. The Imperial Copyright Act 
further shaped the modern music industry by making it easy for the court in the Redwood case to 
find that a song was not a collective work but was instead comprised of two distinct works in which 
copyright subsists, namely a musical work and a literary work.  While this might not seem to be a 
notable achievement today, at the time it was revolutionary and represented the complete cutting of 
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ties with the past era, where it was observed that “[m]usical compositions in the English law go hand 
in hand with the drama”.283            
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Chapter 4: The Historical Development of Music Copyright in 
South Africa 
“IP rights as conceived of in the current IP framework did not exist in precolonial Africa. However, 
customary law provided, and continues to provide, knowledge governance systems …. Such 
systems are relevant and required because there are records of African creativity … on both a small 
and grand scale …. Further, the continent’s rich cultural life manifested in a variety of art, artefacts, 
song, and dance, which are now commonly categorized as traditional cultural expressions (TCE) or 
folklore. The then prevailing governing system of customary law would have regulated such 
expressions, knowledge, skill, and its products.”1  
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4.1 Introduction 
Just as it was necessary to trace the historical development of music copyright law from a general, 
international perspective in Chapters 2 and 3, it would also be extremely helpful to do so in relation 
to South Africa – to the extent that this is possible. In the writer’s estimation, the period from the 
enactment and coming into force of the first South African intellectual property legislation in 19162 
marks the commencement of modern South African copyright law (including music copyright law). 
Accordingly, the discussion about the impact of the British Imperial Copyright Act on the 
development of modern music copyright law, dealt with in Chapter 3, has relevance for the 
development of music copyright law in South Africa, seeing that the 1916 South African enactment 
relating to copyright was, in fact, to a large extent, an incorporation of the Imperial Copyright Act in 
the Third Schedule to the 1916 Act. It is also important to note that the current analysis does not 
include an analysis of the Copyright Act 63 of 1965 – enacted at a time when South African 
copyright law was already in a modern form.3 The current Copyright Act 98 of 1978 shall be 
considered in full in Chapter 7 below, as shown in the framework of the study in Chapter 1, although 
it is also referred to throughout the thesis as necessary.  
Of necessity an analysis of the historical development of music copyright law in South Africa would 
have to be limited to “Western law” – namely the Roman-Dutch common law system and English 
statutory law applicable in South Africa up to the enactment of the 1916 Act. Due to the general 
subjugation of indigenous law systems during the colonial rule4 – a condition that persists today to a 
large extent5 – the manner in which such systems dealt with indigenous knowledge and / or 
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intellectual property does not form part of the current analysis, as it had no influence in the 
development of South African intellectual property law.6 In light of this, early South African copyright 
law can be traced to the first Dutch settlement in the Cape from 1652, when the Roman-Dutch law 
system was introduced as South Africa’s common law. In this regard Dean has observed:  
… Dutch copyright law as it existed in The Netherlands in 1803 was received into South African law 
along with the general body of Roman-Dutch law. That there has been very little mention, if any, of 
Roman-Dutch copyright law in South Africa is hardly surprising because even today … copyright 
remains an esoteric branch of the law … It may well be that 19th Century South African lawyers were 
in blissful ignorance of the availability of copyright protection under the Roman-Dutch common law. 
This does not, however, alter the fact that the law was there and the protection available to be called 
upon if required.
7
 
After English occupation, British statutory copyright law had application in South Africa in those 
territories that were, from time to time, under British control, sometimes alongside local legislation, 
until the enactment of the 1916 Act and the implementation of the so-called 1917 Gateway (for 
which see further below). 
4.2 An Overview of the Historical Development of Music in South Africa 
It has been observed that from at least the beginning of the colonial period, when the Dutch 
colonised the Cape,8 South African music was characterised by “varying degrees of hybridisation”, 
when Western musical instruments and ideas were adapted to indigenous musical forms.9 Music 
was performed by the Khoi-Khoi, Ethiopians and slaves brought in from other countries (e.g. 
Malaysia), so that Cape Town “rapidly became a melting pot of cultural influences from all over the 
world” – so much that by the 1670’s a slave orchestra existed in the Cape.10 By the 1800’s Cape 
Town was a hive of activity in relation to music, with the practice of music parades, influenced by 
travelling American “minstrels”,11 taking form. An abiding manifestation of these parades is the so-
called Tweede Nuwe Jaar (Second New Year) street parade known as the Cape Town Minstrel 
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Carnival, when the Kaapse Klopse (Cape Minstrels) take to the streets of Cape Town in a colourful, 
festivity-filled parade in a performance no less glamorous than the famous Rio Carnival in Brazil.12 In 
this regard it is worth observing that the choir-style that emerged from the influence of the American 
minstrels would have conformed squarely to the definition of “musical work” in section 3 of the UK’s 
Musical (Summary Proceedings) Copyright Act, 1902. This Act defined “musical work” as: “any 
combination of melody and harmony, or either of them, printed, reduced to writing, or otherwise 
graphically produced or reproduced.”13  
With the influence of missionaries a style of black music composition with western influences but 
adapted to local harmonic styles emerged. This was led by early composers such as John Knox 
Bokwe, with other composers such as Enoch Sontonga, composer of Nkosi Sikelel’i Afrika (God 
Bless Africa), emerging. However, by 1925 it was observed that the performing right had hitherto 
“not been of much practical importance in South Africa owing to the fact that little or no attempt has 
been made to enforce it”; and in fact that “musical compositions published in [the] country prior to 
January 1st, 1917, [were] of a practically negligible quantity”.14 With urbanisation and the rise of a 
“black urban proletariat” eclectic forms of African music emerged, starting with Marabi and evolving 
through various styles into Mbaqanga, “the most distinctive form of South African jazz.”15 From this 
evolved the first professional black bands that performed in styles such as “isicathamiya” (first 
popularised by Solomon Linda’s “Mbube” song, which was adapted in several ways, most famously 
through the Disney version “The Lion Sleeps Tonight”;16 and now the signature sound of the famous 
Ladysmith Black Mambazo); “isikwhela Jo” and “kwela” (pennywhistle), which profiled South African 
music internationally in the 1950s and evolved into Mbaqanga, its grand form.17 South African 
popular music itself began in 1912, “with the first commercial recordings.”18 In this regard South 
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Africa’s recording music industry developed around the same time that the recording industry 
developed in other developed parts of the world such as England and the USA.19 
In this regard it would be appropriate to pause and observe that it was the British Copyright Act 1911 
(the Imperial Copyright Act), which was applicable in South Africa through its incorporation by the 
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act of 1916 that facilitated this development of the South African 
music industry. As indicated, the Imperial Copyright Act consolidated British copyright law and 
removed the controversies that existed in particular in relation to the performing right, and also 
facilitated the development of the recording industry (see the discussion under Chapter 3 supra). 
Other forms of music styles developed in South Africa, including “bubblegum”, “kwaito” which 
emerged in the transition to democracy and revolutionised the South African music scene. Gospel 
remains a major music form in South Africa, and rock is prominent among especially the white 
community. Newer styles which have followed developments internationally include House music, 
which is linked to the Dj or Djing craze,20 and Hip Hop, the two being arguably the most sensational 
music forms in South Africa at the moment.21 However, because these music forms are heavily 
dependent on sampling,22 this presents many legal challenges for copyright law that our courts will 
soon have to grapple with.23  
4.3 The Historical Development of Music Copyright in South Africa up to 
1917 
4.3.1 Introduction 
An effort to trace the historical development of music copyright in South Africa is not an easy one 
because research relating to this is as scarce as that relating to the historical development of 
copyright in South Africa in general. The only focused study on the historical development of 
copyright in South Africa that the writer is aware of is a doctoral research conducted by Dean and 
submitted for examination in 1988.24 The writer relies much on this study for this current analysis, 
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Sampling and Ewald J and Oliver 2017  https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2898820 (date of use: 20 
December 2017).  
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 Dean OH The Application of the Copyright Act, 1978, to Works made prior to 1979 (LLD Thesis, University of 
Stellenbosch: 1988), herein cited as Dean Application of the Copyright Act. Copinger Law of Copyright 346 provides a very 
brief, one-page summary of the state of the law of copyright in South Africa prior to 1917. Another study that the writer has 
come across is that of Pistorius T “The Imperial Copyright Act 1911’s role in shaping South Africa’s copyright law”, in 
Suthersanen and Gendreau (eds) A Shifting Empire 204 – 225. This study however focusses not on the historical 
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especially with regard to pre-1912 events. However, because Dean dealt with copyright in general 
and not music copyright specifically, this has to be contextualised for current purposes. Modern 
South African copyright law can be traced from the Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright 
Act, 1916,25 the first intellectual property legislation enacted by the Union of South Africa. This Act 
incorporated, holus bolus, the text of the British Copyright Act of 1911 (the Imperial Copyright Act) in 
its Third Schedule, subject to certain minor alterations.26  
Dean succinctly describes copyright law in South Africa prior to the coming into operation of the 
1916 Act as being “in a very confused and disjointed state.”27 This is reminiscent of the manner in 
which the Copyright Commission 1875/6 described the state of British copyright, calling it “wholly 
destitute of any sort of arrangement, incomplete, often obscure, and even when … intelligible upon 
long study … in many parts so ill-expressed that no-one who does not give such study to it can 
expect to understand it.”28 Section 24 of the British Copyright Act, 1911 attempted to resolve this in 
respect of pre-1912 British rights by providing that any qualifying “existing rights” (whether in the 
nature of copyright or “performing right”) would be ‘transformed into “new” or substituted rights’ 
under the Imperial Copyright Act, and in this way “treated in the same way as rights conferred by the 
British Act, 1911 in works made thereafter.”29 In the same manner, the transitional provisions of the 
South African Act of 1916 created conditions under which rights protected in South Africa up to 1 
January 1917, when the 1916 Act came into operation, would continue to find protection under the 
1916 Act. Borrowing an expression used by Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria to describe the process of 
the substitution by the British Copyright Act, 1911, of pre-1912 rights (“1912 Gateway”), Dean uses 
the expression “1917 Gateway” to describe the process whereby rights in existence in South Africa 
on 1 January 1917 were substituted by rights conferred upon the works in question by the 1916 
Act.30 This expression is apt and it is going to be used here also.   
Apart from the need for historical analysis one important reason why an understanding of the rights 
protected under the 1916 Act (including those that passed through the 1917 Gateway in order to find 
protection in this Act), remains relevant, is the impact of the transitional provisions of the current 
Copyright Act, 1978, as embodied in section 41 and more particularly section 43 of the Act. These 
provisions deal with the application of the 1978 Act to works made prior to 1 January 1979, when 
this Act came into operation. As Dean, who deals expertly and competently with this issue in his 
thesis points out: 
                                                                                                                                                              
development of South African copyright but on the impact of the Imperial Copyright Act on current South African copyright 
law.  
25
 Act 9 of 1916. 
26
 See Dean Application of the Copyright Act 8-9. 
27
 Id at 170.  
28
 See McFarlane Performing Right 61. 
29
 Dean Application of the Copyright Act 147. 
30
 See Dean id at 147 and 170, and the full discussion at 332 – 370.  
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In applying the Copyright Act, 1978, to works made prior to 1 January 1979 … one must, depending 
upon the circumstances, have regard to certain of the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1965, and the 
Patents, Trade Marks, Designs and Copyright Act, 1916.
31
 
Thus, while those earlier laws have been repealed, their provisions remain relevant for purposes of 
the application of the 1978 Act to works made within their auspices.32 To this end one must ask 
these questions: (i) what works enjoyed copyright under the 1916 and 1965 Acts?; (ii) who owned 
the copyright in such works “in terms of those Acts”?, and (iii) what is the term of copyright “under 
those Acts”?33 In essence therefore it can be said that the 1916 Act on the one hand and the 1978 
Act on the other have created a two-way traffic system with regard to copyright protection in modern 
copyright law – with the 1916 Act looking forward to (i.e. relying upon) the 1978 Act for the continued 
recognition of the protection accorded to works protectable under that Act (i.e. the 1916 Act), and 
the 1978 Act looking backward to the 1916 Act34 for the determination of the ownership, duration or 
validity of copyright in relation to such works. This is not a merely pedantic exercise, as 
demonstrated in the so-called Lion Sleeps Tonight case,35 where the court essentially accepted the 
fact that the reversionary interest in Solomon Linda’s work, “Mbube”, vested in the Executor of his 
deceased estate, twenty five years after his death, as provided for in the proviso to s 5(2) of the 
Imperial Copyright Act (which as indicated, comprised the Third Schedule of the 1916 Act). This is 
because “Mbube”, which was composed in the 1930’s, was protected under the 1916 Act and since 
its composer, Solomon Linda, died in 1962, the reversionary interest vested in the executor of his 
deceased estate in 1987.36 Commenting on the impact of this case Pistorius has observed: 
The result was that not only had Linda’s copyright in South Africa reverted to his estate’s executor, but 
this was also the legal position in all countries which were formerly part of the British Empire.
37
  
The following is an analysis of the protection of music rights in South Africa prior to 1 January 1917, 
including those that passed through the 1917 Gateway. This is divided into rights protectable under 
the Roman-Dutch common law and rights protectable under statutory law.38 In this regard it needs to 
be highlighted that this discussion does not include English common law copyright which protected 
unpublished works and did not form part of South African copyright law.39 Roman-Dutch common 
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 Dean Application of the Copyright Act 93. 
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 This is in turn made possible by the fact that the 1916 Act ‘made provision for the granting of so-called “substituted 
rights” in the place of any copyright existing in South Africa no matter what its origin might have been.” Id at 208, emphasis 
added. 
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 See id at 113. 
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 And the 1965 Act in respect of works created under that Act. 
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 Disney Enterprises Inc. v Griesel N.O. & Others 895 JOC (T). 
36
 See for a further discussion of this Dean Handbook of Copyright Law 3-20 – 3-20A; Dean Awakening the Lion and 
Pistorius “The Imperial Copyright Act 1911’s role in shaping South Africa’s copyright law”, in Suthersanen and Gendreau 
(eds) A Shifting Empire 216 – 218. 
37
 Pistorius id at 217. 
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(i.e. Roman-Dutch law and the statutory law of the provinces); pre-1911 British copyright law and British copyright law 
subsisting in terms of the British Copyright Act, 1911, and existing in the United Kingdom as on 1 January 1917. See Dean 
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 In this regard Dean id at 228 – 229 correctly criticises the reference by counsel for the applicant in Boosey & Co v 
Simmonds (1903) 20 SC 632; 13 CTR 1138 to a South African common law protection when the case in question was 
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law would, however be included, despite the fact that no reference to it is made in the Fourth 
Schedule to the South African Act of 1916. As Dean has argued, rights protectable under the 
Roman-Dutch common law would be eligible to pass through the 1917 Gateway because ‘these 
rights were “copyright” and the purpose and intent of the Act of 1916 was to recognise any existing 
copyright but to transform it into copyright provided for in the Act of 1916.’40 Lastly, the discussion 
highlights the impact that the Imperial Copyright Act, 1911, incorporated in the Third Schedule to the 
1916 Act, has had in shaping modern South African copyright law. Pistorius addresses aspects  of 
this issue at some length in her article titled “The Imperial Copyright Act 1911’s role in shaping 
South Africa’s Copyright law”.41 This chapter particularly considers the impact that the Act has had in 
reframing the legal understanding of what constitutes a musical work – thus clearing the maze that 
existed in English law in respect of this matter, prior to 1912.42  
4.3.2 Music Rights Protected under Roman-Dutch Law 
4.3.2.1 The Era of the Republic of the United Netherlands 
During the period of the first occupation of the Cape by the Dutch – i.e. from 1652 until 1795 – the 
Netherlands was a republic comprised of a number of provinces, which were autonomous except in 
matters of foreign affairs and defence. This was the era of the Republic of the United Netherlands. 
Roman-Dutch law was received in the Cape at this stage and became the common law of the 
colony.43 Roman-Dutch law had “a multiplicity of sources” which Dean “conveniently” divides into 
legislation and the works of the writers of Roman-Dutch law.44 The Dutch East India Company, 
which had jurisdiction and trade monopoly over the Cape was administered by a Governor working 
with the Raad van Politie. The company did not have legislative powers and could only issue 
placaaten (local statutes) dealing with matters of an administrative nature, including the granting of 
monopolies and the issuing of licences.45 The fact that the Governor could issue placaaten dealing 
with monopolies is instructive because, like many other European countries as highlighted above, 
                                                                                                                                                              
concerned with published works. Thus, apart from the fact that British common law copyright had not been assimilated into 
South African copyright law, it would not have been applicable in any case because it was only concerned with 
unpublished works. Moreover, Roman-Dutch common law would also not apply because it only gave protection “in the 
country itself” (which would have been the Cape where the case was heard); in this case however, publication had taken 
place in Britain.   
40
 Dean id at 336. 
41
 Pistorius T “The Imperial Copyright Act 1911’s role in shaping South Africa’s copyright law”, in Suthersanen and 
Gendreau (eds) A Shifting Empire 204 – 225. 
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and it did not recognise the technological developments that had taken over the international music industry by storm at 
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 Dean Application of the Copyright Act 183. For a full discussion of the reception of Roman-Dutch law in South Africa see 
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 Dean id at 184.  
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Dutch East India Company and the Estates-General. Zimmerman id at 40.  
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the practice of issuing “proto-copyrights” in the form of royal privileges or letters patent, in relation to 
the printing of books, was prevalent in the Netherlands also, from circa 1516.46 These privileges 
granted monopoly rights of unlimited duration to a publisher or printer in relation to the printing of 
books under certain conditions. Dean states that privileges were granted “to written works of all 
types”, including musical works, but there was no clear distinction between what later became the 
subject-matter of copyright, designs and patents.47 
Dean observes that these privileges were generally granted to “those who incurred a financial 
outlay” in the printing of works, such as publishers, and that “[t]he interests of authors … were 
generally speaking not taken into account”, except where the author was also a publisher.48 
Privileges were only granted in respect of published works or works in which there was a clear 
intention of publication – and no payment was required except that in Holland there was a 
requirement that a copy of the work had to be donated to the library of the University of Leiden.49 A 
privilege vested in the publisher the right of reproducing and publishing the work, later involving the 
right to reproduce or publish the whole or a part of the work; the right to import and distribute copies 
of the work produced elsewhere, and in exceptional cases the right to translate the work.50 It has 
been observed that a prolific book publishing industry existed in the Netherlands during the 17th and 
18th centuries, with many foreign writers choosing to publish their works in Holland to avoid 
censorship in their countries.51 
Having indicated the above, it needs to be noted however that, in respect of both dramatic and 
musical works, the granting of a privilege did not entail the granting of a performing right.52 Dean 
states that the reason for this was that “[t]o grant such a privilege would have been inconsistent with 
the ratio of the privilege system as being for the benefit of the publishing industry.”53 Furthermore in 
respect of dramatic and musical works protection was granted ‘only to the extent that they were in 
the form of “books” and were capable of being reproduced by means of printing and / or published”54 
– a position not very different from that prevailing in England in respect of both the privilege and 
copyright system. Generally protection was not granted in respect of unpublished works; however 
the Estates-General of Holland issued a placaat in 1728 conferring on certain professors and 
members of the teaching staff of the University of Leiden the right to prevent the unauthorised 
publication of their works.55 The territory of the privilege was the territory where the grantor had 
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jurisdiction and generally “there was no question of privileges having international effect.”56 The 
privilege system was abolished in 1796, first in Holland, paving the way for Dutch statutory copyright 
law.57  
Seeing that placaaten were used to grant protection to authors, as indicated above; and seeing that 
the Dutch East India Company Governor at the Cape could, in conjunction with the Raad van Politie 
issue placaaten granting monopoly rights, the question has to be asked why no privileges were 
issued to authors in this way during Dutch rule in the Cape. As indicated above, musical activity was 
rife in the Cape during this period. We again turn to Dean for the resolution of this enigma. Dean 
argues that the fact that under the Dutch East India Company “very little … business or economic 
activity” took place other than the Cape operating as a refreshment station would have contributed 
to the apparent lack of interest in the protection of works of authorship.58 In particular the non-
existence of a publishing trade at the Cape during this period, and the fact that “copyright at the time 
was really only of any particular interest to publishers” would explain this situation – further 
confirmed by the fact that the first printing press in the Cape was only established in 1800. As 
indicated, protection was granted to works only so far as they were capable of being reproduced by 
means of printing. Without a printing press no protection could thus be granted. 
McKenzie provides a convincing reason why there was no publishing industry at the Cape during 
this period – namely the Cape authorities’ fear of the political implications of having a free press.59  It 
has in this regard been observed that Francis Dundas, the acting governor of the Cape during the 
first British occupation, expressed an intense opposition to the establishment of a printing press at 
the Cape, arguing that this was 
more likely to produce evil than good effects, since the minds of the inhabitants are by no means 
prepared to exercise the freedom of discussion on almost any subject, particularly politics, concerning 
which they had been led to entertain very confused and erroneous opinions.
60
 
This, together with the fact that privileges only operated within the jurisdiction of the person issuing 
them, is, it is submitted, conclusive evidence for the position that the system of printing privileges did 
not take root at the Cape. There is thus no question about the rights accorded through such 
privileges passing through the 1917 Gateway and being replaced by substituted rights. In any event, 
even where common law copyright had taken root in the Cape (as dealt with in paragraph (b) 
below), it would have been abolished by the Cape Act of 1873. Similarly common law copyright was 
abolished in Natal by the Acts of 1896 and 1897, and in Transvaal by the Act of 1887.61 The 
exception in this regard relates to the Orange Free State, which did not enact any copyright 
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legislation and provided for the application of Roman-Dutch law in its Constitution of 1854.62 In this 
regard it has been submitted that any copyright published in the Orange Free State from this period 
passed through the 1917 Gateway and was converted to a substituted right.63 Dean, in describing 
the copyright that passed through the 1917 Gateway, indicates that it is copyright ‘derived from the 
earlier South African legislation, i.e. the so-called “Provincial Copyright Acts”, the British Copyright 
Act of 1842, or from the Roman-Dutch common law.”64 It needs however, to be understood what is 
meant by “Roman-Dutch common law” in this context. The brief note below seeks to clarify this. 
First, it needs to be understood that the process of substitution of old rights with new rights under 
the 1916 South African Act involved the recognition of the ‘“old” right and its ownership’, and the 
transformation of the said right ‘into a “new” right having the content, ambit and force” of the 
copyright provided for under the 1916 Act.65 As Sir Wilfrid Greene observed in Coleridge-Taylor & 
Another v Novello & Co. Ltd66 in respect of the provisions of the British Imperial Copyright Act (which 
are mimicked in the 1916 South African Act), what the Act created was a ‘“new copyright,” a different 
matter with different elements in it to any copyright which existed before the Act, and including, as I 
have said, certain matters, performing rights and common law rights, which did not fall under old 
copyright.’ It is in this regard submitted that the “old rights” that passed through the 1917 Gateway 
could not have been the rights accorded under the privilege system but those provided under Dutch 
statutory copyright as received in the South African Roman-Dutch common law (as dealt with below 
in paragraph (b)). Further, apart from the fact that Dutch statutory copyright did away with the 
privilege system, it is explicit in the Fourth Schedule to the 1916 Act that the “existing rights” being 
substituted were either “copyright and performing right”, “copyright, but not performing right” or 
“performing right, but not copyright”. This aligns with the provisions of section 160 of the 1916 Act, 
which stipulated: 
As from the commencement of this Chapter no person shall be entitled to copyright or any similar right 
in any literary, dramatic, musical, or artistic work … otherwise than under and in accordance with the 
provisions of the British Copyright Act and this Chapter …”
67
 
It is submitted that that the reference to “any similar right” does not permit the inclusion of rights 
arising from the privilege system (either in English or Roman-Dutch law) but is rather a reference to 
the performing right, which as dealt with earlier, was, in pre-1912 British copyright law, treated as a 
right separate from but similar to copyright. Rights arising from Roman-Dutch privileges would not 
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qualify as either copyright or performing right (in the latter case for the simple reason that that 
privilege system did not extend to performing rights).68  
4.3.2.2 The Era of the Batavian Republic 
In 1795 the Cape fell under British annexation after the Battle of Muizenberg, a condition that 
remained in place until February 1803 when the colony was returned to the Netherlands following 
the Treaty of Amiens.69 This was also the period when the Republic of the United Netherlands was 
replaced by the Batavian Republic with subordinate status to Napoleon’s French Empire – a mere 
client state.70 The control of the Cape by the Batavian Republic was short-lived however, as the 
British again annexed the Cape in 1806 following the Battle of Blaauwberg, essentially remaining in 
control until South Africa became a republic in 1961.  
Although Dutch control of the Cape under the Batavian Republic was short-lived, it had significance 
not only in terms of improved administration and the establishment of a proper central government 
under Commissioner-General JA De Mist, but, as Dean posits, more particularly in relation to the 
further development of Roman-Dutch law and the introduction of a proper system of statutory 
copyright in that legal system.71 During the era of the Republic of the United Netherlands legislative 
authority in respect of the overseas territories was vested in the Estates-General, the body that dealt 
with the common interests of the various provincial states.72 The Estates-General is however said to 
have exercised this legislative power only once in relation to “the substantive private law” – in a case 
involving the law of intestate succession.73 The administration of justice remained virtually 
unchanged until the end of the first period of Dutch occupation in 1795 and, as observed, the few 
changes to the law at the time (of a very insignificant nature) happened in the Netherlands, not in 
South Africa or Batavia.74 Dean, commenting on the significance of the era of the Batavian Republic 
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in the further development of Roman-Dutch law and the Roman-Dutch system of statutory copyright 
in particular, observes: 
Virtually all the South African legal historians devote very little attention to the Batavian Republic 
period of the Cape. Virtually nothing is said about the further development of the law at the Cape 
during the Batavian Republic period. … However, the period of the Batavian Republic assumes 
considerable significance for the law of copyright because what was in effect the first piece of 
Netherlands copyright legislation dated from July 1803 during which time the Cape was an overseas 
province of the Batavian Republic.
75
 
When Britain took occupation of the Cape in 1795 prior to returning control to the Batavian Republic 
in 1803, it did not do away with the application of Roman-Dutch law.76 Further to this, while during 
the era of the Republic of the Netherlands no one had direct legislative powers over the Cape 
except for the Estates-General, which “only had a minor legislative function” and was not actively 
involved in the development of the law – Dean shows that the Batavian Republic had direct 
legislative powers over the Cape, albeit for a short interval.77 Of greater significance is the fact that it 
was during this period that the Batavian Republic passed the first copyright legislation, the Copyright 
Act of 1803.78 The logical conclusion, as Dean submits, is that this legislation “had full force and 
effect at the Cape.”79 In view of this it is important to consider what this legislation provided in 
relation to literary and musical works in order to consider the extent to which the protection accorded 
to these works found recognition under the 1916 Act. 
The Batavian Act of 1803 was, true to form in relation to the privilege system and the Holland Act of 
1796 preceding it, also focused on the protection of publishers, granting a right of copying to 
“compilers of books” or those in whom the right vested in some other lawful way.80 Section 1 
provided that henceforth no privileges or patents relating to the printing and publishing of books 
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would be granted by means of public authority as this violated the basic principle that everyone has 
a lawful claim to his property without the need for any special law. To assert the new right, the 
publisher’s name and the place and date of publication had to be indicated on the work81 – a 
position reflecting in modern practice in relation to published books. Summing the core purpose of 
the Act, Dean observes that “it remained primarily the promotion of the trade in books and thereafter 
the dissemination of information and the promotion of science.”82 However it should not be assumed 
that because of the emphasis on “books” this Act was only concerned with book publishing as such. 
The Act, like the 1796 law of Holland, granted perpetual copyright which was transmissible to the 
heirs of the publisher, and was concerned with works “which were capable of being reproduced by 
means of a printing process.”83 The emphasis on “books” in the Act no doubt was a relic of past 
glory, where a thriving book culture and trade contributed to the “Golden Age” of the Dutch Republic 
and the so-called “Dutch Miracle”.84 It needs to be noted however that the Netherlands’ book 
publishing industry developed alongside a famed music publishing industry. Thus the collegia 
musica was a group of musical societies spread all over many Dutch towns from the sixteenth 
century onwards, and was known for its focus on instrumental music.85  
It is observed that in the eighteenth century the collegia musica operated by means of “obtaining 
monopolies to license itinerant to play in the town and to regulate admission to their 
performances.”86 Some of the collegia musica became semi-public institutions and licensed and 
admitted guests to their sessions, and in the nineteenth century they influenced the founding of 
professional, civic societies.87 Related to this the following has been stated: 
The first half of the 18th century was a great age of music publishing in the United Provinces. 
Amsterdam, with the publishing houses of Mortier, Witvogel and above all Roger and Le Cène, was an 
international centre of music printing. Good trading links facilitated the rapid distribution of their 
products. This brought Dutch music into direct contact with the international repertory, especially the 
Italian. This ‘internationalization’ of musical tastes and activities is reflected in the frequent references 
to the many foreign musicians who chose to reside there. …
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The Scheme for Passing through the 1917 Gateway89 
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It is clear from the above therefore that the 1803 Act applied to musical works also, in spite of its 
emphasis on “books” (similar to the way in which early English copyright was protected). In essence, 
also already highlighted, what was contemplated was all works capable of being reproduced through 
printing. Section 2 of the Act referred to a regt van kopij (right to copy) and a regt van uitgawe (right 
to publish) which vested in the copyright owner. In relation to the question whether this right, in 
respect of literary works (in this case, lyrics or the words to music) and musical works published in 
the Orange Free State from 1854, would pass the 1917 Gateway the answer must be in the 
affirmative. Thus any literary and musical works printed and published in the Orange Free State 
(since Roman-Dutch law granted protection only to published works) would be substituted with 
better rights under the 1916 Act. However, because Roman-Dutch law did not grant protection in 
respect of performing rights, the right to perform a work in public provided for in terms of the 1916 
Act (the scope of which was that provided for under the British Copyright Act, 1911, incorporated in 
the Third Schedule of the 1916 Act), would not extend to such works. This is the effect of the Fourth 
Schedule to the 1916 Act, which clearly provided that where an existing right protected copyright, 
but not performing right, the substituted right was “[c]opyright as defined in the British Copyright Act, 
[i.e. the 1911 Imperial Copyright Act] except the sole right to perform the work or any substantial part 
thereof in public.”90  
The rights protected in line with the definition of copyright in section 1(2) of the Third Schedule, were 
(i) “the sole right to produce or reproduce the work or any substantial part thereof in any material 
form whatsoever” – thus extending the scope of the right beyond printing; (ii) the sole right “to 
produce, reproduce … or publish any translation of the work; and (iii) the sole right “to make any 
record, perforated roll, cinematograph film, or other contrivance by means of which the work may be 
mechanically performed or delivered” – thus drastically extending the scope of the right to include 
mechanical rights, synchronisation rights and electrical transcription rights (for which see Chapter 3 
supra). Thus the 1916 Act had the effect of transforming a right protected under an old system of 
copyright as the Roman-Dutch common-law copyright system was, into a modern right with an 
extended scope of protection.  
4.3.3 Music rights Protected under Statutory Copyright Law 
4.3.3.1 Introduction 
When dealing with statutory copyright law for purposes of determining which copyright passed 
through the 1917 Gateway, it is important to distinguish between Dutch statutory copyright (as dealt 
with in 2.3.2.2(b) above), which was incorporated into the Roman-Dutch common law; and statutory 
copyright that had direct application in the Cape and the rest of South Africa prior to 1 January 
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1917.91 Regarding Dutch statutory law during the time in which South Africa was under Dutch rule 
the position is that “statutes which are ex facie of universal application”, such as the Bavarian 
Copyright Act dealt with above, “are presumed to have been promulgated in South Africa” and thus 
form part of Roman-Dutch law.92 Furthermore, statutes which are “ex facie of merely local 
application” would only form part of South African law “if incorporated into Roman Dutch law by the 
institutional writers”.93  In contrast, certain statutory copyright law enacted in Britain when any of the 
provinces was a colony of Britain and statutory copyright law enacted in any of the provinces of 
South Africa prior to 1 January 1917 had direct application in South Africa.94 Such copyright passed 
through the 1917 Gateway in terms of section 151 and the Fourth Schedule to the 1916 Act and was 
replaced with substituted rights.  
In addition to the above, copyright in relation to musical, dramatic or artistic works which subsisted in 
the United Kingdom before 1 January 1917, was, in terms of section 147 of the 1916 Act, “deemed 
to have subsisted in the Union as from the date of the commencement of the copyright in the work, 
to the same extent as if copyright therein had subsisted under the law of the United Kingdom.” 
Copyright subsisting in the United Kingdom before 1 January 1917 was that protected in terms of 
the Imperial Copyright Act of 1911. This Act, in similar fashion to section 151 and the Fourth 
Schedule of the 1916 Act, provided for the substitution of previous British copyrights with new or 
substituted rights under section 24 and the First Schedule thereto – the so-called “1912 Gateway”.95 
As Dean observes however, in “some instances … the 1911 Act conferred copyright on works which 
had not previously enjoyed copyright under the pre-1912 legislation or the common law.”96 This is 
particularly true in respect of musical works, the protection of which prior to 1912 was in a state of 
confusion and entangled with protection for dramatic works or “dramatic pieces”. As observed 
previously, it was left to the Copyright Act, 1911, to bring sanity to this situation. The 1911 Act did 
not have automatic application in self-governing dominions like South Africa, but in terms of section 
25(1), had to be incorporated into the law of such dominions through legislation, with or without 
modification. This was achieved in South Africa through the 1916 Act. The following discussion 
maps out the statutory protection of music copyright prior to 1 January 1917 as clarified in the 
preceding comments, indicating in each case, which copyrights passed through the 1917 Gateway.  
4.3.3.2 Pre-1912 British Statutory Copyright 
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Statutory protection applicable in relation to or affecting musical works under British law was dealt 
with in some depth in paragraph 2.2 above. As indicated, this protection was in an entangled form 
and placed an artificial distinction between copyright and performing right. Copyright applied in 
respect of “books” (i.e. literary works) under the Statute of Anne and subsequent legislation, but in 
Bach v Longman it was held that “books” included printed music. 
Protection in respect of performing rights was, with regard to “musical compositions”, introduced 
through the Talfourd’s Act (Literary Copyright Act, 1842), which extended to such works the 
protection afforded to dramatic works under the Bulwer-Lytton’s Act (Dramatic Literary Property Act, 
1833). Other legislation was enacted dealing with musical works and copyright in general but in 
South Africa it was only the Copyright Act, 1842 and the International Copyright Act, 1886, that had 
application.97 Protection accorded under the 1842 Act extended to the British dominions, which 
included “all the colonies of South Africa, from the time when, and for as long as, they were 
colonies, and the Union of South Africa.”98 Under the Talfourd’s Act read with the International 
Copyright Act, 1886 “books” (an expression encompassing all printed works, whether literary, 
dramatic or musical) enjoying copyright protection in the United Kingdom (e.g. if they satisfied the 
requirement of publication) also enjoyed copyright protection in the South African colonies. Similarly, 
dramatic and musical works enjoying performing rights in the United Kingdom also enjoyed 
performing rights in South Africa.  
The above position applied equally in respect of works made in South Africa and those made in 
Britain. In each case protection was granted in terms of British legislation.99 In this regard a 
distinction needs however to be made between the provisions of the Talfourd’s Act and those of the 
International Copyright Act, 1886. The Talfourd’s Act extended protection to works made either in 
Britain or in the dominions, if such works were first published in the United Kingdom. This position 
was confirmed in the case of Routledge v Low.100 The first South African case in which the 
Talfourd’s Act was invoked was Dickens v “Eastern Province Herald”,101 which involved a rule nisi 
motion by Charles Dickens, calling upon the editors and proprietors of the Eastern Province Herald 
newspaper to show cause why they should not be restrained from printing Dickens’ work, Great 
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Expectations, in their newspaper. With reference to the fact that Act 4 of 1854 of the Cape102 
permitted the importation of foreign reprints of English copyright works it was contended that no Act 
of the Cape parliament could alter the provisions of the “Imperial Law”. The rule nisi was granted 
and made absolute with costs. Apart from the Dickens ruling six other cases dealing with the 1842 
Act were heard in the Cape Colony, which were largely concerned with the performing right in 
respect of British dramatic and / or musical works.103     
Under the International Copyright Act, 1886 protection was granted in both the United Kingdom and 
any of the dominions, irrespective of whether publication first took place in the United Kingdom or in 
the dominions (section 8), subject to conditions relating to the registration of copyright (i.e. if the 
dominion concerned had a system of copyright registration, the provisions in any of the Copyright 
Acts relating to registration of copyright would not apply; however if the dominion concerned did not 
have a system of copyright registration then registration in accordance with the Copyright Acts 
would be required). It has however, been observed that the provisions of the International Copyright 
Act, 1886, had no retrospective application and only applied in the dominions after 25 June 1886.104 
This means that the applicable legislation in respect of works made before this date would be the 
Talfourd’s Act, provided that first publication took place in the United Kingdom. 
Scheme for passing through the 1917 Gateway 
Regarding the scheme for passing through the 1917 Gateway of pre-1917 British statutory copyright 
having force in South Africa it needs to be mentioned that, although the British Copyright Act, 1911, 
repealed all previous British copyright legislation in the Second Schedule to that Act, section 36 
provided that such legislation would continue to have effect in the British dominions until the Act was 
made applicable in such dominions (in terms of s 25(1)). Thus although copyright protected under 
the 1842 Act and the International Copyright Act, 1886 would have passed through the 1912 
Gateway and the rights subsisting therein substituted with the new rights provided for under the 
1911 Act, for purpose of the Union of South Africa the old rights provided for under these Acts 
continued unabated until 1 January 1917, when the 1916 Act came into force.105  
(1) Where protection was granted in respect of both copyright and the performing right 
Therefore, pursuant to the Third Schedule to the 1916 Act, read with section 151 thereof, where 
protection was granted in respect of both copyright (or more specifically, rights in books, including 
printed music) and the performing right under the Talfourd’s Act,  this protection would be 
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transmuted into “[c]opyright as defined in the British Copyright Act”. This was indeed a very powerful 
transformation of the old rights, in particular relating to musical works, and in fact ushered in the 
modern era of understanding of these rights. It resolved the longstanding problem so painstakingly 
highlighted above; where an artificial distinction was made between copyright and the performing 
right in British copyright law rather than seeing the performing right as being one of the rights 
subsisting in copyright in musical works alongside the reproduction right (just as the French saw 
both the reproduction and the performing rights as constituting droits d’auteur). Credit must of 
course in this regard, given to the British Copyright Act, 1911 and not the 1916 South African Act for 
resolving this situation because the latter Act merely referred to “[c]opyright as defined in the British 
Copyright Act” for the resolution of the problem. Indeed the Fourth Schedule to the 1916 South 
African Act was a mere mimicking of the First Schedule to the British Copyright Act. 
The definition of copyright under the British Copyright Act was undertaken in section 1(2) of the Act, 
which for the first time created normality with regard to the meaning of copyright – for the first time 
conceiving copyright as a bundle of various rights which included the right to “… perform … the work 
or any substantial part thereof in public”. Furthermore, the concept of copyright was vastly improved 
to take into account technological developments, in particular the emerging recording and film 
industries, by providing in section 1(2)(d) that in the case of a literary, dramatic, or musical work, 
copyright include “the sole right … to make any record, perforated roll, cinematograph film, or other 
contrivance by means of which the work may be mechanically performed or delivered”. Finally the 
definition made it explicit that, in respect of all the acts clearly associated with copyright ownership 
(that is, the newly defined “bundle of rights” in respect of copyright), the sole right included not only 
the copyright owner’s right to do these acts but also the right “to authorise any such acts”.106 This 
resolved the problem where doubts had for example existed as to whether the copyright owner’s 
authorisation was required for the performance of a work, once published.107  
(2) Where protection was granted in respect copyright, but not performing right 
The position in this regard is straightforward. In respect of works in which protection subsisted only 
in respect of “copyright” (i.e. in respect of the printing and publishing right in relation to “books”, 
which as indicated, included printed or sheet music), protection under the 1916 Act would be a 
better, remodelled protection that extended beyond just print rights but excluded the right to perform 
the work. In this regards it needs however to be observed that, in relation to musical works,108 the 
effect of the provisions of section 147(1) of the 1916 Act is that the 1917 Act recognised two types of 
musical works, namely those in a better state than pre-1917 musical works and including all the 
bundle of rights associated with musical works in the 1916 Act, with the exclusion however, of the 
performing right; and a modern category of musical works including the whole panoply of rights, 
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including a proper performing right not burdened with the uncertainties that existed in the pre-1912 
English conception of the performing right.109 In this regard Dean has observed:  
It will be recalled that … British copyright in dramatic, musical and artistic works also passed through 
the South African 1917 Gateway. The copyrights involved included pre-1912 copyrights which had 
passed through the British 1912 Gateway and copyrights in post-1912 works which enjoyed copyright 
in Britain under the British Act of 1911. … [The copyrights in respect of pre-1912 works] passed 
through the South African 1917 Gateway via a South African route and a British route.
110
  
The new category of musical works protectable under the British Act, 1911 is dealt with under item 
(c) below.   
(3) Where protection was granted in respect of performing right, but not copyright 
Where protection in respect of the musical composition subsisted only in respect of the muddled 
pre-1917 performing right111 an inferior form of protection, namely protection only involving “[t]he 
sole right to perform the work in public, but none of the other rights comprised in copyright as 
defined in the British Copyright Act”, was substituted. However, this right was clearly in a better form 
than the pre-1912 British right. This is because the right to perform was now, in the reading of 
section 1(2) of the British Copyright Act (which the right was defined with reference to in terms of the 
Third Schedule), clearly expressed as existing separately in respect of all of the works in which 
copyright subsisted. This removed the confusion that existed prior to 1912, where the interpretation 
of the right of public performance was biased in favour of dramatic or dramatico-musical works, to 
the neglect and detriment of small rights musical works. It is submitted that this clarification in 
general paved the way for the full development of the performing right post-1917, in which the right 
came to be understood more in relation to French petits droits (i.e. small musical works).  
4.3.3.3 Pre-1917 Provincial Statutory Copyright 
The various provinces and / or republics in South Africa (i.e. the Cape, Natal and the Transvaal, with 
the exception of the Orange Free State) enacted copyright or copyright-related legislation at various 
periods from the second half of the nineteenth century. In this regard it should be noted that “[t]o the 
extent that these territories were British dominions this legislation was in part supplementary to the 
British Copyright Act, 1842, and the International Copyright Act, 1886.”112 Dean points out that the 
provincial statutes were in many cases as incongruent as pre-1912 British statutes and imperfectly 
took over and adopted these statutes “apparently without a proper understanding of the subject 
matter”; giving the example of the Transvaal incompletely taking over the Netherlands Copyright Act 
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of 1881 in spite of the fact that the said legislation “differed widely in approach to British 
legislation”.113  
(a) Copyright Legislation in the Cape114 
In the Cape the earliest legislation was Act No. 4 of 1854,115 which formed the subject-matter of the 
case of Dickens v “Eastern Province Herald” dealt with above.116 This case dealt with the importation 
into the Cape colony of foreign-made copies of works in which British copyright subsisted and thus 
has no bearing on the matter of the 1917 Gateway. The second legislation, the Copyright Act 2 of 
1873, protected “books”, which were defined in a manner similar to the definition of “books” in the 
Talfourd’s Act, and included “sheet of music” within the definition. This definition thus aligns with the 
manner in which British legislation protected musical works (in the sense of printed music) since the 
decision in Bach v Longman. Copyright was defined, in similar fashion to the British legislation, as 
“the sole and exclusive liberty of printing or otherwise multiplying copies of any book” (section 9). 
This means that the performing right was excluded. However, since the 1842 Talfourd’s Act made 
provision for the performing right, this would be available in respect of Cape works first published in 
the United Kingdom prior to the coming into force of the International Copyright Act, 1886, and 
thereafter in respect of a work first published either in the United Kingdom or in any of the 
dominions, including the Cape. As indicated, the legislation of the provinces / colonies was 
supplemental to the 1842 and 1886 British Acts.  
For copyright to subsist in the work first publication, which had to have taken place in the Cape, was 
necessary. Although the legislation made no mention of the requirements of nationality or place of 
residence in respect of the author, Dean suggests that asserts that the author needed to have been 
a resident of the Cape Colony for copyright to subsist in a work, although in terms of section 2 the 
author did not need to be alive at the time of first publication.117 Although the 1873 Act made 
provision for a registry book and the registration of works, it seems that this was not a strict 
requirement.118 Dean argues that as in the case of the British Act, 1842, registration was a condition 
precedent for the enforcement, rather than the subsistence, of copyright.119 From the coming into 
force of the International Copyright Act 1886 publication of the work in the Cape conferred copyright 
in the work not only in the Cape but also in Britain and all countries to which the 1842 Act extended 
– as well as all Berne Convention countries and Austria-Hungary – and registration of the work in 
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the Cape was equivalent to registering it in the United Kingdom.120 Dean asserts that the 1873 Cape 
Act abolished Roman-Dutch common-law copyright.121 Unlike in the case of Roman-Dutch copyright 
law section 1 of the Act provided that the author was the initial owner of the work, except that where 
first publication happened posthumously, the initial owner was the proprietor of the manuscript.  
Other legislation was enacted in the Cape which had no real bearing on the subsistence of copyright 
and thus falls outside the scope of this discussion. These pieces of legislation are: (1) the Books 
Registry Act 4 of 1888. This Act dealt with the registration of books and the requirement for the 
deposit of copies of the books. A notable aspect of this Act however is that it supplemented the 
definition of “book” by providing that this did not include, inter alia, “sheet of music … intended for 
private circulation, and not for sale, and of which not more than fifty copies shall be printed.”122 This 
was clearly a position that deviated from British legislation; (2) The Copyright Protection and Books 
Registration Act 18 of 1895 repealed the 1854 Act and replaced its provisions with amplified 
provisions; and (3) the Copyright in Works of Art Act 45 of 1905. This Act, though containing 
substantive provisions relating to the subsistence of copyright, was concerned with copyright in 
artistic works (“works of art”) and thus falls outside the ambit of this thesis.123  
Scheme for Passing through the 1917 Gateway 
Regarding the scheme for passing through the 1917 Gateway what was substituted in relation to the 
1873 Cape legislation was copyright in “sheets of music” which was replaced with a better right 
similar to what was stated above in 2.3.2.3(a)(ii) above. Performing right clearly did not feature 
because as indicated, the Cape legislation made no provision for the performing right. It is obvious 
that the Cape copyright in “sheets of music” was transformed into a powerful right under the 1916 
South African Act, because the Cape legislation clearly had many constraints with regard to exercise 
of the right granted; in particular the provision under the 1888 Act that if the copyright owner 
circulated the “sheets of music” privately and did not print and sell at least fifty copies, copyright 
would not subsist in such music. There is no reason why such a limitation ought to be imposed and 
certainly British legislation had no such limitation.  
Speaking of British legislation, it needs to be recalled that both the Talfourd’s Act, 1842 and the 
International Copyright Act, 1886 operated concurrently with the Cape legislation. Thus although the 
Cape legislation made no provision for the performing right, if, between `1842 when the Talfourd’s 
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registration under the 1873 Act  was “of books which are published and brought out in this Colony, and without any 
reference to publications in England”, held that “the English Act protects the holders of such copyright through the British 
dominions”, and thus “they would be entitled to an action under the English law of copyright”. Thus the court granted the 
interdict restraining the selling of the music compositions (but not the other prayers). 
121
 Id at 243. 
122
 Section 1 of the Act. 
123
 For an analysis of this Act see Dean Application of the Copyright Act 247 – 255. 
146 
 
Act was enacted, and before the coming into force of the International Copyright Act, 1886, a Cape 
resident had owned copyright in a musical composition (i.e. if he was the author of the work or if the 
performing right was assigned to him), he would have the right to exercise such performing right – 
provided of course that the requirement of first performance in the United Kingdom was satisfied.  
After 1886 this right could be exercised without the need to first perform the work in the United 
Kingdom – thus first performance in the Cape Colony, or in Natal, or in either the Transvaal and / or 
the Orange Free State, or in any other British colony or in the United Kingdom itself would suffice to 
vest the right in the copyright owner concerned. 
In light of the foregoing, regarding the passing of the performing right through the 1917 Gateway the 
position outlined above under 2.3.2.3(a)(i) and/or (iii), would apply, depending, respectively, on 
whether the person concerned had “[b]oth copyright and performing right” – as would be the case if 
the person concerned was the author or assignee of the work; where either the Cape legislation or 
the Talfourd’s Act or both would have applied in respect of the pre-1917 copyright, and the 
Talfourd’s Act would have applied in respect of the pre-1917 performing right – or had “[p]erforming 
right, but no copyright” – as where the pre-1917 performing right was assigned to him, or where the 
author had assigned the copyright but retained the performing right; where the Talfourd’s Act only 
would have provided protection.   
(b) Copyright Legislation in Natal 
The first copyright-related legislation to be enacted in Natal was Ordinance 14 of 1856,124 which had 
no bearing on the subsistence of copyright as it was, similar to the 1854 Cape Act, only concerned 
with the authorisation of reprints of books first written, printed or published in the United Kingdom. 
The second Act enacted was the Copyright Act No. 9 of 1896, which was repealed a year later when 
it was observed that it had shortcomings of a highly technical nature. Dean nevertheless contends 
that because the repeal of the Act was made subject to the saving of any copyright created by it, its 
consideration “can … not be disregarded.”125 The writer is nevertheless of the view that since this 
Act was enacted in 1896, when the International Copyright Act, 1886 was already in force, better 
protection would have been provided under the 1842 Talfourd’s Act in respect of Natal works. As 
has been observed, the International Copyright Act, 1886 made the provisions of the Talfourd’s Act 
operational in spite of publication or performance not having first taken place in the United Kingdom, 
as long as it took place in any of the British dominions, a Berne Convention country or Austria-
Hungary. This means that copyright owners would, in the absence of proper copyright legislation in 
Natal, be able to rely on the provisions of the Talfourd’s Act for protection.  
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The need for this resort to the Talfourd’s Act was in fact, recognised in section 5 of Act No. 17 of 
1897, which repealed the 1896 Act.126 This section provided that nothing in the Act of 1896 or the 
Act of 1897 could be deemed to have limited any rights arising from copyright conferred in Natal by 
British legislation, particularly the Talfourd’s Act. As Dean has observed, “[a] Natal copyright owner 
thus enjoyed two parallel copyrights in his book.”127 Nevertheless, what Dean has termed “the Natal 
“Error”’ does need to be highlighted here, as it had an impact on the passing of works through the 
1917 Gateway and is thus “significant for modern South African copyright law.”128 What Dean 
termed the Natal Error was the fact that the Act of 1896 provided that copyright in a literary and 
artistic work (the subject-matter of the Act’s protection) was created by the act of first publication, 
without indicating where this first publication had to take place or what the national status of the 
authors was.  
The effect of this was that “publication anywhere in the world of the works of authors of whatever 
nationality created copyright in Natal.”129 This, as Dean has noted, included works which were not 
accorded protection under Talfourd’s Act and the International Copyright Act, 1886 – thus including 
works emanating from countries that were not members of the Berne Convention or Austria-
Hungary; the result being that “[m]any of these works … would have enjoyed copyright in 1917 
which passed through the South African 1917 Gateway.”130 What Dean does not specifically 
highlight in relation to this is the potential impact that this would have in relation to the reversionary 
interest provisions of the 1916 Act, incorporated through the application of the British Copyright Act, 
1911, by means of the Third Schedule to that Act.131  
It is submitted that the impact of this is that an assignment of copyright by the author of any works 
first published in any part of the world between the coming into force of the Natal Act, 1896 and 1 
January 1917, when the 1916 South African Act came into force, would – if such assignment 
happened after the coming into force of that Act, be subject to the reversionary interest 
contemplated in the British Copyright Act, 1911. The modern impact of this is not inconceivable. To 
illustrate, if a twenty-year old composer of a musical work who first published the musical 
composition anywhere in the world on 31 December 1916132 and assigned such copyright to 
publisher XYZ at any time thereafter, died at the age of eighty (i.e. in 1976), the reversionary interest 
would have vested in his personal representative or the executor of his deceased estate by the 
beginning of 2012 (i.e. twenty-five years after his death). The famous case that dealt with this 
reversionary interest scenario is the so-called ‘Lion Sleeps Tonight” case.133      
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Another important observation not highlighted by Dean in relation to the 1896 law is the significance 
of the manner in which the law treated the protection of musical works. As indicated above, the 
subject-matter of protection under the Natal Act of 1896 was literary and artistic works. This was 
defined to mean “every book …, musical composition … and other work of literature or art”. “Book” 
was however, also defined to include “sheet of music”. It is instructive that the 1896 Act appeared to 
make a distinction between “sheet of music” (i.e. printed music) and what it termed “musical 
composition”. It is not clear if an intentional distinction was meant here or if this was a result of the 
imperfect incorporation of concepts used in other legislation. If the distinction was intentional this 
would be noteworthy, in that it would imply that Natal was ahead of its time in not limiting copyright 
protection of musical works to “sheet music” but by extending this to “musical compositions” in 
general. This would for example imply that the Natal legislation recognised that reproduction of 
musical works was not limited to reproduction by means of printing, but that it would extend to other 
forms of reproduction. This would be instructive because this was a period internationally in the 
development of copyright law – coinciding with technological developments at the turn of the 
twentieth century – that a debate was raging as to whether the protection in relation to musical 
works was limited to the printing of those works or if it extended to the new forms of reproduction.134  
In particular questions were raging as to whether the reproduction of musical compositions by 
means of perforated rolls in player pianos, piano players or reproducing pianos which had become 
the new trend of music usage at the turn of the twentieth century was a prohibited act under 
copyright law. When this question came before the English and American courts, they all took the 
position that such use of musical compositions did not infringe the right to copy a musical 
composition – rulings that sparked an outcry that led to both the United States and the United 
Kingdom enacting legislation that marked the beginning of modern copyright law.135 Within this 
context, the effect of the distinction between “sheet of music” and “musical composition” in the Natal 
law is that – whether intentional or not – the Natal law extended protection to musical works beyond 
just the printing of sheet music to other forms of reproduction. This conclusion would be supported 
by the fact that under the 1896 law, copyright was not defined in terms of printing as has been the 
case with a lot of legislation during this type, since the Statute of Anne defined copyright in this way. 
Markedly, the Natal law defined copyright as “the sole and exclusive liberty of multiplying copies of 
any literary or artistic work”. Clearly the method of multiplication of copies was not mentioned here, 
making the argument advanced here more plausible. Another observation in this regard is the fact 
that the protection granted by the 1896 law did not extend to performing rights. 
The 1897 Act, which repealed the infamous 1896 law, did not however, perpetuate this unusual 
treatment of musical works and reverted to the old British legal tradition of conferring protection in 
respect of “books”.136 “Book” was defined to include “sheet of music” – remaining true to the long 
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British tradition emanating from the Bach v Longman decision. Unlike the 1896 Act, this Act clearly 
stipulated that first publication in Natal was required for copyright to subsist in a book, and such first 
publication could take place in the lifetime of the author or posthumously. The Act also created a 
registration system for both books and artistic works, and certified copies of entries into the 
registries was prima facie evidence of the ownership of copyright unless expunged or varied by the 
Supreme Court (section 8). Registration was, however, in terms of section 28 not a requirement for 
the subsistence of copyright in respect of books but merely a condition precedent for enforcement.  
Although the Act did not specifically require that a book needed to be original for copyright to 
subsist, in line with British authority in Walter v Lane137 a mere copy of a previous book was not 
entitled to copyright protection.138 Dean submits that while the Act was silent on this, it would appear 
that protection was granted in respect of works created by the national of any country, as long as 
first publication took place in Natal.139 Obviously by virtue of the International Copyright Act 1886 
and the Talfourd’s Act, 1842, copyright created in Natal would find protection in Britain, any of its 
dominions, Berne Convention member countries and Austria-Hungary. The 1897 Act made no 
provision for performing rights but these would be protectable under the Talfourd’s Act. Nevertheless 
the Play Rights Act, 1898, dealt with briefly below, did make provision for a form of performing right. 
In light of what was said above regarding the possible extension of copyright protection under the 
1896 Natal law beyond printing to encompass other forms of reproduction, it is instructive that the 
1897 law defined copyright as “the sole and exclusive right of multiplying copies of any work, 
whether by printing, copying, engraving or otherwise.”140 The first highlighted part here conforms 
almost verbatim to the wording used in the 1896 Act.141 The second part however extends the ambit 
of the right to include not only “printing” but also “copying … or otherwise.” It appears that the clear 
intention was that copies would be multiplied not only through the well-recognised (at the time) act of 
printing, but that other forms of copying of the work were contemplated.142 The fact that the 
expression “or otherwise” compels one to conclude that, for all their shortcomings which Dean has 
so carefully highlighted, the two Natal pieces of legislation displayed much progressiveness in 
relation to the recognition of the fact that times were changing, and other forms of reproduction of 
copyright works other than through printing were possible and should be recognised. In this regard 
not even British legislation displayed this form of progressiveness and as indicated, in Boosey v 
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Whight143 two years later, the British courts refused to recognise that the use of perforated roles 
amounted to a copying of musical works. 
The final copyright-related legislation passed in Natal prior to it being incorporated into the Union of 
South Africa was the Play Rights Act No. 44 of 1898.  The expression “play right” was defined as: 
(a) The sole and exclusive right to represent, perform, act, play or exhibit any dramatic, operatic or 
musical work, being a tragedy, comedy, play, opera, farce, scene, pantomime (or its class), song, 
dance, or other scenic or musical or dramatic production or representation registered under this Act; 
(b) The sole and exclusive right of converting or adapting any work registered under this Act into any 
form, whether dramatic or otherwise.
144
 
As Dean has observed, the first part of the definition was concerned with the performing right and 
“was clearly intended to emulate the British Dramatic Copyright Act of 1833 read together with the 
Copyright Act of 1842”.145 The second part clearly dealt with an adaptation right, which is a right in 
the nature of copyright and thus did not conform to the conception of the performing right at the time 
(i.e. as a right distinct from copyright). The “copyright’ aspect of the Natal play right is further 
illustrated by the manner in which the infringement of a play right was described. Section 13 
provided that the infringement of a play right would occur if any person, without the written consent 
of the proprietor or his agent, copied (i.e. repeated, or colourably imitated) a play right work by 
“dialogue, scenic effect, or composition, or in any manner whatsoever, or if any person shall adapt, 
multiply, or publish, or expose for hire, sell, or import any imitation of any play right work, or any 
portion of any play right work.”146  
Dean decries the fact that the 1898 Act referred to the Natal variant of the performing right as a “play 
right” and not as a “performing right”, in line with the manner in which it was described in British 
legislation.147 However, the present writer does not see this as a major concern – or even for that 
matter, as a matter of concern at all. The writer has, in this thesis, been critical of the pre-1912 
British concept of performing right for being convoluted in that it did not clearly distinguish between 
this right as it applies to musical works vis-à-vis its application to dramatic and / or dramatico-
musical works. The writer has, in this regard, made reference to others who have similarly been 
critical of the nature of British performing right, and who showed a preference for the right to be 
termed an “acting right”, a “play right” or a “stage right.”148 The issue of critical importance in relation 
to the Natal Act of 1898 is therefore not that it referred to the performing right as a play right (though 
in this regard it did deviate from the British designation of the right), but that it conflated the right with 
the adaptation and reproduction rights. In its definition of the performing right aspect of the play right 
the Natal Play Rights Act followed the convoluted tradition of British legislation, making no distinction 
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in the operation of the right in respect of dramatic works, dramatico-musical works and non-dramatic 
musical works.   
Scheme for Passing through the 1917 Gateway 
The scheme for passing through the 1917 Gateway in relation to the rights protected under the Natal 
legislation discussed above would be as follows:  
(1) Regarding the rights provided for under the 1896 and 1897 Acts, since these did not include 
a performing right, the substituted right under the Fourth Schedule to the 1917 Act would be 
“[c]opyright as defined in the British Copyright Act, except the sole right to perform the work 
or any substantial part thereof in public”; 
 
(2) Regarding the “play right” contemplated in paragraph (a) of the definition of “play right” in the 
Play Rights Act, the substituted right would be a proper performing right under the British 
Copyright Act, 1911, i.e. “[t]he sole right to perform [the] work in public” – without reference, 
in relation to musical works, to the inappropriate concepts of “represent, act … or exhibit”; 
 
(3) Regarding the “play right” contemplated in paragraph (b) of the definition of “play right” in the 
Play Rights Act – i.e. the right to control the conversion or adaptation of a musical work – as 
Dean has pointed out, ‘the holder of these adaptation rights would have been entitled to 
obtain the full substituted right of “copyright” provided for in the British Act of 1911’, seeing 
that ‘[t]he effect of the Fourth Schedule was that any right of modern “copyright” which was 
not a “performing right” was a component  of “copyright’ and it could be substituted for full 
copyright, excluding the performing right’;149  
 
(4) It will be recalled that, as pointed out earlier, the enactment of copyright legislation by the 
different colonies did not, while these colonies were under British control, do away with the 
application of British copyright legislation. Thus the provision of the Talfourd’s Act and the 
International Copyright Act, 1886, remained applicable in respect of works created by Natal 
nationals and the rights concerned would have passed through the 1917 Gateway either as 
copyright (where the right was both a copyright and a performing right); copyright, with the 
exclusion of “the sole right to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public” 
(where the right was a copyright but not a performing right), or the sole right to perform the 
work in public, “but none of the rights comprised in copyright” in terms of the British Copyright 
Act, 1911 (where the right was a performing right but not a copyright).   
 
(c) Copyright Legislation in the Transvaal 
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Roman-Dutch common law copyright was incorporated into the law of the Transvaal (die Zuid 
Afrikaansche Republiek) when it was constituted as a separate independent state in 1852.150 
Between 1877 to 1881 (or possibly 1884) the Transvaal was declared to be a Crown colony of the 
British and thus the British Copyright Act, 1842, would have been applicable in the colony.151  
The first substantive copyright legislation enacted by the Transvaal, which effectively abolished the 
common law, was the Copyright Act of 1887 (Law No. 2 1887, for the Regulation of Copyright); an 
Act modelled after Dutch legislation, unlike the legislations adopted in the Cape and Natal.152 
Section 1 of the Act provided that copyright was “the right to publish writings, … musical works, 
plays … by means of printing, as also to perform or exhibit dramatic-musical works and plays in 
public”.153 Such right belonged to the author “and his assigns”. A performance or exhibition in public 
referred to “[e]very performance or exhibition to which access is once or oftener obtainable upon 
payment of money or any other valuable consideration … even in cases where a ballot is required in 
addition” (section 1). The Act made provision for a general act of infringement (e.g. in respect of the 
right of public performance), and additionally in relation to specific acts of unlawful trading in the 
work.154 The remedies included the right to seize copies of the infringing work, and the right to claim 
delivery or destruction of such copies (sections 18 – 19). It needs to be noted here that while the Act 
extended protection to “musical works”, a clear reading of the Act demonstrates the fact that the 
performing right only applied in respect of the public exhibition or performance of “dramatic-musical 
works and plays”. The right therefore properly extended only to grand rights (grands droits) and 
dramatic play rights, as discussed above. In this regard the Transvaal legislation at least was clear 
on this issue.  
The Act was mainly concerned with works published through printing, although Dean submits that 
copyright in unpublished works – which “showed a large measure of similarity to British common law 
copyright in unpublished works” – was also contemplated.155 The Act did not make provision for the 
national status of authors or where the works must have been made for copyright to subsist. Dean 
highlights the impact of this on the 1917 Gateway in the following manner: 
… [A]ll unpublished works which enjoyed copyright in the Transvaal at the time of the 1917 Gateway 
would have passed through that Gateway and would have been granted substituted rights under the 
Act of 1916. The works of foreign origin which would have qualified for substituted rights under the 
1916 Act in this way would have included works originating from all parts of South Africa as well as 
abroad.
156
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The right to publish printed translations of the works in other languages was only preserved if the 
author “expressly reserved to himself the exclusive right in respect of one or more specially 
mentioned languages” by making an endorsement on the title page or cover of the issue of the 
original version of the work, and publishing such translations within three years of doing so (section 
5). Similarly, the exclusive right to perform or exhibit “dramatic-musical works or plays” was lost as 
soon as the works were published by printing, unless the author had expressly reserved to himself 
this right in the original issue of the work on the title page or cover of the work (section 12). The 
copyright in a work published by printing lapsed if the author or his assigns, or the publisher or 
printer did not lodge three copies of the work with the Registrar of Deeds, within two months of 
publication, reflecting a sworn declaration by the printer that the work was printed at his printing 
house “established in this Republic” (section  10).157 Nevertheless, Article 298 of a resolution of the 
Second Volksraad of 1 June 1895158 (accepted as notice by Article 420 of the First Volksraad 
Resolution of 20 June 1895), which amended the Act, made provision for the extension of the 
benefits of the Act to all works eligible for copyright printed or published in any state or colony, 
“provided all privileges according to the copyright existing there are conferred by such State of 
Colony to owners of the copyright of books issued and printed within this Republic.”159 A further 
enactment, the Copyright in Military Maps Proclamation No. 24 of 1902 has no relevance for present 
purposes as it was concerned with copyright in maps.  
It was observed above that the British Copyright Act, 1842, would have been applicable in the 
Transvaal from between 1877 to 1881 or possibly 1884 when the Transvaal was a colony of the 
British. The application of British copyright legislation nevertheless ceased thereafter, when the 
independence of the Transvaal was again recognised by Britain. From 1900 the Transvaal was 
however, formally annexed by Britain, becoming a British dominion. As Dean observes, from this 
point the provisions of the British International Copyright Act, 1886, read with those of the Talfourd’s 
Act, “became a factor in the Transvaal”, and there was thus a parallel application of both the 
Transvaal law and the British law.160 In this regard Dean makes certain notable observations based 
on the fact that the Transvaal legislation was based on the law of the Netherlands and not British 
legislation. In the first instance, Dean highlights the fact that an assignment of copyright under the 
Transvaal law, being as it was based on Dutch law, did not necessarily have to be in writing and “the 
acquisition of the ownership of the original manuscript of a work may by implication have included 
the acquisition of the ownership of the copyright in the work in question.”161 However, since British 
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legislation required a written assignment, such acquisition without such a written assignment would 
not have been capable of transmitting copyright derived from British legislation.162  
In the second instance, Dean opines that because British legislation at the time required an express 
reservation of the performing right made on the title page of each copy of a work released to the 
public (which, the author observes, went further than the equivalent provisions in the Transvaal law), 
then  
[i]t is ... possible that many musical works first published in the Transvaal during the relevant time did 
not comply with the aforementioned British formality and they would thus have fallen into the public 
domain as far as their performing rights under British law were concerned, after first publication in the 
Transvaal.
163
  
While the writer agrees with the sentiment that the performing right provided under the Transvaal 
Act might not have been valid under British legislation, where the British formality of reservation of 
the rights was not strictly adhered to, the writer submits that this is not a situation that affected 
musical works but “musical-dramatic works” and “plays”. As the writer has observed above, the 
exhibition or performing right provided for under the Transvaal Act of 1887 did not extend to musical 
works, but only extended to “musical-dramatic works” (which, as indicated, is a reference to the 
grand rights). Pure (or small) musical works were already excluded from the application of the 
performing right under the Transvaal Act and thus Dean’s observation here cannot apply to them.164      
Scheme for Passing through the 1917 Gateway 
In light of the above the scheme for passing through the 1917 Gateway in respect of Transvaal 
works is as follows: 
(1) In respect of dramatic-musical works (and plays) a full copyright as defined in the British 
Copyright Act would be substituted. This is because the rights subsisting in respect of these works 
included both the right to publish the works (by means of printing) and the right to exhibit or perform 
the work.  
(2) In respect of musical work the rights accorded under the Transvaal Act would be replaced by 
copyright as defined in the British Copyright Act, “except the sole right to perform the work or any 
substantial part thereof in public”. This is because as indicated above, a clear reading of the 1887 
Act leads to no other conclusion than that musical works were not accorded a performing right under 
that Act; and 
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(3) As indicated, British copyright legislation applied in the Transvaal from September 1900 when 
the Transvaal was annexed by Britain, in parallel with the Transvaal Copyright Act, 1887. Since the 
Talfourd’s Act included both copyright and performing right in respect of musical works, works first 
published in the Transvaal would have been substituted with a full copyright under the British 
Copyright Act, provided that any assignment of rights fulfilled the requirements of British legislation 
and not merely those of the Transvaal Act (i.e. the assignment must have been in writing); 
furthermore, the performing right must have been specifically reserved as provided for under British 
legislation (and not under the Transvaal Act), seeing that British legislation imposed stricter 
requirements in relation to the reservation of performing rights than the Transvaal Act did. Where 
these requirements were not made however, these works would have failed to pass through the 
1917 Gateway and would have fallen into the public domain.165  
As indicated above, the Orange Free State did not pass any copyright legislation during the time in 
which it was an independent state. As such, the copyright law applicable would have been Roman-
Dutch common law copyright, as discussed above under 2.3.2.2. 
4.3.3.4 Post-1912 and pre-1917 British Copyright 
Apart from “old” copyrights which passed through the 1917 Gateway, the 1916 South African Act 
also specifically made provision for the passing through the 1917 Gateway of copyright in certain 
works protectable under the British Copyright Act, 1911. This specifically referred to copyright in 
musical, dramatic and artistic works. In this regard section 147(1) of the 1916 is worth repeating 
here: 
147. Saving of copyright in certain works made outside the Union 
(1) Where copyright subsisted in the United Kingdom in respect of any musical, dramatic or artistic 
work before the commencement of this Chapter, the copyright shall, subject to this section, be 
deemed to have subsisted in the Union as from the date of the commencement of the copyright in the 
work, to the same extent as if copyright therein had subsisted under the law of the United Kingdom. 
It is of course, not in dispute that the “copyright [subsisting] in the United Kingdom” at the time of the 
commencement of the 1916 Act was that provided for under the Imperial Copyright Act, which 
consolidated all previous British copyright legislation and introduced a new system of copyright for 
Britain. The Imperial Copyright Act nevertheless did not extend automatically to the self-governing 
dominions (like the Union of South Africa) because of the impact of section 25 thereof, which 
provided that the Act would not extend to a self-governing dominion unless the Legislature of such 
dominion declared it to be in force, with or without modifications. When considering the question of 
musical works protected under British copyright, which found protection under the South African Act, 
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1916, the following picture emerges, considering the effect of section 147(1) of the Act, read 
together with section 151 (which created the 1917 Gateway): 
(1) South African musical compositions protected as literary property or “books” under the old British 
legislation (i.e. the Talfourd’s Act and the International Copyright Act, 1886) would have passed 
through the 1917 Gateway in terms of section 151, and received better protection (either full 
copyright, if the old rights included a performing right, or copyright with the exception of the 
performing right), as dealt with above. It is conspicuous that literary works are excluded from the 
types of works in which South African copyright protection would be extended in terms of section 
147(1) (referred to above).166 The writer is of the view that this is because these works would, in any 
case, have found protection in South Africa through the 1917 Gateway as pointed out in this 
paragraph.167 This however, is true only in regard to South African and not British works, as pointed 
out below.  
(2) With regard to British literary works it needs to be acknowledged that “the British works which 
passed through the South African 1917 Gateway were works which already enjoyed substituted 
rights under the British Act of 1911 and not copyrights in British works which existed prior to 1 July 
1912.”168 In respect of musical compositions protected as literary property under the old British 
legislation therefore, a distinction needs to be made between South African works and British works. 
Thus it needs to be observed that, in respect of British works (but not South African works protected 
by British legislation), the 1917 Gateway was redundant. 
(3) Having indicated the above, in many cases a reference to “musical works” in section 147(1) of 
the 1916 Act must be construed as being a reference to works with a broader scope than certain 
musical compositions protectable as books under the old British legislation (and which would have 
passed through the 1912 British Gateway). This is because in some cases (perhaps many cases) 
such pre-1912 musical compositions would only have received protection in respect of copyright 
only, as then understood – i.e. the right to print and publish copies of the work – to the exclusion of 
the performing right. In such cases the protection granted to such works under the Imperial 
Copyright Act (and thus under the 1916 South African Act also) would have been copyright minus 
“the sole right to perform the work or any substantial part thereof in public”. Full copyright in respect 
of musical works under the Imperial Copyright Act on the other hand included all the rights 
applicable to musical works in the definition of copyright in section 1(2) of the Imperial Copyright Act, 
including the right of public performance (for which see the discussion below). 
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4.3.3.5 Case Law 
Two English cases that were decided in relation to the passing of old rights through the British 1912 
Gateway illustrate how this issue has been dealt with in practice and are thus worth considering 
here. The two cases are the Novello169 case and the Redwood170  case. As indicated above, the 
British Gateway was provided for in section 24 of the Imperial Copyright Act. This section is in fact, 
mimicked almost verbatim by section 151 of the South African Act of 1916, so what the courts have 
said in relation to section 24 of the Imperial Copyright Act would, mutatis mutandis, have equal 
application in relation to works passing through the 1917 South African Gateway. Like section 
151(1) of the 1916 Act, section 24(1) of the Imperial Copyright Act provided that a person entitled to 
an “existing right” or an interest in such right would, from the commencement date of the Act, be 
entitled to a substituted right, which (i.e. the substituted right) would “subsist for the term for which it 
would have subsisted if the Act had been in force when the work was made and the work had been 
one entitled to copyright thereunder”, subject to certain provisos. The relevant proviso for purposes 
of the two cases was the proviso under paragraph (a) of section 24(1). 
The proviso stipulated that if, before the commencement of the Act, the author had assigned the 
existing right or granted an interest in the right “for the whole term of the right”, at the date when 
such right would have expired the substituted right would, “in the absence of express agreement”, 
pass to the author or his legal representative if deceased; and any interest created in relation to the 
existing right and subsisting before the commencement of the Act would cease to exist 
(“determine”). Nevertheless, the person who, prior to the expiry of the right was the owner of the 
right or interest would, upon giving notice, be entitled to an assignment of the right or the grant of a 
similar interest for the remainder of the term of protection, “for such consideration as, failing 
agreement, may be determined by arbitration”. In the absence of such an assignment or grant, the 
person concerned could continue to reproduce or perform the work as before, subject to the 
payment of such royalties “as, failing agreement, may be determined by arbitration”, if the author 
demanded payment of such royalties within three years of the expiry of the right. However, the 
proviso specifically stipulated that where the work was incorporated in a collective work, and the 
owner of the right or interest was the proprietor of the collective work, no payment of royalties would 
be required.    
The South African cases that were decided in relation to the 1916 Act were not concerned with the 
direct application of that Act (i.e. they were not heard when that Act had direct application in South 
Africa, namely pre-1965, before the enactment of the Copyright Act, 1965, which repealed the 1916 
Act). Rather, they concerned the extension of copyright protection to works created pre-1965 by 
virtue of the transitional provisions of the 1978 Act. These cases will also be briefly considered. 
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(a) The Novello case 
In this case one Samuel Coleridge-Taylor had concluded an agreement with Novello & Co, in terms 
of which he assigned to them, in consideration for a royalty, “the copyright and right of publication, 
representation, and performance, and all other the rights, property and interests intended to be 
thereby assigned” relating to a musical work titled “A Tale of Old Japan”, of which he was a 
composer, “so long as the copyright should last”. The musical work was published in England in 
September 1911 and the assignment was concluded in March 1912 – prior to the coming into force 
of the Imperial Copyright Act (i.e. 1 July 1912) – and was applicable for the whole of the United 
Kingdom and its territories and dominions, and “for all foreign countries”. The composer died in 
September 1912 and his wife was appointed as an executor. In March 1930 she assigned to herself 
and hers and the deceased’s daughter and son, the copyright and all rights connected thereto, 
including any future rights arising from statute, in respect of all the deceased’s published and 
unpublished works and manuscripts; subject to any agreements concluded by the deceased 
composer or her as the deceased’s legal representative.  
The widow and her two children instituted proceedings against Novello in September 1937, twenty 
five years after the death of the composer, claiming (a) a declaration that they were entitled to the 
copyright in “A Tale of Old Japan”, “free from any right or interest” of the defendant company; i.e. 
notwithstanding the agreement concluded between the composer and the defendant – essentially 
claiming that the copyright had reverted to them; and (b) an injunction against the defendant and its 
servants and agents restraining them from reproduce or performing the work in public, or authorising 
others to do so. The court a quo had ruled in favour of the plaintiffs, holding that since the 
agreement was concluded after the coming into force of the Imperial Copyright Act, the proviso to 
section 5(2) (i.e. the so-called reversionary interest), applied (i.e. the reversionary interest vested in 
the widow as the deceased personal representative); and further that the provisions of section 24(1) 
did not apply.  
The defendant had argued that its rights in relation to the work remained valid until September 1953 
(i.e. forty two years after the publication of the work, being the period for which copyright subsisted 
under the Talfourd’s Act, 1842, which applied to the assignment between the composer and 
Novello). The defendant argued that “the effect of the proviso to s. 24 subs-s. 1, was to preserve to 
assignees such as the company the rights they had acquired (i.e., the copyright until forty-two years 
from the date of publication) and to confer on the author or his legal personal representatives … the 
copyright for the additional period during which it continued under the Act.”171 Essentially the 
defendant argued that “a person entitled immediately before the commencement of the Act to both 
copyright and performing right became entitled to copyright as defined by the Act” and that this 
subsisted for a period of fifty years from the death of the author - which was the effect of the phrase 
providing that the term of protection would be “for the term for which it would have subsisted if this 
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Act had been in force at the date when the work was made”. The plaintiff’s rights to enjoy the 
copyright was thus, according to the defendant’ arguments, curtailed by the defendant’s right to 
enjoy copyright  under the Talfourd’s Act for a period of forty two years from publication of the work 
(i.e. until 1953), after which the plaintiffs would then enjoy the copyright for the residue of the fifty-
year period of protection under the Imperial Copyright Act (i.e. until 1962).  
In furthering its argument the defendant argued that section 24 alone applied in respect of copyright 
“in any work produced before the commencement of the Act” and that the proviso to section 5(2) 
had no application to such copyright and “only [applied] to new copyright under the Act in works 
produced after it came into force.”172 The plaintiffs however, argued that the expression “copyright” 
in the proviso to section 5 “includes pre-Act copyright” and that “[t]he mischief it was meant to 
remedy was the danger of an author being persuaded by a publisher to assign the rights in all his 
works between the passing and the commencement of the Act.”173 In giving its judgment (per Sir 
Wilfrid Greene M.R.) the court observed that “the question depends upon the construction of two 
provisions of the Copyright Act read in relation to one another. One is the provision in s. 5 … and the 
other is s. 24”.174 Regarding the “scheme” of the Act the court observed: 
Broadly speaking it is, I think, correct to say that the scheme upon which the Act is drawn up is to deal 
with copyright law as it is to be under the Act when it comes into force, leaving for special treatment a 
subject which required special treatment – namely, the grafting into the new and comprehensive code 
of law all works in respect of which copyright, performing rights, and common law rights existed under 
the old law. …
175
 
Commenting on section 24 the court observed that the section dealt with existing works, “and it is 
that section that one would expect to find the relevant provisions with regard to the duration of 
copyright and the nature of the right of copyright which is to be given by the law in respect of such 
works.”176 This would be true of section 151 of the 1916 South African Act, since that section mimics 
section 24, as indicated earlier. The court further observed that the effect of section 24 was that 
rights that subsisted in a work that existed before the commencement of the Imperial Copyright Act 
were dealt with as provided in that section so that “if [anyone wished] to find what are the rights of 
copyright which are to subsist in such a work… they are to look within the four corners of this section 
and not outside it, save in so far as sub-s. 3 itself tells them that they are to look outside it, by 
looking, where necessary, to s. 19, sub-s. 7; s. 19, sub-s. 8; and s. 13.” This observation would, 
mutatis mutandis, apply in respect of section 151 of the 1916 South African Act.  
Continuing, the court observed that the provision of subsection (1) of section 24 was a “drafting 
mechanism for getting into the scheme of the Act the existing works and putting them on the same 
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basis mutatis mutandis with new works to be made after the coming into force of the Act.”177 This is 
a reference to the scheme of passing through the 1912 Gateway in respect of existing or “old” rights. 
The observation applies equally with respect to the 1916 Act and the scheme of passing through the 
1917 Gateway in relation to old South African rights, the necessary details having been changed. 
The court observed that in the present case, in relation to the musical work in question, the existing 
right was “copyright and performing right”, which included “the common law rights”; and the 
substituted right was “copyright as defined by [the] Act”. The following observation by the court 
illustrates what was said above in relation to the scheme for passing through either the 1912 
Gateway in respect of British works or the 1917 Gateway in respect of South African works, and 
deserves repetition: 
Applying the language of subs-s. 1 to the facts of the present case, it seems to me quite clear, firstly, 
that Messrs. Novello & Co., the defendants, were immediately before the commencement of this Act, 
namely, immediately before July 1, 1912, entitled to copyright and performing right, the existing rights 
as defined in the First Schedule,
178
 their title to those rights being, of course, derived from the author, 
who was the first proprietor of them, under the agreement in question. … [T]he subsection gives them 
… the substituted right specified in the Schedule, namely, copyright under the Act, and it gives that 
copyright to them for a period which, upon the facts of this case, will expire in September, 1962 … 
whereas the right which they had obtained under the agreement, that is to say the assignment of the 
old copyright, was one which would have expired in September, 1953. Now, the term of the copyright 
having been extended, the amount of the extension being greater or less according to the 
circumstances of the individual case, the Legislature, of course, had to make provision for the added 
term of copyright. Obviously there would have been some ground for complaint … on the part of 
authors and their representatives, if this statutory windfall in the shape of an extended term of 
copyright had fallen into the pockets of purchasers of the old copyright, and the moral claim of the 
authors to have that windfall themselves was one which Parliament recognized subject to a 
qualification conferring certain rights on the purchasers …The substituted right, which, by virtue of that 
assignment, is obtained by Messrs. Novello & Co. immediately the Act comes into force, is to inure for 
the benefit of the author to this extent, that during the period from September, 1953, when the old 
copyright would have expired, until September, 1962, when the new copyright will expire, the copyright 
is preserved to the author under this proviso. …
179
  
In contrast to the provisions of section 24, which were concerned with existing works, the court 
affirmed that the provisions of section 5 were directed towards the future, dealing with new copyright 
which was to come into existence upon the commencement of the Act.180 Much hinged on the 
meaning of the phrase “after the passing of the Act” in relation to the proviso to subsection 2 of 
section 5 of the Act in the final ruling of the court. It will be recalled that the proviso stipulated the 
following: 
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Provided that, where the author of a work is the first owner of the copyright therein, no assignment of 
the copyright, and no grant of any interest therein, made by him (otherwise than by will) after the 
passing of this Act, shall be operative to vest in the assignee or grantee any rights with respect to the 
copyright in the work beyond the expiration of twenty-five years from the death of the author …
181
 
The court contrasted this with the fact that the provisions of section 24(1)(a) dealt with assignments 
“before the commencement of the Act”. In this regard the court noted that “the two provisions cannot 
stand together consistently, in relation to assignments made between the passing and the 
commencement of the Act”;182 observing that what was contemplated by the phrase “after the 
passing of this Act” in relation to assignments provided for in section 5(2) were assignments made 
“during the period between the passing and commencement of the Act”; e.g. assignments in relation 
to future works (i.e. works “to be produced after the commencement of the Act”), and “the proviso to 
subs-s. 2 of s. 5 does not operate to extend, or to qualify, anything that is found in s.24”.183 On this 
basis the court in fact founded in favour of the defendants, ruling that “Messrs. Novello & Co., as 
from the date of the commencement of the Act, were the owners of the copyright within the meaning 
of subs-s. 2 of s. 5”, having become such owners “by virtue of the operation of s. 24” (i.e. by virtue of 
having concluded an assignment with the composer “before the commencement of the Act”). Thus 
“sub-s. 2 of s. 5 [gave] them what they had not got before’, making the application of the proviso to 
be non-existent “because at the date when the Act commences the copyright is vested in them and 
not in the author.”184 
(b) The Redwood Case 
The question that came for consideration before the courts in this case was the meaning to be given 
to the phrase “in the absence of express agreement”, where, in terms of the proviso under 
paragraph (a) of section 24(1) the British Imperial Act provided that the substituted right would, “in 
the absence of express agreement”, pass to the author or his legal representative if deceased. Did 
this mean that the substituted right had to be expressly referred to in the agreement concerned, or 
did an agreement which “[used] express terms wide enough to include the new copyright”, suffice? 
On this point the court unanimously ruled that “[f]or the substituted right not to pass to the author, 
there must be an agreement which expressly states that this is not to happen and that can be made 
clear beyond all doubt”, observing further that “[w]ide general words” would not suffice.185  
The effect of this is that a pre-1912 (in the case of British works) or pre-1917 (in the case of South 
African works) assignment needs, for example, to have specifically mentioned that copyright in a 
musical composition or a performing right in a musical composition or both, as provided for in the 
British Imperial Copyright Act or the 1916 South African Act, respectively, would be assigned to the 
                                               
181
 Emphasis added. 
182
 Coleridge-Taylor & Others v Novello & Co. Ltd [1938] Ch. 850, at 865. 
183
 Id at 866. 
184
 Id at 866 – 867. 
185
 Chappell & Co Ltd v Redwood Music Ltd; Redwood Music Ltd v Francis, Day and Hunter Ltd  [1981] R.P.C. 337 (HL), 
at 823, per Viscount Dilhorne. 
162 
 
erstwhile assignee, for the remainder of the copyright period contemplated in the new legislation 
(unless the work was a “collective work”, in which case this requirement would not apply). If this was 
not done, then copyright would revert to the author as contemplated in section 24(1). 
(c) The South African cases 
As indicated, the South African cases dealing with the 1916 Act were cases that were concerned 
with the application of the provisions of the 1978 Act to works made prior 1 January 1979, when the 
Act came to force. We are, in this regard, concerned with works made when the 1916 Act was still in 
force, i.e. works made before 1965, but the cases referred to here were not concerned with the 
direct application of the 1916 Act (i.e. they were not heard when the 1916 Act was still in force, pre-
1965). They were instead concerned with the application of the 1978 Act to works made under the 
1916 Act. Furthermore, except for one case,186 the cases were concerned with matters relating to 
artistic works and not musical works. The principles dealt with in these cases however have equal 
application in respect of musical works. The extension of protection for pre-1979 works is, in this 
regard, made possible through the provisions of section 43 of the Copyright Act, 1978. This section 
has retrospective effect and applies to works made before 1 January 1979 (when the Act came into 
force) in the same way as it applies to works made thereafter. This notwithstanding, it is specifically 
provided that the Act does not affect the ownership, duration or existence187 of any copyright 
subsisting in terms of the 1965 Act, and does not create any copyright which did not subsist before 
the coming into force of the 1965 Act (namely September 11 1965).188 As indicated, though the 1965 
Act repealed the 1916 Act, in essence it incorporated many of the provisions of that Act, especially 
in its Sixth Schedule, read with section 48 of the Act.189 
One of the first cases to be heard in this regard was Tolima (Pty) Ltd v Cugacius Motor Accessories 
(Pty) Ltd.190 This case concerned the indirect copying of an engineering drawing. The court, relying 
on the earlier judgment of Scaw Metals Ltd v Apex Foundry (Pty) Ltd & Another191 and recognising 
the application of the 1978 Act to works made prior to its commencement in terms of section 43 
thereof, concluded that indirect copying – a doctrine derived from English copyright law – was part of 
South African law, because the latter is modelled on English law.192 In particular, the court noted: 
“The doctrine has been built upon the words of the 1911 English statute which were repeated in the 
South African Copyright Acts both in 1916 and 1965. Similar words were repeated in the 1978 Act 
…”193 This case was among several cases decided under the problematic provisions of the original 
version of section 43(a)(ii).194 Dean has observed that the correct principle with regard to the original 
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version of section 43(a)(ii) can be “distilled” from the case of Saunders Valve Co. Ltd v Klep Valves 
(Pty) Ltd195 (the “Saunders Valve case”).196 This case concerned the copyright protection of a series 
of drawings made in the United Kingdom between 1938 and 1958 and durable in a period covered 
by the 1916 Act, 1965 Act and 1978 Act.  
In assessing the situation, O’Donovan J observed that “[t]he transitional provisions of the Sixth 
Schedule to the Copyright Act of 1965 … left unaffected the subsistence of copyright in works made 
prior to the commencement of that Act” and that, therefore, in the most, “copyright subsisting in 
works made prior to the commencement of the Copyright Act 63 of 1965 remains unchanged to the 
present day”.197 After considering the transitional provisions of the 1978 and 1965 Acts, and 
observing that Chapter 4 of the 1916 Act “extends the provisions of the British Copyright Act of 1911 
to South Africa”, O’Donovan J summed up the applicable position as follows: 
The effect of the foregoing provisions, for present purposes, is that the remedies available to the 
owner of copyright are now governed by the 1978 Act, but that the subsistence of copyright in the 
drawings upon which the applicant relies as at the date when the 1978 Act came into force is to be 
determined in accordance with the 1916 Act, and therefore by the 1911 British Copyright Act.
198
 
                                                                                                                                                              
which copyright could not subsist prior to 11 September 1961”, as the current version provides. This is illustrated in the 
case of Butt v Schultz & Another [1984] 4 All SA 264 (E), which was concerned with the application of the Copyright Act, 
1978, to a boat mould, plug and hull made between 1955 and 1978 (i.e. at the time when the 1916 and 1965 Acts were in 
force).  The court held that the use of such mould, plug and hull without the authorisation of the plaintiff infringed upon his 
copyright in these artistic works. Nevertheless, on appeal in Schultz v Butt [1986] 2 All SA 403 (A) the court held that, in 
spite of the retroactive nature of the provisions of the Copyright Amendment Act 66 of 1983 (as understood from the 
provisions of section 43 of the 1978 Act), which amended the 1978 Act by introducing “works of craftsmanship of a 
technical nature” as a category of artistic works, no copyright infringement took place in respect of moulds and hulls made 
before October 1983 on the ground that, prior to the said amendment, no copyright subsisted in works of craftsmanship of 
a technical nature – which the boat mould fell under.  More specifically, in light of the provisions of section 43(a)(ii), no 
copyright subsisted in respect of works of craftsmanship of a technical nature made prior to 11 September 1965. This 
position of the court is in line with Dean and Karjiker’s contention that the term “copyright” in the original version of sec tion 
43(a)(ii) of the Copyright Act (applicable when these earlier cases were heard and amended in 1992 to make the position 
clearer) had to be understood as referring to what in American law is referred to as “a copyright” – i.e. the complete bundle 
of rights comprised in a copyright work, as opposed to “rights in copyright” or “a component right of the bundle” – so that 
the effect was that this provision “precluded creating any bundle of rights where no bundle of rights existed” before. Dean 
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This position finds support in the Procast Holdings case,199 where Burger J observed, in respect of 
the original provisions of section 43(a)(i) and (ii) of the Copyright Act, 1978: 
I understand these provisos to mean on the one hand that the duration and validity of copyright 
existing under the 1965 Act is not in any way curtailed, and copyright which did not exist prior to the 
1965 Act is not created by the new Act. The clear intention is merely to make available the additional 
remedies of the 1978 Act to the holders of copyright works without altering, extending or diminishing 
their copyright existing in any work made prior to 1979. Counsel for respondent at one time contended 
that in the last proviso the word ‘Copyright’ should be read as meaning ‘right’, and hence he argued 
that if a person had no right prior to 1965, then because of the second proviso to section 43(1) of Act 
98 of 1978 no new rights are created in 1978. But proviso (b) to section 43(1) applies to ‘copyright’ 
and not ‘right’.
200
 
This observation is enlightening because it affirms the fact that, where copyright in a work existed in 
terms of the 1916 Act, e.g. copyright in a musical work, such copyright continues to exist under the 
1978 Act. However, such copyright is now clothed with the rights – i.e. the bundle of rights – 
associated with that type of work under the 1978 Act. What is crucial therefore is whether the type of 
work concerned was protected by copyright under the 1916 Act, who owned it and the duration of 
such copyright. It is not necessary - or even warranted – to consider the content or scope of such 
copyright since this is dealt with in terms of the 1978 Act.201 In other words, the question to ask is: 
What protection does the 1978 Act provide in respect of the type of work concerned – seeing that it 
is the protection provided for under the 1978 Act that matters.202 For this reason Dean correctly 
criticises the dictum of Grosskopf JA on appeal from the Saunders Valve case, where the learned 
judge opined that one had to look at the 1916 Act (incorporating the 1911 British Act) to determine 
the ambit of the claimant’s copyright.203  
The leading case in relation to the interpretation of section 43(a) of the Copyright Act, 1978 is 
Appleton & Another v Harnischfeger Corporation & Another.204 This case was concerned with the 
application of the international aspects of the British Copyright Act, 1911, as embodied in the 1916 
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South African Act; as such, the facts of the case are of less relevance for current purposes.205 In the 
case the court observed that in light of the provisions of section 43(a) of the Copyright Act, 1978, 
which “make it abundantly clear that [the] provisions apply to works made both before and after the 
commencement of the Act”, the Act was made applicable to American works made both before and 
after 1 January 1979 on the basis of Government Notice 125 of 1990,206 the latest government 
notice dealing with the recognition of protection for works of American origin, inter alia. Proc 118 of 
1924 therefore, albeit being the “legislation recognising American works current when these 
drawings were made”, did not apply.207 A contrary position “would seem to rescue from the grave 
and give present legal effect to a piece of legislation which was totally and unconditionally repealed 
…”208 
In analysing the statutory provisions necessary to determine the recognition of copyright protection 
in respect of works made before the 1978 Act the court held that “[t]he starting point in [such] 
investigation is the current Copyright Act 98 of 1978.”209 In conclusion the court observed (per 
Corbett CJ): 
To sum up, the general, or substantive, provision in the opening words of s 43 means that the 1978 
Act applies to all works, whenever made. As far as proviso (i) is concerned, the position is as follows: 
If copyright subsisted under the 1965 Act, it must mean that it was, at least at the date of the 
promulgation of the 1978 Act, valid copyright. In this situation the proviso can only mean that the new 
Act preserves rights. The validity or invalidity of copyright under the 1965 Act is thus not an enquiry 
which one need pursue. As regards ownership of copyright, there was initially a material difference 
between the two Acts. … It was accordingly necessary to preserve rights of ownership. … [A]s a result 
of an amendment in 1980 this difference no longer exists (see s 9 of Act 56 of 1980). There are some 
differences between the two Acts relating to term or duration of copyright …. It follows that the 
subsistence of copyright in the works in question … must be determined by reference to the 1978 Act 
….
210
  
While acknowledging that “the result achieved … will be the same in the final outcome” Dean and 
Karjiker have expressed preference for the position where the starting point of the investigation is 
the historical analysis, “working forward”.211 The authors refer to this as “the progressive approach”, 
while they refer to the approach used by the court in the Appleton case  - of starting with the current 
Copyright Act, 1978 and “[working] backwards” – as the “regressive approach”.212 In the writer’s 
view, the process entails both a regressive and a progressive approach. This is in line with the 
concept of a “two-way traffic system” alluded to above.213 It is submitted that of necessity a 
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methodical approach will require one to start with the current Act, because in the first place, the 
basis upon which copyright protection must be granted to works made before the commencement of 
the current Act needs to be established. Such basis, as is now common cause, is in terms of the 
provisions of section 43(a) of the Copyright Act, 1978 and that is the place therefore, where the 
enquiry must commence.  
The second step would then entail identifying the work whose protection is under consideration. Is it 
the type of work protected under the current Act? This enquiry is crucial because it determines if the 
provisions of the current Act can be used to buttress the protection granted in respect of such work 
by the earlier Act.214 This is also in line with the observation of the court in the Procast Holdings 
case,215 where it was noted that the objective of section 43 of the current Act is not to alter, extend, 
or diminish copyright existing in any work made prior to 1979.216 Thus in the odd case that the 
current Act may not make provision for the copyright protection of the work in question, the scope of 
protection would have to be determined in terms of the old legislation, depending of course, on 
whether the period of protection in respect of such work has not yet expired.217 Having determined 
that the current Act grants protection in respect of the type of work in question the writer submits 
that, it is not, at this stage, necessary to be seized with an analysis of the scope of copyright under 
the current Act in such a work, or to be concerned with matters relating to the duration of copyright 
and remedies for infringement. Rather, whether the work is of a type protected under the current Act 
or not, the court must embark on a journey backwards (the regressive approach) to determine the 
outcome, based on the following circumstances: 
(i) If the work is of a type not protected under the current Act 
 Under such circumstances the enquiry involves traversing back in order to determine if the work is 
protected under “old law” and the applicable provisions in such a case. Protection is not granted 
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section 35 of the Sixth Schedule to the Copyright Act, 1965, which maintains the distinction between the three types of 
musical works provided for under the 1916 Act. This also has some similarity to the Appellate Division case of Schultz v 
Butt [1986] 2 All SA 403 (A), referred to supra n 194, where the court excluded protection to moulds and hulls made before 
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under the current Copyright Act. This is not unlike the case of Schultz v Butt described above,218 
where, on appeal, the court excluded protection to moulds and hulls made before 1983 on the 
ground that prior to 1983 no copyright subsisted in “works of craftsmanship of a technical nature.” 
The port of arrival for such regressive journey is the 1965 Copyright Act. What will determine 
whether the 1965 Act will apply per se, or if it would be necessary to traverse further back to the 
1916 Act, is the period when the work was made. If the work was made before 1 January 1978, but 
on or after 11 September 1965, then the main provisions of the 1965 Act apply. If however, the work 
was made before 11 September 1965, but on or after 1 January 1917, the provisions of the Sixth 
Schedule of the 1965 Act, which in fact are “effectively the 1916 Act”,219 apply.  
A related consideration in this regard is the duration of the work concerned. Obviously protection 
would be granted in respect of the work if the period of protection for the work (as determined by the 
legislation under which the work was made) has not expired. Both where the provisions of the 1965 
Act apply per se, and where the provisions of the 1916 Act apply specifically, the period of protection 
is the lifetime of the author and fifty years after his death.220 It is submitted that all musical 
compositions that passed through the 1917 Gateway, in which both copyright and performing right 
subsisted, would be protectable under the current Copyright Act. However, as highlighted,221 at least 
works in which only the performing right subsisted under the 1916 Act must be treated as peculiar 
works not comparable to musical works protected under the 1978 Act and would therefore, not find 
protection under the current Act. This position finds support in section 35 of the Sixth Schedule to 
the 1916 Act, which effectively preserves the treatment of musical works under the 1916 Act. Firstly, 
in terms of section 33(2) of the Sixth Schedule protection in respect of pre-1965 rights only extend to 
substituted rights and not to rights in existence prior to 1917.  
Section 35(1) provides that, if the right accorded to a musical work under the 1916 Act did not 
include the performing right, then this position would prevail under the 1965 Act. Similarly, section 
35(2) provides that if the right accorded to a musical work under the 1916 Act only included the 
performing right, then this position would prevail under the 1965 Act. Nevertheless, section 35(3) 
extends the ambit of the performing right accorded under the 1916 Act to include not only the right of 
“performing the work or an adaptation thereof in public”, but also “broadcasting the work or an 
adaptation thereof”, and “causing the work or an adaptation thereof to be transmitted to subscribers 
to a diffusion service”.222 Nevertheless, these types of musical works are alien to the 1978 Act and 
thus, it is contended, such types of works would conform to the provisions of section 43(a)(ii) and 
would thus not find protection under the 1978 Act. This, as indicated earlier, should be seen as 
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being similar to the situation in the Schultz case,223 where protection was refused in relation to an 
artistic work of a technical nature on the ground that no copyright protection existed in respect of 
such work when the work was first made (albeit such protection was subsequently introduced).  
(ii) If the work is of a type protected under the current Act 
The type of work protected under the current Act in relation to the present discussion is a “musical 
work”, which is protected in terms of section 2(1)(b). The scope of protection for this type of work is 
dealt with in section 6 of the Act, which contains the bundle of rights associated with a musical work. 
A musical work is in turn defined as “a work consisting of music, exclusive of any words or action 
intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music.”224 Where therefore, a work made before 
11 September 1965 satisfies these elements (i.e. it is a work meeting the definition of a “musical 
work” in section 1 and comprising of a bundle of rights), then such a work would most likely find 
protection under the current Act as a musical work and the provisions of section 43(a)(ii) would not 
apply to such a work.  
It is submitted that, apart from what is stated in (i) herein, musical works made under the 1916 Act 
would qualify as musical works for purposes of the Copyright Act, 1978. As dealt with in Chapter 3, 
the modern regime for the protection of musical works in the common law system was ushered in by 
the Imperial Copyright Act, which was incorporated in the 1916 South African Act. Although the 1916 
Act did not proffer a definition of “musical work”, it is submitted that the copyright accorded under the 
1916 Act in respect of musical works largely conforms to that which subsists under the current Act. It 
is submitted that it is partly for this reason that the court in Disney Enterprises Inc v Griesel N.O.225 
(the “Lion Sleeps Tonight” case) had no difficulty accepting the position that a musical work made 
under the 1916 Act was eligible for protection under the 1978 Act.226 Under such circumstances 
section 43(1)(i) of the 1978 Act makes it explicit that issues relating to the ownership, duration or 
existence of copyright are determined by the 1965 Act (including the provisions of Schedule 6 to that 
Act, which preserved essential provisions of the 1916 Act). However, such a work (provided that 
copyright therein has not yet expired), “enjoy[s] the measure of protection conferred upon that type 
of work in the 1978 Act.”227  
In essence therefore, the subsistence of copyright in respect of a work made before 1 January 1979 
(including its ownership and duration) is regulated by the provisions of the 1965 Act, while “the 
scope or content of [the] copyright and the manner of its enforcement” is regulated under the 1978 
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Act.228 In this regard therefore the analogy of a two-way traffic is completed. The regressive journey 
begins with the enabling provisions of section 43 of the 1978 Act – what Corbett CJ called the 
“general, or substantive, provision in the opening words of s 43” in Appleton & Another v 
Harnischfeger & Another.229 It traverses back to the 1965 Act, and where necessary, goes further 
back to the 1916 Act, to determine issues relating to the subsistence, ownership and duration of 
copyright. If the work concerned is of a type not protected by the 1978 Act, the journey will end there 
and protection must be determined under the provisions of the applicable old legislation. If however, 
the work is of a type protected under the 1978 Act the enquiry must make a U-turn and traverse 
back on a forward-looking, progressive journey to the 1978 Act. Of necessity a determination of 
whether copyright has not expired must first be made, after which, if copyright still subsists, the 
scope of protection and the manner of copyright enforcement must be determined.  
The above-outlined framework can be demonstrated in the Lion Sleeps Tonight case.230 The work 
which was the subject-matter of the infringement action, Mbube, was composed in the late 1930’s by 
Solomon Linda. In 1952 he assigned his worldwide copyright in the work to a record company for 
ten shillings, and died in 1962 of kidney disease, a pauper.231 Several derivative forms of the work 
were made, including “Wimoweh” and Disney’s “The Lion Sleeps Tonight”, which featured in the 
Lion King movie and attained worldwide success.  
When determining how to deal with the copyright in Mbube, the lawyers representing the executor of 
the deceased estate of Solomon Linda had, of necessity, to rely on the provisions of section 43 of 
the Copyright Act, 1978, which extend the protection arising from the Act to works made before its 
commencement.232 On this basis the lawyers could traverse back to the 1916 Act and the 
reversionary provision in the proviso to section 5(2) of the Third Schedule to the 1916 Act, to 
determine that in 1987, twenty-five years after Solomon Linda died, the reversionary interest in 
Mbube vested in the executor of the deceased estate of Solomon Linda. The fact that several 
assignments were concluded by the heirs of Linda transferring copyright in the song to various 
parties did not change this situation.  
4.4 Conclusion 
The foregoing was an attempt to provide a comprehensive analysis of the early development of 
music copyright in South Africa until the early 1900’s. It was submitted that such an analysis is 
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necessary to understand the nature of music copyright protection in South Africa today, especially in 
light of the retrospective application of the Copyright Act, 1978, to works made prior to its 
commencement. While a doctoral thesis written by Owen Dean is undoubtedly the magnum opus in 
relation to the analysis of the historical development of copyright law in South Africa, no such 
analysis has been done in relation to musical copyright. This chapter therefore, it is submitted, fills a 
serious gap in relation to this. 
The analysis began with a consideration of the privilege system forming part of early Roman-Dutch 
law, proceeded to the application of pre-1912 British statutory copyright in South Africa, considered 
the application of pre-1917 provincial copyright legislation, considered the effect of the retrospective 
application of the British Imperial Copyright Act of 1911 and finally, considered the continuing 
relevance of the first South African intellectual property legislation, namely, the Patents, Designs, 
Trade Marks and Copyright Act, 1916. In each instance an emphasis was placed on how this has 
impacted on the development of music copyright law in South Africa. 
It was further highlighted that, through the application of English statutory copyright law in South 
Africa the confusion that existed in that system in relation to the scope of music copyright and the 
construction of the performing right in musical works of necessity prevailed in South Africa also. 
Thus, even though the Imperial Copyright Act and its incorporation in the 1916 South African Act, 
sought to level the playing field with regard to the copyright protection of musical works and 
introduced a new regime in this regard, it would take some time before these new changes would be 
understood. The work of the British courts in clarifying the meaning of the performing right and the 
proper scope of music copyright is thus equally relevant for the development of South African music 
copyright law. 
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PART 2 – THE MODERN PROTECTION OF COPYRIGHT IN 
MUSICAL WORKS 
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Chapter 5: General Principles of Copyright Protection with a 
Focus on Music Copyright Protection 
“It seems to me that when he who harbours an idea, by dint of his imagination, skill or labour, or 
some or all of them, brings it into being in tactile, visible or audible form, capable thereby of being 
communicated to others as a meaningful conception or apprehension of his mind, a right or property 
in that idea immediately comes into existence.”1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Per Slomowitz AJ in Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd v Paramount Pictures Corporation; Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd 
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at 7.  
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5.1 Introduction  
Seeing that the rights accorded by law in respect of musical works (and sound recordings) derive 
primarily from the copyright system2 – and while recognising that many texts have been written in 
the area of copyright law, both in respect of South African and international copyright - it is 
necessary to consider the general principles relating to the protection of copyright. The ensuing 
discussion is intended to provide a critical analysis in this regard, with an emphasis of its application 
to the protection of musical works. In this regard it needs to be noted that music copyright “presents 
a methodological problem for courts … that most other forms of copyright subject matter do not.”3 
For purposes of enriching the discussion and in line with the contextual approach advocated for in 
this thesis, a comparison of the position applicable in other jurisdictions (in particular those from the 
Anglo-American tradition4) is, where applicable, made. This is aimed at highlighting any differences 
in practices, authenticating South African practices or recommending the adoption of certain 
practices where the position in South Africa is not well developed.  
As indicated, the South African music industry is still in a state of development and can benefit from 
practices in related jurisdictions. The discussion in this Chapter shall be of great assistance as no 
comprehensive analysis of the principles of copyright with particular emphasis on the protection of 
musical works has been done in South Africa. This will thus add to the body of knowledge in this 
regard. Prior to delving into this however, it would be worthwhile to remind ourselves of the 
approach adopted in this thesis regarding the treatment of the subject-matter. As indicated above,5 
the distinction between the expressions “Music Rights Law” and “Music Law” need to be always kept 
in mind when dealing with the current study. It has, in this regard, been contended that the 
expression “Music Rights Law” needs to be understood in the limited sense of those rights that, in 
law, arise in order to afford legal protection to music. On the other hand the expression “Music Law”, 
while encompassing “Music Rights Law”, should be understood to include all other branches of law 
that have an impact on the relationships, transactions and activities that arise in the conduct of the 
music business. These would include certain forms of intellectual property law6; the law of contract; 
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copyright legislation, are essentially based on the rules of civil (and at certain instances, criminal) procedure. Thus except 
where the context requires, this work is not concerned with matters relating to the infringement of copyright and remedies 
thereto.   
3
 Goldstein Goldstein on Copyright 10:52. The author attributes this situation to the need to compare the contested works 
“by ear rather than eye”, necessitating the need for expert testimony (e.g. by musicologists) and courtroom demonstrations 
which “can, through emphasis and other nuance make similarities appear – or disappear – with disturbing ease.” Id at 
10:52 – 10:53.  
4
 That is, those jurisdictions based on the English system of copyright law, also termed “common law jurisdictions”. In this 
regard the Anglo-American system has been termed the “copyright system”, as distinguished from the “author’s rights 
system” of mainly Continental Europe. See generally in this regard Sterling World Copyright Law 17 – 18, and Von 
Lewinski International Copyright Law at Chapter 3.  
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music industry. Notable in this regard are so-called “celebrity patents”, where certain celebrities made certain inventions 
relating to their performance careers. In the music industry Eddie Van Halen’s two-handed guitar playing (tapping) 
technique, which gave him his signature sound, comes to mind. Van Halen made this by “[inventing] a support (top) that 
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regulatory aspects of the music industry (e.g. the law of competition and the law of mergers and 
acquisitions); the law of agency (regulating relationships with agents, managers etc); privacy and 
media law (in respect of the persona of the artist), etc. 
The expression “Music Rights” refers to those rights that arise in respect of certain intellectual 
property relating to music in general. This is specifically limited to rights that arise from copyright and 
related rights. In the area of copyright the rights concerned are those subsisting in relation to 
musical works and sound recordings. In the area of related (or neighbouring) rights the rights 
afforded to performers in respect of their performance of musical works, whether through live or 
recorded means. The current chapter is limited to a discussion of the general provisions relating to 
the copyright protection of musical works and where warranted to provide more context, sound 
recordings.7     
5.2 The nature and meaning of modern copyright 
5.2.1 The Nature of Copyright 
The foregoing chapters dealt with the historical development of copyright, but a definition of 
copyright as it applies today was not as such ventured. In common-law jurisdictions the rights of 
authors in respect of their creative works is protected through certain copyright principles generally 
encapsulated in legislative enactments.8 In this regard it has often been said that modern copyright 
law is “a creature of statute”9. In many cases however copyright enactments do not define the 
meaning and nature of copyright, so that clarification in this regard has to be sought in case law, 
legal writings etc.10 Often legislative enactments simply refer to “copyright”, “author’s right”, 
“exclusive right” etc, without defining these – and in this regard it has been cautioned that it is 
important to examine these terms in the context in which they are used.11 Since copyright law 
provides protection in respect of a number of works it would be important to examine the relevant 
provisions of the copyright legislation dealing with these categories of works in order to determine 
the nature and meaning of copyright in each case.12  
                                                                                                                                                              
could flip out of the back of his axe’s body to raise and stabilize the fretboard”, and filed a patent in this regard in 1985. 
Similarly, the musician Prince invented and patented the so-called “keytar” – a “portable keyboard instrument”, in 1992. 
Not to be outdone, the musician Paula Abdul patented her own microphone stand in 2009, a “dynamic microphone support 
apparatus” with a weighted base which the singer can stand on and move around “without fear of falling over”. In 2002 
Marlon Brando received a patent for a “drumhead tensioning device and method”, used in musical drums. However, 
perhaps the most spectacular and famous celebrity patent of all times is the invention that gave rise to Michael Jackson’s 
legendary “moonwalk” dance, which he showcased in the “Smooth Criminal” video and gave the illusion of gravity 
defiance. Michael Jackson was able to do this through the use of a pair of specially-designed shoes “that could hitch into a 
device hidden beneath the stage”, which he and two co-inventors patented in 1993. See in relation to the foregoing Trex 
and McCarthy 2013 http://mentalfloss.com/article/52444/27-celebrity-patent-holders (date of use: 24 December 2018). 
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In light of the foregoing it would be useful to review some of the definitions proposed regarding the 
expression “copyright”. Within the perspective of British copyright law, Garnett, Davies and Harbottle 
simply define copyright as “a property right which subsists in a number of different kinds of works, 
such as original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works, sound recordings, films or broadcasts 
and the typographical arrangement of published editions.”13 The British Act of course specifically 
provides that intellectual property is a property right.14 It has to be further noted that this definition 
makes a distinction between works that are original and those that are not. This is because the 
British Act makes a distinction between works that are original and those that are not required to be 
original.15 In South African law however all works are required to be original in order to warrant 
copyright protection.16  
When defining the meaning of copyright a debate has often raged as to whether copyright is to be 
construed as a positive right or rather as a negative right (i.e. whether it is a right “authorising” the 
doing of certain acts, or whether it is a right “preventing” the doing of these acts).17 Thus Dean and 
Karjiker define copyright as “[the] right to control the use of a work in all the manners in which it can 
be exploited for personal gain or profit”18, implying a positive right. On the other hand, Copeling 
embraced a negative right position and defined copyright as “that right which vests in the author of 
every original literary or artistic work and enables him to prevent the unsolicited copying of his work 
…”19 In a similar manner, Garnett, Davies and Harbottle assert that the essence of copyright relates 
to the owner’s right to prevent others from engaging in the restricted acts relating to the particular 
copyright work, without the owner’s prior authorisation.20  
                                               
13
 Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James on Copyright at 27. 
14
 Section 1(1) of the UK Copyright, Patents and Designs Act 1988 c. 48 (hereinafter the UK Copyright Act). The South 
African Copyright Act (Act 98 of 1978 as amended, hereinafter the Copyright Act or the South African Copyright Act) 
makes no specific reference to copyright being a property right, but the courts have recognised this reality. See in this 
regard Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd v Paramount Pictures Corporation; Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd Shelburne 
Associates and Others; Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd v Century Associates and Others [1986] 1 All SA 1 (T), at 7.  
15
 See s 1(1) of the UK Copyright Act. See also Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James at 159 – 160. 
16
 See section 2(1) of the South African Copyright Act.  
17
 For a brief discussion of this debate see Copeling Copyright Law at 7. Klopper et al Law of Intellectual Property at 145 – 
146 also deal with this matter and refer to others who do so (at footnote 25, page 145). 
18
 Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law at 1-1.  
19
 Copeling Copyright Law at 5 – 6. 
20
 Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 29. In an earlier edition the authors of Copinger and Skone 
James were even more emphatic, observing that “[c]opyright is, in fact, only a negative right to prevent the appropriation of 
the labours of the author by another." James Copinger and Skone James 2. Copeling ibid has in this regard observed that 
“many leading authorities on the subject are inclined to regard copyright as an essentially negative right.” In this regard no 
less an eminent tribunal as the WTO Panel has observed (albeit in relation to the freedom that Member States have with 
regard to pursuing “legitimate public policy objectives” which “lie outside the scope of intellectual property rights”): “… [T]he 
TRIPs Agreement does not generally provide for the grant of positive rights to exploit or use certain subject matter, but 
rather provides for the grant of negative rights to prevent certain acts.” European Communities — Protection of 
Trademarks and Geographical Indications for Agricultural Products and Foodstuffs (EC — Trademarks and Geographical 
Indications). WTO Panel Report (WT/DS174/R, 15 March 2005), at 7.210. This position is supported by Van den Bossche 
Law of the World Trade Organization 743, where he observes: “IP rights, it should be noted, confer only negative rights, 
i.e. the right to exclude others from the use of the protected subject matter for a particular period of time. They do not 
confer positive rights, such as the right to produce or market the product embodying the IP right.” Similarly national courts 
have lent their credence to this view, as evidenced in the famous Australian decision of Pacific Film Laboratories Pty Ltd v. 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation (1970) 121 CLR 154, at 169, where Windeyer J observed that copyright “is not a right in 
an existing thing. It is a negative right, as it has been called, a power to prevent the making of a physical thing by copying.” 
In the famous tobacco plain packaging case, JT International SA v Commonwealth of Australia [2012] HCA 43 French CJ  
relied, amongst others, on the Pacific Film Laboratories case to assert that intellectual property rights are negative rights, 
observing (at para 36): “It is a common feature of the statutory rights asserted in these proceedings that they are negative 
176 
 
In the writer’s view however, it is better to see copyright as both a positive and a negative right.21 It is 
contended that the language employed in the South African Copyright Act clearly leans more 
towards the “positive right” view.22 However it is suggested that the exclusive right to exploit the work 
or to authorise others to do so inherently also involves the right to prevent others (who have not 
been so authorised), from exploiting the work.  This prevention would however, often arise or 
become necessary or effective in the event of the work being infringed or being under threat of 
infringement. It could thus be said that the positive nature of copyright as an enforceable right 
relates to the copyright owner’s ability to authorise the exploitation of the copyright work (whether for 
economic or non-economic purposes), while its negative nature relates to the ability to prevent 
others from infringing the work (i.e. from using the work without authorisation).23  
                                                                                                                                                              
in character.” Our own courts have adopted a similar approach. See Feldman NO v EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) 
Limited, Feldman NO v EMI Music (Pty) Limited [2007] ZAGPHC 294 at para 7 where Jajbhay J asserts: “Copyright is in 
fact a negative right, in that it is a right of prohibition enforceable against others from performing infringing acts in relation 
to the work. Therefore, the ability to enforce a copyright through the Court is the foundation of such copyright.”   
21
 Rahmatian Assignment and Licences 286 – 287, expresses a similar position when he remarks that the reference to 
copyright and other intellectual property as a negative right “is an overstatement”. He then argues that copyright shares the 
conceptual features of any property right, whose extent and content is expressed by both (i) the relationship of the property 
right holder to third parties (the “external” aspect), which involves the right to exclude others from the property in the form 
of trespass or infringement action, and (ii) the content or substance of the property right (the “internal aspect”), which 
involves the right to use and is in the nature of  the concept of “incidents of ownership” applicable in the area of tangible 
property rights (e.g. right to possession and use; right to management; right to alienate and burden etc). Rahmatian then 
concludes that in the area of copyright as an intangible right the internal aspect would involve the right to assign or license. 
See also in support of this position Guan 2012 RCCL 11. 
22
 With the usage of the phrase “to do” or “to authorise others to do” certain acts (rather than “restrict others from doing” 
the acts). See also in this regard Slomowitz AJ in the Video Parktown North case (see supra n 14), who scoffs at the idea 
of copyright being a negative right, remarking: ‘… [C]opyright has sometimes been called intellectual property, as indeed it 
is. Thus seen, it is no more “negative” in notion or effect than is property in a res. Ownership in a thing is not the right to 
prevent others from using it. That is merely an incident of ownership. It is the right, at common law at least, … to do what 
one pleases with the thing to which it relates, to use it, consume it or exploit it. So too is it with copyright. … [T]he 
connotation of sections 6 to 11 of the Act is obvious. Those provisions attempt to define, possibly to circumscribe, that 
bundle of rights which constitute copyright. Those rights in no way, at least to my way of thinking, “smack of a negative 
approach”.’  
23
Some have seen the author’s right of authorisation as rather underpinning the economic nature of the rights provided for 
in copyright. For example Klopper et al Law of Intellectual Property at 146 write that “[t]he ‘negative right’ viewpoint echoes 
the economic and social arguments for copyright protection.” Dean and Karjiker, who, as observed above, seem to lean 
more on the “positive right” perspective, also arrive at a similar conclusion, asserting that the various acts over which 
copyright law vests exclusive rights to the copyright owner are acts which “represent  in the case of each type of work the 
manners in which that work can be exploited for personal gain or profit.” Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-1 
(emphasis added). The authors then proceed to argue that this right (to exploit the work for personal gain or profit) “is an 
essential right under the law of copyright and that law does not achieve its objective unless such essential right is granted 
to the full.” Ibid. However, while this position is correct in certain cases, it is submitted that it is not correct in all cases. 
First, this view suggests that at all times, the copyright owner’s only interest is in authorising others (either through the 
granting of a licence or the assignment of rights) to exploit his work (which of course has to be for economic purposes). 
However this is not entirely true. There are times (such as when the author may have already given an exclusive licence to 
another to use the work, or when the copyright owner may wish to use the work himself) that the copyright owner would 
not be interested in authorising others to use the work, even for economic benefit. In such instances the copyright owner 
would clearly be interested in preventing others from using the work. At the same time the copyright owner may, at any 
given time, not wish to derive any economic benefit from the exploitation of the work. The work does not have to be used 
only for purposes of personally benefitting or profiting the copyright owner as the copyright owner may elect to allow the 
usage of the work for no economic consideration (as when a copyright owner allows a children’s home to use his work 
without the need to pay any licence fees). In this case the copyright owner is clearly not interested in positively pursuing 
the maximisation of profit opportunities from the exploitation of the work. For example, in recent times some musicians 
have resorted to giving away all or part of their music for free – sometimes as a marketing ploy - without any immediate 
gain or profit. This has been seen as a way of attracting more fans and hopefully inducing them to buy the music later. 
Artists and bands like U2, the late Prince, Radiohead and several others have given away their music with varying results. 
When rights-holders do this they are merely exercising their exclusive right to authorise the usage of their musical works 
without the expectation of payment. It is in fact on this premise that the Creative Commons system was formed. Creative 
Commons (CC), which is “[built] on existing copyright law” is used by many, including musicians, to ‘[reframe] their 
“property right”’ by issuing CC licences to enable free use of their music. See in this regard Goss 2007 Chi.-Kent.L.Rev. 
964. For a list of websites that offer CC-licensed music see https://creativecommons.org/legalmusicforvideos/ (date of use: 
08 June 2016). Secondly, it needs to be noted that the philosophical view underpinning the notion that copyright’s main 
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Some have suggested that the use of the phrase “exclusive right” in defining copyright24 lends 
credence to the view that copyright is a negative right.25 It is nevertheless contended that the 
relegation of copyright into a mere negative right should not be taken lightly. It can in fact, yield 
negative results (with no pun intended), regarding the manner in which copyright is viewed, and can 
be restrictive on the ongoing development of copyright in light of changing technologies.26 Thus the 
view of copyright as a negative right that grants the power “to prevent the making of a physical thing 
by copying”27 could be interpreted to mean that where physical objects are not involved, copyright 
should give way to other rights such as freedom of expression or some expression of the public 
interest.28 A definition of the term “exclusive” from an authoritative dictionary, which we should resort 
                                                                                                                                                              
purpose is to give economic benefits to the author (rather than simply saying that it is to give the author exclusive rights to 
control the usage of his work), is premised on the so-called incentive theory of copyright, which Dean and Karjiker have 
shown support for. See Dean and Karjiker ibid. Incentive theorists argue that copyright (and other intellectual property) law 
seeks to reward the creator for the effort, creativity and talent expended in creating the work, and copyright is conferred on 
the creator as an incentive for him to create further and better works. This conception of the rationale for copyright 
protection is however not without criticism. Thus in Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group PLC 786 JOC (A) 
Harms JA, in recounting the history of the development of copyright law has noted (albeit obiter) that the booksellers who 
lobbied for the enactment of the Statute of Anne of 1709 “had no thought of bringing prosperity to the trade of author” and 
that the Statute was “a monopoly-breaking move for the benefit of the bookselling trade and authors were merely the 
excuse for it” (at 792). Furthermore, while commending the current South African Copyright Act for initially entrenching a 
concern to uphold the interests of the author, where the intention was “to move in the direction of Continental law where 
the emphasis is on the rights (moral and other) of the author and not on the economic rights of employers and 
entrepreneurs”’, he laments the fact that this good intention was short-lived, as barely a year later the legislature amended 
Section 21 of the Copyright Act “to the Anglo-American model where commercial rights tend to reign supreme.” 
Concluding, the honourable judge quipped: “One consequently does not have to be a cynic in order to be sceptical about 
the philosophical premise” – referring to the incentive theory. Ibid. Dean and Karjiker’s argument (ibid at 1-2) that “[t]he fact 
that others … may reap benefits in lieu of the author does not detract from the situation because such persons generally 
derive benefits in loco the author and not in their own right” is not convincing. In a recent, highly-representative analysis of 
the incentive theory in respect of the music industry in the United States, it was concluded that copyright law tends not to 
benefit the majority of musicians and does not appear to provide marginal incentives to create for all musicians at all times, 
but rather directly affects mostly the income of the highest-earning musicians. This is credited to the prevalence of the 
winner-take-all markets in the entertainment industry. See Dicola 2013 ALR 55:0 at 43.  
24
 As for example in section 6 of the Copyright Act where it is provided that copyright in a literary or musical work “vests the 
exclusive right to do or to authorize the doing” of certain acts.   
25
 In this regard Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 28 – 29 note: ‘Copyright …essentially gives the 
right owner the right to restrict others from doing [certain] acts … and, when copyright is referred to as “an exclusive right”, 
the emphasis is on the word “exclusive”.’   
26
 In a special report commissioned by the US National Bureau of Standards to investigate the impact of technological 
developments on copyright law a thorough legal analysis was made in this regard, and the conclusion was that “copyright 
law has been shaped and reshaped to fit new conditions flowing from technological innovations”. See Saltman Copyright in 
Computer-Readable Works A18. As to the philosophical basis for this the following has been observed: ‘We deduce from 
the [US] Constitution that the end purpose of copyright is to “promote the progress of science and useful arts,” that is, to 
stimulate the growth and spread of learning and culture for the benefit of society at large; and that, as a means toward 
achieving this end, authors are to be given exclusive rights in their works; thus, the creation and public dissemination of 
works of authorship are to be fostered by giving to authors the legal means to realize the economic value of their 
contributions to society.’ Ibid A-19. It can on this basis be concluded that the adaptation of copyright law in the light of 
technological developments is thus to be expected and encouraged (seeing that in the first place it is the granting of 
copyright protection that leads to technological developments). See also in this regard Carrol 2005 Florida Law Review 
907 generally, and at 956 – 961 in particular, and Chapter 3 above. 
27
 As held in the Pacific Film Laboratories v Federal Commissioner of Taxation case dealt with supra at n 20. Emphasis 
added. 
28
 See for example Mason 1998 J.L. & Inf. Sci. generally and specifically at 11, where he argues that “[b]ecause copyright 
protects expression and confers rights on the copyright owner with respect to his copyright expression, there is the 
potential for conflict between copyright and freedom of expression, if copyright protection is taken too far.” Emphasis 
added. A similar position was advocated for by the Freedom of Expression Institute in its comments on the highly-criticised 
Copyright Amendment Bill 2017, where the Institute argued that “there is an inherent tension between copyright law and 
the right to free expression” and that “when viewed expansively, copyright law can be repurposed as a tool to curb and 
even suppress speech, dissent and other forms of expression” – thus aligning with the growing chorus of voices that 
suggest that the protection of copyright works in the digital environment poses a threat to other interests. See the Freedom 
of Expression Institute’s submission at https://www.fxi.org.za/docs-resources/FXI-Copyright-Amendment-Bill-Submission-
07July2017.pdf (date of use: 24 December 2018). From a perusal of the version of the Copyright Amendment Bill 
approved by the National Assembly on 5 December 2018 and submitted to the National Council of Provinces for its 
concurrence (version B13B-2017), it is obvious that the “freedom of expression lobby” has lamentably succeeded in 
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to when there is uncertainly,29 should assist in this regard. In this regard Black’s Law Dictionary 
defines the term “exclusive” as “[a]ppertaining to the subject alone, not including, admitting, or 
pertaining to any others. … vested in one person alone.”30 This understanding of the term should 
thus be seen to denote the sense of a right that is unique to the rights-holder (rather than a right that 
merely excludes others from doing certain acts). This is the sense in which the exclusive right 
vesting in the copyright owner under Section 6 should be understood: it is a right that is unique to 
the copyright owner – a right that pertains to the copyright owner alone to the exclusion of all 
others.31   
A simple analysis of the phrase “[c]opyright in a literary or musical work vests the exclusive right to 
do or to authorise the doing of any of the following acts” should therefore bring us to the conclusion 
that the exclusive right referred to relates to the positive act of doing or authorising the doing of the 
acts mentioned, and not, as a primary concern, the exclusion of others from doing these acts. It is a 
right empowering or enabling the copyright owner “to do or to authorise the doing” of the acts 
mentioned in Section 6 (a) – (g); i.e. a right to use, as Rahmatian has asserted,32 and not just a right 
to exclude. In this regard Ficsor, linking this to the role that collective management of copyright 
plays, has observed: 
It is … essential to note that exclusive rights – irrespective of the possibility of prohibiting some acts – 
basically are not of a negative nature. Their genuine purpose is not just that, on the basis of them, 
owners of rights may exclude others from the exploitation of works …. [T]he real value of such a right 
is that it ensures that works are exploited in a way that corresponds to the intentions and interests of 
the owner of the right.
33
 
While the copyright owner is not obliged to exploit the work, he is nevertheless empowered to do so 
(or to authorise others to do so). This in many ways accords with the economic nature of copyright 
and the fact that the bundle of rights associated with a copyright work are often termed “economic 
rights”.34 Thus it has been observed that “intellectual property rights are rights of exploitation”.35 In 
                                                                                                                                                              
swaying the minds of parliamentarians. The National Council of Provinces approved the Bill without changes on 28 March 
2019. For the Bill passed by the National Assembly and the National Council of Provinces (version B13B-2017) and the 
process followed see https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 24 December 2018). Eminent scholars like Owen Dean have 
criticised the Bill for undermining copyright while politicians are claiming to protect it, arguing: “While purporting to grant 
various new rights to copyright owners, … it introduces such extremely wide-ranging exceptions to the exclusive rights of 
the copyright owner that those rights are seriously undermined.” Dean O Sunday Times, November 25 2018.  
29
 See in this regard Geyser and Another v Msunduzi Municipality and Others 2003 (5) SA 18 (N) at 20. 
30
 See Black Black’s Law Dictionary 673. 
31
 In this sense the term “exclusive” is used in relation to the positive nature of copyright rather than its negative nature. 
This is the manner in which Kur and Levin Intellectual Property Rights 198 use the term, when they make reference to “a 
positive (exclusive) right to exploit”.   
32
 See n 21 supra. 
33
 Ficsor Collective Management 15 – 16. 
34
 This is to distinguish them from the non-economical, “moral rights” of authors, which relate to the protection of the 
author’s personality (and the right of the author of a work to be attributed as such), and the integrity of his work. See 
Sterling World Copyright Law 392 and 429. This distinction is generally recognised, although the South African Copyright 
Act does not specifically use the phrase “economic rights” (as contrasted for example with the UK Copyright Act, which 
uses the heading “Economic Rights” when dealing with the rights of performers in Chapter 2 of Part II of the Act – although 
the term is not specifically used in the section dealing with copyright). For an economic analysis of copyright see Landes 
and Posner 1989 J. Legal Stud. 325 – 363. The concept of “entrepreneurial copyright” also assists in understanding the 
economic nature of copyright. In this regard it has been noted: “There is always entrepreneurial effort behind the cultural 
creation – the book, the painting, the music, the film. The entrepreneurs are the sound recording company, the film 
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this regard Drahos further argues that a historical review “shows that intellectual property rights have 
always been used by states to secure market place objectives, both domestic and international”, 
resulting in “the engineering of economies using intellectual property norms”.36 In a nutshell Drahos 
affirms the view that “the western intellectual property tradition is rooted in the idea that intellectual 
property rights are positive rights created by the state for the benefit of the commonwealth.”37  
In view of the foregoing, the brazen, albeit widely-held view that intellectual property rights do not 
confer “the right to produce or market the product embodying the IP right”38  - a natural outcome of 
viewing intellectual property rights as merely negative rights - stands to be challenged. It manifestly 
leaves open the question as to the basis for the author’s active exploitation of his work.39  
Furthermore, it lends credence to the practice of some in the music industry of soliciting the 
assignment of rights from unwary authors, with no undertaking to actively exploit the rights and only 
looking for an opportunity to benefit from the exploitation of the rights through the efforts of others 
(including the author).40 Rights-holders of copyright works must be seen as having the right to 
positively exploit their works. This is at the core of copyright being seen as an instrument for active 
economic activity. It is also in line with daily practice in the music industry, where musicians actively 
seek opportunities to exploit their works rather than seeking to benefit from the proceeds of 
infringement proceedings.41  
The best approach thus, as highlighted above, is to view intellectual property rights, and copyright in 
particular, as constituting both a positive and negative right. The copyright owner positively 
exercises his exclusive rights through the issuing of usage licences (whether exclusive or non-
exclusive), or by assigning the particular exclusive right to another, thus completely disposing of the 
                                                                                                                                                              
producer, the broadcasters, the publishing houses, the art auction houses and the ISPs who are content owners. It is 
interesting to note that the ‘creator’ is often captured and made part of the corporate or legal rent-seeking stakeholder in 
order for the latter to source his creations. …”  Macmillan New Directions 130. This accords with the prescript of the right 
as an exclusive right to do or to authorise the doing of the acts, thus more than merely the preventing of the doing of the 
acts. 
35
 Drahos 1999 I.P.Q. 350. The author further notes (at 364): “National intellectual property systems around the world link 
the origination of rights to individual persons and maximise the capacity of individual owners to trade in these rights.” 
36
 Ibid 350 – 351. Emphasis added. 
37
 Ibid 350. 
38
 See Van den Bossche Law of the World Trade Organization 743, referred to supra at n 20. The conception of copyright 
as the right to exclude others from interfering with the work is admittedly a persistent one. See in this regard Zemer 2006 
Buff. Intell. Prop. L.J. at 71, who adds that “[t]he right to authorise certain uses supplements this right to exclude.” Ibid. 
Emphasis added. To reinforce this idea Zemer writes: “In copyright terms a musician has a right to exclude others from 
accessing or making adaptations of his composition, a privilege to make and use the adaptations, a power to authorise 
others to make adaptations and an immunity against others exercising their powers and affecting the legal status of the 
original works and adaptations." Ibid. Emphasis added. This accords with the Lockean view of rights as negative, natural 
rights. See in this regard Hick 2009 Tex. Intell. L.J. 365. The writer cannot agree to this Hohfeldian analysis of rights, 
especially in relation to copyright. It is submitted that in its quest to construe copyright as a negative right this position 
militates against the plain understanding of the nature of copyright in a work.  
39
 Some have attempted to bridge this anomaly by stating that it is the right to exclude (as the phrase “exclusive right” is 
understood) that forms the basis of the right to license (i.e. the right to give permission). See Kohn and Kohn Music 
Licensing 367. This, it is submitted, is a rather convoluted manner of dealing with this issue. How the right to exclude 
would form the basis for the right to permit is a baffling conclusion indeed, conveying as it does, the incompatible idea of 
“excluding and permitting” as a singular concept. Excluding, of necessity rules out permitting, and the two are not 
compatible with each other.  
40
 See in this regard an article by the writer entitled “To Publish or not to Publish: A Critical Consideration of the Role of the 
Music Publisher Today” which seeks to highlight the practices of unscrupulous music publishers. Baloyi 2012 SA Merc LJ 
218 – 232. 
41
 Furthermore, because of the high cost of instituting infringement proceedings, practice shows that these are not as rife 
as the negative rights theory of copyright would require. 
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right.42 From a negative perspective, the copyright owner exercises his right by having recourse to 
the courts to obtain interdicts against infringers, to seek for damages and / or to seek for the 
payment of a reasonable royalty.43  
5.2.2 Defining “Copyright” 
In conclusion it needs to be mentioned that, as a general definition Dean’s definition of copyright as 
“work embodying intellectual content” is rather general as it presupposes that one would know what 
such “work” is. Furthermore, since the term “work” is a technical term the use of the phrase 
“intellectual content” also presents problems in that it suggests that in addition to a work being 
recognised as such in copyright law, it also needs to embody intellectual content. However a work 
(such as a literary work, musical work, artistic work etc.) is considered to be such with reference to 
certain defined intellectual content relating to it. Copeling’s definition would seem to resolve this 
situation by defining copyright as “that right which vests in the author of every original literary or 
artistic work”. What however becomes immediately obvious with this definition is the fact that it limits 
works to “original literary or artistic works”.44 Copyright law however provides protection to other 
original works in addition to literary and artistic works, such as musical works, dramatic works,45 
sound recordings, cinematograph films, broadcasts and published editions.46  
Copeling’s definition can be faulted for other reasons: (i) the fact that he indicates that copyright 
vests in the “author”. As is common cause copyright can be assigned by the author to another, in 
which case it would vest in the assignee.47 On this basis it would be better to speak of copyright as 
“originally vesting in the author” or simply stating that copyright vests in “the copyright owner”; (ii) the 
fact that he limits the right of the author to preventing “the unsolicited copying” of his work. As is 
common cause, copyright is a “bundle of rights” and thus involves other restricted acts in addition to 
copying;48 and (iii) the inclusion of the requirement that the work needs to be “not of a kind which is 
contrary to public morality”. Although the requirement of impropriety was considered to be important 
                                               
42
 See in this regard Feldman NO v EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) Limited, Feldman NO v EMI Music (Pty) Limited [2007] 
ZAGPHC 294 at para 6, where it is further observed: “From the viewpoint of exploitation of the [music] rights, assignment 
and licensing are the most commonly used methods.” 
43
 Section 24(1) and (1A) of the Copyright Act. 
44
 It is true that that the expression “literary and artistic works” is used in art. 2(1) of the Berne Convention to refer to “all 
productions in the literary, scientific and artistic domain, and permits of no limitation by reason of the mode or form of their 
expression”. WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention 12. However, defining copyright in this manner within the context of 
South African legislation, where, even under the Copyright Act 63 of 1965, the subject-matter of Copeling’s text, literary 
works and artistic works were treated as distinct works of copyright among other works, is problematic, as it suggests that 
only these two works are protectable by copyright.    
45
 Dramatic works may also be protected as a genre of literary works, as is the case in South Africa. See the definition of 
‘literary works’ in Section 1(1) of the Copyright Act. 
46
 Copeling recognises this limitation and argues that the other works “either fall within or are related to the fields of 
literature and art”. Copeling Copyright Law at 6. It is suggested that it would have been more useful if Copeling had defined 
copyright as “that right which vests in the author of every work in the field of literature and art”, where “art” or “the arts” is 
defined as “[t]he various branches of creative activity, such as painting, music, literature, and dance” – see 
https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/art (date of use: 24 December 2018) - as this would have been more 
encompassing.  
47
 For assignment of copyright see section 22(1) of the Copyright Act. 
48
 For the concept of copyright as constituting a bundle of rights see Dean Handbook of Copyright Law 1-81. This has 
sometimes been referred to in a number of ways, e.g. “an abstract bundle of legal relations”; “a cluster-right”; “a complex 
aggregate of rights”; “a range of ownership rights along the ownership spectrum”; “a bundle of distinct and specific 
monopolies” etc.  See in this regard Zemer The Idea of Authorship 49 – 51.  
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at some stage,49 Dean has made a compelling argument to the effect that the requirement of 
propriety is one that would apply in respect of the enforcement rather than the subsistence of 
copyright.50 On this basis Dean argues that while copyright would subsist in a work despite its being 
improper, the courts may refuse protection if the work is improper or contra bonos mores.51 
The fact that the rights conferred by copyright in respect of a work are exclusive rights means that in 
the duration of copyright, only the copyright owner or his authorised licensee or assignee has rights 
to exploit the work. Because of this it has often been said that copyright confers a monopoly right 
upon the copyright owner.52 However, Garnett, Davies and Harbottle53 counters this notion, arguing 
that copyright is not a monopoly because it does not prevent competition from similar works, if such 
works were created independently. Furthermore, because the exclusive rights could be exercised 
oppressively in such a way as to exclude access to the works or to make access too expensive, the 
legislature has, in the public interest, imposed certain limitations on and exceptions to copyright (and 
related rights) and provided for regulation of licensing.54 Based on a review of the foregoing 
definitions and discussion one would venture to define copyright as  
legal protection subsisting in certain original works of literature and the arts (such as literary, musical 
and artistic works), and other original works related to these (such as sound recordings, films and 
published editions), which vests in the authors of such works the exclusive right to do certain restricted 
acts in relation to the works; or to authorise others (whether as assignees or licensees), to do so.  
While the above definition is admittedly rather long, it does capture all the essential aspects of the 
meaning of copyright within the South African context without creating ambiguity.  
5.3 The subject-matter of copyright 
Within the South African context copyright subsists only in respect of works. In this regard it needs 
to be noted first, that there are a number of creative expressions that would not warrant copyright 
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protection because they are not considered to be works.55 Secondly, even where an expression may 
be considered to ordinarily meet the requirements of a work it may still be denied copyright 
protection if it can be seen as too commonplace that endowing it with copyright would place undue 
restrictions on others.56 In Accesso CC v Allforms and Another57 it was held that a court had to 
exercise a value judgment to determine if the material on which copyright is claimed constitutes a 
work or is too trivial to merit copyright protection. After this an objective test must be used to 
determine whether the work is of such a commonplace nature that it should not attract copyright; 
further considering the consequences of awarding copyright to such a work.58  
In Waylite Diary CC v First National Bank Ltd the court held that two enquiries are involved in 
determining whether subject-matter constitutes a work eligible for copyright in terms of Section 2(1) 
of the Copyright Act, namely (i) whether the work concerned falls within one of the recognised 
categories and (ii) whether the work is original. However, though the two enquiries are different they 
are often intertwined as it would be difficult to discuss what amounts to a work  without discussing 
the work’s originality, since a work needs to have a sufficient degree of originality to exist.59  The 
court further held that in assessing whether a work is entitled to copyright protection it would be 
permissible to consider the consequences of affording copyright to “a work of doubtful substance”.60  
                                               
55
 In copyright law a work needs to comply with certain requirements, such as originality and embodiment in a material 
form (see in this regard the discussion under paragraph 6.4 below). Performances are for example not protectable as 
copyright works though they clearly constitute creative expression (instead they are protected as related or neighbouring 
rights).  In the same vein expressions of folklore and other traditional cultural expressions (TCEs) normally do not fit the 
description of a “work”. One notes however that the Intellectual Property Amendment Act 28 of 2013, which has been 
signed by the President but is not yet in force, purports to protect such expressions as works within copyright law.    
56
 See Accesso CC v Allforms (Pty) Ltd and Another (Case No II) 677 JOC (T) (at 690). See also Francis Day and Hunter 
Ltd v Twentieth Century Fox Corporation Ltd & Others [1940] AC 112, a British decision of the Judicial Committe of the 
Privy Council relevant for music copyright as it was concerned with the question whether there is copyright protection in a 
song title. The case involved, inter alia, a claim of copyright infringement in respect of the words, “The man who broke the 
bank at Monte Carlo”, which were the title of a song released by the appellant in 1892 and subsequently used as the title of 
a film released by the respondent in 1935. Apart from the title there was no other connection with the song and neither the 
song nor the music was used in the film. On appeal to the Privy Council (from the Ontario Appellate Division) Lord Wright 
held that the claim for literary infringement failed because only the title of the song was copied, and, in the facts of the 
case, this was too insubstantial to constitute infringement. For copyright to subsist in the song title it had to be sufficiently 
original and distinctive, which the current title failed to be because the phrase “To break the bank” was a hackneyed 
expression and the name “Monte Carlo” was “the most obvious place at which that achievement or accident might take 
place” (at 123). This decision was followed by our courts in the case of Waylite Diary CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) 
SA 645 (A). See also Exxon Corporation v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd  [1982] Ch 119 (in particular at 
143 – 145), where the English Court of Appeal held that the word “Exxon” could not be protected under copyright as an 
original literary work. Similarly it was held in the Australian case of Sullivan v FNH Investment (Pty) Ltd [2003] FCA 323; 
(2003) 57 IPR 63 that no copyright subsisted in the slogans “Somewhere in the Whitsundays” and “The Resort that offers 
precious little” because their authorship did not require “the requisite degree of judgment, effort and skill to make it an 
original literary work in which copyright may subsist” (at 75 – 76). This conforms to the so-called Scènes à Fair doctrine 
applicable in the United States, in terms of which “courts will not protect a copyrighted work from infringement if the 
expression embodied in the work necessarily flows from a commonplace idea …” Ets-Hokin v. Skyy Spirits, Inc., 225 F.3d 
1068 (9th Cir. 2000), at para 45. See also generally Reyher v. Children’s Television Workshop 533 F.2d 87, cert denied 
429 U.S. 980, 97 S. Ct. 492. For an application of this doctrine in respect of musical scènes à fair see Smith v. Jackson, 84 
F.3d 1213 (9th Cir. 1996), where the court affirmed the ruling that taking musical motives (a motive being a “short musical 
phrase, usually comprised of only a few notes”), where neither the lyrics nor a substantial part of the music was taken, did 
not amount to copyright infringement. 
57
 Ibid. See also Waylite Diary CC ibid pp 9 – 10 para 15. 
58
 Dean and Karjiker however note that subjective considerations, such as the amount of effort and ingenuity involved in 
the making of the subject-matter, may be taken into account. Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law at 1-6. 
59
 Waylite Diary CC v First National Bank Ltd 1995 (1) SA 645 (A) at 6 – 10. 
60
 Id at 9 – 10. See also Castanaro 2008 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. 1271 – 1272, who, after remarking about 
how, when one flips through the radio stations it feels like one is “hearing the same song over and over again”, observes: 
“We live in a musical era marked by covers, music sampling, and dubiously similar songs that are the product of both 
accidental and conscious borrowing.” 
183 
 
It is submitted that in the music industry there are many songs that use hackneyed, commonplace 
phrases and thus would be works of doubtful substance. Recently there was a public outcry elicited 
by certain emotive allegations in the media regarding how the Southern African Music Rights 
Organisation (SAMRO), a performing rights society, is allegedly “ripping off” arrangers of public 
domain songs by not allocating to them a hundred percent of royalties relating to the use of such 
arrangements.61 It is however submitted that often many recordings of public domain songs 
(especially those relating to church hymns) lack the element of originality required for true 
arrangements (or adaptations) of existing works. Often these are blind imitations or slavish copies of 
the original work, and if subjected to the rigorous processes of the courts, might not meet the 
requirements of works deserving of copyright protection. One of the arguments made by SAMRO in 
defence of the allegation against it was that, in terms of its default rules, where arrangements are 
made of works in which copyright subsists (presumably with the authorisation of the copyright 
owner), the arranger receives a share of 16.7% in the work, and the original composer receives a 
share of 83.3%.62 SAMRO then argues that this position is deemed to apply equally in respect of 
arrangements of public domain works, with the arranger been allocated a share of 16.7% and the 
rest of the 83.3% being distributed to all SAMRO members eligible for royalties in the period 
concerned.63  
This appears to be a reasonable approach to dealing with the matter and is generally consistent with 
practices elsewhere, as shown in Chapter 6. Another consideration here is the fact that if, without 
considering the originality elements of an arrangement, a hundred percent copyright credit is given 
to the arranger, this might place undue restrictions on others, who may want to use or perform the 
public domain song, as held in the Accessio case.64 Such parties may find that they are not able to 
use the public domain song because this would be similar to and would thus infringe the arranger’s 
version, which itself is a slavish copy of the public domain song.   This is an untenable situation that 
cannot be permitted by the law and would defeat the objective of placing copyright works in the 
public domain after a certain period for free use by everyone. As highlighted above, following the 
Accesso decision,65 even where an expression may ordinarily meet the requirements of a work it 
may still be denied copyright protection if it can be seen as being too commonplace that endowing it 
with copyright would place undue restrictions on others. In this regard it was held in the Klep Valves 
case66 that a person who relies on an earlier work to create a work over which he claims copyright 
must demonstrate that in creating the new work, he exercised sufficient independent skill and labour 
and that there are substantial differences between his work and the earlier work.  
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As observed, a clear distinction thus has to be made between “works that are truly original 
creations” and those that are not, being based on similar, pre-existing works.67 In this regard it has 
been observed:  
In the latter instance, it would not be enough for an author simply to content himself with the bald 
statement that the work in respect of which copyright protection is claimed is of his own making and is 
therefore original; he must go further and distinguish the work from the pre-existing works and 
demonstrate his own contribution.
68
  
This is also consonant with the definition of “adaptation” in section 1(1) of the Copyright Act, namely 
as “any arrangement or transcription of the work, if such arrangement or transcription has an original 
creative character.”69 This clearly shows that indeed, something more than trivial is required for 
copyright to subsist in any arrangement. It is in fact notable that the Act refers to the fact that an 
arrangement or transcription has to have “an original creative character” for copyright to subsist in 
the arrangement / transcription. This might suggest that a higher standard of originality than that 
which is applicable in respect of works created for the first time, which conforms more to the US 
standard of a “creative spark”, applies in respect of adaptations. Whatever the conclusion, it is clear 
that for copyright to subsist in an arrangement, a real difference has to be exhibited from the original 
work. 
It would be important to point out that, in terms of section 1(1) of the Copyright Act a work is defined 
as “a work contemplated in section 2”.70 This means that any subject matter that cannot fit within the 
description or definition of the works mentioned in section 2 falls short of being considered a work. 
Conversely, this means that it is important that a work is capable of being categorised either as a 
literary work, musical work, artistic work, cinematograph film, sound recording, broadcast, 
programme-carrying signal, published edition or computer programme. Another reason why the 
correct categorisation of a work is crucial is that, as has been noted, the category which a work 
belongs to determines, to a large extent, the scope of the work and thus the bundle of rights relating 
to the work.71 It needs to be mentioned in this regard that the categorisation of what constitute works 
under the South African copyright legislation does not necessarily reflect the categorisation of works 
in other jurisdictions. South Africa has generally followed the English tradition in this system but 
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other jurisdictions, including those that were historically associated with the English tradition, have 
been at liberty to use other forms of categorisation.72  
Under section 1(1) of the UK Copyright Act the following works are protected: original literary, 
dramatic, musical or artistic works; sound recordings, films or broadcasts; and the typographical 
arrangement of published editions.73 Section 1(2) then goes on to define the expression “copyright 
work” as referring to a work of any of those descriptions in which copyright subsists. An important 
UK decision where the position that only works categorised as such in the legislation are eligible for 
copyright protection, was cemented, is Creation Records Ltd and Others v News Group Newspapers 
Ltd.74 In this case the court refused to grant copyright protection for a scene specially designed and 
arranged for an album shoot, i.e. a photoshoot for use as artwork for the sleeve of the album for a 
well-known music group, Oasis. The scene was a hotel pool that had been drained of water, with a 
Rolls Royce lowered to the pool by crane and arranged in such a way as to give the appearance of it 
coming out of the pool (which had subsequently been partially refilled with water). The scene also 
entailed the arrangement and positioning / composition of members of the group around the pool 
and the use of various objects. The defendant had deployed a photographer to the scene, who took 
photographs that were published in the defendant’s newspaper (“The Sun”) with a promise to give 
readers, at a price, “a glossy poster of The Sun’s world exclusive of the new Oasis album shoot”.  
The court refused to grant copyright protection in respect of the scene, ruling that the scene was not, 
as alleged, (i) a dramatic work, being inherently static with no movement, story or action; (ii) a 
sculpture or work of artistic craftsmanship, as no element in the composition was “carved, modelled 
or made in any of the other ways in which sculpture is made”, nor was it “the subject or result of the 
exercise of any craftsmanship”; or (iii) a collage, since the composition was ephemeral, existing only 
for a few hours with its continued existence to be in the form of a photographic image, and was thus 
to be distinguished from a collage, which “involve[s] as an essential element the sticking [i.e. gluing] 
of two or more things together.”75  
Having highlighted the above, it appears that the rigid categorisation of works may no longer be 
sustained under UK law, following a recent ruling of the Court of Justice of the European Union 
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(CJEU).76 This case (the Levola case) involved a claim by Levola, a Dutch company, that Smilde 
Foods’ cheese product, the “Witte Wievenkaas”, tasted the same as its product, the “Heksenkaas” 
and thus infringed the copyright in the “taste” of the Heksenkaas product. Levola instituted 
proceedings at the Gelderland District Court in the Netherlands, arguing that the taste of the 
Heksenkaas was its manufacturer’s intellectual creation in which copyright subsisted (i.e. the taste 
was a copyright work), and that the taste of Smilde Foods’ product thus amounted to an 
unauthorised reproduction of that copyright work. The Gelderland District Court rejected the claim, 
stating that Levola “had not indicated which elements, or combination of elements, of the taste of 
Heksenkaas gave it its unique, original character and personal stamp”.77   
Levola appealed to the Regional Court of Appeal, Arnhem-Leeuwarden, Netherlands, which 
considered that the key issue in the case was whether the taste of a food product may be eligible for 
copyright protection. Levola argued that the taste of a food product could be classified as a work of 
literature, science or art protectable under the Dutch Copyright Act, and referred to an earlier 
decision of the Supreme Court of the Netherlands where that court “accepted in principle the 
possibility of recognising copyright in the scent of a perfurme.”78 Smilde countered, arguing inter alia 
that the protection of tastes is not consistent with the copyright system, which is intended purely for 
“visual and auditory creations”; and further that “the instability of a food product and the subjective 
nature of the taste experience preclude the taste of a food product qualifying for copyright protection 
as a work”.79 The Court of Appeal, noting that the Court of Cassation in France had previously 
refused the granting of copyright protection to a scent, observed that there was a divergence of 
opinions among the supreme courts of the European Union (EU) regarding this matter. The court 
thus stayed the proceedings and referred two main questions relating to this matter to the EU Court 
of Justice for a preliminary ruling.  
The Court of Justice dealt only with the first question, ruling that in the light of the answer to the first 
question there was no need to answer the second question. The Court of Justice interpreted the first 
question as in essence asking “whether Directive 2001/29 must be interpreted as precluding (i) the 
taste of a food product from being protected by copyright under that directive and (ii) national 
legislation from being interpreted in such a way that it grants copyright protection to such a taste.”80 
In this regard the Court of Justice made several observations that have a bearing on the 
understanding of the concept of “work” in EU law. In particular the court observed: 
… The directive makes no express reference to the laws of the Member States for the purpose of 
determining the meaning and scope of the concept of a ‘work’. Accordingly, in view of the need for a 
                                               
76
 Levola Hengelo BV v Smilde Foods BV [2018] EUECJ C-310/17 (13 Nov. 2018). 
77
 Id at para 19. 
78
 Id at para 22. 
79
 Id at para 23. 
80
 Id at para 32. Emphasis added. 
187 
 
uniform application of EU law and the principle of equality, that concept must normally be given an 
autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union …
81
 
The Court then ruled that two cumulative conditions need to be satisfied for subject matter to be 
classified as a “work” within the meaning of Directive 2001/29, namely: (i) the subject matter must be 
original, in the sense of being the author’s own intellectual creation; and (ii) the subject matter must 
be an expression of the author’s own intellectual creation.82 After analysing the provisions of the 
Berne Convention83 the court mentioned an additional condition, namely the fact that the subject 
matter “must be expressed in a manner which makes it identifiable with sufficient precision and 
objectivity, even though that expression is not necessarily in permanent form.”84 As a rationale for 
this ruling the Court made the following observation: 
… [F]irst, the authorities responsible for ensuring that the exclusive rights inherent in copyright are 
protected must be able to identify, clearly and precisely, the subject matter so protected. The same is 
true for individuals, in particular economic operators, who must be able to identify, clearly and 
precisely, what is the subject matter of protection which third parties, especially competitors, enjoy. 
Secondly, the need to ensure that there is no element of subjectivity –– given that it is detrimental to 
legal certainty –– in the process of identifying the protected subject matter means that the latter must 
be capable of being expressed in a precise and objective manner.
85
 
Based on the foregoing the Court ruled that the taste of a food product cannot be classified as a 
work within the meaning of Directive 2001/29 as it “cannot be pinned down with precision and 
objectivity”; further noting that it was not possible in the current state of scientific development to 
achieve such precision and objectivity to be able to distinguish the taste “from the taste of other 
products of the same kind.”86 The significance of this case is that the EU Court of Justice has 
effectively done away with the strict categorisation of what constitutes a work, which applied in the 
UK and applies in South Africa, having ruled that for subject matter to qualify as a work within the 
European Union it needs only satisfy the three requirements that it has outlined.87 This new position 
now applies in the UK, as the Court of Justice has ruled that the new concept of “work” “must 
normally be given an autonomous and uniform interpretation throughout the European Union”. It is 
acknowledged that the UK is currently implementing processes to exit the EU single market through 
the “Brexit” decision. However, it appears that EU intellectual property law that applied in the UK 
before the finalisation of Brexit shall remain applicable in the UK.88  
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Seeing that our courts have traditionally referred to English copyright law in clarifying or confirming 
certain provisions of our copyright law, is it possible that this ruling might in future, influence the way 
in which works eligible for copyright are construed in South African law?  Could this then result in the 
recognition of more artistic expressions as falling within works eligible for copyright protection (and 
thus entitling their authors to the economic rights subsisting in copyright works)? This, alongside a 
Constitutional interpretation that seeks to ensure greater equality, where subject matter that was 
previously excluded on the basis of copyright law’s strict categorisation is recognised, is 
conceivable. An example in this regard is drum performances. It is common knowledge that drums 
play a pivotal role in African culture and that “[r]hythm is the most distinguishing characteristic of 
[the] African music tradition.”89 However, unlike in Canada, drum performances would not be 
protected under copyright in South Africa, even in instances where “only their contributions, and not 
elements the law recognizes as going towards authorship of the work”,90 have given the work its 
distinct character.  
The reason for the above is that music is generally conceived in terms of the Western tonal system, 
which, on the one hand, ‘denotes a “material scale,” the set of tones at the disposal of a musical 
praxis’, and on the other, “designates a form of musical perception that turns tonal material into a 
complex of tonal relationships.”91 In this conception of music it is understood that a musical 
composition is in its technical analysis, comprised of rhythm, harmony and melody, but that “[i]t is in 
the melody of the composition or the arrangement of notes or tones that originality must be found.”92 
In this regard it has been observed: 
Rhythm is simply the tempo in which the composition is written. It is the background for the melody. 
There is only a limited amount of tempos; these appear to have been long since exhausted; originality 
of rhythm is a rarity, if not an impossibility. Harmony is the blending of tones; this is achieved 
according to rules that have been known for many years. Being in the public domain for so long 
neither rhythm nor harmony can itself be the subject of copyright.
93
 
It is submitted that this is a grossly simplistic view of rhythm, which explains its relegation to a state 
of insignificance as an element for determining the originality of a musical work. In this conception of 
rhythm traditional African music, by which is meant “the characteristics of African music prior to the 
colonization of the continent by European countries”,94  does not stand a chance for broader 
recognition within the copyright system. This is because in this musical tradition “[t]he emphasis is 
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placed more strongly on rhythms than on melody and harmony.”95 This rhythmic structure is 
characterised by the following elements: (i) an equal pulse base; (ii) a metric time arrangement; (iii) 
a “specific organizing principle unifying a diversity of simultaneous rhythmic patterns together”, and 
(iv) an exact starting point for rhythmic groupings.96  
The centrality of rhythm in African musical expression is demonstrated by the fact that the 
performance of drums and other traditional instruments, rather than harmonic tonality,97 is itself seen 
as the essence and embodiment of music.98 This can be illustrated by the use of the term “ngoma” 
or its plural form, “ingoma”, a “verbal cognate” that is “nearly pervasive” among the so-called Bantu 
peoples of Africa.99 The term “ngoma” primarily means “drum”, but it also means “song” and 
“dance”.100 In essence however, the term is concerned with “[a]n African conceptual framework for 
music”; “an active process of experiencing drumming, playing drums, or dancing to drums, as well 
as the name of the artifact”, and “a method of making music [as well as] the experience of music 
itself”.101 This is diametrically opposed to the dominant Western conception of music as a system of 
harmonic tonality, where notes and tones (i.e. the melody) play a central role.102 It has been 
observed that the centrality of melody in the Western system arises from the fact that melody is 
“most valuable” because “it is melody that listeners find memorable”; but also because “originality is 
easier to achieve in melody than in rhythm, harmony or tone colour”.103  
One could equally observe that in the African context originality is easier to achieve in rhythm than in 
melody, even though the beat of a drum could itself possess “a very simply melodic character of its 
own”.104 In this case therefore, where in African culture, the playing of drums and other 
accompanying instruments constitute “the making of music” and “the experience of music itself”, it 
should be possible to accord copyright protection to this artistic expression, despite the prevalence 
of rhythmical elements.105 Thus even though the concept of copyright is a Western construct, an 
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 Ibid. See further Bloch 1997 U. Miami Ent. & Sports. L. Rev. 187 generally, for an elaboration on the problem of drum 
beats not being accorded copyright protection, albeit with reference to modern popular music.  
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 New World Encyclopaedia ibid. 
97
 For which see Dahlhaus and Gjerdingen Origin of Harmonic Tonality generally.    
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 For an anthropological study of the richness and creativity of rhythm, with a focus on drama, dance and ceremony see 
Goodridge Rhythm and Timing generally. 
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 See Janzen Ngoma 69. 
100
 For the Shona understanding of the term (as “hymn”; “drum”) see Hawn Gather into One 164, and for the Zulu 
understanding of the term (as “song”; “dance”) see https://zu.oxforddictionaries.com/translate/isizulu-english/ingoma (date 
of use: 04 January 2019).  “Ngoma” also refers to a ritual healing ceremony among many African Bantu groups, where the 
drum is the dominant instrument used while at times accompanied by other traditional instruments. In this regard Janzen 
has distinguished between the “ngoma of entertainment and of healing”. See Janzen ibid generally and at 21 specifically. 
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 Hawn ibid. This is also evident from the use of the Tsonga (or Xitsonga) words, “vunanga”, and its root word, “nanga”. 
“Vunanga” is the Tsonga word used for “music”. See https://www.xitsonga.org/search?sk=vunanga (date of use: 04 
January 2019), while “nanga” is the word used to refer to a traditional wind instrument or whistle made from calabash. See 
Manganye Children’s Game-Songs 10. When loosely translated the word “vunanga” would mean, “in the order of the 
nanga”, thus showing a connection between the instrument (“nanga”) and the music (“vunanga”) that it produces.  
102
 For this system and its history see Dahlhaus and Gjerdingen Origin of Harmonic Tonality generally.   
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 Goldstein Goldstein on Copyright (2017) 10:53 – 10:54. Emphasis added. 
104
 See the observations of Judge Learned Hand in Fred Fisher v Dillingham 298 F. 145 (S.D.N.Y. 1924) at 146, where the 
court ruled that copyright subsisted in an “ostinato”, a constantly repeated figure or accompaniment to the melody of the 
song with rhythmical elements (“something like the beat of a drum or tom-tom”).  
105
 This is not an outlandish assumption, for which compare the decision of the English Court of Appeal in Sawkins v 
Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] WLR 3281; [2005] EWCA Civ. 565 where it was held that “the resulting combination of 
sounds” emanating from “performing editions” of an earlier, public domain work, was an original musical work, because 
this affected “which instrument to play, whether it is to be played soft or loud, or fast or slow, and ornaments, such as tri lls 
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African epistemology of copyright could be developed on this basis.106 However, the ability to do so 
is curtailed by copyright law’s limited categorisation of “work” and its insistence on non-transitory 
fixation as a pre-requisite for according copyright protection. The fixation requirement becomes an 
impediment even though the English courts have observed that a musical work can exist even 
before it has been fixed in a material form.107   
In view of the foregoing, African traditional musicians are denied the opportunity to participate 
economically in the copyright system if their performances are of a purely rhythmical nature. To be 
able to benefit from the system they are compelled to incorporate within their entertainment 
performances those elements of Western music that are recognised as meeting the originality 
requirements of copyright law. This at times means that they have to dilute the traditional character 
of these performances to conform them to the Western tonal system. Simply stated, to participate in 
the  copyright system African music has to lose its character as a largely rhythmical performance in 
order to incorporate a more tonal and harmonic approach, in light of the poor treatment of rhythm as 
                                                                                                                                                              
and slurs; creating a “combination of sounds available for hearing and appreciation through the ears of the listeners” (at 
paras 17 and 18). This, in the writer’s opinion, is the recognition of the place occupied by rhythmical elements in the 
originality of a musical work, and not merely as an accompaniment to melody, as held in the Northern Music Corp. decision 
(see supra nn 92 and 93).   
106
 In recent times there have been concerted calls for an African epistemology of knowledge, alongside the call for the 
“decolonisation” of the curriculum. African epistemology of knowledge is understood as “a way the African conceptualises, 
interprets and apprehends reality within the context of African cultural or collective experience”, based on “the acceptance 
that such concepts as knowledge, truth, rationality etc.  can be interpreted using African categories and concepts as 
provided by the African cultural experience without a recourse to Western or alien conceptual framework.” Udefi 2014 
Canadian Social Science 108. See also in this regard Ndubisi 2014 IOSR-JHSS 32 – 36; Teffo 2013 Indilinga African 
Journal of Indigenous Knowledge Systems 188 – 202; Ogungbure 2014 Thought and Practice 40 – 54.. For the concept of 
the decolonisation of the curriculum see Le Grange 2016 South African Journal of Higher Education 1 – 12. 
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 See generally Hadley v Kemp [1999] E.M.L.R. 589; also Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] EWCA Civ 565, where 
the court observed (at para 53) that “fixation in the written score or on a record is not itself the music in which copyright 
subsists”, and that music has to be “distinguished from the fact and the form of its fixation as a record of a musical 
composition”. Music thus exists apart from fixation and the form of its fixation. Thus the sounds that come from whistling or 
humming or improvisation is music before it is recorded or reduced into some material form, and such recording or 
reduction into material form only clothes it with legal protection, in terms of the current requirement of fixation. This then 
raises the question: must such fixation then be permanent or can it be temporary or transient, to attract copyright 
protection? These are questions that the courts seem to be currently confronted with now, and it is a matter that the Levola 
case referred to above sought to unravel. Also what the Sawkins court appeared to be saying is that musical expression is 
not limited to a particular fixation and could extend beyond that. The recent US case of Williams v Gaye No. 15-56880 (9
th 
Cir. 2018) (Order and amended Opinion, popularly dubbed the “Blurred Lines” case) provides an example in this regard. In 
this case, the question was whether popular musicians, Pharrell Williams, Robin Thicke and Clifford Harris, Jr.’s bestselling 
single, “Blurred Lines”, infringed the copyright in Marvin Gaye’s 1977 hit song, “Got to Give it Up” – where it was alleged 
that the making of the song did not involve a direct copying of the sequence of notes, riff, lyrics or other musical phrases 
contained in the music score deposited with the US Copyright Office. The court of appeals for the Ninth Circuit upheld the 
District Court’s ruling that “Blurred Lines” infringed the copyright in “Got to give it Up”, on the ground that Gaye’s song was 
entitled to broad copyright protection [i.e. beyond what was expressed in the music score filed with the US Copyright 
Office, which constituted the fixation or material embodiment of the song] because musical compositions are not confined 
to a narrow range of expression.” as music is comprised of a large array of elements.   The court held that where a work is 
capable of a wide range of expression, as is the case with a musical work, broad, rather than thin copyright protection is 
warranted. In this regard substantial similarity is sufficient to prove copyright infringement, rather than the works being 
“virtually identical” (at 17 - 20). In the case it was submitted that Marvin Gaye could not write “or fluently read” sheet music, 
and the copy of the sheet music deposited with the US Copyright Office was notated by an undescribed transcriber after 
Marvin Gaye had already recorded the song. Nguyen Circuit Judge gave a dissenting judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs 
were merely emulating Marvin Gaye’s musical style; that the two songs were not objectively similar as they differed in 
melody, harmony and rhythm, and concluding that the majority’s decision allowed the Gayes to copyright a musical style – 
something no one had accomplished before (at 58). In countering the majority observed: ‘… While the dissent is adamant 
that the scope of the Gaye’s copyright is limited to the four corners of the deposit copy, it provides no statutory 
interpretation or legal analysis supporting its assertion. … Our decision does not grant license to copyright a musical style 
or “groove”. … Far from heralding the end of musical creativity as we know it, our decision, even construed broadly, reads 
more accurately as a cautionary tale for future trial counsel wishing to maximize their odds of success” (at 56 – 57).  
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a source of originality.108 Autry proffers a better conception of rhythm as a compositional element of 
musical works, which, if embraced, would, it is submitted, be more accommodating of traditional 
African music:109  
… Rhythm naturally encompasses "meter," the number of musical pulses contained in each bar (or 
subdivision) of a composition, but is more likely to be characterized in scholarly circles as the 
"symmetry" linking the other artistic choices made by the composer. Rhythm also covers the 
fluctuations in tempo (the speed at which the notes of a composition are played) within a piece. 
However, again, educated musicians regard tempo as merely a small portion of the overall symmetry 
of the composition, making judicial focus on whether one composition is played faster or slower than 
another highly suspect and even irrelevant to the similarity inquiry. Courts may be likely in this context 
to focus on the specific correlation between the durations of notes in each composition.' Common 
meter, while not a copyrightable element by itself, may be cited by the court if used in a "unique" 
manner that establishes more than an intent to use something common to many compositions. 
Another more insightful avenue of proving similarity involves analysis of the symmetrical relationships 
between pitches and the placement of certain musical events within the scope of the piece. Thus, the 
symmetry is dissected on two levels: the interrelation of pitches within the smaller units (measures, 
bars, or phrases), and the interrelation within the piece when viewed as a whole.
110
  
Narratives of this nature, understood within the context of developments such as those in the EU 
Court of Justice decision in the Levola case discussed above, shed some hope that in future 
copyright law can be developed to incorporate all forms of intellectual creation in their own merit, i.e. 
without the current limiting categorisation of what constitutes a work and without the current 
obsession with the fixation requirement. It needs to be noted that the system of categorisation of 
works and fixation is not required under the Berne Convention, the bedrock of the copyright and 
authors’ rights systems.111 Furthermore, within the context of South Africa, a Constitutional 
imperative that seeks to redress the ills of the past and to grant freedom of expression, including 
                                               
108
 In this regard Manganye Children’s Game-Songs 11, quoting Allgayer-Kaufmann and Webber, observes that African 
music was “at its purest during the pre-colonial period when there was minimal foreign influence”, and highlights the 
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 In the sense of music that is highly characterised of rhythmical elements from which the originality requirement of 
copyright must be satisfied.   
110
 Autry 2002 J. Intell. Prop. L. 123. Nevertheless Autry’s conception of rhythm is still used within the context of the note or 
tone (i.e. the melody) being a necessary intertwining or pervasive component of the composition, where he refers to 
rhythm as being “loosely related to the spatial relationship between the pitch choices … generally accepted to include 
duration of both individual notes and larger musical units such as phrases, themes or even entire compositions.” Ibid. 
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the recognition of rhythmical performances, such as drum performances, as stand-alone compositional works in which 
copyright subsists.  
111
 Article 2(1) of the Convention, in defining what constitutes “literary and artistic works” merely gives examples of such 
works but makes it clear that the definition extends to “every production in the literary, scientific and artistic domain”. 
Similarly article 2(2) leaves it to member states to determine if they wish to impose the requirement of fixation in respect of 
all or any works. 
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freedom of artistic creativity, would, it is submitted, lead to the recognition of African drumming as a 
copyright work, if it is original.112  
Indeed it is not for the lack of creativity or more properly, originality that African performances (or 
performances in general) are denied copyright protection. The value of African forms of performance 
is demonstrated by the fact that Africa’s esoteric sounds have often been used to “spice up” or 
increase the appeal of huge commercial projects. A recent example in this regard is the use of the 
Senegalese “talking drum” in the Hollywood blockbuster, Black Panther.113 In a regime where the 
strict categorisation of what constitutes a work is eliminated and where the only considerations are 
those relating to the originality of the artistic expression it is conceivable that drum performances, 
could, even without singing or other “melodic accompaniment”, be recognised as copyright works 
based on their original qualities.114 Indeed more forms of artistic expressions not currently 
recognised can, under such circumstances, find protection under copyright law.115  
Regarding the fixation requirement (which, as hinted to above, is another impediment to the 
recognition of drum beats and other performances under the current copyright regime),116 it is 
common cause that the normal form of material embodiment for performances is by means of sound 
recordings or films. The realities of the entertainment industry however are that where this takes 
place at a commercial level, it is not the performer but other parties (i.e. the record label and film 
producer, respectively), who would own the copyright in the sound recording and film. The answer 
thus lies in according copyright protection to the performance itself and thus the performer, provided 
that the performance satisfies the requirement of originality. This may be done by following the 
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 It has been observed that the freedom of artistic creativity provided for in s 16(1)(c) of the Constitution of the Republic 
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example of Canada and giving legislative recognition of performances as subject-matter in which 
copyright subsists.117 Alternatively it can be done by simply removing the categorisation requirement 
and either removing or relaxing the fixation requirement, as done in the Levola case.  
There have indeed been growing agitations for the removal of these requirements in recent times.118 
A controversial attempt in this regard was made in a recent three-judge panel ruling of the US Court 
of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in Garcia v. Google Inc.,119 where the court, in a much criticised 
judgment, held that there was originality in an actor’s performance, relying on the Feist120 ruling. In 
this regard the court observed: 
… [A]n actor does far more than speak words on a page; he must “live his part inwardly, and then give 
to his experience an external embodiment.” … That embodiment includes body language, facial 
expression and reactions to other actors and elements of a scene. …An actor’s performance, when 
fixed, is copyrightable if it evinces “some minimal degree of creativity … ‘no matter how crude, humble 
or obvious’ it might be.” Feist Publ’ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 345 (1991) (quoting 1 
Nimmer on Copyright § 1.08[C][1]). That is true whether the actor speaks, is dubbed over or, like 
Buster Keaton, performs without any words at all. …
121
 
In arriving at this ruling the court also placed reliance on the fact that US copyright law protects 
pantomimes and choreographic works.122 The court’s ruling was however, evidently too 
revolutionary for its time, and following widespread criticism, an en banc court overturned the panel 
decision’s ruling and held that the injunction granted in favour of Garcia against Google “was 
unwarranted and incorrect as a matter of law and was a prior restraint that infringed the First 
Amendment values at stake.”123 In its rebuttal of the panel decision the en banc court reiterated the 
need to decide the case on the law,124 and to “[put] aside the rhetoric of Hollywood hijinks and the 
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 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Circ. 2014). In this case the producer of a controversial film on Islam, titled Innocence of Muslims, 
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manipulating footage from an earlier film (which was never released commercially). The appellant had participated in a 
minor role as an actor in this film. The producer manipulated the actor’s lines in this earlier film for purposes of Innocence 
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 Garcia v Google Inc. 743 F.3d 1258 (9th Circ. 2014) at 1263. 
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protection of “choreographic works and entertainment in dumb show”. Art. 2(1) of the Berne Convention, 1886 (Paris Text). 
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 “The central question is whether the law and facts clearly favor Garcia’s claim to a copyright in her five-second acting 
performance as it appears in Innocence of Muslims.” Id at para 78. 
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dissent’s dramatics”.125 The law of course, as rehearsed by the court, relates to the fact that only 
subject-matter that constitutes a “work” is protected by copyright;126 and further that such work has 
to meet the fixation requirement.127   
It is submitted that the Levola court would have arrived at a different decision on this matter, and 
that the Garcia’s acting performance would, within that context, have been found to be a work 
eligible for copyright protection. The example of choreographic works and pantomimes, which are 
essentially performances, is apt here. It is for example acknowledged, within the context of the 
Berne Convention, that such works are protectable by copyright even where they are “diffused live 
by television” without having been fixed in writing.128 A further reason why it is acknowledged that 
such works can be protected even if they have not been fixed in writing relates to the fact that 
difficulties could arise in insisting on this requirement because the acting form “is difficult to describe 
precisely by words”.129 In this regard it needs to be further observed that the Berne Convention does 
not, as such, impose the fixation requirement, leaving it to national states to determine this matter.130 
In this regard the US Supreme Court observed in US v. Martignon131 that “duration and fixation 
requirements are not identifying characteristics of copyright laws.” 
The notion of granting copyright protection to live performances is in fact, not an unusual one. Under 
US State copyright law copyright protection is, for example, granted in respect of live or 
improvisational performers (e.g. Jazz performers).132 This position has not been pre-empted by US 
federal copyright law, which has, since 1996, also granted protection against the unauthorised 
fixation of live musical performances and provides that the infringer shall be held liable “to the same 
extent as the infringer of copyright”.133 In his dissenting judgment in the Garcia v Google (en banc)134 
decision Kozinski, circuit judge, makes some important observations. Questioning what he 
perceived as inconsistencies in the majority’s judgement, he observes: 
Garcia’s dramatic performance met all of the requirements for copyright protection: It was 
copyrightable subject matter, it was original and it was fixed at the moment it was recorded. … At 
times, the majority says that Garcia’s performance was not copyrightable at all. And at other times, it 
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 Id at para 47. 
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 See generally id at paras 79 – 91. 
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 Id at paras 92 – 93. 
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 WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention 14. 
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 Ibid. 
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 See art. 2(2) of the Berne Convention.  
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 492 F. 3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007), at 151. 
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 Thus California’s statute provides that “the author of any original work of authorship that is not fixed in any tangible 
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except one who originally and independently creates the same or similar work.” California Civil Code 980 (a) (1) (West. 
Supp. 1997). This section further provides: “A work shall be considered not fixed when it is not embodied in a tangible 
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 See s 1101 of the US Copyright Act. These are the so-called anti-bootlegging provisions. In the case of US v. 
Martignon 492 F. 3d 140 (2d Cir. 2007) however, the US Supreme Court, while affirming these provisions, held that the 
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“limited right”, vis-à-vis the bundle of rights accorded to a copyright owner. Id at 152. 
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 Garcia v Google Inc. 771 F.3d 647 (9th Circ. 2014) (en banc). 
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seems to say that Garcia just didn’t do enough to gain a copyright in the scene. Either way, the 
majority is wrong …. In its haste to take internet service providers off the hook for infringement, the 
court today robs performers and other creative talent of rights Congress gave them. …
135
  
Kozinski also challenges the majority’s contention that Garcia’s performance did not amount to a 
work, even though it met the minimal requirements for copyright protection, arguing that if this was 
the case, then Garcia’s performance, which was incorporated in an earlier, unsuccessful film, could 
not be subjected to a copyright claim by anyone, including the film producer.136 Kozinski, noting that 
Garcia did not sign any contract in which she divested herself of her rights in the performance 
observes: “Without a contract the parties are left with whatever rights the copyright law gives them. 
It’s not our job to take away from performers rights Congress gave them….”137 Kozinski also refers 
to the inconsistency arising from the fact that the US was a signatory to the Beijing Treaty on 
Audiovisual Performances138 and that both the US Copyright and Patent Offices had affirmed that 
US copyright law was consistent with the treaty, observing that “[t]he Treaty would recognise 
Garcia’s rights in her performance”.139 One of the arguments made by Google against Garcia’s 
copyright claim in her performance was that allowing the claim would “make Swiss cheese of 
copyrights”, i.e. it would result in the ‘splintering [of a work] into many different “works,” even in the 
absence of an independent fixation.’140 In response Kozinski quips: 
The answer to the “Swiss cheese” bugbear isn’t for courts to limit who can acquire copyrights in order 
to make life simpler for producers and internet service providers. It’s for the parties to allocate their 
rights by contract. …
141
 
It is interesting, in light of the Levola decision, that in the Garcia case Google made a light argument 
about making Swiss cheese of copyright “in the absence of an independent fixation”, seeing that the 
Levola case was literally concerned with the taste of cheese (albeit Dutch cheese) as well as the 
question as to what constitutes independent fixation. As observed earlier, while the EU Court of 
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entitling the performer earn royalties arising from copyright (including publishing royalties) – unless the performer had 
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Justice ruled that the taste of a food product cannot be classified as a work within the meaning of 
Directive 2001/29, this was only because it “cannot be pinned down with precision and objectivity”, 
seeing that it is not possible in the current state of scientific development to achieve such precision 
and objectivity to be able to distinguish the taste from the taste of other similar products.142 The 
importance of the Levola ruling however (which it is submitted, signals the new direction in the 
copyright protection of eligible subject-matter), is that (i) it did away with the strict categorisation of 
works in copyright law (which implies that Garcia’s performance could have been recognised as a 
copyright work, if it satisfied the requirements of originality); and (ii) it did away with the requirement 
of permanent fixation as a prerequisite for the subsistence of copyright in a work, requiring only that 
the work “must be expressed in a manner which makes it identifiable with sufficient precision and 
objectivity”143  
In concluding the matter of the subject-matter of copyright and the position of rhythmical 
performances it would be helpful to refer to the English Court of Appeal decision in Sawkins v 
Hyperion Records Ltd.144 This case was concerned with the resurrection (restoration) of the music of 
the French court composer Lalande (1657 – 1726) which was long in the public domain, through the 
making of “performing editions” of the work, rather than through the arrangement or rearrangement 
of the music by, for example, adding significantly to the melody of the music.145 Dr Sawkins, a 
musicological scholar, had instead spent some 3000 hours preparing the performing editions, which 
involved gathering surviving manuscripts and prints; choosing the most appropriate version to use; 
inserting missing material; adding figuring to a bass; adding a new figured bass; recording missing 
bars etc. The question was whether Dr Sawkins’ performing editions amounted to a musical work as 
contemplated in UK copyright legislation. That is, the question was 
whether a musical work includes items such as the figuring of the bass, ornamentations and 
performance directions or is really limited for copyright purposes to the notes on the score, so that in 
the case of an existing work nothing less than significant rearrangement of, or significant additions to 
the melody will create copyright in the edition of a musical work.
146
 
Traditionally a copyright work based on an existing work (including a public domain work) would take 
the form of an adaptation or arrangement.147 Copyright subsists in the adapted work, distinctly from 
the copyright in the main work, if the adapted work complies with the requirements for the 
subsistence of copyright (i.e. originality and, currently, fixation). In the Sawkins case Hyperion 
argued that Dr Sawkins had merely exacted scholarly exertions on the notation of the scores, as 
well as including performing indications and directions, but failed to compose or recompose new 
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notes of music, as in a musical adaptation or arrangement.148 In essence Hyperion contended that 
‘“unless the edition includes the composition of new music in the form of the notes on the score (and 
not merely the correction of wrong or unsatisfactory notes in the scores used) then no copyright 
would exist in the edition as a musical work.”’149 
The court of appeal deemed Hyperion’s contention as giving rise to a restrictive approach to the 
definition of a “musical work” and as resting on an unduly narrow view of what constitutes music for 
purposes of copyright.150 The court then set out to elaborate on how the expressions “music” and 
‘“creation” of music’ should be understood, and observed:  
… [T]he fallacies in Hyperion’s arguments are that (a) they only treat the actual notes in the score as 
music and (b) they approach the issue of subsistence from the wrong direction by dividing the whole of 
the performing edition into separate segments and by then discarding particular segments on the 
basis that they are not music and not therefore covered by copyright.
151
  
The court then emphasised that the question whether copyright subsists in a work involves an 
assessment of the whole work.152 It is submitted that in uttering these words the Sawkins court 
introduced a revolutionary approach to the question of what constitutes a musical work – one that is 
diametrically opposed to the earlier US decision of Northern Music Corp., where it was succinctly 
asserted that “[i]t is in the melody of the composition or the arrangement of notes or tones that 
originality must be found.”153 The Sawkins court then elaborated further on the matter by finding that 
the essence of music is the combination of sounds for listening to – intended to produce effects of 
some kind on the listener’s emotions and intellect, and that “in musical copyright the sounds are 
more important than the notes”.154 The essence of music is thus the combining of sounds to produce 
a pleasing effect to the ear, and “not … mere noise”.155 In this regard the observations of Arnold are 
also important: 
As is notorious, what is music to some is mere noise to others, particularly if there is a generational 
difference. The question is essentially a functional one: if sounds are presented and consumed as 
music, that is to say, for aural enjoyment, then they are music.
156
 
What is important is therefore for subject-matter to qualify as music is that sounds have been 
combined with the intention that they should be listened to and enjoyed, and if so listened to and 
enjoyed, then they are music, despite the fact that others may deem them mere noise. This, it is 
submitted, would apply equally to traditional African rhythmical performances. Although others may 
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deem them to be mere noise because of their non-conformity to the Western system of harmonic 
tonality, they are, in fact, combined together and intended for aural enjoyment by their listeners – 
and are thus received by the listeners. In this regard as observed above when considering the 
centrality of the “ngoma” in traditional African entertainment, rhythmical performance represents 
“[a]n African conceptual framework for music”; which entails “an active process of experiencing 
drumming, playing drums, or dancing to drums …” and constitutes “a method of making music [as 
well as] the experience of music itself”.157  
From the Sawkins ruling, it is clear that notes, or melody, are but only a component of the sound that 
constitutes music, with the court observing: 
… The sounds may be produced by an organised performance on instruments played from a musical 
score, though that is not essential for the existence of the music or of copyright in it. Music must be 
distinguished from the fact and form of its fixation as a record of a musical composition. The score is 
the traditional and convenient form of fixation of the music and conforms to the requirement that a 
copyright work must be recorded in some material form. But the fixation in the written score or on a 
record is not in itself the music in which copyright subsists. There is no reason why, for example, a 
recording of a person's spontaneous singing, whistling or humming or of improvisations of sounds by a 
group of people with or without musical instruments should not be regarded as "music" for copyright 
purposes. …  
It is wrong in principle to single out the notes as uniquely significant for copyright purposes and to 
proceed to deny copyright to the other elements that make some contribution to the sound of the 
music when performed, such as performing indications, tempo and performance practice indicators, if 
they are the product of a person's effort, skill and time, bearing in mind, of course, the "relatively 
modest" level … of the threshold for a work to qualify for protection. …
158
 
From the above observation of the court one has therefore to conclude that it is possible to have 
“music” even if the sounds thereof are comprised only of rhythmical performances and devoid of or 
featuring less notes and melody, provided that such performances satisfy the requirement of 
originality.159 The court’s recognition of rhythmical elements as being eligible for consideration when 
determining if subject-matter amounts to music is consistent with Waadeland’s study of rhythmical 
performance (or rhythmic performance).160 Waadeland shows that rhythm contains important 
[creative] properties in the ultimate expression of music (e.g. making a musical performance swing). 
This happens when ‘the performing musician [gives] “life” to the rhythm through a process by which 
(more or less) conceptualized structural properties of rhythm are transformed into live performances 
of rhythm.’161 One of the ways in which rhythm achieves this is that it gives rise to “musical styles of 
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performance, and contribute[s] in fundamental ways to a communication of motional and emotional 
musical qualities from the performer to the listener and within the group of performing musicians.”162  
Consequently, as the Sawkins court has held, rhythmical or performance elements should not be 
excluded in the consideration of what constitutes music. This is particularly significant in the South 
African scenario, where the Constitutional Court has ruled that matters of intellectual property (and 
copyright in particular) must “be understood through the prism of the Constitution”.163 It is submitted 
that the exclusion of rhythmical performances, including those of a live nature, from copyright 
protection as a result of the rigid categorisation of what constitutes works eligible for copyright 
protection and the fixation requirement, would be at odds with certain constitutional protections. It 
needs to be acknowledged that the artistic creativity protected by the freedom of artistic creativity in 
s 16(1)(c) of the Constitution would generally be categorised as intellectual property. This it is 
submitted, includes traditional forms of artistic creativity. As is common cause, intellectual property 
is protected as a property right under s 25 of the Constitution.164 In order not to “[deprive] the right of 
any usefulness”,165 intellectual property in the form of traditional, rhythm-based music should not be 
excluded from copyright protection based on the strict categorisation of works and the fixation 
requirement.  
Further to the above, depriving traditional forms of entertainment from copyright protection because 
they do not fall within the recognised categorisation of works, and because of the fixation 
requirement would, it is submitted, also infringe the right of equality of the originators of such 
entertainment. Section 9(1) of the Constitution provides that “everyone is equal before the law 
[including the law of copyright] and has the right to equal protection and benefit of the law [thus not 
only receiving the lesser protection of the neighbouring rights system]”.166 Section 9(3) provides that 
the state “may not unfairly discriminate directly or indirectly against anyone on one or more grounds, 
including … ethnic or social origin …”167 From this perspective the law cannot, in according copyright 
protection to musical works, favour the Western conception of music to the detriment of its African 
conception. Rather than compelling African creators to conform their music creation practices to 
Western compositional norms in order for such music to be eligible for copyright protection, the law 
should instead recognise African music creation practices in their own right, as long as there has 
been a combination of sounds for listening to, intended for and appreciated by an audience, as 
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observed in the Sawkins case.168 This, it is submitted, would be consonant with the Constitutional 
imperative. 
It is acknowledged that others, like Dean and Kajiker, may find this expansive interpretation of the 
Constitution to be unjustified, instead holding the view that “the protection granted to intellectual 
property by [section 25 of the Constitution] is of a very limited ambit”, confined essentially to “the 
taking away of existing property” and “[placing] no obligation on the state to continue facilitating the 
creation of intellectual property in the future.”169 However the same authors acknowledge the 
international law roots of intellectual property and the fact that, in terms of s 39(1) of the 
Constitution, when interpreting the Bill of Rights a court must have regard to international law and 
may consider foreign law.170 In this regard it needs to be observed, as highlighted above, that the 
Berne Convention, to which South Africa is a signatory, does not impose a rigid categorisation of 
works eligible for copyright protection, nor does it dictate that a work must be fixed in material form 
for it to attain copyright protection.171 In addition foreign law, in particular the Levola decision 
discussed in this chapter, is increasingly following a trend where the strict categorisation of works 
eligible for copyright protection and the fixation requirement are “not identifying characteristics of 
copyright laws.”172 Finally, the categorisation requirement has also been criticised for not being 
consistently adhered to.173  
5.4 The requirements for the subsistence of copyright 
The fact that a work is capable of qualifying as a subject-matter of copyright does not per se imply 
that such work would be capable of being vested with copyright, as certain requirements or 
conditions need to be complied with first. In dealing with the question of the requirements for the 
subsistence of copyright in a work some have distinguished between so-called inherent 
requirements and formal requirements.174 We shall, in line with such convention, also make a similar 
distinction. It also needs to be noted that, unlike other forms of intellectual property rights such as 
patents and trademarks, copyright law does not require any formalities (such as registration) prior to 
copyright subsisting in a work.175  
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5.4.1 Inherent requirements 
Two inherent requirements exist in relation to the subsistence of copyright, namely the fact that the 
work needs to be original (originality), and the fact that it needs to be embodied in a material form 
(material embodiment, or the requirement of fixation, as discussed above).176 It was indicated above 
that often the consideration of the requirement of originality is intertwined with a consideration of 
whether the subject-matter under consideration amounts to a work. It is however important to 
consider closely what amounts to originality in copyright law. 
5.4.1.1 Originality 
Section 2(1) of the Copyright Act identifies certain works177 as being eligible for copyright, “if they are 
original”. The Act does not however, define the meaning of originality.178 It has therefore been left to 
the courts to define what originality entails. This was succinctly dealt with by Corbett CJ in Appleton 
& Another v Harnischfeger Corporation & Another,179 where the honourable judge had this to say: 
Originality in this context does not require that the work should embody a new or inventive thought or 
should express a thought in a new way or inventive form. Originality refers to original skill or labour in 
execution: it demands that the work should emanate from the author himself and not be copied. This 
does not mean that a work will be regarded as original only where it is made without reference to 
existing subject-matter. An author may make use of existing material and yet achieve originality in 
respect of the work which he produces. In that event the produced work must be more than a slavish 
copy: it must in some measure be due to the application of the author’s own skill or labour. Precisely 
how much skill or labour he need contribute will depend upon the facts of each particular case. 
From the foregoing it is clear that originality entails the following:  
                                                                                                                                                              
may be worth mentioning that prior to its accession to the Berne Convention in 1989 the United States, having been a 
signatory of the Universal Copyright Treaty (which does require formalities), had a requirement for a copyright notice to be 
placed on works that underwent a general publication. Failure to have such a notice resulted in a work being “immediately 
and irreversibly divested … of copyright protection”. Although this requirement is no longer applicable since 1 March 1989, 
it has been strongly suggested that US copyright owners continue to make use of the copyright notice as its use “precludes 
the ability of a defendant to mitigate damages pursuant to an innocent infringement defense.” See Lind Copyright Law, 
especially at 119 – 125.  In South Africa a voluntary but commendable registration system exists in respect of 
cinematograph films in terms of the Registration of Copyright in Cinematograph Films Act 62 of 1977. 
176
 It will be noticed that in the EU case of Levola discussed above, “expression” is treated as a separate requirement for 
the subsistence of copyright and not as part of the requirement of originality as is the case in South African copyright law. 
See n 84 supra. This is similar to the approach used in the United States. Under the US law, the treatment of expression 
as a separate requirement for the subsistence of copyright relates to the emphasis of the fact that it is the author’s or iginal 
expression of ideas, and not the ideas themselves, albeit totally original, that constitute a copyright work. See in this regard 
Moser and Slay Music Copyright Law 27. In this regard reference has been made to the “spectrum ranging from the clearly 
unprotected abstract idea to the literal expression constituting the work as a whole”, where the objective is “to determine 
where, on that spectrum, the material allegedly taken lies.” Halpern Copyright Law 51. In the traditional English provision, 
which is the position applicable in South Africa, considerations of expression are taken into account when addressing the 
originality requirement, where the position is that it is the relevant form of expression that is protected but this “does no t 
prevent use of the information, thoughts or emotions expressed in the copyright work”. Garnett, Davies and Harbottle 
Copinger and Skone James 140. 
177
 Literary works, musical works, artistic works, cinematograph films, sound recordings, broadcasts, programme-signals, 
published editions and computer programs. 
178
 Copeling Copyright and the Act of 1978 14, in dealing with the “common law” requirements for the subsistence of 
copyright (in which he includes the requirements of propriety and originality), states that these requirements are so-called 
“because they are universally regarded as copyright requirements whether or not specified as such in the act itself.” 
179
 Appleton & Another v Harnischfeger Corporation & Another 1995 (2) SA 247 (A) at 262. Emphasis added. See also 
Klep Valves (Pty) Ltd v Saunders Valve Co Ltd 1987 (2) SA 1 (A) at 22H-23B. 
202 
 
(i)  The work does not have to be a vehicle of new or inventive thought or express a 
thought in a new or inventive form 
 
This position is to be contrasted with the position applicable to patents, where an invention is 
required to be new in order to be patentable.180 In the case of copyright it is merely required that the 
work must emanate from the author himself and not be a copy of another work.181 This is particularly 
relevant in the case of music copyright where, it has been observed, there is a limited number of 
musical notes.182 Thus where the effort of two authors working independently of each other 
produces an identical work, the requirement of originality would have been satisfied and copyright 
will subsist in each of the works.183 In this regard the words of Jerome Frank in a decision of the US 
Appeals Court for the Second Circuit are apt: 
Original in reference to a copyright work means that the particular work owes its origin to the author. 
No large measure of novelty is required. … All that is needed … is that the author contributed 
something more than a merely trivial variation, something recognizably his own, Originality in this 
context means little more than a prohibition of actual copying.
184
 
Relying on this decision Robert S. Lasnik held in the case of ZZ Top v. Chrysler Corp.185 that the use 
by the defendant of the guitar riff in the plaintiff’s song, La Grange, amounted to an infringement of 
the copyright in the song despite the fact that the guitar riff was similar to those used in prior musical 
works. The court found that the defendant, in contesting the claim of copyright infringement, had 
only focussed on the guitar riff and not considered other aspects of the song; and further that it had 
not ‘objectively analysed the various riffs to show that the “idea” and objective characteristics of La 
Grange’s guitar riff are not original”.186 In conclusion the court found that the song La Grange and its 
guitar riff was something recognisably attributable to the plaintiff and that the plaintiff had contributed 
more than a merely trivial variation “to the common idea of a guitar riff”, thus finding the defendant 
liable for infringing the plaintiff’s valid copyright.187  
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It needs to be noted however that, even though the standard of originality has been said to be 
low,188 originality must be determined from the perspective of the work as a whole, and not elements 
of the work.189 In this regard it has been said that the author of a work cannot cherry-pick features or 
extractions of the work that should satisfy the originality requirement or be seen as constituting “the 
material copyright work”.190 Thus where the claimant identified three features in a song as 
constituting the musical work itself and as being the part that the defendant had infringed, the court 
held that these features “[could] not, by any stretch of the imagination be said to be sufficiently 
separable from the remainder of the song as themselves to constitute a musical work.”191 The court 
then held succinctly:  
What the copyright work is in any given case is not governed by what the claimant alleging copyright 
infringement chooses to say that it is. Rather, it is a matter for objective determination by the court.
192
 
(ii) Originality refers to original skill or labour in execution 
 
This requirement was confirmed by Streicher JA in Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) 
Ltd,193 where the honourable judge remarked,  
… a work is considered to be original if it has not been copied from an existing source and if its 
production required a substantial (or not trivial) degree of skill, judgment or labour.  
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The expression “skill, judgment or labour” is generally known as the “sweat of the brow” (or “pure 
industriousness”) doctrine. In Moneyweb (Pty) Limited v Media 24 Limited and Another it was 
contended by counsel for the respondents that the “sweat of the brow” approach is no longer a test 
for originality in our law.194 The court however refuted this contention, observing that such a 
conception arises from the imprecise nature of the expression “sweat of the brow” and its propensity 
for being misunderstood. Affirming the continuing application of the doctrine in our law the court then 
observed: 
Our law still regards the time and effort spent by the author as a material consideration in determining 
originality. But the time and effort spent must involve more than a mechanical, or slavish, copying of 
the existing material. In other words, there must be sufficient application of the author’s mind to 
produce a work that can be judged to be “original”. …
195
 
In this regard it has been noted that whether a work is original is a question of degree depending on 
the facts placed before the court with regard to the amount of skill, judgment or labour involved in 
making the work.196 Accordingly it has been held that the resultant work does not need to be 
“unprecedented”.197 In this regard the requirement of skill, judgment or labour must be contrasted 
from the requirement of creativity or “creative spark” applicable in American law.198 In the Haupt 
case199 Streicher JA countered the submission by the respondents, on authority of American case 
law (and its acceptance by the court a qou), that a “minimal degree of creativity” was required to 
satisfy the requirement of originality. In this case the judge, finding support in Canadian case law,200 
held that because English copyright law, from which both South African and Canadian copyright law 
originate, does not require creativity to make a work original, the same position obtains with regard 
to South African copyright law.201 In this regard it has been observed that ‘[w]hile creative works will 
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by definition be “original” and covered by copyright, creativity is not required to make a work 
“original”.’202 
Pursuant to the foregoing it has been observed that “little originality is required of a person's 
contribution to a piece of music in order to attract copyright in the altered work which results”, so that 
copyright can subsist in a mere “straightforward arrangement of a well known song employing for 
the purpose well known musical devices and clichés.”203 We find in this regard “very borderline” 
cases of works that “only just” succeed in meeting the requirements of originality.204 Notwithstanding 
the foregoing, it needs to be observed that the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 (version B13B-
2017),205 that has recently been passed by both houses of Parliament and awaits the signature of 
the President,206 has introduced several concepts and principles arising from American copyright 
law.207 With these introductions, if the Bill becomes law it is conceivable that South African copyright 
law may in future experience greater influence from American copyright law, including with regard to 
its conception of the originality requirement.  
Even where South African copyright law continues to follow UK law, it needs to be noted that the 
Infopaq ruling208 of the EU Court of Justice is generally considered to have shifted the traditional 
view of originality applicable in UK copyright law, as stated in the University of London Press 
case,209 namely the “skill, judgment or labour” criterion.210 It has been said that the Infopaq decision 
has in effect harmonised EU copyright law, where originality and work are now understood as 
referring to “subject-matter which is original in the sense that it is its author’s own intellectual 
creation”.211 Prior to this the UK only applied the “intellectual creation” criterion in respect of 
databases in order to comply with the EU acquis, with the result that the UK did not therefore apply 
a single test of originality.212 The intellectual creation criterion espoused in the Infopaq ruling has 
been held to have raised the bar in respect of the traditional originality requirement applicable to UK 
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copyright law.213 Thus in the EU Court of Justice judgment of Football Dataco214 the following was 
observed: 
29. Under Article 3(1) of Directive 96/9, ‘databases’ within the meaning of Article 1(2) of that directive 
are protected by copyright if, by reason of the selection or arrangement of their contents, they 
constitute the author’s own intellectual creation. … 
37. … [A]s is apparent from recital 16 of Directive 96/9, the notion of the author’s own intellectual 
creation refers to the criterion of originality …  
38. As regards the setting up of a database, that criterion of originality is satisfied when, through the 
selection or arrangement of the data which it contains, its author expresses his creative ability in an 
original manner by making free and creative choices …  
42. … [T]he fact that the setting up of the database required, irrespective of the creation of the data 
which it contains, significant labour and skill of its author, as mentioned in section (c) of that same 
question, cannot as such justify the protection of it by copyright under Directive 96/9, if that labour and 
that skill do not express any originality in the selection or arrangement of that data.
215
 
A consideration of the above observations would confirm the view that the independent creation 
criterion espoused in the Infopaq case did indeed raise the standard with regard to the originality 
requirement in EU (and thus UK) copyright law. Nevertheless the standard does not require “adding 
important significance” to existing material.216 In this regard it has been observed that the difference 
between the European approach to originality, compared to the traditional British approach may be 
“very small or non-existent”, so that “Infopaq may therefore be a mere confirmation of a somewhat 
higher level of originality being required.”217 It has nevertheless been further observed that this does 
mean that certain works will no longer be eligible for copyright protection in the UK and that 
“copyright can no longer be used as a stop-gap solution to protect these works”.218 Derclaye 
however expresses the opinion that the Infopaq decision merely highlights the fact that “creativity is 
the criterion of originality”, and that this would not affect the status of musical works because 
generally most, if not all musical works can be described as “creative”.219 
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(iii) A work can be deemed original even where existing subject-matter is used 
 
As indicated above,220 a work shall be considered to have satisfied the requirement of originality 
even if it is identical to another work, provided that the author of each of the works produced the 
work independently of the other. It should further be noted that the requirement that a work must not 
be copied does not imply that the work needs to be made without reference to existing subject-
matter. As Copeling has noted, if this were the case, “the great majority of works would be denied 
the benefit of copyright protection.”221 It is suggested that this would even be more applicable to 
music copyright, where, as observed earlier, “we live in a musical era marked by covers, musical 
sampling, and dubiously similar songs”,222 and where historically composers “have drawn heavily” 
from folk music and current popular music, and “borrow directly” from one another.223 Consequently 
where an author uses existing subject-matter in creating his work, the requirement for originality 
would still be satisfied if the work is, “in some measure … due to the application of the author’s own 
skill or labour” and not a mere slavish copy of the existing work.224 In this regard the author is 
required to expend sufficient skill or labour as to impart to his work some quality or character not 
existing in the material he is using, thus substantially distinguishing his work from the existing 
material.225  
What was said above applies generally to works that draw from existing subject-matter in which 
copyright does not subsist (e.g. songs that are in the public domain). However, questions of 
originality often arise in cases where an alleged infringement of the copyright in a work in which 
copyright subsists, is made.226 What is the position where a work is based on existing subject-matter 
in which copyright subsists (i.e. infringing works)? Section 2(3) of the Copyright Act deals with this 
issue, providing that “[a] work shall not be ineligible for copyright by reason only that the making of 
the work, or the doing of any act in relation to the work, involved an infringement of copyright in 
some other work.” Thus in the Haupt case227 Streicher JA held that where an improved work 
satisfies the requirement for originality, i.e. where the improvement or refinement of a work in which 
copyright subsists is “not superficial”, and where the alteration to the original work is substantial, 
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copyright would also subsist in the improved work. In the music business, other than possible cases 
of direct copying, the making of original, yet infringing works  would generally take the form of so-
called “arranged” (or “re-arranged”) works and “remixes”, where such take place without the 
authorisation of the owner of the original copyright work, as occurs often.  
 In an enlightening judgment of the Federal Court of Australia in Larrikin Music Publishing Pty Ltd v 
EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited228 the court enumerated the test applicable in determining whether 
a musical work constitutes an infringement of an earlier work as follows: (i) there must be a sufficient 
degree of objective similarity between the works and a causal connection between them (where 
causal connection means that the infringer must have copied the plaintiff’s work, i.e. the work must 
be the source from which the infringing work derives); (ii) the question of the objective similarity of 
musical works must not be determined by a note to note comparison but “by the eye as well as by 
the ear”,229 and depends largely upon the aural perception of the judge and upon the expert 
evidence; and (iii) the test is whether the substance of the copyright work was taken, thus the new 
work needs not be identical with the original work.  
It is evident from the foregoing that, as one commentator has argued, the “dividing line” between 
original works and non-original works “remains an uncertain and shifting one”.230 One area where 
this becomes more pronounced is the area of compilation or collection of various existing works, 
where the existing works are selected to create a new compilation work. The existing works may 
both be works in which copyright subsists or non-copyright material. In this regard it should be noted 
that protection given in respect of compilation works is not only in respect of the chosen material but 
also in respect of “the actual arrangement and layout of the assembly of material.”231 In the music 
industry this has traditionally taken the form of compilation albums232 and playlists. Playlists have 
traditionally taken the form of radio playlists; however new challenges are now presented through 
the prevalence of playlists in online music streaming services and DJ playlists, also termed 
“livesets”, which may be performed before audiences or on radio.233 Does copyright subsists in such 
a “perfect combination of tracks”?234  
The answer to the above question is dependent on a country-by-country analysis of the applicable 
laws.235 It has been stated that the selection and arrangement of music compilations and playlists 
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(i.e. the “gathering” and “ordering” of songs) “can be decisive” of their success and can therefore be 
valuable.236 In this regard it has also been noted that “there can be genuine artistic creativity 
involved in compiling and executing [a DJ] set”, and that this is not about “[s]imply standing at the 
decks and playing some popular tracks one after the other”.237 It has been observed that the 
question whether copyright subsists in playlists is not settled in the laws of the major music markets 
of the world.238 It appears that the reason why it has been observed that “copyright protection for 
music compilations and playlists under the current U.S. Law is unlikely” owes to the fact that US law 
uses a higher standard to determine originality,239 i.e. “the modicum of creativity necessary to 
transform mere selection into copyrightable expression”.240 In view of this Fritzsche has observed: 
… [C]ompilations and playlists are just an arrangement of preexisting materials or data. … [C]an a 
music compilation or playlist be depicted in different ways? The answer is no, because basically, it is a 
list. And, whatever category, style or genre the arrangement falls under, there generally is a 
dominating logical element of order in it that withdraws any approach of creativity.
241
  
Fritzsche then charges that ‘it could be argued that the selection falls under the “sweat of the brow” 
doctrine and is merely a necessary work process”.242 It is of course common course that, after 
Feist,243 the “sweat of the brow” doctrine does not apply in the United States. In the European Union, 
where, as discussed above, the “intellectual creation” criterion introduced by the Infopaq case244 is 
seen as equally representing a higher standard than the “sweat of the brow” standard,245 Recital 19 
of the Preamble to Directive 96/9/EC of the European Union and of the Council246 excludes “the 
compilation of several recordings of musical performances on a CD” from the scope of the Directive, 
“both because, as a compilation it does not meet the conditions for copyright protection and because 
it does not represent a substantial enough investment to be eligible under the sui generis right.”247 
However, writing on UK law prior to the Football Dataco case,248 when the “sweat of the brow” 
doctrine still played a major role in UK copyright law, Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria observed: 
… [A] person can research and put together a compilation of songs and create something which must 
be properly considered as constituting the author’s own intellectual creation. Whether or not a 
compilation album amounts to the author’s own intellectual creation will depend on all the facts. Some 
will qualify, others will not. It is submitted that it depends on what kind of work goes into the creation of 
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the compilation. Notwithstanding the words of Recital 19 there is no absolute rule that a compilation of 
recordings of musical performances cannot qualify for copyright protection.
249
 
The authors therefore here resorted to the “sweat of the brow” standard as the basis for claiming the 
subsistence of copyright in musical compilations. However, as noted, this was before the ECJ ruling 
in the Football Dataco case, where the “intellectual creation” criterion was held as superseding the 
“sweat of the brow” standard. The position under UK law will therefore probably be different than 
what is proposed by Laddie, Prescott and Vitoria, and be more aligned to the position under US law 
as proposed by Fritzsche. The matter has not yet been decided by the courts so the position 
remains uncertain. The matter could have been resolved when, in 2013, Ministry of Sound, a well-
known dance music record label in the UK instituted proceedings in the UK High Court against 
Spotify, an online music streaming service.250 Ministry of Sound claimed copyright infringement in 
respect of playlists uploaded by users on Spotify’s streaming service that copied the label’s 
compilation albums. As observed, the case “hinge[d] on whether compilation albums qualify for 
copyright protection due to the selection and arrangement involved in putting them together … [i.e.] 
whether the compilation structure - the order of the songs - can be copyrighted.”251 
In the case, Ministry of Sound had argued that it did “a lot more than putting playlists together”; that 
a lot of research went into creating the compilation albums “and the intellectual property involved in 
that”;252 and that it was therefore “not appropriate for someone to just cut and paste them”.253 
Ministry of Sound further argued that its work with regard to creating the compilation albums was in 
the nature of “curation”. The court did not however, get to make a ruling on the matter as the parties 
reached an “amicable” out-of-court settlement of the dispute, with Spotify agreeing to remove the 
offending playlists from its search engine and to ‘block new users from “following” them on its 
service’, without however deleting the playlists.254   
What would the position be in South Africa? In the South African Copyright Act compilations are 
protected as a genre of a literary work, where a literary work is defined as including, “irrespective of 
literary quality and in whatever mode or form expressed … tables and compilations, including tables 
and compilations of data stored or embodied in a computer or a medium used in conjunction with a 
computer, but shall not include a computer program”.255 
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It is evident therefore from the foregoing, that the protection of compilations in South African 
copyright law envisages the “sweat of the brow” doctrine in which what is required is simply that 
labour, skill and capital should have been expended in such sufficient levels as to impart some 
quality or character to the product (i) which did not exist in the raw material, and (ii) which thus 
differentiates the product from the raw material.256 Furthermore, it is clear from the definition that this 
would include compilations used in online media (“embodied in a computer or a medium used in 
conjunction with a computer”).  
In conclusion, it would seem that musical compilations and playlists would be protectable by 
copyright under South African copyright law if these do not amount to a mere slavish copying of 
existing material; and where the claimant expended skill, judgment or labour, provided that the 
labour  expended exhibits skill and judgment (i.e. if it produces something original). In this regard 
nevertheless it is useful to note the appeal court’s decision in Waylite Diary, where the court pointed 
out to the fact that while “time and effort”, i.e. labour, is a material factor in determining originality, it 
is a value judgment whether such time or effort has produced something original.257 
It would also be relevant to refer in this regard to the provisions of the proposed section 2A(2) and 
(3) to the Copyright Act, introduced by clause 2 of the Copyright Amendment 2017, which was 
recently passed by the National Assembly and also approved without changes by the National 
Council of Provinces are relevant.258 The proposed provisions read as follows: 
(2) A table or compilation which by reason of the selection or arrangement of its content, constitutes 
an original work, shall be protected as such by copyright.  
(3) The copyright protection of a table or compilation contemplated in subsection (2) does not extend 
to its content. 
The provision is in some ways, superfluous, as the copyright protection of tables and compilations is 
already provided for in the definition of “literary work” in section 1 of the Act. The provisions of the 
proposed section 2A(2) would have made more sense if it was expressed as follows: 
A table or compilation shall only be protected by copyright if, by reason of the selection or 
arrangement of its content, it constitutes an original work. 
Be that as it may, if the Bill is passed into law and escapes a Constitutional challenge259 the 
proposed section shall confirm the fact that under South African copyright law compilations and 
playlists would be protectable by copyright if the time and effort expended in selecting or arranging 
their content gives rise to a work that meets the originality requirements of the Act.  
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5.4.1.2 Material embodiment (“fixation”) 
Section 2(2) of the Copyright Act260 provides that, apart from a broadcast or a programme-carrying 
signal, all works of copyright must be “written down, recorded, represented in digital data or signals 
or otherwise reduced to a material form” in order to be eligible for copyright. This embodiment in a 
material form determines the time when the work is deemed to have been made.261 It should be 
observed that the question as to the time when a work was made plays a crucial role in determining 
the ownership of copyright in the work. More particularly where two or more persons lay claim to 
ownership of copyright in a work,262 the identification of the true owner may hinge on the ability to 
determine the time when the work was made (which in turn determines the author of the work, i.e. 
person who first clothed the work with material embodiment).263 In the music industry, where the 
need to “establish a chain of title”264 is real, answering this question appropriately is crucial – and 
difficult.265 The difficulty in determining the moment of the creation of a work (particularly as a result 
                                               
260
 Read with s 44. 
261
 Section 44(1).   
262
 Other than in a case where it is proved that each of the authors of works that are identical or otherwise similar created 
the works independently of the others, dealt with above at paragraph 6.4.1.1(i). 
263
 See Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-31. 
264
 The expression “establish (or ‘prove’) a chain of title’ refering to the need to determine all the transfers of copyright that 
would have taken place from the first owner to the current claimant, is a way of proving the legitimacy of the claimant’s 
claim to copyright ownership. Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 286 indicate that this situation 
arises from two features of copyright “which combine to create difficulties when it comes to establishing title”, namely the 
potential longevity of copyright works and the absence of a system of registration of title “or the existence of any rule 
whereby a good title can be deduced from a transfer made at least a certain number of years ago, or a concept equivalent 
to a possessory title of land.”’ Seeing that music copyright is, in the majority of cases, assigned by the author to others 
(who may also further assign the copyright to further parties), determining the chain of title is often crucial in music 
copyright cases. 
265
 Ordinarily, in the absence of a registration system for copyright, a person claiming to be the author of a work that is the 
subject of an infringement action would depose to an affidavit indicating the circumstances under which he created the 
work, as a way of showing that the requirements for the subsistence of copyright (including the requirement of embodiment 
in a material form) were met. (See in this regard MCA International BV v Movie Time 33 JOC (D), at 38, where it was noted 
in respect of a party alleging to be the author of certain films without stating when any of the films were made or first 
published: “In any event, the bold statement that the applicant was the author of the films within the meaning of that term in 
the Act, would also in my view have been insufficient to comply with the requirements …, unless the deponent also set 
forth the facts upon which that statement was made.”) The author could possibly also depose to an affidavit prior to the 
incident of infringement, before a notary public, who would attest to the identity of both the deponent and the work 
concerned (see for example Punch-line (Pty) Ltd v International Micro-computers Inc 329 JOC (SEC) for a case where 
evidence adduced by notarised affidavits was admitted). To do this the notary public would sign, stamp and date not only 
the affidavit but also the work, as proof that the work was in fact presented to him on the particular date. The purpose of 
such a deposition would not be to prove that copyright subsists in the work but rather to prove that the work was in 
existence on the date of deposition. A person claiming ownership of copyright in the work would have to prove an earlier 
date in which he created his work. In this case it is submitted that it would be best, to facilitate the notary’s attestation, if 
the musical work were embodied in a written score (i.e. in the form of sheet music), rather than in a sound recording. 
Another possible solution is to deposit the work with a depository institution, such as a bank or other trusted institution; 
provided that the date of deposit can be easily determined. Another method generally acknowledged by many as sufficient 
to prove the date of the making of a work is the system of “notification of works” used by many collective management 
organisations in the music industry (CMOs, or “collecting societies”, as dealt with in Chapter 6 infra). CMOs generally 
require members and applicants for membership to “notify” their works to the CMO, meaning that the members or 
applicants have to submit to the CMO a list of the works that they claim to have created (using forms made available for 
this purpose). While the obvious reason for this is to enable the society to administer the works on behalf of the member 
concerned, it has often been said (at times without full understanding), that another benefit for this is that it assists in 
proving the date or time for the making of a musical work. Thus Chislett One, Two, One, Two, commenting on this 
notification system as used by the Southern African Music Rights Organisation (SAMRO), writes, “… [T]he moment you 
compose a song you are recognised as the owner of its copyright. All that remains after that is to make sure that you can 
prove this if such a fact should ever be disputed. In the case of the music business, this is most easily achieved by 
becoming a member of SAMRO and lodging each new song that you write with it. In this way the date of the membership 
acts as a legal and binding proof of the date of origination and of your right to be recognised as the owner of the copyright 
on [sic] the work”’ (at 135, emphasis added). It is obvious that the significance, if any, of the notification process, in relation 
to proving the time of the making of a work, would be in indicating the date of notification (rather than the date of admission 
to membership, which often takes place much later), as constituting the date of the making of the work. CMOs normally 
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of the non-existence of a registration system in respect of copyright works) has led to some 
proposing some intriguing “solutions” to circumvent this situation.266 Ultimately however, determining 
the moment of creation (and thus the author) is a question of fact.267 
In view of the fact that certain types of works such as literary, dramatic and musical works may 
undergo several stages of development before assuming their final form,268 the question has often to 
be asked as to the particular stage at which a work comes into existence.269 This question is closely 
related to arguments relating to the so-called idea versus expression dichotomy.270 It is a maxim of 
copyright law that it is the embodiment of ideas that is protectable by copyright and not the ideas 
themselves, however original they may be.271 Only the material form in which the idea is expressed 
attracts copyright protection.272 Where a work avails itself to various stages of development,273 at 
                                                                                                                                                              
stamp, or otherwise date the notification of works form to reflect the date in which it was received. Having indicated this, 
whether in any of the scenarios mentioned herein it can be said that a person is the author or owner of copyright would 
depend on the facts of each case.      
266
 One of the solutions proposed, especially in respect of music composers, is the use of the so-called “poor man’s 
copyright”. Since employing some of the methods of establishing the time of copyright creation (such as use of a notary 
public’ services or depositing a work with a bank) could have cost implications, it appears that the concept of a “poor man’s 
copyright” implies that this is a cheap way of safeguarding one’s copyright, affordable even to the poor. The UK Intellectual 
Property Office seems to acknowledge this “poor man’s copyright” system (although acknowledging that proving the 
originality of a work is “[u]ltimately … a matter for the courts to decide”), and explains the process as follows: “[S]end 
copies to yourself by special [postal] delivery (which gives a clear date stamp on the envelope), leaving the envelope 
unopened when it is returned to you”. This is for the purpose of proving that one’s work “existed at a certain time.” See 
http://www.ipo.gov.uk/c-basicfacts.pdf. (Date of use: 05 September 2013). N.B. It seems that this information has since 
been removed from the website of the UK Intellectual Property Office, but its existence at the time of accessing the website 
can be verified by these two websites: http://ipkitten.blogspot.com/2009/08/getting-in-flap-over-copyright.html and 
https://www.snopes.com/fact-check/poor-mans-copyright/; date of use: 14 January 2019). Elsewhere however the courts 
have been sceptical and indeed scathing of this “poor man’s copyright” concept. (See the US case of Selletti v Carey 23 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1269 (D.C.S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff’d 173 F.3d 104 (2
nd
 Cir. 1999), where the court had this to say in respect of the 
plaintiff: ‘Selletti also mysteriously, and somewhat bizarrely, contends that he possesses an envelope containing the 
Selletti composition, which he alleges is “strikingly similar” to the song “Hero”. He claims that he mailed the envelope to 
himself prior to the date Carey allegedly composed “Hero”, and contends that the envelope is postmarked across the seal 
(Par. 2). … As to the mysterious envelope … Selletti has made no effort to explain why he would have mailed a copy of the 
composition to himself in 1989.’ (at Par. 3). This should not however, be construed as saying that our courts could not, 
depending on the circumstances of each case, rule that a particular case of ‘poor man’s copyright’ does prove the time in 
which a work was made. In this regard a plaintiff should be prepared to deal with possible contentions from the defendant, 
such as the contention that finding something in the envelope when it is opened does not mean that it was there when the 
envelope was mailed, as the plaintiff could have posted the envelope to himself without sealing it and without inserting 
anything, only later inserting the product and sealing the envelope.”   
267
 See MCA International BV v Movie Time 33 JOC (D).  See also Pan African Engineers (Pty) Ltd v Hydro Tube (Pty) Ltd 
and Another 1972 (1) SA 470 (W); Accesso CC v Allforms (Pty) Ltd (Case No II) 677 (JOC); Peter-Ross v Ramesar and 
Another 2008 (4) SA 168 (C). 
268
 As for example, distinguished from artistic works (paintings, photographs etc), where “it is only when the particular 
painting, photograph or other work is executed that the idea for it is transmuted into expression”. Cornish and Llewelyn 
Intellectual Property at 11-33. 
269
 Cornish and Llewelyn ibid at 11-33 – 11-34. See also Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-31. 
270
 See the English case of SAS Institute Inc v World Programming Ltd [2011] R.P.C. 1 (Chancery Division), where the 
court held (at paras 206 – 207), that a distinction needs to be made between “expression” and “ideas, procedures, 
methods of operation and mathematical concepts as such”, and that the skill, judgment and labour that is required for 
copyright to subsist in a work is one in relation to the “expression”, and not in relation to ideas etc.  
271
See Bradbury, Agney & Company v Day (1916) 32 TLR 349 (KB), where the learned judge observed that “… it was the 
embodiment which was the subject of copyright, for though the idea was not original, if the embodiment of this idea or any 
substantial part of it was copied, copyright was infringed; whereas the idea might be adapted, even if it was original, but i f 
the embodiment of such idea or a substantial part thereof  was not copied, no copyright was infringed.”  Bradbury was 
cited with approval in Rapid Phase Entertainment CC v SABC 597 JOC (W), where the court further held (at 606) that the 
presentation of an incident from a cartoon strip in dramatic form with live characters not bearing the names of those 
portrayed in the cartoon strip (as an artistic work) did not amount to a broadcast of “the work”, observing: “To constitute an 
infringement it is the artistic features or attributes of the work which have to be transformed or adapted, not some concept 
which it conveys”. Per Wunsch J. 
272
 See Payen Components South Africa Ltd v Bovic Gaskets CC 473 JOC (W), at 479, where Van Zyl J refers to this “well 
known dictum”. 
273
 Such as where there are different “working versions” of the work, leading to the “final version”. 
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what stage can it be said that the idea has taken material expression? It is this conundrum, i.e. the 
fact that copyright does not protect ideas, which has led to scepticism about the validity of the idea-
expression dichotomy.274 Dean and Karjiker have for example suggested that it is generally the “final 
complete version which is ready for utilisation or commercial exploitation” which should enjoy 
copyright protection.275 It is submitted that this may be too simplistic a view, as certain works, such 
as literary works, by their nature convey ideas and it would thus be difficult to extricate the ideas 
from the work.276  
In relation to the foregoing it has been contended – it is submitted correctly - with specific reference 
to musical works, that  
… however elegant the distinction between idea and expression may seem as a matter of legal theory, 
empirically it is an impossible distinction to make. In music there is no “idea” or “expression” to be 
distinguished.
277
 
Castanaro elaborates on this as follows: 
Music is … a special genre of copyright with regard to the idea-expression dichotomy. … The 
elements of musical works are not easily separated into those constituting original expression and 
those that are part of the basic, mechanical ideas. An artist’ musical expression is inextricably linked to 
the mechanics of the music. The sequencing of notes and chords, the harmony, melody, beat, tempo, 
composition, and lyrics all work together to create a musical expression. Individually, each of these 
components, except for the lyrics, constitutes an unoriginal, un-copyrightable idea. Collectively, certain 
lyrics set to certain notes and chords, played in a certain way creates an expression. It’s an 
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 See for example Galago Publishers (Pty) Ltd and another v Erasmus 1989 (1) SA 276 (A), at 283J – 285B, where it 
was observed, inter alia: “It has often been stated that there is no copyright in ideas or thoughts or facts, but only in the 
form of their expression; and if their expression is not copied, there is no infringement of copyright …. As pointed out, 
however … this pithy statement is liable to lead to confusion. …” Emphasis added. 
275
 Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law at 1-31 – 1-32. 
276
 This position was expressed in Peter-Ross v Ramesar and Another 2008 (4) SA 168 (C), which somewhat spelled a 
death knell to the maxim that copyright does not subsist in ideas by holding that literary works are a vehicle of ideas and 
that in the case of a scientific work the precise mode of expression was of less importance and the contribution of ideas 
(which were of a scientific nature) were more crucial. This is because a scientific work is less concerned with the creative 
expression of ideas than it is with the conveyance of the ideas themselves. See also Galago Publishers ibid. In this regard 
it needs to be expressed that Dean and Karjiker do acknowledge this situation, noting firstly that “[e]ach case will be 
determined by its own facts”; and secondly that “[i]nterim versions of a work in the creation process can, of course, enjoy 
copyright, provided they are original, and if copied or otherwise misused without authority copyright infringement occurs …” 
Dean and Karjiker id at 1-32. However the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 approved by Parliament and currently awaiting 
the President’s signature (version B13B-2017) and available at https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 13 July 2019), 
would, if passed into law, have the effect of not only resuscitating the idea / expression dichotomy but would, furthermore, 
introduce the American so-called “merger doctrine”, “a close cousin to the idea/expression dichotomy [in terms of which] 
copyright protection will be denied to even some expressions of ideas if the idea behind the expression is such that it can 
be expressed only in a very limited number of ways.” Toro Company v. R & R Products Co., 787 F.2d 1208 (8th Cir. 1986) 
para 14. See for the idea / expression dichotomy the proposed s 2A(1)(a); and for the merger doctrine the proposed s 
2A(4)(a) in clause 2 of the Copyright Amendment Bill. See also Chapter 7 infra for further deliberation on this matter. 
277
 Keyt 1988 Cal.L.Rev. 421 at 442 – 443. See further to this Macdonagh 2012 International Review of Intellectual 
Property and Competition Law 409 – 410, who opines: ‘The idea/expression dichotomy is of dubious value in relation to 
music. … [M]usic “collapses” the idea/expression dichotomy. One reason for this is that there are a limited number of 
musical notes in a standard major scale. … [S]ome chord progressions and musical phrases are … too common to be 
protectable. For instance … the “twelve-bar blues structure” … could be described as the example of a general musical 
“idea” which cannot be made subject to copyright.’ 
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expression that becomes an experience to the person who listens to and engages with it. Removing 
the individual ideas would destroy the musical work as a whole.
278
 
In view of this it is contended that the essence of musical works is such that they are not required to 
undergo different stages of development prior to attracting copyright protection,279 so that each 
“working version” of a musical work created prior to arriving at a “final complete version which is 
ready for utilisation or commercial exploitation”280 would qualify as a work in which copyright 
subsists. It is submitted that commercial viability in respect of musical works is a matter of aesthetic 
judgment which has little bearing on whether a work will ultimately achieve commercial success or 
not. History can point to many musical works that were once shunned for not exhibiting great 
creativity, which however later achieved great success. It can be contended that as soon as a 
musical creation satisfies the requirements of originality and is reduced into a material form, it would 
qualify as a musical work, whether or not it is considered to be commercially viable. This would be in 
line with Harms’ proposition that the correct way to understand the idea-expression dichotomy is to 
see copyright as “protect[ing] the form in which an idea is cast and not the idea itself.”281 
While the composer of a musical work may choose to use one version of the work as the 
commercially viable one, this does not detract from the fact that earlier versions of the work, if they 
satisfy the inherent and formal requirements of copyright, would equally be protectable by copyright. 
Thus any unauthorised adaptation of a “pre-final” version of the musical work would constitute 
copyright infringement all the same. Furthermore, seeing that there is generally no requirement for 
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 Castanaro 2008 Fordham Intell. Prop. Media & Ent. L.J. at 1282. Emphasis added. It has to be mentioned however, 
that the current writer is not in agreement with the exception of the lyrics from this scenario. It is contended that just as 
musical works are made from a musical scale and musical phrases comprised of a combination of notes, pitches, rhythms 
etc, so also lyrics, which are protected as literary works, are made from a combination of existing letters of the alphabet, 
words in the vocabulary, etc. Thus lyrical phrases like “I love you baby”; “You are the best”; “Hold me close” are common 
phrases in popular music. In this regard it should also be noted that the courts have held that copyright does not subsist in 
a single word. See the English decision Exxon Corp. v Exxon Insurance Consultants International Ltd [1982] Ch. 119. 
More specifically the US district court decisions of O’Brien v Chappel & Co., 159 F. Supp. 58 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) and Acuff-
Rose Music, Inc. v Jostens, Inc. 988 F. Supp 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) are relevant in this regard. In the O’Brien case the 
plaintiff alleged copyright infringement against the defendant on the ground that the defendant had read an unpublished 
composition of the plaintiff containing the phrase, “Sharing my dreams with a star, asking the moon if it’s soon when you’ll 
be mine, night and noon”, and that he had, together with another, copied and plagiarised the phrase in a song forming part 
of the musical “My Fair Lady” in which the phrase “I’ve grown accustomed to the tune you whistle night and noon” 
appeared. In this regard the court held (at 59): ‘It is well established that copyright or literary rights do not extend to words 
or phrases isolated from their context, nor do they extend to abstract ideas or situations. … The plaintiff apparently thinks 
that he can get sole rights to the phrase ”night and noon” no matter in what context the phrase is used. Such a common 
phrase in of itself is not susceptible of copyright nor of appropriation by any individual….’ Likewise in the Acuff-Rose Music 
case the court refused to find the defendant guilty of copyright infringement, where the defendant had used a theme from 
the plaintiff’s song, “You’ve Got to Stand for Something”, which had become a “hit” on the national charts. The song 
contained the line “You’ve got to stand for something or you’ll fall for anything” and the defendant had used this theme 
(based on the theme of a father admonition a child to stand for principles), in an advertising campaign making use of, 
among others, a promotional video / slide show with music, lyrics and narration, where the slogan “If You Don’t Stand for 
Something, You’ll Fall for Anything”, was used. It was contended on behalf of the defendant that a prior use search for the 
slogan was no conducted and permission to use the slogan was not sought because the defendant ‘considered it to be 
“the expression of an idea which was not entitled to copyright protection …”’ (at 292). While the court affirmed that the 
defendant had found inspiration for its slogan from the plaintiff’s song and had copied the song, it found that the plaintiff 
failed on the ground of improper appropriation, remarking (at 294): “… That both works employ the identical phrase does 
not constitute substantial similarity, in light of the written lyric’s status as an unprotected cliché and the fundamental 
differences in the parties’ usage of the phrase. … While especially creative phrases may be protected, there is nothing 
unique about the use of standing/falling imagery to convey the importance of living a principled life. …”      
279
 Even though, as a matter of fact, such stages of development may take place. 
280
 Dean and Karjiker Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1-31. 
281
 Harms 2013 PELJ 505. 
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the copyright owner to exploit the work commercially,282 so that all he could do is to prohibit others 
from exploiting the work (and to, himself, do nothing about the work), it cannot be a requirement of 
copyright law that the work be commercially viable.283 This position can clearly be illustrated by the 
phenomenon of so-called “never-before released songs”, which are often released posthumously 
and often become “great hits”. The internet teems with information about such never-before 
released songs in respect of various famous and not-so-famous artists.284 These are usually songs 
that were recorded as demonstration records (“demos”)285 or songs initially rejected for their 
unlikelihood to be commercially viable but which often later proved very valuable.286 In this case it 
needs to be observed that copyright would subsist in respect of all versions of the song concerned, 
including the earlier rejected version. 
In conclusion, a note needs to be made regarding the manner in which music is embodied in a 
material form. As indicated above, sections 2(2) and 44 of the Copyright Act provide that a work 
(other than a broadcast and a programme-carrying signal) must be “written down, recorded, 
represented in digital data or signals or otherwise reduced to a material form” in order to be eligible 
for copyright. All these forms of embodiment apply in respect of musical works. However, a 
distinction needs to be made between the protection given to the words sung with the music (the 
lyrics) and the musical work itself. Lyrics have a distinct protection as a literary work, independent of 
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 Or to authorise others to do so – except in the limited cases of compulsory licensing of copyright.  
283
 For further light into this see the remarks of Streicher JA in Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd  908 JOC 
(A), at 916,  Par. 23, where he indicated that the contention by the applicant that a computer program was not eligible for 
copyright because it produced incorrect results and because sections of the raw data could not be read at all, [which can 
be interpreted to say that it was not “ready for utilisation or commercial exploitation”] was incorrect. In this regard the 
learned judge seemed to emphasise the fact that the subsistence of copyright in a work has to be determined from the 
definition of the work under the Act. In the current case the judge found that the work qualified as a computer program 
because it brought about a result (as required in the definition of computer program), albeit the result was “sometimes 
correct, sometimes wrong”. A literary work is for example defined as such, “irrespective of literary quality” (thus irrespect ive 
of whether or not it is “ready for utilisation or commercial exploitation”). See s 1(1) of the Copyright Act. 
284
 See for example in respect of Jimi Hendrix  https://www.usatoday.com/story/life/music/2018/02/15/exclusive-listen-one-
jimi-hendrixs-last-songs-experience/332296002/ and in respect of Michael Jackson 
https://www.thestar.com/entertainment/music/2010/03/17/60_unreleased_michael_jackson_songs_available_for_new_alb
ums.html (date of use: 15 January 2019). 
285
 Defined as “[a] recording made to demonstrate the capabilities of a musical group or performer or as preparation for a 
full recording.  https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/demo (date of use: 15 January 2019). 
286
 See in this regard http://mentalfloss.com/article/502946/10-hit-songs-were-almost-never-released as an example. (Date 
of use: 15 January 2019). 
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the musical work.287  When music is written down however, this is still a musical work and not a 
literary work.288 In this regard Garnett, Davies and Harbottle289 have remarked: 
To the extent that notation or words are written down and are intended to represent sounds which 
qualify as music … it seems that they are excluded from the definition of literary work, even though 
they can in one sense be read. 
This situation is in contradistinction to the one obtaining in the historical development of copyright 
protection for musical works, starting in the United Kingdom, where music was protected as a genre 
of literary works (in the form of sheet music or otherwise in printed form). As dealt with in Chapter 3 
above, since the enactment of the Imperial Copyright Act however, musical works began to be 
protected as a separate, standalone work alongside literary works. The statement by Garnett, 
Davies and Harbottle above regarding “notation or words” being intended “to represent sounds” may 
create some confusion, especially in respect of what has been said about words (lyrics) being 
protected as literary works. What the authors are referring to however, are words “intended to 
represent sounds which qualify as music”; i.e. words the utterance of which results in music being 
heard. What comes to mind is the representation of music through what is termed tonic sol fa (or 
solfa notation).  
While the writing of music in staff notation makes use of certain signs, marks or symbols that 
represent the music, in tonic sol fa the music can accurately be said to be represented by words  (as 
in do, ray, mi, fa, sol, la, ti, do, and their variants).290 Words are part of a language and music has 
been said to resemble language.291 That, it is submitted, is the meaning intended by the above 
authors in relation to their reference to the term “‘words” – namely words as used in the language of 
music to express musical sounds.292 Having indicated the above it should be mentioned that in 
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 This position is distinct from the position that obtains in the United States, where lyrics that form part of a musical 
composition are considered part of the composition, although both the composition and the lyrics are capable of being 
protected separately (as a musical work and a literary work, respectively). See in this regard Moser and Slay Music 
Copyright Law 31, observing: “If words are written independently of music without any intention at the time of creation that 
they will be combined with music, the work will be considered to be a literary work. However, if created to be combined 
with music, the words will be part of a musical work.” Similarly it was observed in Acuff-Rose Music, Inc. v Jostens, Inc. 
988 F. Supp 289 (S.D.N.Y. 1997) (at 292): “… A copier will be liable for copying the musical work in its entirety, that is, the 
composition’s words and music together, as well as for copying just the music or the words alone. …” This arises from the 
fact that under US copyright law musical works are understood as “including any accompanying words”. § 102(a)(2) US 
Copyright Act 117, U.S.C. 101 et seq. This is to be contrasted with the position under South African law, UK law and the 
laws of most other common-law jurisdictions where words are specifically excluded from the definition of musical work. 
Such a differentiation is contemplated and permissible in the Berne Convention, where reference is made to “musical 
compositions with or without words” (emphasis added) as forming part of the works protected by copyright.  
288
 See the remark of Jacob J in the English case of Anacon Corp v Environmental Research Technology [1994] F.S.R. 
659, at 663, where he noted: “… [M]usical notation is written down but needs expressly to be taken out of the definition of 
‘literary work’.”  
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 Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 97 – 98. 
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 The definition of the term “word” as “[a] sound or a combination of sounds, or its representation in writing or printing, 
that symbolizes and communicates a meaning and may consist of a single morpheme or a combination of morphemes” 
(see The Free Dictionary, available at http://www.thefreedictionary.com/word, date of use:15 September 2013), would 
encompass the notes used in solfa notation. 
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 See Adorno https://www.msu.edu/~sullivan/AdornoMusLangFrag.html (date of use: 15 September 2013).  
292
 This is clear from what the authors say in the very next sentence, when they recognise that “words which are sung with 
music do not form part of the musical work”. Garnett, Davies and Harbottle  Copinger and Skone James 98. 
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modern times the composition of music in written form is no longer widespread.293 Many well-known 
musicians have not studied music, and even where they have, material embodiment generally takes 
the form of physical sound recordings (i.e. “recorded” music, as in the use of CDs) or digitally-
created compositions (“represented in digital data or signals”, as in software-aided MP3 
recordings).294 Technology has thus made it easier for composers who have not studied music to 
express their musical ideas in material form.295   
5.4.2 Formal requirements 
The formal requirements for the subsistence of copyright relate to the external circumstances at the 
time when the work is made.296 In Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group Plc297 the court 
encapsulated the formal requirements for the subsistence of copyright (i.e. the alternative 
circumstances under which copyright can be conferred) under the Copyright Act in the following 
manner: first, the existence of a work eligible for copyright and made by a qualified author (or a joint 
author, in the case of a work of joint authorship) in terms of section 3; second, where the work 
eligible for copyright, while not made by a qualified person, is nevertheless first published in South 
Africa, in terms of section 4, and third, where the work is a work made by or under the control of the 
State in terms of section 5(2), provided the work is original and reduced to a material form. In the 
case of copyright conferred in terms of sections 3 and 4 initial ownership vests in the author unless 
the work was made in the course or scope of employment or where it was commissioned, in terms 
of Section 21(1). However, where the work is made in terms of section 5 ownership initially vests in 
the State or a prescribed international organisation, and not in the author.298 Harms JA further 
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 There are a number of software programmes that can create sheet music, but these are often used incidentally as part 
of the digital creation of music. I.e., in the majority of cases the focus in these cases is to create digital sound recordings of 
the musical works and not to create sheet music. An instance where the use of written compositions continues unabated is 
in the area of so-called “serious music”, namely Western “art” or classical music (e.g. orchestral music created for opera, 
ballet etc.) as well as choral music. 
294
 The phrase “digitally-created” is not used in the same sense here as the phrase “computer-generated” was used by the 
court in Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 458 (A) (at 918, paras 31 – 32). See the discussion 
below in Chapter 7, under paragraph 7.3.1.3.   
295
 Thus rendering it unnecessary to hire an arranger and eliminating the spawning copyright ownership disputes (where 
the hired arranger may claim to be a co-composer or the sole composer. For more information on disputes that could arise 
from musical arrangements see Chapter 7 below.) This is especially so because, prior to the advent of digital technology, 
high quality recording of music was an expensive undertaking within the control of a few recording labels. Digital 
technology has minimised the practice of singer-composers with no training in music composition, having to express their 
un-fixated compositions through vocal or instrumental rendition, while another with financial means (e.g. a record label) 
would record the song, thus often denying the singer composer copyright protection who then has to “seek legal protection 
elsewhere, particularly through contracts and legislation protecting performers.” Klopper et al Law of Intellectual Property 
164. Since the compositions were not recorded, i.e. reduced to a material form prior to the studio or other recording, 
another, including the record label, might claim copyright protection in respect of the compositions. In explaining this 
situation Garnett, Davis and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 98, commenting on the definition of “musical work” in 
the UK Copyright Act (which is defined in the same way as in the South African Act), observe: “There is no requirement in 
the statutory definition of a musical work that the music must be expressed in writing or other notation. However … for 
music to be the subject matter of copyright it must satisfy the requirement as to fixation. A composer who composes a 
piece of music entirely in his head, therefore, will be creating a musical work for the purposes of the 1988 Act. Equally, 
where a musician plays music which has not previously been composed, what is produced is a musical work. In any such 
case, however, no copyright will be capable of subsisting in such work until it is fixed, and for purposes of the 1988 Act the 
date the musical work is made will be the date it is fixed, not when it was first conceived or performed.” 
296
 See Klopper et al ibid. 
297
 786 JOC (A), at 793 at para 15. 
298
 Section 21(2). In this regard it needs to be mentioned that the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017, passed by both houses 
of Parliament (version B13B-2017) and awaiting the signature of the President, available at https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ 
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indicates that in terms of ranking one first has to consider if a work was made under the 
circumstances in section 5(2), and if not, under sections 3 or 4.299  
5.4.2.1 A work made by a qualified person 
Section 3(1) defines a qualified person, in the case of an individual, as a person who is a South 
African citizen, or is domiciled or resident in the Republic;300 and in the case of a juristic person, as a 
body incorporated under the laws of the Republic.301 The provisions of the Act also apply in respect 
of works emanating from a member country of the Berne Convention, as well as in respect of 
persons who are citizens of, or are domiciled or resident (and in the case of body corporates, are 
incorporated) in a member country of the Berne Convention.302   
Regarding juristic persons it needs to be noted that copyright law recognises as authors certain 
parties (including juristic persons), in respect of certain works, that may not have been involved in 
the actual physical making of such works. Thus the Copyright Act provides that the author of a 
sound recording or a cinematograph film is “the person by whom the arrangements for the making of 
the [relevant work] were made”.303 Seeing that the first owner of copyright is the author,304 the juristic 
persons who make these arrangements then become the owners of copyright in such works, unless 
and until they transfer ownership to another in terms of section 22. It is presumably on this basis 
(namely that they make the arrangements for the making of music recordings), that record 
companies become owners of copyright in respect of sound recordings.305 This position does not 
however, apply generally in respect of the making of musical (and literary) works. In this case 
copyright initially vests in the author of the work, as contemplated in section 21(1)(a), and a music 
publisher or other entity would only obtain copyright ownership in such a work if the work is assigned 
to it by the author in terms of section 22.306  
                                                                                                                                                              
(date of use: 13 July 2019), has added a prescribed “local organization” among the entities eligible for ownership of 
copyright in terms of s 5(2). It is not clear what the intention was in this regard. See further in this regard Chapter 7 infra.   
299
 Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group PLC 786 JOC (A) at 793 para 16. 
300
 As to what constitutes citizenship, domicile and residence the Copyright Act does not define these terms, and thus 
deference has to be made to the applicable national laws in this regard. See also in this regard Klopper et al Law of 
Intellectual Property at 165. 
301
 Section 3(1) however exempts a work of architecture erected in the Republic (or any other artistic work incorporated in 
a building or any other permanent structure) from the requirement of a qualified person.  
302
 See s 37 of the Copyright Act, read with GN 1558 GG 17517 of 1 November 1996 and s 3(1). For a detailed discussion 
of the application of this section see generally Appleton and Another v Harnishfeger Corporation and Another 515 JOC (A) 
and Nintendo Co Ltd v Golden China TV-Game Centre and Others 488 JOC (T) at 504 - 505. See also Dean and Karjiker 
Handbook of South African Copyright Law 1-29 – 1-30.  
303
 Section 1(1) of the Copyright Act. Similarly the author of a computer-generated literary, dramatic, musical or artistic 
work or computer program is “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work were 
undertaken.”  
304
 Section 21(1)(a) of the Copyright Act. 
305
 The use of the word “probably” is based on the fact that s 21(1)(c) of the Copyright Act also provides another basis 
upon which a record company may claim ownership of copyright in a sound recording, namely the commissioning of such 
a sound recording. It appears that the record company could choose the basis upon which it lays claim to ownership of 
copyright in a sound recording, which creates an untenable situation. This discussion however is outside the scope of this 
work and has to be pursued elsewhere. 
306
 Although the music publisher who makes logistical and financial arrangements for the making of demo recordings for 
purposes of composing music would generally be entitled to claiming copyright ownership of the sound recording in terms 
of s 1(1) of the Copyright Act, in practice music publishers do not do this as they are more interesting in the musical 
composition itself, for which they acquire copyright ownership through written assignment of rights from the composer. For 
the practice of making demo recordings of musical compositions see Jarret and Day Music Composition 28 – 30.   
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Another point to note in respect of juristic persons is that it is those juristic persons that satisfy the 
requirements of “a body incorporated under the laws of the Republic” that would be considered to be 
a qualified person. It is thus important that music business professionals ensure that they only use 
entities that qualify as juristic persons incorporated under the laws of the Republic, as vehicles to 
own copyright. Companies, close corporations,307 trusts308 and even certain forms of non-profit 
entities309 would meet the requirements of a qualified person in this regard. However, sole 
proprietorships, partnerships and other unincorporated entities would not meet the requirements of a 
“qualified person” because they are not “incorporated under the laws of the Republic”.310 Another 
matter to consider is the protection of works belonging to qualified persons who are non-South 
African citizens (i.e. those that are citizens of, or are domiciled or resident in, or in the case of 
companies, are incorporated in a member state of the Berne Convention). The determination of this 
issue often gives rise to choice-of-law questions, namely questions as to which court has 
jurisdiction, what law is applicable in determining the issue, and (after judgment has been given), the 
conditions under which a court will recognise and enforce the judgment given by a foreign court.311 
These are important matters for consideration in relation to music copyright because of the general 
trans-jurisdictional nature of the music business.312  
It needs to be noted that in dealing with the question of the applicable law two “distinct” issues often 
have to be determined, which would have an impact on determining the choice-of-law question, 
namely the issue of title (i.e. ownership of the rights) and the issue of the substantive rights (or 
scope of protection).313 The conflict of law issues in copyright cases mainly arise from the fact that 
copyright (as also other forms of intellectual property) is essentially a territorial system of protection 
limited to the territory of protection.314 However, it has been observed that the internet imposes a 
                                               
307
 It should be noted that under the Companies Act 71 0f 2008 no new close corporations can be incorporated, while 
existing close corporations may continue existing as such, or convert to be companies. 
308
 A trust is, under the new Companies Act (Act 71 of 2008), a juristic person (though not a company). This applies in 
respect of trusts established in South Africa and those established outside South Africa. See in this regard Melville v 
Busane and Another [2012] 1 ALL SA 675 (ECP). 
309
 In the music industry non-profit entities are used particularly in respect of collective management organisations (CMOs 
or collecting societies). Traditionally the corporate form used was the company limited by guarantee, based on the English 
tradition. The 2008 Companies Act (Act 71 of 2008) has however now abolished the company limited by guarantee, and so 
a CMO would either register as a non-profit company under the Companies Act, as a non-profit trust, or as a non-profit 
organisation in terms of the Nonprofit Organisations Act 71 of 1997. 
310
 Unless of course the incorporation of such forms of conducting business is permissible in terms of the laws of a 
member country of the Berne Convention, and they are so incorporated under such laws, as discussed immediately below. 
311
 See Sterling World Copyright Law 136. These questions are components of the “Conflicts of Law’ or Private 
International Law regime. 
312
 See for example Gramophone Co Ltd v Music Machine (Pty) Ltd & Others 1973 (3) SA 188 (W), decided under the 
1965 copyright legislation, which dealt with questions about the copyright protection of sound recordings impacting upon 
three jurisdictions, namely the United Kingdom, the United States of America and South Africa; as well as raising questions 
relating to the scope of the Berne Convention. 
313
 Courts have either dealt with these issues separately, or treated them generally under the expression “subject-matter 
jurisdiction”. See the US case of Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v Russian Kurier, Inc 153 F.3d 82 (2
nd
 Cir. 1998), where 
it was held that Russian copyright law was applicable in respect of the question of initial ownership, while US law, as the 
lex loci delicti, applied in respect of the question of infringement (seeing also that the defendant was a US corporation). 
Compare this approach with that of the UK Supreme Court in Lucasfilm Limited and Others v Ainsworth and Another 
[2011] UKSC 39 (see n 314 infra). This is to be contrasted with the ruling of our appeal court in Gallo Africa Ltd v Sting 
Music (Pty) Ltd 1103 JOC (A), where Harms DP (at para 22) relied on Lucasfilm Limited and Others v Ainsworth and 
Another [2009] EWCA Civ 1328, where it was held that the question was whether, in spite of the court having personal 
jurisdiction, there was causa jurisdictionis, i.e. subject-matter jurisdiction.  
314
 This is the position followed by the court in Gallo Africa Ltd v Sting Music (Pty) Ltd ibid, relying on Lucasfilm Limited and 
Others v Ainsworth and Another [2009] ibid. It needs to be noted however that this decision was overruled in Lucasfilm 
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threat to this traditional principle of territoriality.315 Questions have often arisen as to the source of 
the conflict rules to be applied in these cases, with some holding that such rules emanate from the 
principle of national treatment provided for in international copyright treaties (e.g. the Berne 
Convention and the TRIPs Agreement), and some holding that they emanate from national 
principles of private international law.316    
5.4.2.2 A work first made or published in South Africa or a member country of the Berne 
Convention 
Where the author or any co-author of a work is not a qualified person as provided for in section 3, 
copyright can be conferred on the work, if eligible for copyright, under certain circumstances 
generally relating to the country of publication or making of the work, or the origin of the work.317 
Thus copyright shall be conferred on a literary work, musical work, artistic work and sound 
recording, if any such work was first published in South Africa or a member country of the Berne 
                                                                                                                                                              
Limited and Others v Ainsworth and Another [2011] UKSC 39, where the UK Supreme Court held (see paras 60 – 61)  that 
the judgment of the Supreme Court of Victoria in Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd [1905] VLR 612, affd (1906) CLR 469,  
had been wrongly interpreted to say that it relied solely on the extension of the rule in British South Africa Co v Companhia 
de Moçambique [1893] AC 602 (the so-called Moçambique rule) to patents. The Moçambique rule emphasised the 
distinction between matters that are local as opposed to matters that are transitory, and provides that “it is contrary to 
international law, or comity, for one state to exercise jurisdiction in relation to land in another state” (Lucasfilm Limited and 
Others v Ainsworth and Another [2011], para 56. See also Gallo Africa Ltd v Sting Music (Pty) Ltd ibid 22). The court in 
Lucasfilm Limited and Others v Ainsworth and Another [2011] held (at para 61) that Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd in fact 
dealt with four strands (not necessary to repeat here), of which the Moçambique rule was but “one of the elements” that 
the court took into account. The court held that contrary to the view that Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd relied on the 
Moçambique rule, “the effect of the decision in Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd was to apply the Moçambique rule and, 
especially, the act of state doctrine to actions for patent infringement” (at para 68. Last emphasis added). Thus “it is the act 
of state doctrine, rather than the Moçambique rule, which is the essential foundation of the judgments in [Potter v Broken 
Hill Pty Co Ltd]” (at para 67). The court then went on to show that “in the case of copyright infringement, it has been held 
that the act of state doctrine has no application because there is no need to pass on the validity of acts of foreign 
government officials” seeing that the Berne Convention bars administrative barriers. Para 84. After noting the fact that 
Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd appears to stand alone in the Commonwealth in using the act of state doctrine “as an 
impediment to actions for infringement of foreign intellectual property rights” (para 85), the court concluded that the act of 
state doctrine “should not today be regarded as an impediment to an action for foreign intellectual property rights, even if 
validity of a grant is in issue, simply because the action calls into question the decision of a foreign official” (para 86).   On 
this basis, the court held that the claim (which concerned an infringement of US copyright) was justiciable and that the 
English courts thus had jurisdiction to hear the matter. The conclusion herein can only be that, inasmuch as Harms DP 
relied on a faulty interpretation of the use of the Moçambique rule in Potter v Broken Hill Pty Co Ltd  and Hesperides 
Hotels v Aegean Turkish Holidays [1979] AC 508 (both of which were discarded in Lucasfilm Limited and Others v 
Ainsworth and Another [2011] ), then the decision in Gallo Africa Ltd v Sting Music (Pty) Ltd can be faulted, in spite of the 
fact that the Moçambique rule itself “[coincides] with the position under Roman law” (Gallo Africa Ltd v Sting Music (Pty) 
Ltd ibid 22).   
315
 See in this regard Tydniouk 2004 Brook. J. Int’l. L 899. 
316
 Tydniouk ibid, generally, recounts this position, where she speaks about, first, “the conventional understanding of 
national treatment”, “which comports with the related principle of territoriality” in which the law of the protecting country 
determines all issues of copyright (at 900 – 901). The conventional approach was clearly followed by the court in Lucasfilm 
Limited and Others v Ainsworth and Another [2009], as  
well as our Appeal court in Gallo Africa Ltd v Sting Music (Pty) Ltd. Secondly, Tydniouk (at 901) speaks about the 
approach followed in Itar-Tass Russian News Agency v Russian Kurier, Inc, where the court “imported the modern conflict 
of laws analysis into the world of copyright law” by finding that the national treatment principle did not contain a choice of 
law provision. However, highlighting the problems that arise from a general conflicts of law approach, Tydniouk (at 902) 
advocates for the establishment of “supranational equitable principles”, which “would be a step towards universal copyright 
law, and would be easier to achieve because it would not cause interference with sensitive policies underlying national 
copyright regimes.” This “universalist” approach was clearly favoured by the UK Supreme court in Lucasfilm Limited and 
Others v Ainsworth and Another [2011], where the court observed: “There is no doubt that the modern trend is in favour of 
the enforcement of foreign intellectual property rights” (para 108); “[t]here are no issues of policy which militate against the 
enforcement of foreign copyright. States have an interest in the international recognition and enforcement of their 
copyrights …’; further noting that while the Appeal Court had “thought that it was relevant that there was no international 
regime for the mutual recognition of copyright jurisdiction and of copyright judgments”, this was “no reason for the English 
court refusing to take jurisdiction over an English defendant in a claim for breach of foreign copyright” (at para 109). 
317
 Section 4 of the Copyright Act.   
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Convention; and on a cinematograph film, if the film was first published or made in South Africa or a 
member country of the Berne Convention.318 Thus in respect of works published in a member 
country of the Berne Convention, protection would be accorded to such works “as if the works had 
been first published in the Republic.”319 In view of this, it is crucial to understand what constitutes 
“publication” or “publishing” under the Act.320 In this regard it suffices, for present purposes, to 
indicate that, except for cinematograph films and sound recordings, publication entails the issuing to 
the public, with the consent of the copyright owner, of copies of the work in sufficient quantities so as 
to reasonably meet the needs of the public.321  
It suffices for present purposes to note that publication normally entails the commercial dealing in 
copies of the original work and “[i]t is therefore not essential that the work concerned be published in 
the manner in which it is first created or reduced to tangible form.”322  Thus in the case of musical 
works, this would refer to a reproduction of the work or an adaptation, including “cover versions”. It is 
also important to note that it is the first publication of the work, either in South Africa or a member 
country of the Berne Convention, that would result in copyright being conferred in the work under 
South African law. Where a work is published simultaneously in a member country of the Berne 
Convention and a non-member country, the country of origin in respect of the work is deemed to be 
the Convention member-country, and where the work is published simultaneously in several 
countries that are members of the Convention, the country of origin is deemed to be the country 
whose laws give the shortest term of protection to the work.323 The expression “first publication” 
includes a publication that takes place within thirty (30) days of an earlier publication taking place 
elsewhere.324 
With the advent of internet technology many musicians325 find that the internet is a cheap and 
convenient platform on which they can make their works available to prospective fans. Does making 
works available on the internet in this way constitute publication as contemplated in the Copyright 
                                               
318
 Sections 4(1)(a) and 4(1)(d) of the Copyright Act, respectively, read with s 37 and GN 1558 GG 17517 of 1 November 
1996. 
319
 See Smith Copyright Companion 6.  
320
 Smith id at 7. For a detailed and critical discussion of what constitutes “publication” and “publishing” see Baloyi 2012 SA 
Merc LJ 218.  
321
 Section 5(a) of the Copyright Act. In the case of sound recordings and cinematograph films publication takes place 
when copies of the sound recording or film are sold, let for hire or offered for sale or hire to the public (s 5(b)).  
322
 Smith Copyright Companion 7. In fact it would be close to impossible or rather not commercially viable to publish works 
in their original forms. Works are generally published as copies of the original. Further to this, a copy is defined as a 
reproduction of a work and in the case of certain works (including literary and musical works), includes an adaptation of the 
work. In respect of literary and musical works publication further includes a reproduction in the form of a record or a 
cinematograph film (s 1, Copyright Act). Thus it is clear that a reproduction does not have to be in the form in which it 
originally existed. See further Smith ibid. Attempting to reproduce works in their original forms would take the music 
industry backwards to the days of Edison’s phonogram, Berliner’s gramophone and the piano roll (see Chapter 3 supra 
and http://www.collectionscanada.gc.ca/gramophone/028011-3004-e.html generally. (Date of use 18 September 2013). In 
this regard it needs to be further noted that while in the past musical works would be published as copies of the original 
work (in the form of sheet music and orchestral scores), in modern times musical works are mainly published through the 
medium of sound recordings, cinematograph films (including all forms of audio-visual works) and digital copies (through 
downloads). 
323
 Section 1(b), GN 1558 GG 17517 of 1 November 1996. 
324
 Section 1(5)(c). It has been observed that this is intended “to permit a person wishing to comply with publication 
requirements internationally to arrange for substantially simultaneous publication of a work in a number of countries”. 
Smith Copyright Companion 8. 
325
 In particular those that have not yet secured a recording or publishing deal and must therefore take steps to self-
promote their works. 
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Act? It has been observed that opponents of the view that making works available on the internet 
constitutes publication often base their view on two arguments: (i) They argue that the internet 
owner cannot possibly issue copies to the public because what is streamed from the internet does 
not constitute a copy but is rather bits that only become a copy once assembled by the user’s 
computer. The second argument relates to the position that (ii) because the website proprietor plays 
only a passive role the works made available through the internet do not amount to publication.326 It 
has in this regard been argued that the fact that a work is available online should not have an effect 
on the conferment of copyright protection, as “[c]ourts interpret the law in a purposive manner to 
ensure that it remains effective in the digital environment.”327   
5.4.2.3 A work made by or under the control of the State 
A work made by or under the control of the state in terms of s 5(2), provided it is eligible for 
copyright, initially vests in the State and not in the author.328 The fact that the work initially vests in 
the State means that the State could potentially assign ownership of this work to another.329 It is 
inconceivable under what circumstances the State would do so, but a possibility would be where the 
State assigns a musical work created by an author under its control to the author. In terms of this 
provision a work would automatically vest in the State by virtue of it having been made by or under 
the control of the State.330 It is thus not necessary for the State to undertake any further action, such 
as passing special legislation, for copyright to vest in it.331 For administrative purposes copyright 
created in terms of section 5 is deemed to vest in an officer of the public service designated by 
proclamation by the President.332 Copyright conferred in terms of section 5 nullifies any claim to 
copyright under sections 3 and 4.333 Thus, as stated above, Harms JA has observed that in terms of 
ranking one first has to consider if a work was made under the circumstances in section 5(2), and if 
not, under sections 3 or 4.334  
Not long ago a row erupted with regard to ownership of “Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika”, one of the 
components of the national anthem of the Republic of South Africa designated pursuant to section 4 
of the Constitution.335 The row apparently related to a claim by some that “Nkosi” is a royalty-earning 
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 See Klopper et al Law of Intellectual Property 166. 
327
 Ibid. 
328
 Section 21(2) of the Copyright Act. 
329
 This, it is submitted, is the effect of the current provision of the Act. It is to be noted however that the Copyright 
Amendment Bill proposes to change this position under clause 23(a), where it is provided that “copyright owned by, vested 
in or under the custody of the state may not be assigned.” See the further discussion below under paragraph 7.3.2.8(b)(i). 
330
 For a discussion of what the expression “by or under the control of the state” entails see Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 
v Beecham Group PLC 786 JOC (A). 
331
 Where however, the State acquires ownership of copyright in a work through assignment, the state may find it 
necessary to  pass an act of parliament to validate this action. See for example in this regard the “Stem van Suid-Afrika” 
Copyright Act 2 of 1959, validating the assignment to the South African government of the literary work “Die Stem van 
Suid-Afrika” and its recognition, in its musical form, as the official national anthem of South Africa; and the “Vlaglied” 
Copyright Act 9 of 1974. 
332
 Section 5(6), Copyright Act. 
333
 See s 5(5) of the Copyright Act. 
334
 Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group PLC 786 JOC (A) at para 16. 
335
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996.  The proclamation was made in Government Gazette No. 18341 of 
10 October 1997. See regarding this row the article titled “An Anthem to Ignorance – The case of Nkosi Sikelel’ iAfrika”, 
which appears to have been written by Owen Dean, [former] Professor of Intellectual Property at Stellensbosch University 
224 
 
song, that the South African government is the correct party to earn such royalties but that it has 
forfeited its right to do so by not registering with a collecting society, and that in doing so others had 
benefitted from the royalties, at its expense.336  The national anthem is a composite work comprised 
of abridged versions of “Nkosi” and “Die Stem van Suid Afrika”, as well as new English words written 
by a well-known composer and set to the tune of “Die Stem”. The author of the article analysed the 
situation by stating that (a) “Nkosi” is out of copyright, since fifty (50) years have elapsed since the 
death of its author, and so no royalties are payable in respect thereto; (b) although “Die Stem” was 
assigned to the South African government, its assignment has since lapsed and the rights have 
since reverted to the heirs of the author, who are entitled to earning royalties;337 and, (c) the author 
of the English lyrics of “Die Stem”, and not the State, is entitled to copyright ownership thereto and 
should thus be receiving royalties in respect of that work.338 
While the afore-mentioned analysis appears plausible it needs to be mentioned that much in this 
regard will depend on an analysis of the position of the arrangers of the two works and the 
composer of the new English lyrics at the time of working on the anthem. Regarding the legal 
position in respect of composite works Garnett, Davis and Harbottle have observed339:  
In the case of collective or composite works … there will be distinct copyrights, namely the copyright in 
the entire work and the copyright in the various separate contributions. The person who gathers 
together and arranges the entire work will be the author of the whole work, considered as a 
compilation. The fact that he is assisted in this by others will not make him any the less the author if it 
is he who compiled and arranged the information. As to the separate contributions, the authors of 
these will be the persons who wrote them. Thus where a person has written the entries in a work such 
as a directory using information supplied by others he will be the author of those entries, unless he 
has done nothing more than simply copy such information verbatim. 
It is submitted however that the more pertinent issue to determine is the relationship that existed 
between the arrangers of the two works, the composer of the new English lyrics and the State when 
the composite work was compiled. It cannot, and should not simply be assumed that the arrangers 
and composer are entitled to copyright without regard first, to a determination of the question 
whether the work  was made by or under the control of the State in terms of section 5(2). As 
indicated earlier, the effect of section 5(5) of the Copyright Act is that copyright conferred in terms of 
                                                                                                                                                              
and former intellectual property attorney, available at http://blogs.sun.ac.za/iplaw/2012/06/18/an-anthem-to-ignorance-the-
case-of-nkosi-sikelel-iafrika/ (date of use 22 September 2013). 
336
 http://blogs.sun.ac.za/iplaw/2012/06/18/an-anthem-to-ignorance-the-case-of-nkosi-sikelel-iafrika/ ibid. 
337
 He was referring in this regard to the provisions of s 5(2) of the now-repealed 1911 British Imperial Copyright Act, made 
law throughout the British Empire (including South Africa), which provided that if an author assigned his copyright, the 
copyright would revert to the Executor of his estate 25 years after the author’s death, regardless of any other assignments 
of the copyright that might have happened in the meantime.  This provision remains part of our law and is applicable to 
copyright created under it through the preservation provisions of both the 1965 and the 1978 Copyright Acts. See in this 
regard Dean 2006 De Rebus 16 – 21. 
338
http://blogs.sun.ac.za/iplaw/2012/06/18/an-anthem-to-ignorance-the-case-of-nkosi-sikelel-iafrika/ (date of use 22 
September 2013). The author identifies Professor Jeanne Zaidel-Rudolph as being the compiler of the composite work, 
and as having written the English words of the song. However, the Government Gazette No. 18341 of 10 October 1997 
shows that while Prof. Zaidel-Rudolph was responsible overall for the “re-arrangement” of   “Die Stem” and the English 
words, M. Khumalo (Professor Mzilikazi Khumalo) was responsible for arranging “NKosi”.    
339
 Garnett, Davis and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 236 – 237.  
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section 5 nullifies any claim to copyright under sections 3 and 4.340 Harms JA has observed that 
section 5 of the Copyright Act is broad enough to include not only employees of the State but, in 
certain cases, also persons in a contractual relationship with the State.341 The learned judge 
mentioned the possibility of commissioned works falling within the ambit of the provision342 and 
inferred that the expression “by the state” would cover works of organs of the State and possibly 
employees also, while the preposition “under” governs direction or control; furthermore, “an 
important pointer in assessing whether State copyright vests or not may be whether the work was 
made for or on behalf of the State …”.343 The learned judge then concludes: 
[T]he production of the work needs to be the principal object of State direction and control and not 
merely an incidental or peripheral consequence of some generalised governmental … monitoring 
power; the direction and control should be directly and specifically expressed with respect of the work 
in question, and should not be inferred from the fact of some residual or ultimate government veto.
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In other words, the State has to control the making of the work or the intellectual effort exerted in its 
genesis and not merely control the fate of the work in an administrative sense.345 It is contended that 
the State had control over the making of the national anthem in the sense of controlling the making 
of the work. The constitutional imperative required the State to be involved with the making of the 
national anthem in more than just an administrative sense in that an official of the State (i.e. the 
President) had to determine the national anthem.346 In this regard an anthem committee was 
established under the control of the State to oversee the making of the work.   
5.5 Conclusion 
This Chapter was concerned with providing an expository, contextual and often critical elucidation of 
the general principles applicable to the protection of copyright, with an emphasis on copyright in 
musical works. The Chapter was not merely a regurgitation of the well-rehearsed general principles 
of copyright protection. The writer was careful not to merely rehearse the well-known principles in 
this regard but rather to provide context focussed on the copyright protection of musical works. The 
Chapter commenced with a critical consideration of the nature and meaning of modern copyright. In 
this regard the writer challenged the generally-accepted notion of copyright as a negative right. The 
writer instead contended that copyright should be seen as both a positive and a negative right. The 
writer’s main interest in this regard is in the conception of copyright as a legal instrument that can be 
used by authors to actively participate in economic life. It is contended that a conception of copyright 
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 See in this regard Harms AJ’ statement in Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group PLC 786 JOC (A) at para 
16, as highlighted above. 
341
 Biotech Laboratories id at para 17.  
342
 Ibid. 
343
 Ibid paras 17 – 18. 
344
 Ibid para 22.   
345
 Ibid. 
346
 Section 4 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996, reads: “The national anthem of the Republic is 
determined by the President by proclamation.” Emphasis added. The expression “determine” means to “cause (something) 
to occur in a particular way or to have a particular nature.” http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/determine 
(date of use 22 September 2013). Emphasis added. 
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as a negative right does not provide the necessary theoretical basis to use copyright to spur 
economic activity.347 
In particular, the writer critically considered the concept of work and the subject-matter of copyright 
protection and argued that it is generally exclusionary of traditional musical expressions of African 
origin. This, it was submitted, arises from the fact that the concept of “musical work” in copyright law 
is based on the Western system of harmonic tonality that extols the elements of melody and 
harmony, while generally discarding the role of rhythm in musical expression. This strict 
categorisation of a musical work means that traditional African musical expressions of a rhythmical 
nature would rarely meet the requirements of protection as a musical work. Even where such 
expressions were to be reduced to material form, they would very likely be protected under the 
regime of “related rights”, as fixated performances, rather than as musical works.   
The writer praised the recent EU Court of Justice decision of Levola as revolutionary and as 
signalling a new era where the strict categorisation of works and the fixation requirement are not the 
critical considerations for the recognition of copyright subject-matter. It was in this regard submitted 
that following the line of reasoning used in the Levola case it would be possible to develop an 
African epistemology of copyright law, in terms of which African traditional rhythmical performances 
would be recognised as meeting the requirements of musical expression. The writer further 
commented on the idea / expression dichotomy, especially commenting on how difficulties arise in 
applying this doctrine in respect of musical works. This, it was submitted, arises from the limited raw 
materials (e.g. notes, chords, musical styles etc.) used to create musical works, resulting in the 
argument that when it comes to musical works, the idea is inextricably merged with the expression.  
Similarly, the question of compilation works and the possibility of according protection to music 
compilations and playlists under South African copyright law was mooted. The writer made several 
other observations, including a consideration of works made by or under the control of the State. In 
this regard it was suggested that copyright in the national anthem, as a composite work, probably 
vests in the State and not in any of the persons who participated in the arrangement of the work.  
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Chapter 6: The Collective Management of Musical Works: A 
Contextual Overview 
“… New technologies have given rise to new, high-volume markets for works in respect of which 
individual exercise and control of rights is at worst, impossible, or at best impractical.”1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 1790. 
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6.1 Introduction: The Essence of Collective Management of Copyright 
6.1.1 The Need for Collective Management 
Under normal circumstances, the rights accorded by copyright to rights-holders should be exercised 
by them individually. This in fact is the essence of the exclusive nature of these rights.2 As Ficsor 
has stated, the exclusive right of authors to exploit their works or authorize others to do so “is a 
basic element of copyright” and may only fully be enjoyed if exercised by the rights-holder 
individually.3 This is because the rights-holder may then determine the conditions under which the 
work may be used, including the remuneration payable.4  
Having indicated the above, there are certain instances where, in particular with respect to certain of 
the rights, it becomes difficult and at times close to impossible for rights-holders to individually 
exercise these rights in an effective and efficient manner.5 This is often as a result of multiple users 
using the works at different places and varying times or needing rapid access to such works, thus 
making it difficult or costly to negotiate with the users, to monitor uses and to collect usage fees.6 
Under such circumstances rights-holders may only derive the best value from the exercise of such 
rights with the assistance of a third party. This would counter the view by some, highlighted by 
Ficsor, that if rights-holders cannot effectively exercise the rights granted to them, such rights should 
be abolished or be converted from exclusive rights to remuneration rights.7 The writer agrees with 
Ficsor that there is no justification for such a view and that the system of collective management 
becomes a better and more effective alternative under such circumstances. 
6.1.2 The Benefits of Collective Management 
The positive benefits of collective management have been repeatedly highlighted.8 Ficsor distils the 
functions of collecting societies9 as entailing (i) monitoring the use of their members’ works; (ii) 
negotiating with prospective users; (iii) issuing licences; (iv) collecting remuneration and (v) 
distributing the remuneration among the members whose works were used.10 Collective 
management also has benefits for users, enabling easy access to a large body of works from a 
single source and simplifying negotiations.11 It has, in this regard, to be mentioned that collective 
management of copyright has never been seen, in its historical origins and development, as 
conflicting with or obstructing the individual management of copyright by the rights-holders 
                                               
2
 See the discussion in Chapter 5 supra regarding the exclusive nature of copyright protection. 
3
 Ficsor Collective Management at 15 and 16. 
4
 Ficsor 2003 Copyright Bulletin 1. 
5
 See Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 1790. 
6
 See Ficsor Collective Management 19; Von Lewinski International Copyright Law 61; WIPO Intellectual Property 
Handbook 387; UNESCO The ABC of Copyright 73 .  
7
 Or else converted to a non-voluntary licensing system. See Ficsor id at 17. 
8
 See WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook 387 – 400 generally; Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone 
James 1790 – 1794; UNESCO The ABC of Copyright 78; Bently and Sherman Intellectual Property 269 – 270 and Riccio 
and Codiglione 2013 Masaryk U. J.L. & Tech. 
9
 Also popularly known as collective management organisations (CMOs). The two phrases are used interchangeably in this 
thesis.  
10
 Ficsor Collective Management 17, at para 21. 
11
 Ficsor id at 17 – 18. 
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themselves. It has rather been seen as a system and / or mechanism that can be contrasted with 
and is complementary to the system of individual rights management, leaving the rights-holder with 
the freedom to individually administer his rights “in constellations in which the right holder is in a 
position to contract directly with the user(s) of his work(s).”12  
In view of the foregoing it has been observed that “a collecting society acts instead of the right 
holder, but ultimately on his behalf.”13 This is an important observation and thus where the system of 
collective management is seen as replacing the rights-holder’s ability to administer the rights himself 
then such a system is misdirected and unjustifiable. One of the well-recognised rationales for the 
existence of the collective management system is that it serves to overcome high transactions costs 
that arise from the market failure in relation to the identification of and negotiation with large 
numbers of users by individual rights-holders.14 Schovsbo expresses this phenomenon in the 
following manner: 
On the level of the market several things happen. First and foremost, collectivization opens up access 
to the use of works which would otherwise have been inaccessible because of transaction costs. This 
in turn transfers money to authors from users … To this process collectivization is instrumental 
because it makes copyright work in areas where no individual markets exist, or where such markets 
would be sub-optimal. …
15
 
Collective management organisations play a critical role in the administration of music copyright in 
South Africa and their importance has become a topical issue in South Africa. However, not much 
has been written about the nature and legal basis of their operations. This section will thus provide 
much assistance in understanding the operations of CMOs and the idiosyncrasies of the system, 
focussing on the South African environment. 
6.2 Dealing with the Monopolistic Nature of Copyright Societies 
It is common cause that CMOs are de facto (and sometimes de iure) monopolies. Their role in 
reducing transaction costs is however seen as legitimising their existence in spite of their 
monopolistic position.16 In view of this, CMOs have sometimes been called “natural monopolies”.17 It 
                                               
12
 Hilty RM, “Individual, multiple and collective ownership: what impact on competition?”, in Rosén Individualism and 
Collectivism 35. 
13
 Hilty id at 37. 
14
 See in this regard Handke and Towse 2007 IIC; Hansen and Bischoffshausen 2007  
https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998328 and Schovsbo J “The necessity to collectivize copyright – 
and dangers thereof”, in Rosén Individualism and Collectivism. Transaction costs have been called “costs of exchange”, 
and include search costs (finding an “exchange partner”, or someone who can buy or sell one’s products); bargaining costs 
(successful negotiations, including the conclusion of contracts), and enforcement costs (monitoring performance and 
“punishing violations”, which would include costs relating to the institution of infringement actions against copyright 
violators). See in this regard Cooter and Ulen Law and Economics 88. Nevertheless, it needs to be noted that collective 
management’s function in reducing transaction costs is a benefit that applies equally for users as it does for rights-holders. 
See Ficsor Collective Management 18. 
15
 Schovsbo id at 177. 
16
 See Riccio and Codiglione 2013 Masaryk University Journal of Law and Technology 291 – 293. Because of the benefits 
provided by the collective management system Riccio and Codiglione have observed that “it seems difficult to overcome 
the dogma of a centralized collective management.” Id at 293. 
17
 A natural monopoly exists where “a sole supplier can offer a good or as the case may be, a bundle of goods, on a 
relevant market at lower production costs than two or more suppliers (so-called sub-additive cost function)”. Hansen and 
230 
 
has been said that in respect of CMOs, the concept of natural monopoly is used in relation to “the 
relationship between the demand and the technology of supply”, where “the costs associated with 
the management solutions provided by collecting societies make it economically preferable for one 
single entity to serve the entire market.”18 In view of this, collecting societies are often exempted 
from competition laws and regulated separately to prevent rising market costs.19 It is likewise 
believed that CMOs offer efficiencies and benefits that far outweigh “the cost associated with their 
monopolistic nature.”20 Not everyone is however enthusiastic about the idea of collecting societies 
being seen as natural monopolies.21 In this regard Katz argues that the cost efficiency argument in 
favour of CMOs is not that straightforward, as many of the underlying cost efficiencies attributed to 
CMOs are merely assumed and could be achieved “under less restrictive arrangements”.22 Having 
indicated this, the prevailing view is one that sees CMOs as natural monopolies that should be 
exempt from strict competition rules while subject to other forms of government regulation.23  
                                                                                                                                                              
Bischoffshausen 2007 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998328 9 n 66. More specifically, “[a] natural 
monopoly arises when the average costs of producing a product or service declines as more of the product or service is 
supplied to the market.” Ghosh 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev.1138.  For the application of the concept in respect of intellectual 
property see Duffy 2004 U. Chi. L. Rev. generally. For the idea of CMOs being seen as natural monopolies see also 
Handke and Towse 2007 IIC generally and the US decision of Broadcast Music, Inc. v Moor-Law Inc. 527 F. Supp. 758 
(D.Del.1981), at 762 – 763, where the court agreed that Broadcast Music Inc. (BMI), a performing rights society, was a 
natural monopoly. 
18
 Flanagan and Montagnani Intellectual Property Law 148. 
19
 Drexl Research Handbook on Intellectual Property 396; Drexl J “Competition in the field of collective management: 
preferring ‘creative competition’ to allocative efficiency in European copyright law”, in Torremans (ed) Copyright Law 263 – 
264; also Kretschmer 2002 EIPR 126. In this regard Drexl et al 2013 https://ssrn.com/abstract=2208971 further note: “… 
[T]he natural monopoly of collecting societies should be accepted as an efficient market solution. In principle, law should 
not try to try to impose competition on natural monopolies; otherwise it would endanger the efficiencies arising from the 
monopoly. Yet law should regulate the monopoly by addressing its anti-competitive effects and, more specifically act 
against abuse of the market dominance of collecting societies.” Similarly Throsby Economics of Cultural Policy 205 argues 
that “the natural monopoly” reason for the emergence of a single supplier is that “[t]he cost efficiency of a strong natural 
monopoly in any market provides an effective barrier against the entry of new firms, since a new entrant is unlikely to be 
able to achieve the same scale economies as those enjoyed by the incumbent firm.” 
20
 Katz 2005 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 551. 
21
  Ricolfi M “Individual and Collective Management of Copyright in a Digital Environment”, in Torremans (ed) Copyright 
Law 298 highlights the position that the argument “… that CRMOs are a remedy for market failure has now become 
obsolete.” 
22
 See Katz 2005 J. Comp. L. & Econ. especially from 553 – 593. See also Katz 2006 J. Comp. L. & Econ. generally. One 
of the arguments advanced by Katz for this position is that other entities, such as music publishers can achieve the same 
“economies of scale and scope” attributed to CMOs, arguing that this explains “the common practice” whereby songwriters 
assign their full copyright to publishers “in exchange to the publisher’s service and payment of the writer’s share for the 
royalties collected by the publisher”. Katz id at 554.  It has however, been shown that songwriters do not always conclude 
publishing agreements willingly but because they feel compelled to do so, and that such contracts are often couched in 
unconscionable terms. See in this regard Baloyi 2012 SA Merc LJ 218 – 232 and Baloyi 2014 PELJ 86 – 167 generally.  In 
this regard it has been argued that those who criticise the collecting society system are often exploiting businesses (such 
as music publishers), “who have an own interest in acquiring and exercising certain authors’ rights”, and those who are 
under obligation to pay a remuneration. Von Lewinski 2004 http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/19552/11515904771 
svl_e.pdf/svl_e.pdf 1. As to Katz’s argument that “… the existence of multiple publishers of varying sizes suggests that the 
minimum efficient scale for copyright administration … can probably be achieved at scales that fall well short of monopoly” 
one needs to heed the warning of Riccio and Codiglione 2013 Masaryk U. J.L. & Tech. (at 299), that ‘the market opening 
process may increase majors [i.e. major publishers]’s commercial power, that could manage bigger and enormous musical 
repertoires, increasing also their own contractual power, passing from a “collecting societies monopoly to a “major right 
owners monopoly”’.   
23
 See in this regard Torremans Copyright Law 264, and 263 – 268, generally and Dworkin G “Monopoly, non-participating 
rightowners, relationship authors/producers, Copyright Tribunal”, in Jehoram, Keuchenius and Seignette Collective 
Administration 12 – 14. The tolerance for the monopoly status of CMOs was expressed by the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) in Ochranný svaz autorský pro práva k dílům hudebním o.s. v Léčebné lázně Mariánské Lázně 
a.s. Case C – 351/12, where the court observed (at para 72) that “… legislation … which grants a collecting society … a 
monopoly over the management of copyright in relation to a category of protected works … must be considered as suitable 
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Perhaps a more balanced view is that presented by Ghosh, who relates the concept of natural 
monopoly to the intellectual property system itself. In this regard Ghosh argues that the use of the 
natural monopoly concept in relation to intellectual property is in fact a metaphor arising from the 
exclusive nature of intellectual property, as “the exclusivity associated with intellectual property can 
be understood in the same terms as the exclusivity enjoyed by a natural monopolist.”24 According to 
Ghosh the outcome of such a view is that the intellectual property system can itself be seen as a 
regulatory system capable of safeguarding consumer interests and enhancing potential 
competition.25 Kretschmer on the other hand, envisages a different rationale for copyright “beyond 
the private property premise”, whereby collecting societies would, themselves, be converted into 
“regulatory instruments”, based on the principle that “wherever commerce is generated through the 
use of creative content, a share of revenues should flow back into creative production.”26 It is 
suggested that a system of measured regulation, allowing room for the use of competition rules 
where appropriate, would be more appropriate one for CMOs to ensure their more efficient 
operations – at least in the South African context.  
6.3 Has Digital Technology Rendered the Role of CMOs redundant? 
There are those who have argued that the advent of digital technology with the concomitant use of 
digital rights management (DRM) systems has rendered the role of CMOs obsolete or irrelevant, as 
rights-holders may now easily control the use of their works.27 In this regard it is argued that, 
because “DRM enables rightsholders to individually monitor and meter the use of copyright 
protected works, resort to it would ultimately make CRMOS [collective rights management 
organisations – another alternative for CMOs] redundant.”28 Thus, because rights-holders can now 
(supposedly) easily do what CMOs did for them, it is argued that the role of CMOs has been 
rendered redundant.29 Katz, displaying greater confidence in the veracity of this argument, has 
                                                                                                                                                              
for protecting intellectual property rights, since it is liable to allow the effective management of those rights and an effective 
supervision of their respect in the that territory.” For various approaches regarding the regulation of CMOs see Thorpe 
1998 Prometheus 317 – 329 and Street, Laing and Schroff 2016 International Journal of Cultural Policy 1 – 19. 
24
 Ghosh 2008 U. Ill. L. Rev.1128. 
25
 Ghosh ibid generally. For a similar view see Liu 2004 N.C. L. Rev. generally, and at 102 – 103, where the author asserts 
that ‘all copyright legislation “regulates” the copyright markets.” 
26
 Kretschmer 2002 EIPR 135 – 136. 
27
 See for example in this regard Ricolfi M “Individual and Collective Management of Copyright in a Digital Environment”, in 
Torremans Copyright Law 283 – 314, and Katz 2006 J. Comp. L. & Econ. generally. Ricolfi for example clearly states (at 
298): “DRM may be visualised as a device for replacing collective management through individual management”, further 
observing (283): “At times, it even appears that in the long run collective rights management and collective rights 
management organisations (CRMOs) might end up being altogether displaced from the digital environment.” Katz is even 
more pronounced on his views. See also Graber et al Digital Rights Management generally, for a debate on these 
questions.  
28
 Ricolfi id at 283. Ricolfi also makes reference to another school of thought which suggests that the displacement of 
CMOs shall be carried out through the setting up of “levy-based neo-regulatory devices”, e.g. a so-called “governmentally 
administered reward system” which would in the long, “phase out copyright in the entertainment sector.” Ibid. According to 
this theory, in the neo-regulatory system or “plan” the compensation or “final price” will be set by states, and such 
compensation will be “in exchange for the whole package of all registered works” instead of individual works, making it 
“impossible for rightsholders to engage in the educated guess of anticipating demand for a given work … and of setting the 
price accordingly.” Id at 306.  
29
 Ricolfi gives the analogy of a comet in explaining this theory. Just as the tail of a comet follows its head (and is thus 
dependent on the head), so collective management of copyright was, before the advent of digital technology, a secondary 
form of exploitation following upon and dependent on the success of the primary uses controlled by individual rights-
holders. [See below in Chapter 8 for the distinction between primary and secondary uses of copyright works]. However (so 
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suggested that digital technology will result in collecting societies shedding their current activity of 
collective management and assuming new roles such as online merchants, infringement monitors 
and / or standard-setting organisations.30 In this regard Katz asserts that, apart from the limited role 
of only administering back catalogues, “[the CMOs’] traditional functions of collective administration 
would no longer exist.”31  
The view that CMOs will lose their relevance in the digital environment has been countered by 
others. Firstly it needs to be noted that it has been over ten years since Katz predicted the demise of 
CMOs, and this prediction does not seem to have come true as CMOs continue their activities 
unabated. There is also continuing governmental and intergovernmental support for CMO activities, 
in particular in the European Union and the developing world.32 Meyer33 outlines a number of tasks 
performed by CMOs that cannot be replaced by DRMs, including the documentation of works and 
rights-holder information; the monitoring of music usage; the negotiation of tariffs and lobbying. 
Hansen and Bischoffshausen mention, inter alia, the search and information costs of users;34 the 
role of CMOs in the administration of copyright levies and the economies of scale and of scope 
realised through the blanket licensing of copyright works (as opposed to the individual or 
transactional licensing inherent in DRM systems).35 Garnett, Davies and Harbottle point out to the 
fact that DRMs can in fact be used positively by CMOs “to facilitate the administration of rights in the 
digital environment.”36  
Perhaps offering a more balanced analysis, Gervais argues that the role of CMOs in the digital 
environment can best be described as “evolutionary”, arguing that CMOs would need to adapt in 
order to remain efficient and relevant.37 In particular, Gervais argues that CMOs can be instrumental 
in resolving the problem of fragmentation of copyright, by “bundling fragments” for purposes of 
licensing copyright usages (e.g. through the issuing of a single fee licence representing the rights 
                                                                                                                                                              
the argument goes), after the advent of digital technology (and the demise of the “factory” which characterised the 
analogue, primary use market), “it does not make sense any longer to speak of primary and secondary exploitation, of the 
head and of the tail of a comet, because the very sequence of acts of exploitation no longer needs to start from a ‘factory’. 
Maybe the comet has been replaced by a Milky Way Galaxy. …” Ricolfi id at 285; 312 – 313. 
30
 Katz 2006 J. Comp. L. & Econ. 273 – 277. 
31
 Katz id at 277. It needs however to be noted that Katz made this prediction over ten years ago (in 2006) and there is no 
indication that the role of collecting societies is, in any way, diminishing. The passing of instruments such as the EU 
Directive on Collective Management of Copyright, and the growing interest in collective management amongst developing 
nations signifies the confidence of regulators in collective management and its continuing relevance. 
32
 The passing of the EU Directive on Collective Management in 2014 has affirmed the EU’s long-standing support of 
collective management as an effective system of copyright management, while ensuring that CMOs operate within 
acceptable guidelines and principles to ensure their greater efficiency and the safeguarding of the interests of rights-
holders and users. Collective management has also shown growth in Africa (though not without problems). See in this 
regard Baloyi JJ and Pistorius T “Collective Management in Africa”, in Gervais Collective Management of Copyright (2016) 
369 – 424 and Monyatsi ARIPO Survey http://www.aripo.org/news-events-publications/annoucements/item/113-survey-on-
the-status-of-cmos-in-aripo-member-states.  
33
 Meyer A “DRMs Do Not Replace Collecting Societies”, in Graber et al Digital Rights Management 64. 
34
 When seeking to determine which works to use and who the copyright owners of such works are. This may be 
problematic, especially where foreign works are used.  
35
 Hansen and Bischoffshausen 2007 https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=998328 13 et seq. 
36
 Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 1826 – 1829. 
37
 Gervais D “Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age”, in Gervais  Collective 
Management of Copyright (2016) 7. In this regard it is observed: “What is certain … is that the ability of CMOs to meet the 
needs of both authors and users is contingent on the evolution of both their internal practices, and the framework in which 
CMOs work to alleviate the many concerns of fragmentation within the current system.” Gervais id at 23. 
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controlled by several CMOs), where the bundle can then be “split” for distribution purposes without 
any hassles for users.38 
6.4 Collective Management in Africa – General Observations 
Despite growing criticism of collecting societies, the relevance of the system of collective 
management for less developed nations such as those in Africa cannot be negated. With lack of 
developed copyright markets and a lack of sophistication and / or resources in the individual 
administration of rights, rights-holders in less developed nations are often vulnerable to exploitation 
and unconscionable conduct by “exploiting businesses”.39 Consequently, a well-functioning and well-
resourced copyright society can go a long way in assisting rights-holders from such countries to 
reap benefits from the use of their musical works.40 It was pointed out above that despite the 
assertions of some, the advent of digital technology has not, as such, rendered obsolete the role of 
collective management of copyright. In some instances digital technology may have strengthened 
the need for progressive, highly-responsive CMOs.41 In particular in Africa, where high internet 
connectivity costs limit transacting in the digital environment,42 CMOs can play a role by streamlining 
the processes and thus saving costs. Moreover, the traditional market for collective management 
(i.e. licensing of phono-mechanical rights, broadcast rights and public performance rights) remains 
intact in most of Africa, and seems poised to do so for the foreseeable future. Although physical 
music sales have recently been overtaken by digital sales,43 the physical market remains a viable 
market in many African countries, and the transition to digital broadcasting has been at a snail 
pace.44 This, coupled with the fact that music continues to be used in hundreds of public 
performance venues such as restaurants, pubs, hotels, retail establishments, halls and stadiums, 
validates the continuing importance of collecting societies.  
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 Gervais id at 15; 20-23.  Gervais argues that CMOs can, in this regard, play a rationalising and organising role. 
Fragmentation is explained as arising from the fact that copyright is a bundle of rights, where each sub-right (or copyright 
fragment), e.g. publishing rights, reproduction rights or performing rights, can be owned by different rights-holders with the 
result that a single use of a copyright work would often require multiple authorisations from different rights-holders. See 
Gervais id at 12 – 15.  
39
 For barriers experienced by rights-holders from developing nations with regard to the exploitation of their copyright 
works, and the unfair advantage taken by “exploiting businesses” (e.g. music publishers and record companies) as a result 
see generally Baloyi PELJ 86 – 167. 
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 Individual licensing in respect of some rights (especially those that are not normally administered through collective 
management) will of course, remain open to rights-holders, but, as observed, it is in the area of individual management 
that many authors and composers are subjected to unconscionable arrangements. See Baloyi ibid and Baloyi 2012 SA 
Merc LJ generally. Furthermore it has been observed that “… the culture of payment of royalties with respect to authors’ 
rights … is virtually unknown or non-existent [in many African countries] except at the collecting society level”, prompting 
many musicians to prefer a “buy-out” of rights, “since they don’t have much faith on [the] royalties mode of payment”, with 
the result  “collective management of rights represents the better known or better established system of royalty earnings … 
[and for] many authors/composers … the only system from which they can ever hope to earn royalties.” Baloyi 2014 
MEIEA 65 – 66. 
41
 As Gervais has observed, it is difficult to see how the online mass and P2P market can be organised (through the 
provision of “a broad license to use … music”) without the involvement of CMOs. See Gervais D “Collective Management 
of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age”, in Gervais Collective Management of Copyright (2016) at 22. 
42
 See Muwanga http://wikieducator.org/images/f/f3/PID_289.pdf. Some reasons attributed for the high cost of internet 
connectivity in Africa include inadequate investment in basic infrastructure, unfavourable economic market conditions and 
insufficient competition in certain market segments. See ITU Study 2013 https://www.itu.int/en/ITU-D/Regulatory-
Market/Documents/IIC_Africa_Final-en.pdf at 30 - 33. 
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 See IFPI Global Music Report 2016 http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2016.pdf.  
44
 See Vourlias 2016 http://variety.com/2016/digital/global/africa-transition-digital-1201745102/. There has also been an 
observable resurgence in vinyl record sales, at one stage also surpassing digital record sales. See Billboard March 14, 
2015.  
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As indicated above, there has been a growing interest in collective management amongst African 
nations and many have only recently set up CMOs or updated their laws to make provision for this. 
A number of African countries have hosted several collective management seminars under the 
auspices of international and inter-governmental organisations such as WIPO, ARIPO and 
KOPINOR. This notwithstanding, it is the observation of the writer that the euphoria associated with 
collective management in Africa and its benefits does not always give rise to effective and 
empowering policies, laws and regulations in relation to the formation and functioning of CMOs. The 
writer has often observed a slant towards over-regulation, which, rather than facilitating an 
environment conducive to the smooth and proper functioning of collecting societies, has instead 
often resulted in a chaotic state leading to a highly litigious environment. Invariably rights-holders 
bear the brunt of such mishaps. This trend has particularly been observed in Nigeria, Kenya and 
here in South Africa. This is a worrying trend as these are the leading economies in Africa and thus 
should set an example for the proper functioning of CMOs.  
It is the writer’s conviction that this trend often arises from an obsession with overly-regulated 
mandatory systems of collective management, implemented (whether consciously or 
subconsciously) as a punitive measure against what are perceived as unsavoury practices of CMOs. 
Rather than remedying the situation however, such measures only stifle the proper functioning of 
CMOs and thus fail to safeguard the interests of rights-holders. As Von Lewinsky has observed, this 
is often as a result of regulators “[having] little regard to the particularities of authors’ rights.”45 In the 
ensuing pages the writer will discuss the operations of copyright societies in South Africa, with a 
focus on the operations of SAMRO, the largest CMO in Africa. This is to highlight the typical 
operations of a CMO in Africa. This will be followed by an analysis of the regulation of CMOs in 
Nigeria, Kenya and South Africa, with the aim of critically highlighting the pitfalls in the regulatory 
systems applicable to such CMOs and proposing a better model of collective management in Africa. 
This exercise shall be completed in Chapter 8 with a consideration of the EU Directive on Collective 
Management and how the adoption of some of its principles can assist South Africa (and hopefully 
other African countries) in implementing a more effective regime for collective management.   
6.5 The History and Nature of Collective Management of Musical Works 
in South Africa46 
The history of collective management in South Africa (as in many other African countries) can be 
traced back to colonial times. South Africa being a colony of the British, the UK’s Performing Right 
Society (PRS), formed in 1914, had operations in South Africa from 1925 until 1961.47 The PRS 
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 See Von Lewinski 2004  
http://portal.unesco.org/culture/en/files/19552/11515904771svl_e.pdf/svl_e.pdf  1. Emphasis added. 
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 Information on the history of collective management in South Africa is sparse, and thus much of the discussion in this 
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established an agency in the Union of South Africa (as South African was then known) in 1925 and 
this was, in fact the PRS’s first overseas agency.48 At the time the following was observed: 
… Until recently … [the performing right] has not been of much practical importance in South Africa 
owing to the fact that little or no attempt has been made to enforce it, but with the advent of the 
Performing Right Society, Ltd., a society formed for the express purpose of enforcing this right on 
behalf of its members, the matter has become of the greatest importance to conductors of orchestras 
and proprietors of place of entertainment throughout the country. …
49
 
The modus operandi of the PRS was to appoint agents to represent its interests not only in the 
Union, but also in South West Africa (now Namibia), British Bechuanaland (now Botswana), 
Basutoland (now Lesotho) and Swaziland. This observation is important in that it can be linked to 
the concept of a “SAMRO territory” that has been prevalent in the licensing activities of SAMRO for 
a concerted period. The “SAMRO territory” was this PRS territory in Southern Africa (incorporating in 
particular South Africa, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland), i.e. the areas in which the PRS 
exercised its rights before transferring these to SAMRO in 1961 (the year of South Africa’s 
independence from Britain). This is in fact, the reason why SAMRO’s name was changed from 
South African Music Rights Organisation to Southern African Music Rights Organisation, where it is 
acknowledged that “[t]he new name sought to reflect that SAMRO was not just for South Africans 
but would be active throughout the region”.50 
From the time that the PRS handed over its operations to SAMRO the later conducted its licensing 
operations in the “SAMRO territory”, and the standard SAMRO licence agreement always reflected 
this position. This often created conflicts with these other countries – particularly after they 
themselves started to have interest in collective management.51 Obviously these SAMRO territory 
countries were all British colonies so the PRS’s reach to these countries could be justified on this 
basis.52 After these countries gained independence from Britain however (and after South Africa 
itself gained independence from Britain), the only justification for SAMRO’s involvement in these 
sovereign countries (which was not limited to licensing activities but also entailed SAMRO being the 
de facto CMO in these countries), would be that these countries had under-developed or poorly-
enforced copyright laws. Secondly, on a practical level many South African businesses that set up 
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 See in this regard Billboard Nov. 6, 1976 C-44; also 
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 This was certainly the case in Botswana after the enactment of its Copyright and Neighbouring Rights Act, 2000 (as 
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West Africa, now called Namibia, gained independence from South Africa in 1990. See generally in this regard 
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shop in these countries were willing53 to extend the scope of their licensing agreement with SAMRO, 
concluded in South Africa, to include their operations in these other countries.54 It is arguably this 
latter scenario that continued to provide the real lifeline for the “SAMRO territory” licensing model. 
This is because, from a legal standpoint, SAMRO’s licensing of activities taking place in these other 
countries based on licences concluded in South Africa in terms of South African legislation would be 
on shaky ground.55 Currently SAMRO’s licensing operations in these other territories have 
decreased drastically.56  
The events leading to the formation of SAMRO are well captured in the following extract: 
The PRS agents were usually firms of attorneys based in the various territories and reporting to a 
Chief Agent who was based in South Africa. From April 1938 until September 1961 the PRS’ Chief 
Agent was the firm of Ivan Christian Silberbauer. In 1959 Dr. Gideon Roos Snr., a former Director-
General of the SABC, commenced discussions with the PRS with a view to obtaining the PRS’ 
assistance in establishing South Africa’s own collective management organization. These discussions 
culminated in the conclusion of an agreement between the PRS and Dr. Roos in July 1961, appointing 
the later [sic] as its South African General Manager pending the formation of a South African company 
that would take over the PRS’ operations in the five countries. Dr. Roos would replace Silberbauer as 
the PRS’ representative in South Africa and, pending the formation of the new company, the PRS 
would execute a power of attorney in favor of Dr. Roos to enable him to represent the PRS in the five 
territories. The PRS would also assist with the formation of the new company and would ensure that 
Dr. Roos was appointed as the first General Manager of the new company.
57
 
It has been observed that SAMRO is the oldest, and in fact the most-established and effective CMO 
in Africa, contributing over fifty percent (50%) of African collecting society revenues as of 2015.58 
SAMRO was originally constituted as a society primarily concerned with the administration of 
performing rights, taking over the role previously played by the PRS. SAMRO’s constitutive 
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57
 Baloyi and Pistorius in Gervais Collective Management of Copyright 384. 
58
 Baloyi and Pistorius id at 374. 
237 
 
documents (its erstwhile memorandum and articles of association) however, permitted it to 
administer a whole range of other music-related rights, including mechanical and synchronisation 
rights. Because SAMRO’s members also had an interest in mechanical rights, the Board of SAMRO 
resolved in July 1962 to also administer mechanical rights on behalf of SAMRO’s members. This led 
to some conflict with the Mechanical Copyright Protection Society,59 the UK’s mechanical rights 
society, which, like the PRS, had operations in South Africa.60 After deliberations SAMRO limited its 
mechanical rights administration to only one case,61 paving the way for the MCPS and its successor, 
the South African Recording Rights Limited (SARRAL), to administer mechanical rights without the 
threat of competition from SAMRO.  
SARRAL was formed in 1963 and its first members were the MCPS, Chappell62 and some local 
music publishers. In this regard the following has been observed: 
By 1965 SARRAL had had little success with efforts to obtain assignments of mechanical rights from 
composers, as they appeared to trust SAMRO’s ability more than those of the new CMO. In view of 
this a tentative agreement was reached that SAMRO would obtain assignments from its members 
both in respect of performing rights and mechanical rights … and thereafter “sub-assign” the 
appropriate portion of the mechanical rights to SARRAL for it to administer them. This thus began the 
practice whereby SARRAL became an agency in respect of mechanical rights, while SAMRO 
continued to obtain three forms of deeds of assignment from its members [i.e. in respect of performing 
rights, mechanical rights and synchronisation rights] so that by 2006, when SAMRO took the decision 
to enter into the administration of mechanical rights … it had stacks of mechanical and 
synchronization agreements that it could immediately use.
63
 
SARRAL however continued to experience an uphill battle with the administration of mechanical 
rights “to a point where in 1970/71 [its membership] was virtually nil and the very existence of the 
society was in jeopardy….”64 As part of this crisis a break-away organisation, the National 
Organisation for Reproduction Rights in Music (NORM), was formed “with the support of the major 
record-label aligned publishers”, following the trend in the 1970’s where record label groups 
acquired ownership of publishers.65   
SARRAL’s revival took shape around 1976, championed by certain major European collecting 
societies, namely SACEM (France), SDRM (France), GEMA (West Germany) and MCPS (UK), 
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which became its “main members”.66 As observed, “[t]his triggered off a program of reorganization 
and replanning which resulted in the steady growth of the society in becoming the mechanical rights 
collection agency for South Africa. …”67 With time, NORM’s membership was largely comprised of 
publishers (including the major publishers) and fewer authors, while SARRAL’s membership was 
largely comprised of authors (both composers and lyricists) and fewer publishers. SARRAL’s control 
of the author market was also enhanced by its affiliation with foreign collecting societies.68 As a 
result, the two mechanical rights organisations focussed on different areas of mechanical rights 
administration: NORM, because of its publisher link to record labels, was mainly involved in the 
licensing of “commercial music”,69 while SARRAL “largely focused on the licensing of mechanical 
rights in the area of radio, TV, film, private pressing, background music etc., with limited involvement 
in the field of commercial music.”70  
It has been observed that the administration of mechanical rights in South Africa has been 
historically beset with problems and “fallen short of its real potential.”71 This has mainly been as a 
result of difficulties in licensing radio and television uses, and the contentions that arose between 
SARRAL and NORM. This era in South African music rights administration is important to highlight 
because it ultimately led to the liquidation of SARRAL in the case of Shapiro and Galeta v South 
African Recording Rights [Association Limited],72 ushering in a new era in collective management of 
mechanical rights with the formation of the Composers, Authors and Publishers Association 
(CAPASSO) in 2014.73 SARRAL in fact championed broadcast mechanical licensing in South 
Africa.74 Initially SARRAL faced an uphill battle with regard to this.75 This was mainly as a result of 
the ephemeral provisions in copyright legislation, which permits a broadcaster to reproduce a 
musical work without paying compensation as long as such reproduction is destroyed within a period 
of six months of making the reproduction, or, where the reproduction is of an exceptional 
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documentary nature, archived before the end of the period of six months.76 Clearly as a way of using 
these provisions to its advantage the SABC insisted on using in-house facilities when reproducing 
musical works, or  
where [it] used recordings made by outside studios [it] insisted on the use of cheap, production music 
or music that was directly commissioned … from local composers, where the musicians were paid 
nominal once-off fees in exchange to giving the SABC the right to make virtually unlimited recordings 
of the musical works.
77
   
However, because of a number of factors, namely (a) the fact that production needed to be 
completed long before broadcasting took place; ((b) the need to repeat broadcasts; (c) the need to 
license broadcasts to other users in order to recoup costs and (d) the difficulty arising from the 
licensing of the works on a transactional (i.e. work-by-work) basis, the SABC finally gave in and 
agreed to procure a blanket mechanical rights licence from SARRAL. The first television blanket 
licence was concluded in 1984 (effective from 1983).78 Although the negotiations were initiated by 
SARRAL, the licence was actually signed between SARRAL and NORM on the one part, and the 
SABC on the other. It was observed that  
SARRAL was prompted to invite NORM to form part of the agreement because the SABC had 
required SARRAL to indemnify it against any claim that might arise from the SABC’s use of any 
recordings not represented by SARRAL.
79
 
However, when the second television blanket licence was concluded in 1992 SARRAL deliberately 
excluded NORM from the agreement, with the intention of excluding works “falling within the 
repertoire of NORM members from the indemnity clause while still allocating royalties to such 
works.”80 Explaining this incident Baloyi and Pistorius have observed: 
The exclusion of NORM from the 1992 agreement arose from a disagreement between NORM and 
SARRAL regarding the issue of the use of interest earned on license fees pending distribution. 
SARRAL’s modus operandi was to use the interest to defray its operational expenses, and to cover 
whatever remained outstanding of these expenses from a commission charged on royalties. It appears 
that NORM was demanding a share of this interest, a move resisted by SARRAL. It also appears that 
SARRAL benefited the most from the SABC blanket license (as opposed to NORM), with not more 
than 15% allocated to NORM’s repertoire at any given time. By 2001 the total blanket license amount 
paid by the SABC was ZAR 13, 966.300 million (about USD 1.2 million). Meanwhile NORM felt that its 
full repertoire was not taken account of, especially with regard to music videos …
81
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By excluding NORM from the 1992 agreement SARRAL made a blunder that signalled the 
beginning of its demise. NORM, which had been dissatisfied with the arrangement between it and 
SARRAL, began to make demands for its own blanket licence with the SABC. This led the SABC to 
give notice of its intention to terminate the blanket licence with SARRAL in 2002, while continuing to 
pay royalties on a month-to-month basis. The SABC then appointed audit consultants to determine 
the extent of its licence fee liability, concluding that it was paying more than was warranted. 
Consequently, the SABC reduced the licence fee and divided the reduced amount equally between 
SARRAL and NORM, resulting in SARRAL’s royalty collections decreasing by about seventy 
percent.82 This created a situation where SARRAL was no longer able to meet its expenses, 
tempting it, around 2004, to change its accounting method to be similar to SAMRO’s, as a way of 
ameliorating the effect of the reduction in licence fees.83 This is explained in the following manner: 
Rather than continuing to act as an agent and deducting its expenses from interest and from 
commissions (which ranged between 7% - 9%), SARRAL claimed that its accounting method had 
been incorrect and that it, in fact, owned the royalties it was collecting. On this basis, SARRAL claimed 
that after deducting its expenses from both the interest income and commissioning fees, it was entitled 
to deduct all outstanding expenses from royalty income, prior to paying out what was left to members. 
…
84
 
In this regard SARRAL, without the approval of its members, switched to the accounting method 
used by SAMRO, resulting in almost fifty percent of royalties due to members being used to cover 
SARRAL’s expenses. It was this situation that provided the justification for the winding up of 
SARRAL in the Shapiro case.85 In this regard the court made the following observation: 
It is common cause or not in dispute that from the date of its incorporation until 2003, a period of some 
40 years, the respondent recognised and treated royalties collected as belonging to its members. The 
respondent’s audited financial statements were always drawn on the basis that it was an agent and 
that royalties did not accrue to it or form part of its revenue.  … Royalties were consistently reflected in 
its financial statements as a liability to its members. …
86
 
The above observation is very important in understanding the difference between SAMRO and 
SARRAL in particular and performing rights societies and mechanical rights societies in general, 
regarding the basis of their relationship with their members. While SAMRO (and many other 
performing rights societies internationally), has operated on the basis of an assignment of copyright 
by the author to SAMRO – essentially making the performing rights society the owner of the 
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copyright assigned to it by the author87 – many mechanical rights societies (in particular those from 
Commonwealth jurisdictions) have merely acted as agents of the copyright owners with no transfer 
of copyright to them.88 Thus it has been noted, in respect of the MCPS:  
Unlike many other societies, [notably those from the civil law jurisdictions] the MCPS does not take an 
assignment or license of the copyright of its members. Instead the society acts as an agent for its 
members in granting licenses and in collecting revenue.”
89
 
In the same way, Article 4.1.15 of the CAPASSO Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI)90 provides 
that one of the objects of CAPASSO is to “administer on an agency basis, the copyrights in Works of 
Music as defined in the Copyright Act”.91 This is also the manner in which SARRAL administered the 
rights entrusted to it by its members.92 For this reason, SARRAL’s membership agreement 
contained a provision that stipulated:  
Where necessary to protect, enforce and / or collect mechanical royalties due to the owner, the owner 
shall cede, transfer and assign his copyright to SARRAL for the sole purpose of instituting action for 
the necessary relief in SARRAL’s or its nominee’s name.
93
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This provision strengthens the position that SARRAL merely acted as an agent on behalf of its 
members and did not own copyright in the members’ works, thus requiring a special assignment to 
institute legal proceedings for the enforcement of the members’ rights. The position is further 
supported by the observation of the Copyright Review Commission of 2011, in which it was stated: 
In a system of collective administration, the owners of copyright authorise one or two collecting 
societies to administer their rights. … These societies acquire from their members copyright by 
assignment or act as agents or licensees on behalf of their members to enforce copyright belonging to 
their members.
94
 
Certain mechanical rights societies have, of course, operated on the basis of receiving a grant of 
exclusive licences or even an assignment of rights, in addition to being agents.95 This was however 
not the case with SARRAL. It was in fact SARRAL’s attempt to unilaterally change the basis of its 
relationship with its members from being that of an agent to being that of principal in the collection of 
royalties - justifying a change in its accounting system and the treatment of royalties – that led to its 
liquidation. As the court in the Shapiro case observed, the “vital issue” in that case was whether 
SARRAL was “entitled in terms of its constitutive documents to treat royalties collected as its own 
revenue and not as a liability to members”, and whether SARRAL could permissibly deduct 
operating expenses from the royalties collected.96 As the court held, “[a] finding one way or the other 
on this issue [was] fundamental to the question whether the respondent [was] factually insolvent”, 
systematically mismanaged or guilty of material misstatements in its audited financial statements.97 
The effect of SARRAL’s change of its accounting system was that “the significant liability of 
SARRAL, reflected in all its prior financial statements was converted into the respondent’s own 
revenue and profit”, thus hiding unpaid royalties to its members in excess of eleven million rand 
(R11 000 000).98  
The court held that SARRAL’s change of its method of doing business was in breach of its 
constitutive documents and its position of trust, concluding that liquidation was the most reasonable 
and proper order to grant. In arriving at this decision the court placed much emphasis on the fact 
that SARRAL charged a commission for its services. The court ruled that this was “a most significant 
feature”, seeing that a commission is by its nature, “remuneration for services for work done as an 
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 See Copyright Review Commission Report 2011 https://www.gov.za/documents/copyright-review-commission-report-
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agent”;99 and, quoting the ruling in Drielsma v Manifold,100 “the most general word that can be used 
to describe the remuneration paid to an agent for an agency work other than a salary.” This is in 
contrast to how SAMRO and many performing rights societies operate. As indicated, SAMRO 
operates on the basis of an assignment of rights from its members.101 This essentially means that 
SAMRO legally owns the copyright in respect of the assigned rights and thus, unlike SARRAL, truly 
owns the money collected from the licensing of the rights.  
The foregoing is evident from the definition of “Licence Revenue” in the SAMRO MOI as contrasted 
with the definition of “Royalty Payment”.102 It is clear from this that what amounts to a “Royalty 
Payment” is to be determined by the SAMRO Board after transfers to or from the Royalty Reserves; 
and after making the “Permitted Royalty Deductions”. The expression “Permitted Royalty 
Deductions” is in turn defined in Article 30.5 of the SAMRO MOI as “[certain deductions] from the 
Licence Revenue … of the Company”,103 relating to “such amounts as are determined by the Board 
as they regard as reasonably required” to settle or provide for certain matters. It is clear from this 
therefore that licence revenue is regarded as belonging to the company (i.e. SAMRO) and as only 
available as royalty payment after the making of transfers to or from the royalty reserves, and after 
making certain permitted royalty deductions. Although the amount of any deduction for purposes of 
administration costs is at the discretion of the Board, SAMRO has largely kept its administration 
costs within the thirty percent (30%) ceiling recommended by CISAC.104 Furthermore, from the 
outset SAMRO has not used the interest earned from the investment of licence revenue pending 
distribution, for its own administration costs but as additional distribution to members.105 
While SARRAL’s liquidation case was in progress, SAMRO announced its intention to enter into the 
field of mechanical rights administration in 2016. SAMRO indicated that it took this decision “after 
listening to the representations made by our members … about the difficulties they face regarding 
the administration of their reproduction rights.”106 Naturally many SARRAL members (who happened 
to be also SAMRO members in respect of performing rights) were in a state of anxiety regarding the 
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Payment”. See http://www.samro.org.za/sites/default/files/SAMRO_MOI_as_amended_Sept_2016_-_Final.pdf (date of 
use: 24 September 2017).  “Licence Revenue” is defined as “the royalties, licence fees, and other proceeds (all excluding 
VAT) received by the Company directly from the Company’s Administration of the Administered IP Rights (to be 
determined and attributed by the Board in applying the Payment Rules)”. In contrast “Royalty Payment” is defined in Article 
30.2 as “[the] amount equal to the Licence Revenue (adjusted for transfers to and from Royalty Reserves) received by the 
Company during the relevant financial year minus the Permitted Royalty Deductions … as reasonably determined by the 
Board, applying the Payment Rules with reference to the Licence Revenue attributed to the respective Member’s Granted 
IP Rights.” The article further provides that “[t]he Board shall determine the attribution of the Licence Revenue to the 
respective Member’s Granted IP Rights and the proportions in which such Royalty Payment shall be apportioned between 
the Members, applying the Payment Rules.” Emphasis added. 
103
 Emphasis added. 
104
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future administration of their mechanical rights in light of the SARRAL catastrophe. As indicated, 
SAMRO already had stacks of mechanical rights deeds of assignment that it had procured from 
members over many years.107 When the decision to enter the field of mechanical rights was made 
SAMRO therefore, simply approached its members to inform them of this decision, asking them to 
confirm if they wanted SAMRO to administer their mechanical (and synchronisation) rights; if they 
wanted SAMRO to “licence back” certain aspects of the rights or if they wanted to completely “opt 
out” from SAMRO’s administration of their mechanical rights or aspects thereof (e.g. digital 
usages).108 SAMRO also made inroads with regard to concluding reciprocal agreements with foreign 
mechanical rights societies, with many of them prepared to sever their relationships with SARRAL 
and to transfer their mandates to SAMRO in the wake of SARRAL’s woes.109  
In spite of being in control of the mechanical rights of many rights-holders SAMRO nevertheless 
experienced an uphill battle in its attempt to administer mechanical rights. In the first instance 
SARRAL was angered by SAMRO’s decision to enter the field of mechanical rights, feeling betrayed 
by a “sister” society that was not interested in its recovery but rather wanted to take advantage of its 
misfortunes.110 Secondly, SAMRO came into conflict with NORM also, with the latter feeling that by 
entering into the administration of mechanical rights SAMRO was essentially competing with its own 
members.111 Thirdly, SAMRO had difficulties making inroads into the one area that was 
indispensable for effective mechanical rights administration in South Africa – namely procuring a 
blanket licence from the SABC. As a result of SARRAL’s liquidation in 2009 the SABC unilaterally 
decided to stop any payments in respect of broadcast mechanical rights, which negatively impacted 
upon NORM’s operations. The SABC then insisted on SAMRO and NORM reaching agreement 
before it would be willing to conclude a new mechanical rights blanket licence.112  
This hard-line position from the SABC in fact yielded positive results because it compelled SAMRO 
and NORM, after the demise of SARRAL, to enter into good faith negotiations towards joint licensing 
of their respective repertoires with the SABC, and ultimately, abandoning their mechanical rights 
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operations in order to give way to a new mechanical rights agency. This cause of action was 
successful in that the SABC started paying for broadcast mechanical rights in August 2011, back-
paying both SAMRO and NORM and undertaking to pay a provisional amount of one million rand 
(R1 000 000.00) on a monthly basis from August 2011 going forward, to be shared equally between 
SAMRO and NORM. These amounts would be paid pending a referral by the SABC of the licensing 
schemes of the two collecting societies to the Copyright Tribunal for a final determination with regard 
to the reasonableness “or otherwise” of  the licensing schemes.113 The decision for mutual 
cooperation was further boosted by the report of the Copyright Review Commission, which 
recommended in its report that, following SARRAL’s collapse, there needed to be one collecting 
society per a set of rights and that SAMRO and NORM needed to merge their mechanical rights 
operations within two years of the publication of the report (i.e. between 2011 and 2013).114     
The above developments paved a way for the advent of CAPASSO, the “mechanical rights hub” of 
South Africa today,115 formed and coming into operation in 2014. With the formation of CAPASSO 
SAMRO ceased its operations in respect of the administration of mechanical rights and NORM 
ceased its existence, being replaced by the Music Publishers Association of South Africa 
(MPASA).116 When a person applies for CAPASSO membership, he or she agrees to abide by 
CAPASSO’s Membership Rules if admitted to membership, and further declares that he or she is 
not a member of any other mechanical rights organisation in South Africa.117 This would suggest that 
CAPASSO membership is exclusive; nevertheless, Rule 1.5.1 of the CAPASSO Membership 
Rules118 provides that CAPASSO administers mechanical rights “on a non-exclusive basis”, except 
in respect of “the Mechanical Rights included in blanket broadcast and digital licences, which shall 
be administered on an exclusive basis.” This means that a CAPASSO member may personally 
administer phono-mechanicals, transactional broadcast mechanicals, transactional digital 
mechanicals and any other reproductions of such member’s works, as long as such administration 
does not amount to a blanket broadcast or digital licence. Rule 1.5 makes it explicit that CAPASSO 
“is an agency, operating on Mandate from its Members and does not take assignment of its 
Members’ copyright.”119 
The formation and coming into operation of CAPASSO has arguably ushered in a new era of 
effective mechanical rights administration in South Africa. Along with the demise of SARRAL, a new 
chapter seems to have been opened and the combatting parties seem to have now buried the past. 
One can only hope that the missed opportunities of the past, which arose from the rivalry between 
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SARRAL and NORM and later, the scramble for the mechanical rights cake between NORM, the 
struggling SARRAL and SAMRO, will be compensated for through effective administration in the 
future. Indeed it appears that the formation of CAPASSO has already been yielding positive results. 
With Ms Nothando Migogo (who later joined SAMRO as CEO) at the helm, it has been observed 
that CAPASSO has achieved “triple digit revenue growth and crucial licensing breakthroughs”.120 
The formation of CAPASSO has also been hailed for the integration of rights holders in the field of 
mechanical rights administration (i.e. composers and publishers) “following years of fragmented 
administration”; and also hailed for “the licensing of digital music platforms in South Africa.”121   
Apart from the collecting societies mentioned above there are other collecting societies 
administering copyright and related rights in South Africa. A discussion of such collecting societies is 
however, outside the scope of this work, which is only concerned with musical works. It suffices to 
mention the fact that there are societies in the field of “needle-time” rights,122 namely SAMPRA123 
and IMPRA;124 societies in the field of audio-visual rights, or specifically, music videos, namely 
IMPRA and RAV;125 and a society in the field of reprographic rights,126 namely DALRO.127 Under the 
proposed new regulatory system for collecting societies in South Africa all these organisations shall 
be subject to the new regulations and shall be required to comply with them.  
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6.6 The Anatomy of an African Collecting Society: The Case of the 
Southern African Music Rights Organisation (SAMRO) 
6.6.1 Overview 
As hinted to above, SAMRO is the largest and most developed collecting society in the whole of 
Africa,128 both in terms of size and financial position. SAMRO has also influenced and provided 
assistance to the formation of several other societies in Southern African, just as it has, itself, been 
influenced and assisted by the PRS in the United Kingdom.  Accordingly it is appropriate to use 
SAMRO as a prototype of a fairly-established collecting society in Africa. Having indicated this, it is 
fair to state that SAMRO has been far from being a shining example of what constitutes an ethically-
administered CMO.129 Over the years allegations of maladministration of the royalties of authors 
have been levelled against SAMRO.130 It is submitted however that many of these allegations are 
based on mistaken perceptions rather than reality, mainly owing to the complex nature of the system 
of collective management and the mystery that seems to surround it.131 Because of this complexity 
an impression is often given to the outsider, including oftentimes, government officials, that the 
operations of CMOs are intentionally, maliciously or rather cryptically shrouded in secrecy.132 It is 
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also noteworthy that virtually none of the headline-grabbing allegations of SAMRO depriving certain 
well-known South African musicians of “millions” of rands, which have surfaced in the past twenty 
years or so, have been proven to be true.133 The allegations have thus remained merely of a 
sensational nature but they have, unfortunately, contributed to the dented image that SAMRO has 
experienced in the public eye. One of the more scathing, yet unfounded recent allegations emerged 
in the City Press, in which it is alleged that SAMRO pays over eighty percent of royalties arising from 
the use of out-of-copyright arrangements ‘to a mysterious composer called “DP”’, thus depriving the 
arrangers of the royalties due to them.134  
Dubbed “the biggest music rights scam in South African music history”, the allegation is in fact, 
merely sensational, because first, the acronym “DP” stands for “domaine publique”, meaning “public 
domain”, and is not a reference to “a mysterious composer”.135 Secondly, it is trite fact that the 
                                                                                                                                                              
trite fact that South Africa has, until more recently, only made provision for a private system of collective management and 
this does not mean that the collecting societies have been operating secretively.  
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members whose works did not earn any royalties to also share in this pre-allocation and thus a rule was established to the 
effect that only members “who had produced a reasonable number of works of such a standard that some of them were 
performed in public” would qualify for participating in this scheme. This led to the formation of a third category of 
membership, namely the candidate-member category, “a probationary membership for a period of two years, during which 
time the board would ascertain whether the member’s music was in fact being used.” If the candidate member’s music was 
used then the membership would become an associate member and be eligible to share in the pre-allocation. If not, the 
membership would lapse unless extended by the board. There was no consideration of race regarding this type of 
membership and in fact both whites and blacks became candidate members throughout the years. Furthermore, the status 
of candidate member was never revoked by the board (in spite of the works of the member concerned not having been 
actively used) – probably upon recognition that revoking this status would deprive many budding authors and composers 
from the potential of earning performing rights royalties – and a practice evolved where after every two years the board 
passed a general resolution to extend the SAMRO membership of candidate members. Furthermore these members were 
eligible to attend meetings of SAMRO and to vote accordingly. See further in this regard Baloyi JJ and Pistorius T, 
“Collective Management in Africa”, in Gervais Collective Management of Copyright (2016) 385 – 386. The further 
statement in the City Press article that, because many publisher members of SAMRO are full members, they “obtain 
shares of Samro income that candidate members cannot” (emphasis added), is also misleading. The true position is that 
payment of royalties is based on the usage of a members’ works and if, during any period, more usage of a candidate 
member’s works takes place than that of a full member, the candidate member concerned would earn more royalties than 
the full member.  
134
 Ibid. 
135
 This is clarified in a response article by SAMRO in the Sunday Times, April 29 2018, at 8. 
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allocation of a limited royalty share to arrangements of a public domain work is not unique to 
SAMRO but is a prevalent practice internationally.136 For example, in the case of ASCAP in the USA 
the royalty payable in respect of arrangements of public domain works depend upon such 
considerations as (i) whether the work contains public domain text as well as original music, in which 
case it may receive from between fifty percent (50%) to a hundred percent (100%) “of the Otherwise 
Applicable Credit depending on the extent and treatment of the public domain text within the context 
of the entire work”; or (ii) whether it is a separately-published or separately “copyrighted” work, in 
which case it receives ten percent (10%) and sometimes two percent (2%) of the Otherwise 
Applicable Credit, where “Otherwise Applicable Credit” is defined as the full credit for a single 
performance (or so-called “Use Credit”).137 On the other hand BMI has a standard rate of twenty 
percent (20%) for all arrangements of works in the public, but does not pay royalties in respect of 
live performances of classical works.138 In Canada SOCAN uses various ranges, depending on 
whether the work is published or not, whether new original lyrics are included etc. but generally 
gives the arranger twenty-five percent (25%), and the author of new lyrics fifty percent (50%), with 
the rest of the percentages being designated as “non-controlled”.139  
The SAMRO rate of 16.7% is akin to the PRS capped rate of 16.667% applicable generally for 
performances of works arranged with the permission of the copyright holder.140 SAMRO uses the 
same rate of 16.7% in respect of arrangements of public domain works, asserting that 
internationally, “the percentage apportioned to the arranger is pegged between 12.5% - 25%, 
depending on the country.”141 In the SAMRO situation “[t]he balance 83% [sic] of the royalty share 
that would have accrued to the rest of the arrangement had the DP portion been in copyright is held 
back and distributed to all the active musical works belonging to SAMRO members in proportion to 
the use of their music during the period under review.”142 The money has thus not piled up to now 
amount to R1.2 billion “deducted in DP’s name over 55 years” as alleged in the City Press article.143 
This does not mean that SAMRO could not improve upon the current situation by amending its 
distribution rules to, for example, align with the Canadian practice where SOCAN accords twenty-
                                               
136
 In this respect see Baskerville and Baskerville Music Business Handbook 91, who note: “In respect of performance 
income, ASCAP, BMI, and SESAC are accustomed to paying (often reduced) royalties to authors and publishers of 
arrangements based on works in the public domain.” See also Kohn and Kohn Music Licensing 790. 
137
 See ASCAP’s Survey and Distribution System 2015 https://www.ascap.com/-/media/files/pdf/members/payment/drd.pdf 
(date of use: 27 June 2018). 
138
 https://www.bmi.com/creators/royalty/general_information (date of use: 27 June 2018). 
139
 See SOCAN Distribution Rules 2016 https://www.socan.ca/pdf/en/mem/DistributionRules.pdf (date of use: 27 June 
2018). 
140
 See the PRS Distribution Policy Rules at https://www.prsformusic.com/-/media/files/prs-for-
music/membership/membership-policies/full-document-prs-dist-policy.pdf (date of use: 27 June 2018).  
141
 Sunday Times, April 29 2018, at 8. For SAMRO’s distribution rules see 
http://www.samro.org.za/sites/default/files/SAMRO%20Performing%20Rights%20Royalty%20Distribution%20Rules.pdf 
(date of use: 27 June 2018).  In this regard it needs to be observed that, while at one stage royalties for arrangements of 
works in the public domain “[varied] from 1/1 to 1/24” depending on the level of originality of the arrangement, the present 
PRS position is that the arranger is treated “as if he / she was the composer of an original composition”, thus with the 
potential of according to such arranger the full copyright value to such an arrangement, often after assessment by a 
copyright panel. See Rothenberg Public Performance of Music 109 at n 12; PRS Distribution Policy Rules at 
https://www.prsformusic.com/-/media/files/prs-for-music/membership/membership-policies/full-document-prs-dist-policy.pdf 
(date of use: 27 June 2018); Gammons Art of Music Publishing 135.  
142
 Sunday Times, April 29 2018, at 8. 
143
 City Press, April 1 2018, at 2. 
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five percent (25%) to arrangers. There is a real need for SAMRO to do so and this is accentuated by 
the fact that SAMRO operates in the developing world and further, in a country beset with past 
injustices. SAMRO has itself recognised the need to amend its rules accordingly, and has stated 
that it has, since 2017, been in a process to do so.144  
Having indicated the above, SAMRO’s practices cannot be defended at all cost and where these 
display lack of transparency or fall short of exemplary conduct, they need to be pointed out. This is 
important because the system of collective management of copyright needs to work and to be seen 
to work in Africa. As a leading CMO many African CMOs are looking up to SAMRO as a model of 
what constitutes efficient collective management of copyright in an African context. Moreover, it is 
important for SAMRO to function both effectively and ethically because the livelihoods of many a 
creator – some of whom have no other means of accessing copyright economic markets – are 
dependent on this. In this regard the observation made in the EU Collective Management Directive 
is apt: 
… Collective management organizations play, and should continue to play, an important role as 
promoters of the diversity of cultural expression, both by enabling the smallest and less popular 
repertoires to access the market and by providing social, cultural and educational services for the 
benefit of their rightholders and the public.
145
 
Against this backdrop the recent media reports about SAMRO having lost almost forty million rand 
(R40 million) after “investing” the money in a Dubai entity are a matter of great concern and do not 
bode well for SAMRO’s role as a model for efficient collective management of copyright in Africa.146 
The account states that SAMRO had, without the consent of members, invested the money in an 
entity that was a subsidiary of the Arab Emirates Music Rights Organisation (AEMRO), and that 
some of the money had been used to cover operational expenses.147 It is reported that SAMRO had 
invested the money in line with its strategic growth priorities, “hoping to become a leading 
organisation in Africa and globally”, and had identified “a potential return on investment of more than 
R1bn ($71m)”.148 It is stated that “although [SAMRO was] aware that the South African music 
industry was not leading in Dubai, Samro’s business model believed it would receive a negotiated 
administration fee on all collections and contributions directly to the South African company’s 
revenue.”149  
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 Sunday Times, April 29 2018, at 8. 
145
 Recital 3, Directive 2014/26/EU on Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-territorial 
Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Uses, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0026 (date of use: 28 June 2018). 
146
 See https://www.channel24.co.za/Music/News/south-african-musicians-have-lost-more-than-r40m-due-to-bad-
investment-20171029 for the story. (Date of use: 28 June 2018). 
147
 SAMRO itself asserts that members were informed about the strategy. Ibid. 
148
 Ibid. Also https://www.iq-mag.net/2017/11/samro-loses-3m-aborted-uae-aemro-tieup/#.WzrYP9IzbIU (date of use: 28 
June 2018). 
149
 https://www.channel24.co.za/Music/News/south-african-musicians-have-lost-more-than-r40m-due-to-bad-investment-
20171029 (date of use: 28 June 2018). 
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It appears that the problem arose when CISAC refused to admit AEMRO as a member, on the 
ground that it did not have a licence to operate as a CMO in the United Arab Emirates.150 This 
situation clearly raises certain governance questions and begs the question if proper due diligence 
was conducted prior to the decision to invest in this entity. In particular this seems to have been a 
hasty decision on the part of the SAMRO Board because if not, why did the board release the 
money before AEMRO obtained a licence to operate, and before CISAC had admitted AEMRO as a 
member? An answer to these questions is crucial, especially in light of the fact that the demise of 
SARRAL was pinned down to the failure of its governance system.151 It has been indicated that a 
forensic audit is underway to unravel what happened, and one would have to wait for the outcome of 
the audit to determine what actually happened.  
6.6.2 SAMRO as an example of the Functioning of Collective Management of Copyright in 
Musical Works in Africa  
Because of its mature operations152 SAMRO remains a model of what an advanced African CMO 
looks like. In the following analysis the operations of a collecting society shall be critically 
considered, based on the essential elements that comprise a fully-fledged system of collective 
management of copyright for musical societies, with SAMRO as a reference point. The essential 
elements or facets of a developed CMO are as follows: (i) legal and governance structure; (ii) the 
authority to administer rights; (iii) the mode of licensing; (iv) distribution of royalties and (v) 
transparency issues.153 Since the aim of this analysis is illustrative, to show how SAMRO fares in 
this regard – and also in order to avoid an expansive chapter – the analysis shall only cover the first 
two elements referred to here, namely the legal and governance structure and the authority to 
administer rights. The discussion focuses on what is generally accepted in relation to these 
elements and how the elements apply in respect of SAMRO.154 This also serves to illustrate the fact 
                                               
150
 Ibid. 
151
 Section 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, which determines the affairs of SAMRO as a non-profit company 
(NPC), requires that “[t]he business and affairs of a company must be managed by and under the direction of its board …” 
In this regard it has been observed that “the section places a positive obligation on the directors”, who are no longer 
merely functionaries (i.e. an organ or agents) of the company. See Delport, Vorster and Henochsberg Henochsberg on the 
Companies Act 250(2).  
152
 In the sense of having all the distinct functional departments essential for the effective operations of a CMO, and having 
been able to license users and distribute royalties without fail on an annual basis since its inception. The concept of mature 
operations is also used with reference to compliance with the requirements for being a member (rather than being an 
“associate” or “provisional”) of CISAC, which, in terms of article 8(c) of the CISAC Statutes, include “[having] at its disposal 
effective machinery for the collection and distribution of royalties to creators and publishers “; in terms of article 8(i) 
involves effectively collecting and distributing royalties, and in terms of article 8(j) involves carrying out its activities in 
accordance with the Professional Rules (in this case the Professional Rules for Musical Societies). In terms of article 
15(a)(i) a CISAC member has to comply fully with the Professional Rules and in terms of article 15(a)(iii) the member must 
file an annual statement of compliance with the said Rules, failing which the member may, in terms of article 22 of the 
Statutes, be subjected to sanctions which may include a warning, censure, temporary expulsion or permanent expulsion. 
Seeing that SAMRO remains a member of SAMRO, it can be assumed that CISAC is satisfied with its compliance with its 
requirements of membership. For the CISAC Statutes see http://www.cisac.org/What-We-Do/Governance/Statutes (date of 
use) 30 June 2018). 
153
 These categorisation are adapted from Gervais Collective Management of Copyright (2016) 8 – 12. See also the EU 
Directive on Collective Management 2014 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0026&from=EN (date of use: 5 July 2018) under Title II generally.  
154
 Further commentary on the system of collective management arising from the provisions of the Copyright Amendment 
Bill (version B13B-2017), approved by both houses of Parliament and currently awaiting the President’s signature, 
available at https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 13 July 2019), shall be made in Chapter 7 below. 
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that regulators – especially those in the less developed world – have been overly critical and 
suspicious of CMOs, and rather than empowering them to fulfil their critical roles, have tended to 
have a heavy-handed approach to dealing with them. This is to be contrasted with the position in the 
West where, even though strict regulations are in place, the CMOs are at the same time empowered 
to effectively and efficiently carry out their responsibilities.  
6.6.2.1 Legal and Governance Structure  
(a) General 
The legal and governance form or structure of a CMO is largely dependent on the legal regime, 
rules and practices within each jurisdiction.155 Generally CMOs take the form of a non-profit 
company or organisation, although in some cases some CMOs have operated as profit 
companies.156 In some cases the founders can themselves, choose the form in which the CMO is to 
be incorporated, while in others the form is specifically determined by law.157 Thus for example in 
many Commonwealth countries (including African countries such as Nigeria, Kenya, Malawi and 
recently Botswana) the British tradition of incorporating CMOs as “companies limited by guarantee” 
has been prescribed by statute.158 Other organisational forms such as parastatal, state agencies, 
foundations, trusts, co-operatives and other non-profit forms have also been used in several 
jurisdictions.159 Following the British tradition SAMRO was also originally registered as a company 
limited by guarantee, although this was not as such required by law.160 This position remained until 
2011, when the Companies Act 71 of 2008 came into force, resulting in SAMRO becoming a non-
profit company (NPC) in terms of section 8(1) of that Act, as further deliberated upon below. 
As with other incorporated entities, a distinction exists between members of a CMO and its board of 
directors.161 Members are admitted to membership based on certain criteria, while the board is 
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 See Gervais id at 8; Liu 2012 J Intellec Prop Rights 46. 
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 An example is SESAC in the United States and DALRO in South Africa, both of which are private companies (in the 
case of DALRO it is in fact a wholly-owned subsidiary of SAMRO). See for SESAC Gervais Collective Management (2016) 
324, and for DALRO https://www.dalro.co.za/index.php/about-us/our-publishers (date of use: 30 June 2018).  
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 Liu 2012 J Intellec Prop Rights 46. Dealing with this matter Ficsor Collective Management 136 has observed (at para 
366): “In market-economy countries, private organizations dominate (although some of them have a semi-governmental 
character, others function with government participation, and still others work under fairly close supervision by public 
authorities). In planned-economy countries, public institutions were in the majority, but some of them were of a mixed 
nature with author-dominated governing bodies. In developing countries both private bodies and public institutions can be 
found.” Ficsor then makes an interesting observation, namely that “[i]t is mainly in Africa that public organizations are fairly 
frequent.” Ibid. 
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 Hooijer and Baloyi Musical Works and Audio-Visual Works 37. 
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 Ibid. Also Gervais Collective Management of Copyright (2016) 8. 
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 South African legislation has not, until 2002 when both the Copyright Act and the Performers’ Protection Act were 
amended, regulated the formation of collecting societies. The 2002 amendments dealt specifically with so-called “needle-
time” societies in respect of rights in sound recordings and recorded performances. In the Copyright Amendment Bill, 2017 
awaiting the President’s signature and available at https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 13 July 2019), comprehensive 
provisions relating to the formation and regulation of all collecting societies have been introduced in clause 22, following 
the recommendations of the Copyright Review Commission of 2010 – 2011. The report of the Commission, published in 
2012, is available at https://www.gov.za/documents/copyright-review-commission-report-2011 (date of use: 30 June 2018). 
An analysis of the provisions relating to the formation and regulation of collecting societies in the Copyright Amendment 
Bill 2017, is made in Chapter 7 infra. 
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 The type of board depends on the nature of the jurisdiction. In many common-law jurisdictions a unitary or single board 
is appointed by members, while in civil law and certain Asiatic jurisdictions a dual board system, comprising of a 
supervisory board (appointed by members) and a management board (appointed by the supervisory board) applies. See 
Hooijer and Baloyi Musical Works and Audio-Visual Works 38. 
253 
 
appointed by the members. In line with the principles of good governance, a distinction and 
clarification of roles must also be made between members of the board of directors and members of 
management. In this regard article 5(g) of the CISAC Professional Rules for Musical Societies, 
dealing with governance matters, provide that a member of CISAC shall, all times, inter alia: 
            … 
g. ensure that the by-laws – and / or internal rules – of [the] Member:  
(i) provide for a collegiate body whose role is to supervise the Member's business as carried 
out by the management body;  
(ii) ensure that such collegiate body effectively and independently supervises the 
management body, by means of setting up specific rules to this effect including, without 
limitation, the following rules:  
(a) rules regarding the distinction and separation of the function of a member of the 
management body on the one hand and that of a member of the supervisory body on 
the other hand, or  
(b) in the absence of such separation rules, rules prohibiting a member of the 
management body from having, (merely because of his status as a member of the 
management body) the right to vote during meetings of the supervisory body, or at the 
very least, a blocking minority voting right or any right of veto whatsoever, and 
(iii) prohibit any improper interference of the supervisory body in decisions falling within the 
scope of the exclusive powers (if any) of the management body. 
The generally-acknowledged essence of a collecting society is that it must be owned or controlled 
by its members.162 Essentially this entails that members should be represented in the board of a 
CMO, but further, as provided for in the EU Directive on Collective Management, that such 
representation should be fair and balanced, taking into cognisance the different categories of 
members of a CMO.163 Moreover, members must be enabled to participate in the decision-making 
process of the CMO.164 Seeing that the governance of a CMO is generally entrusted to its board of 
directors,165 a member’s rights to participate in decision-making processes of the CMO is limited to 
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 See for example the definition of “collective management organisation” in art 3(a)(i) of the EU Directive on Collective 
Management 2014 https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/TXT/PDF/?uri=CELEX:32014L0026&from=EN (date of use: 
5 July 2018).   
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 EU Directive id at art 9(2). 
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 Id at art 3. See also reg 3(3)(c) of the South African Regulations on the Establishment of Collecting Societies in the 
Music Industry (the “Collecting Society Regulations”) GG No. 28894, GN No. 517 of 1 June 2006, applicable in respect of 
“needle-time” societies, which provides that a person or licensing body applying to become a representative collecting 
society must demonstrate that its members are afforded “an appropriate right and opportunity to take part in decision 
making concerning the affairs of the applicant and the administration of the rights in question, as well as the distribution of 
the royalties to be received.” 
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 And in South Africa, required to be exercised by the board of directors. See in this regard s 66(1) of the Companies Act 
71 of 2008, which provides that “[t]he business and affairs of a company must be managed by or under the direction of its 
board, which has the authority to exercise all of the powers and perform any of the functions of the company”, except as 
otherwise limited by the Act of the company’s MOI. Emphasis added. This of course would on ly apply to CMOs that are 
registered in terms of the Act (normally as non-profit companies (NPC)). 
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certain statutory and other designated matters, generally exercised at the AGM or another general 
meeting of members.166 Accurate and transparent reporting by the CMO to its members in relation to 
these matters is thus crucial.167  
Traditionally, and also in line with the rules of CISAC, members of the Board of a CMO were 
appointed from qualifying members of the CMO.168 With recent trends in the field of corporate 
governance however, where an emphasis is placed on appointing independent non-executive 
directors to the boards of companies and other organisations this issue has also become relevant 
for the boards of collecting societies.169 Thus full representation of members in the boards of CMOs 
may be tampered by the need to also appoint directors that are not in any way related to the CMO. 
The CISAC Professional Rules for Musical Societies are not, as such, opposed to such a scenario, 
as a deviation from the normal position is permitted in terms of article 5 of the Rules if such deviation 
or non-compliance is necessitated by “any national, legal or regulatory provision to which [the 
society] is subject”. Under such circumstances the CMO has to promptly inform CISAC of such 
regulatory or legal requirements, “with full particularity, and with appropriate documentary 
justification”. In South Africa such requirements arose from a new company law regime as well as 
the provisions of the King Report on Corporate Governance.170  
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 Under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 such matters are provided for in s 61(8) of the Act, and include, inter alia, the 
presentation of the directors’ reports; the presentation of the audited financial statements for the previous financial year; 
election of directors; appointment of an auditor; any matters raised by members etc. Other matters relating to the decision-
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royalties to be received.”  Reg 3(3)(c) of the Regulations on the Establishment of Collecting Societies in the Music Industry 
(the “Collecting Society Regulations”) GG No. 28894, GN No. 517 of 1 June 2006. Having indicated this, it must be 
observed that the provision under reg 3(3)(c) of the Collecting Society Regulations that members must be afforded a right 
and opportunity “to take part in decision making concerning the affairs” of the CMO is clearly in conflict with the provisions 
of s 66(1) of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, which enjoins the board of a company manage or direct the management of 
the “business and affairs of a company”. It is submitted that a resolution to this situation requires that this provision under 
reg 3(3)(c) of the Collecting Society Regulations has to be interpreted narrowly to permit the application of s 66(1) of the 
Companies Act. Failing this the only other conclusion is that a needle-time society cannot be registered as a non-profit 
company under the Companies Act. It would need to be registered in another form, such as registration as a non-profit 
organisation (NPO) under the Non-Profit Organisations Act 71 of 1997; registration as a trust etc.       
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 See in this regard paragraph 8.2 of the WIPO Good Practice Toolkit 2018 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/management/index.html#cmotoolkit (date of use: 5 July 2018), at 51, where it is 
recommended that a CMO provides “a full and transparent picture of its financial performance and operations” in its Annual 
Reports, and that the reports should be in an accessible format.  
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 See in this regard art 5(d) of the CISAC Professional Rules for Musical Societies, which provides that a CMO shall at all 
times “maintain a fair balance on its Board between Creators on the one hand and publishers on the other hand”, thus not 
envisaging that persons who are neither creators nor publishers can be members of the board. This was also the case with 
SAMRO. Article 38 of the erstwhile Articles of Association of SAMRO (which were replaced by a new Memorandum of 
Incorporation in 2011, as a result of the coming into force of the Companies Act 71 of 2008) provided that “[n]o person who 
is not a full member shall be appointed to act as a Director”. Emphasis added. Although the same article further provided 
that “[n]notwithstanding the foregoing there may be appointed as Director any person who, not being a member, has 
special knowledge and / or experience of copyright law and / or the administration of copyright”, this was not applied in the  
case of SAMRO in relation to independent directors but rather in relation to executive directors.  
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 The issue featured prominently in the report of the Copyright Review Commission (n 94 supra). 
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 The new company law regime commenced with amendments to the then applicable Companies Act 61 of 1973, which 
were effected through the Corporate Amendment Act 24 of 2006 and came into force on 14 December 2007. The 
relevance with regard to the issue of independent directors is that the amendments introduced a new section 269A to the 
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(b) Application to SAMRO 
SAMRO was incorporated on 28 December 1961 as a company limited by guarantee, under the 
Companies Act 46 of 1926. When the 1926 Act was repealed by the Companies Act 61 1973 the 
corporate form of SAMRO as a company limited by guarantee did not change, as the 1973 Act 
continued this corporate form. The writer, having been at the centre of SAMRO’s governance 
operations, can, at least until 2011 when the Companies Act 71 of 2008 came into force, vouch for 
SAMRO’s compliance with statutory reporting and governance requirements under the Companies 
Act 61 of 1973.171 This therefore brings into serious question the curt assertion by the Copyright 
Review Commission (CRC) that SAMRO was not compliant with principle 6.1 of the King III Report 
because “[t]he Memorandum of Association has been in conflict with the Companies Act of 1973 for 
37 years and it is in conflict with the Companies Act of 2008.”172 This assertion is of course a serious 
castigation of SAMRO, especially in view of the significance of the CRC Report in the current debate 
in South Africa relating to copyright reform. It is thus of concern that the assertion is made without 
providing any detail or supporting information, or at least indicating in what way it is suggested that 
SAMRO’s MOI has been in conflict with the Companies Act. 
As indicated above, it is submitted that SAMRO has, in fact, consistently operated in line with the 
reporting requirements of the Companies Act 61 of 1973 when the Act was in force and that the 
CRC’s assertion, without substantiation or evidence, that it has not, is incorrect and misinformed. 
                                                                                                                                                              
Companies Act, which, in subsection (3) provided that an audit committee had to be comprised of at least two members 
“and consist only of non-executive directors of the company who must act independently.” Emphasis added. The 
Companies Act 71 of 2008, which repealed the 1973 Act, took the matter further by providing, in section 94(2) and (4), that 
an audit committee must be comprised of at least three directors who must satisfy the requirements of an independent 
director. Seeing that SAMRO at the time had a Risk and Audit Committee, the need to have directors who would not be 
members of the organisation began to emerge. (In the end, because of the delay in the process of adopting of a new MOI 
as a result of delays in the finalisation of the new Companies Act, and the fact that the MOI was necessary to make 
provision for independent directors, as well as uncertainties regarding SAMRO’s corporate form, the Board resolved to 
convert the Risk and Audit Committee into a Risk Committee that would however, also deal with audit matters). From the 
perspective of the King Report the requirement for independent directors was introduced in principle 2.18 of the King 
Report on Governance for South Africa 2009 (King III Report), which provided that the board of a company was to be 
comprised of a majority of non-executive directors, the majority of whom “should be independent”. Principle 2.16 also 
introduced the requirement for the Chairperson of a company to be an independent non-executive director. King III 
operated on an “apply or explain” basis (i.e. the board had to apply the particular principle or recommendation, but where it 
was not in the best interests of the company to do so, or where it was best to apply the recommendation differently or to 
apply a different practice, while still achieving the same objective, the board, in providing this explanation, would still have 
complied.) King III was replaced by the King IV Report on Corporate Governance for South Africa 2016 (King IV Report), 
which reiterates the requirement for the board of a company to be comprised of a majority of non-executive directors, 
“most of whom should be independent” (Part 5.3, Recommended Practice 8, King IV). The provisions relating to the 
independent non-executive director is dealt with in Part 5.3, Recommended Practice 31. Unlike King III, King IV operates 
on a “apply and explain” basis, which requires companies to substantiate the claim that good governance is being 
practiced.  
171
 The writer was, in the period between 2005 – 2010, the Head of Legal and Company Secretary for SAMRO. Especially 
in the latter role, the writer was in charge of the governance operations of SAMRO and also had access to the earlier 
statutory records of SAMRO from its inception in 1961. Some of the information about SAMRO that the writer learned and 
had access to during this period forms part of the writer’s contribution in Baloyi JJ and Pistorius T “Collective Management 
in Africa” (Chapter 12), in Gervais Collective Management of Copyright (2016) 369 – 424. After leaving the employ of 
SAMRO at the end of 2010 the writer continued to consult for the organisation in 2011, particularly with regard to providing 
assistance with SAMRO’s efforts to comply with the Companies Act 71 of 2008, which came into force on 1 May 2011. 
After 2011 the writer’s relationship with SAMRO has been on an arm’s length and thus the writer cannot speak (or rather 
write) in defence of SAMRO’s actions thereafter. Indeed the AEMRO incident (dealt with supra under paragraph 6.6.1) 
casts aspersions on SAMRO’s governance systems, but, as indicated, the complete truth would, as in the Brenda Fassie 
case, only emerge after the forensic investigation has been completed. 
172
 Copyright Review Commission Report 2011 https://www.gov.za/documents/copyright-review-commission-report-2011, 
at 49. (Date of use: 1 July 2018). The expression King III Report is used in this discussion interchangeably with the 
expression King III Code (the Code having been embodied within the Report). 
256 
 
Evidence can demonstrate that since its establishment SAMRO never failed to conduct annual 
general meetings (AGMs) of members, after duly sending them notices in this regard within the 
stipulated time-frames; or to have special general meetings (or what the SAMRO constitutive 
documents have termed “extraordinary general meetings”) as and when the need arose. Matters 
forming part of the mandatory reporting requirements of a company (e.g. presentation of annual 
financial statements and directors’ reports, election of the companies’ directors, appointment of the 
company’s auditors etc.) have always formed part of the agendas of such meetings. SAMRO also 
regularly made the necessary filings of required information with CIPRO,173 as required by statute. 
The writer can confirm that this information was in fact submitted to the CRC as part of SAMRO’s 
submissions during the review process,174 and if the CRC required further information this could 
have been provided.  
The CRC also made the finding that SAMRO did not comply with principle 2.16 of the King III Report 
because it did not have an independent Chairperson. In this regard it needs to be mentioned that the 
King III Report only came into force on 1 March 2010. The CRC commenced its work towards the 
end of 2010 and finalised its findings in 2011 (although the report itself was only made available in 
2012). As indicated above, as soon as the new requirements regarding the need to have 
independent directors on the boards of companies came to the fore, particularly as a result of the 
introduction of the King III Report and a review of company law, SAMRO too saw the need to 
respond to these developments.175 Accordingly the SAMRO Board, with the assistance of 
management, commenced a process of identifying persons with skills that would be relevant for 
SAMRO. The priority was on finding someone who could qualify as an independent Chairperson of 
SAMRO in line with the requirements of the King III Report, and thereafter to identify other 
independent non-executive directors for the organisation.  
It was at the time however recognised that the erstwhile SAMRO Articles of Association would need 
to be amended to make it possible for SAMRO to appoint non-member directors. In this regard it 
was resolved that the amendments would await overall amendments to the Memorandum and 
Articles of Association in order to adopt a new Memorandum of Incorporation (MOI) under the 
envisaged new company law regime. Delays in the coming into force of the new company law 
however also affected the process of amendment for these documents.176 This situation was 
recognised at the SAMRO board meeting of 23 March 2010, where the current independent 
                                               
173
 The Companies and Intellectual Property Registration Office, now replaced by the Companies and Intellectual Property 
Commission (CIPC) under the Companies Act 71 of 2008. 
174
 The writer prepared SAMRO’s submissions to the CRC, in consultation with external counsel. 
175
 At the time, around 2009, the writer wrote to CISAC to highlight the new regulatory environment and to specifically 
enquire how SAMRO should deal with the requirement to have independent non-executive directors, in light of the fact that 
this was in conflict with the CISAC requirement that boards of CMOs needed to be comprised of members of the CMO 
concerned. The response from CISAC was that if the requirement to have non-member board members arose from the 
provisions of national laws and / or regulation, it would be justifiable for the CMO to comply with such laws.  
176
 The first version of the new Companies Bill was published in 2007 and a second version published in 2008, but the new 
Act, the Companies Act 71 of 2008 only came into force on 1 May 2011. See http://www.sabinetlaw.co.za/economic-
affairs/legislation/companies (date of use: 1 July 2018). 
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Chairperson of SAMRO177 was introduced and it was observed that “he was invited to attend board 
meetings until such time as the Articles of Association were amended to make provision for the 
appointment of independent persons to the SAMRO Board of Directors, at which stage he would 
then join the board as a member.”178 The CRC was made aware of these developments and in 
SAMRO’s submission to the Commission the following was stated: 
The new Companies Act, as well as the King III Code of Corporate Governance (which applies to all 
entities), has created the need for SAMRO to also have independent directors. In line with this, 
SAMRO is in the process of amending its constitution to make provision of the fact that the SAMRO 
Board shall also be comprised of independent directors.
179
 
In light of the foregoing it was, it is submitted, rather ingenious for the CRC to find that SAMRO fell 
short of good corporate governance standards for failing to have an independent Chairperson, 
considering (i) the historical practice of CMOs in general, and not just SAMRO, in relation to board 
membership; (ii) the fact that by the time that King III came into force in March 2010 SAMRO had 
already commenced efforts to comply with its requirements, and (iii) SAMRO’s failure to appoint an 
independent Chairperson was justifiable in view of the fact that SAMRO first needed to amend its 
MOI, which, besides the fact that this could not be done overnight, was further precipitated by the 
delay in finalising the coming into force of the new Companies Act. This delay in the amendment of 
SAMRO’s MOI would thus be justifiable in terms of the “apply or explain” basis for the application of 
the King III Code in terms of which “[e]xplaining how the principles and recommendations were 
applied, or if not applied, the reasons, result[ed] in compliance.”180 In fact when the date for the 
coming into force of the new Companies Act became clear, SAMRO called an extraordinary general 
meeting (EGM) of its members on 20 May 2011, in line with stipulated time frames, for purposes of 
adopting a new MOI.181  
                                               
177
 Mr Jerry Mnisi. See http://www.samro.org.za/about (date of use 1 July 2018). 
178
 Minutes of the Board of Directors of SAMRO, 23 March 2010. 
179
 Paragraph 13.5 of SAMRO’s submissions to the Copyright Review Commission, 2010 – 2011. 
180
 King Report on Governance for South Africa 2009, at p. 7, available at 
https://www.iodsa.co.za/general/custom.asp?page=kingIII (date of use: 01 July 2018). Emphasis added. 
181
 A new MOI was in fact only adopted at SAMRO’s AGM of November 2011. A matter of grave concern to SAMRO and 
its operations had arisen as a result of the manner in which the Companies Bill 2008 was originally drafted. In essence the 
Bill did away with the “company limited by guarantee” form, and replaced it with the new “non-profit company” (NPC), 
which, in terms of Item 4 of the Memorandum on the Objects of the Companies Bill, 2008, was clearly designated as “the 
successor to the current Section 21 companies.” The problem with this was that while SAMRO was a company limited by 
guarantee, and while Section 21 companies (termed “associations not for gain”) were also, in terms of s 21(1) of the 
Companies Act 61 of 1973, incorporated as companies limited by guarantee, SAMRO was nevertheless not a Section 21 
company. SAMRO was incorporated as a company limited by guarantee under the Companies Act 46 of 1926, which also 
separately recognised the equivalent of a Section 21 company. Under the Companies Act 61 of 1973 SAMRO was 
recognised as an existing company limited by guarantee in s 19 of that Act, and was thus distinct from the Section 21 
company. The main distinction in this regard was that while a Section 21 company was a funding-dependent entity and 
prohibited from paying or transferring its income and property, or any portion thereof, “whencesoever derived”, and 
whether “directly or indirectly, by way of dividend, bonus, or otherwise howsoever, to the members of the association” (s 
21(1)(d) and (2)(a) of the Companies Act, 1973), SAMRO’s source of income was derived from its trading activities (i.e. the 
licensing of musical works) and its main undertaking, which it was able to carry out as a company limited by guarantee, 
was the collecting of licence fees and the distribution of royalties to its members. However, because the new non-profit 
company (NPC) under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 was seen as a successor of the Section 21 company, it carried 
provisions similar to s 21(1)(d) and (2)(a) of the Companies Act, 1973 and thus prohibited the new NPC from paying any of 
its income or a portion thereof to its members. With the involvement of SAMRO (through the writer) two major 
achievements were attained: (i) Paragraphs (a)  - (d) were added to item 3 of Schedule 1 to the Companies Act 71 of 
2008, which created exceptions to the general rule that an NPC may not pay its members any of its income or a portion 
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In view of the foregoing it would seem that the CRC was simply quick to make a finding of non-
compliance without fully applying its mind. There are several other observations regarding SAMRO’s 
apparent non-compliance with governance requirements that the CRC made, all based on particular 
principles of the King III Report, and some of which are valid while others remain questionable. More 
pertinently, judging SAMRO’s adherence to principles of good corporate governance on the basis of 
a code that had just been newly-introduced, and which many other companies were still grappling 
with (and also without taking into account steps that SAMRO had already taken to comply with the 
provisions of the code), was, in the writer’s view, rather unfair. It would have been best if the 
Commission had assessed SAMRO’s adherence to good governance practices on the basis of the 
King II Report which had been in operation until it was replaced by the King III Report on 1 March 
2010.  
More specifically the report finds fault with SAMRO for not having the head of finance as an 
executive director on the board, in contravention of principle 2.18 of the King III Report which 
recommended that at least the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) and the head of finance should be 
executive directors. While this observation was correct a consideration of the practice hitherto would 
have confirmed the fact that, until the occurrence of the case under review, the head of finance had 
in fact, together with the CEO, been the executive directors of SAMRO.182 Another unnecessary 
castigation of SAMRO by the CRC relates to the observation made in the CRC Report that SAMRO 
failed to comply with principle 3.10 of the King III Report, in that the audit committee report did not 
form part of SAMRO’s annual report.183 The fact however is that by the time the CRC was appointed 
(November 2010) SAMRO did not have an audit committee. This information could have been easily 
verified from SAMRO. 
In the past SAMRO had a Risk and Audit committee. However, when the Companies Bill 2008 was 
published and provided that audit committees had to be comprised of independent non-executive 
directors it became clear to the SAMRO Board that SAMRO would not, at that stage, comply with 
                                                                                                                                                              
thereof, making it for example possible to do so “as payment in respect of any rights … to the extent that such rights are 
administered by the company in order to advance a stated object of the company”; (ii) item 4(1)(d) of Schedule 5 to the Act 
was introduced, which made it possible for an existing company limited by guarantee to elect to be a profit company within 
twenty (20) days after the general effective date of the of the Act, failing which the company would be deemed to have 
amended its MOI as of the general effective date to state that it is a non-profit company. It is for this reason that SAMRO 
called an EGM on 20 May 2011, after the Act came into force on 1 May 2011. The purpose was to provide members with 
an opportunity to either adopt an MOI that would convert SAMRO into a profit company (mainly because though the 
problem of SAMRO not being able to distribute royalties to its members had been resolved through the insertion of 
paragraphs (a)  - (d) of item 3 to Schedule 1, it appeared that as an NPC SAMRO would still not be able to distribute non-
royalty revenue to its members), or to adopt an MOI that would maintain SAMRO’s position as a non-profit company while 
ensuring more compliance with the new Act and also introducing the provisions relating to SAMRO’s ability to appoint 
independent non-executive directors. Apparently due to mistrust of the intentions of the board, misinformation or sheer lack 
of appreciation of the gravity of the situation, the necessary amounts of votes to pass special resolutions in this regard 
were not obtained and both motions failed, and it was only at SAMRO AGM in November 2011 that a new MOI was 
adopted. For SAMRO’s failed motions at its EGM of 20 May 2011 see  
http://www.bizcommunity.com/Article/196/480/67085.html; and for SAMRO’s submission to Parliament regarding 
outstanding issues of concern in relation to the Companies Bill 61 of 2008 see  http://pmg-assets.s3-website-eu-west-
1.amazonaws.com/docs/080813samro.pdf. (Date of use: 1 July 2018). 
182
 Soon after, the Chief Operating Officer (COO), who had been on the board as the second executive director, was 
appointed as Chief Financial Officer (CFO) and the Finance Manager appointed as the new COO. 
183
 Copyright Review Commission Report 2011 https://www.gov.za/documents/copyright-review-commission-report-2011, 
at 49. (Date of use: 1 July 2018). 
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that requirement, and that the SAMRO constitutive documents would first need to be amended to 
make provision for the appointment of independent directors. This process would be carried out as 
part of SAMRO’s compliance with the new Companies Act 71 of 2008 and was also dependent on 
the corporate form that SAMRO members would chose for SAMRO in terms of Item 4(1)(d) of 
Schedule 5 to the Act.184 In light of this, the SAMRO Board resolved, in 2009 – a year before the 
CRC was constituted – to convert the Risk and Audit committee into a Risk committee, pending the 
finalisation of the afore-mentioned processes.185  
In view of the foregoing, finding that SAMRO did not comply with good corporate governance 
requirements because its annual report did not contain the report of the Audit committee, when in 
fact SAMRO did not have an audit committee was unwarranted. Further to this, it needs to be noted 
that SAMRO is not required, in terms of the Companies Act 71 of 2008, to have an Audit committee, 
nor did SAMRO’s Articles of Association at the time require it to do so.186 The CRC further observed 
that SAMRO did not comply with principle 2.18 of CRC Report because the majority of its non-
executive directors were not independent. What was said above with regard to the appointment of 
an independent non-executive Chairperson would apply equally in relation to the issue of 
independent non-executive directors in general.187  
The CRC Report made a valid observation with regard to the potential for SAMRO’s inability to 
comply with the requirements of Principle 2.18 of the King III Code with respect to have the correct 
                                               
184
 Members could only make this choice once the Companies Act had come into force (i.e. within 20 days after the 
general effective date of the Act, in accordance with Item 4(1)(d) of Schedule 5 to the Companies Act 71 of 2008). 
185
 It was resolved that the new Risk Committee would also deal with audit matters.  
186
 In terms of s 94(2) of the Companies Act  an Audit committee is only required for “a public company, state-owned 
company or other company that is required only by its Memorandum of Incorporation to have an audit committee”. Neither 
SAMRO’s erstwhile Articles of Association, nor its current MOI (see art 13 of the MOI) require[d] SAMRO to have an Audit 
committee. 
187
 Having indicated this it is of concern that SAMRO has, up to now, apart from complying with the requirement of 
appointing an independent non-executive chairperson, has no other independent non-executive directors on its Board. See 
for the current composition of the Board of Directors of SAMRO http://www.samro.org.za/about (date of use: 01 July 2018). 
It is also questionable whether SAMRO’s current MOI makes it possible to comply with King IV’s requirement that the 
majority of a company’s non-executive directors must be independent non-executive directors. Although art 16.2.3 of 
SAMRO’s MOI (and probably also art 16.2.2) makes it possible for SAMRO to appoint an independent director, (i) it does 
not make it mandatory, and (ii) there is no provision that the majority of members of the SAMRO non-executive directors 
must be independent. It is nevertheless acknowledged that it is difficult for non-profit companies to comply with the 
requirement of having the majority of their non-executive directors to be independent members, and this is more so for 
CMOs with their history of having boards that are fully-representative of their members. The Sector Supplement for Non-
profit Organisation of the King IV Report recognises the difficulty for CMOs to comply with this requirement and while 
affirming that the principles of the King IV Code apply to all non-profit organisations, it provides that proportionality 
considerations may be made, where the practices are adapted “according to where the organisation is in its growth cycle 
and its size, resources and the complexity of strategic objectives and nature of operations. …” King IV Sector Supplement 
for Non-Profit Organisations 
https://cdn.ymaws.com/www.iodsa.co.za/resource/resmgr/King_IV/sector_supplements/NPO_supplement.pdf at 2 (date of 
use: 1 July 2018). It also appears that the Sector Supplement recognises that the main concern, where there is a 
requirement for members of the governing body of a non-profit organisation to be representative of certain constituencies, 
is to ensure that the required knowledge, experience and skills is represented on the board (see page 6 of the Sector 
Supplement). In this regard art 16.2.2 of the SAMRO MOI, which provides that “there may be appointed as Director any 
person who, not being a Member, has special knowledge, skills and / or experience relevant to performing the role and 
functions of a Director.” Although this provision is couched in a manner similar to art 38 of SAMRO’s erstwhile Articles of 
Association, which as observed earlier (n 236) was used for purposes of appointing executive directors to the SAMRO 
Board, there is no reason why the same provision could not be used to appoint non-executive directors who are not 
members. Having indicated this, the point must still be made that SAMRO has not fully complied with these provisions in 
its MOI. It would have been best if, using proportionality considerations, SAMRO had at least appointed at least two other 
independent non-executive directors in addition to the appointment of the independent Chairperson. 
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balance of skills within the organisation.188 The CRC report also noted correctly that there was no 
internal audit function in place at SAMRO, as required by Principle 2.10 of the King III Code, but that 
it was in the process of being established. Furthermore the report observed the fact the provision in 
SAMRO’s erstwhile Articles of Association189 whereby the Board was empowered to unilaterally 
terminate the membership of any member did not conform to the requirements of Principle 8.1 of the 
King III Report, which provided that a company had to ensure equitable treatment of its members. In 
fact this issue was concerned with transparency concerns, in line with the further observation in the 
report, made validly, that “objective criteria” with regard to issues of membership needed to be 
clearly articulated in the organisation’s constitutive documents.  
The point relating to equitable treatment in terms of Principle 8.1 of the King III Report could have 
been made (but was not made) in relation to the provision in article 11 of SAMRO’s erstwhile 
Articles of Association, which, while providing that the Board could terminate the membership of a 
member “at any time”, only entitled a full member to refer the matter for the determination of 
members at a special general meeting of the members, with members who were not full members 
not afforded this opportunity. This provision clearly did not conform to the transparency principle that 
formed part of the ethical values of the King III Code.190 Another valid observation made in the CRC 
Report related to the fact that the SAMRO annual reports did not disclose the remuneration of 
individual directors as required by Principle 2.26 of the King III Report.191 In the same breath the 
report noted that the remuneration paid to non-executive directors was “much less than that for 
similar size organisations”, while casting aspersions on the high salaries paid to the two executive 
directors.192 On a more positive note the CRC concluded its assessment of SAMRO’s governance 
profile by observing that SAMRO was in “[f]ull compliance” with the requirement to issue audited 
financial statements within six months of the end of the its financial year. 
The foregoing has shown that while, in certain instances, there have indeed been lapses in good 
corporate governance on the part of SAMRO, in many other cases the perception of poor 
governance on the part of SAMRO has been exaggerated and / or biased. In particular, the bald 
statement made by the CRC that  “[t]he Memorandum of Association [of SAMRO] has been in 
conflict with the Companies Act of 1973 for 37 years” left much to be desired and bordered on 
recklessness. It appears to have stemmed from the general attitude of suspicion or mistrust over the 
functioning of collecting societies, displayed by many governments and / or regulators in the 
developing world, rather than seeing them as playing “an important role as promoters of the diversity 
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 See CRC Report at 50, where the CRC observed that while the SAMRO Board had broad skills, because the Board 
was only drawn from the membership, “if there is a skills shortage within the membership, the search does not go wider 
than the current membership.”  
189
 The report inadvertently refers to SAMRO’s Memorandum of Association. The matter was in fact dealt with in art 11 of 
SAMRO’s erstwhile Articles of Association. 
190
 Under the Companies Act 71 of 2008 the right of a director to make representations before he or she may be removed 
from office is provided for in s 71 of the Act. This right is now also provided for in art 17.2.4 of SAMRO’s current MOI. 
191
 SAMRO has since ensured compliance with this requirement in its annual reports. See http://www.samro.org.za/about 
(date of use: 01 July 2018). 
192
 Copyright Review Commission Report 2011 https://www.gov.za/documents/copyright-review-commission-report-2011, 
at 51 - 52. (Date of use: 1 July 2018). 
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of cultural expression”, as affirmed by the EU Collective Management Directive.193 This, it is 
submitted, is the reason why “[i]t is mainly in Africa that public organizations are fairly frequent” as 
collecting societies – because African governments feel the need to control the affairs of collecting 
societies arising from their suspicion of the operations of CMO.  
The result of the foregoing is that, in spite of this heavy-handed government control of CMOs, 
collective management in Africa is rarely effective, with South Africa and Algeria being the notable 
exceptions, and with global collections amounting to a meagre 0.7% in 2016.194 Heavy-handed 
regulatory interventions have also stymied the development of collective management in parts of 
Africa. In contrast collective management thrives in Western economies, where CMOs are left to 
function with slight government intervention, and where rules of competition and self-regulatory 
codes are often used as means to keep CMOs with the contours of good governance.195 
6.6.2.2 The authority to administer rights 
(a) General 
The basis upon which a CMO administers the rights of its members and other rights-holders is 
important and must be clearly defined to avoid uncertainties. Broadly speaking this is either based 
on a full transfer of the copyright (i.e. an assignment of rights) or an agency relationship.196 An 
exclusive licence may also be granted by a member instead of an assignment, but, as is well 
recognised, the effect of such an exclusive licence is largely similar to that of an assignment, 
especially with regard to the exclusive licensee’s right to institute infringement proceedings in his 
own name.197 In certain cases, though limiting to the CMO, the authority to administer members’ 
rights has been based on a non-exclusive licence (either coupled with an agency relationship or 
not).198 An example in this regard is the United States, where, as a result of anti-trust measures, 
including the adoption of so-called “consent decrees”, the initial practice of ASCAP and BMI 
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 See Recital 3, Directive 2014/26/EU on Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights and Multi-territorial 
Licensing of Rights in Musical Works for Online Uses, available at https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=celex%3A32014L0026 (date of use: 01 July 2018). 
194
 CISAC Global Collections Report 2017 http://www.cisac.org/Media/Studies-and-Reports/Publications/Royalty-
Reports/Publications/Royalty-Reports/2017-Global-Collections-Report-EN (date of use: 02 July 2018). There has clearly 
been not much growth since 2012, when the Africa’s global contribution was 1.6%. See Gervais Collective Management 
(2016) 370 
195
 The US and the EU are good examples of jurisdictions where rules of competition or anti-trust are used to rein in the 
activities of CMOs. In other jurisdictions such as Australia and the United Kingdom self-regulatory codes of good 
governance for CMOs have been adopted. See for Australia see ACCC Code of Conduct for Copyright Collecting 
Societies https://www.accc.gov.au/system/files/public-registers/documents/D09%2B171037.pdf and for the UK see BCC 
Principles of Collective Management Organisations’ Codes of Conduct 
http://www.britishcopyright.org/files/9714/1312/6511/BCCPGP_Policy_Framework_250512.pdf (date of use: 02 July 2018). 
The Australian code of conduct is currently under review. See in this regard  https://www.communications.gov.au/have-
your-say/reviewing-code-conduct-copyright-collecting-societies 
(date of use: 02 July 2018). 
196
 See the infra at paragraph 6.5 the discussion regarding the administration of copyright by SAMRO vis-à-vis the 
administration of copyright by the now defunct SARRAL. See also Gervais Collective Management (2016) 9.  
197
 See for example Dworkin and Taylor Blackstone’s Guide 84; Dean & Dyer Introduction to Intellectual Property 31.  
198
 The Canadian regime is an example of a jurisdiction where the broad spectrum of the system of voluntary collective 
management of copyright is provided for, as stipulated in s 2 of the Canadian Copyright Act 1985 (as amended), which 
provides that a “collective society” is an entity that carries on the business of collective administration of copyright “for  the 
benefit of those who, by assignment, grant of licence, appointment of it as their agent or otherwise, authorize it to act on 
their behalf …” 
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administering the rights of their members on the basis of an assignment of rights was changed to a 
non-exclusive licensing basis.199 In terms of these consent decrees any CMO member could directly 
issue licences to users, thus theoretically permitting competition among members of the society, and 
permitting the member to receive licensing revenue directly from the user.200 It has, nevertheless 
that although songwriters do not have to use ASCAP and BMI201 to license their rights, “in practice, 
most do because it’s the simplest way to collect royalties.”202 
The above-mentioned mode or model of administration of rights by CMOs forms part of the system 
of voluntary collective licensing and constitutes the next step from what Dusollier and Colin have 
termed “the key paradigm”, where authorisation for exploitation of copyright works is given by the 
rights-holder individually, who “should decide whether or not to authorize use of her work and upon 
what conditions her work may be used.” 203 At the basic level voluntary collective licensing entails the 
right of a rights-holder to choose the entity that will administer his or her rights. Beyond this however 
the system of collective management moves in a continuum that includes variedly regulated forms of 
collective licensing, entailing a legislatively-determined system that ranges from being more 
voluntary at first (by for example providing for opt-out provisions) to being less voluntary further 
along the continuum.204 We consider below variants of the more voluntary systems, and thereafter 
consider the non-voluntary systems.205  
(i) Legislation-based Voluntary Licensing 
1. Implied Licensing 
The implied licensing system relates to the indemnification, by statutory provision, of the user, from 
liability for infringement of copyright in respect of certain works considered to be part of the licence 
issued to the user. An example is section 136 of the UK Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988, 
which provides that, where a work falls within the “apparent scope” of the licence issued to a user, 
the user is indemnified from liability arising from any claim of infringement in respect of such work.206  
2. Legal Presumption 
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 See Gervais Collective Management (2016) 329 – 332 for a historical analysis of this development. See also as an 
example the current ASCAP Writer agreement, which clearly shows that the right granted to ASCAP is a non-exclusive 
right. Nevertheless the author still grants ASCAP (in this case contractually), “[a]ll the rights and remedies for enforcing the 
copyright or copyrights of such musical works” (clause 1(a) of the agreement), available at 
https://www.ascap.com/about/join/membership-agreement (date of use: 03 July 2018).  
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 Gervais Collective Management (2016) 331 – 332. 
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 SESAC has not been subjected to the consent decrees. Id at 324. 
202
 http://fortune.com/2016/06/30/ascap-consent-decrees/ (date of use: 03 July 2018).  Attempts by ASCAP and BMI to 
have the consent decrees abolished have been unsuccessful. Ibid. 
203
 Dusollier and Colin 2011 Columbia Journal of Law & the Arts 817. See also PWC 2011 
https://www.alrc.gov.au/sites/default/files/subs/766._org__attachment_2_2011_pwc_final_report.pdf (date of use: 03 July 
2018), at 37. 
204
 Dusollier and Colin id at 817 - 818. 
205
 The continuum is dealt with here based on a consolidation of Dusollier and Colin (ibid)’s analysis, and that of Liu 2012 J 
Intellec Prop Rights 48 – 49. 
206
 See id at 48. 
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The technique of legal presumption is mainly used in Germany, where it is presumed that a CMO 
seeking for information or remuneration from a user administers the rights of all rights-holders 
unless the user can prove otherwise.207 It has in this regard however been observed that “this leaves 
little room for right holders to choose whether to assign the CMO the task of representing them or 
not, and limits their freedom to opt out.”208   
3. Extended Collective Licensing   
The system of extended collective licensing (ECL) has largely been used in the Nordic countries 
(Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden), and in Canada.209 It enables non-member rights-
holders to be treated in the same way as members of the CMO in that the licensing of the works by 
a CMO representing a substantial number of rights-holders in a particular field is deemed to include 
the licensing of the works of non-members in that field.210 Furthermore, unlike the legal presumption 
system, the ECL system permits rights-holders to opt out of the system and to administer the rights 
themselves, thus “mitigat[ing] the mandatory imposition of the collective agreement on authors who 
have chosen to stay outside of the CMO”.211 In this regard the system has been hailed for “its 
comprehensive mechanism that combines a legal extension and freedom of opting out with a 
voluntary.”212 It has nevertheless been further observed the ECL system would work best in 
countries with mature CMO operations, namely where rights-holders are well organised; where the 
CMO indeed represents a substantial number of rights-holders in the field concerned and where the 
CMO “has strong capabilities of management and coordination.”213  
Apart from the above other sui-generis systems, which may be a combination of any of the above-
mentioned systems, exist in other jurisdictions.214  
(ii) Legislation-based Non-Voluntary Licensing 
1. Mandatory Licensing 
The first obvious form of legislatively-determined non-voluntary licensing of collective management 
is the system of mandatory licensing. In terms of this system “all right owners in a given field are 
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collectively represented by one or more CMOs.”215 An example in this regard is the administration of 
cable retransmission rights in the European Union.216 It has been observed - it is believed correctly - 
that the system of mandatory licensing weakens contractual freedom, as authors and other rights 
owners “have no choice but to commit the exercise of their rights to CMOs.”217 The further effect of 
the use of this system of collective management has been expressed as follows: 
If owners do not expressly enlist with any organization, the law presumes that the most representative 
CMO in the sector represents them. Therefore, the copyright owner has no alternative to collective 
management and it is unlikely that a CMO could refuse licensing in such a legally imposed 
scenario.
218
 
Furthermore, while it is generally recognised that the system of mandatory licensing would be 
suitable for remuneration rights and cases of exclusive rights in respect of which exceptions and 
limitations are permissible in international law, others have cast aspersions on the permissibility of 
such a system in respect of exclusive rights in all other cases, and whether this constitutes an 
exception or limitation to these rights.219 More emphatic in this regard is Ficsor, who asserts: 
… [I]t can be deduced that, in general, mandatory collective management of exclusive rights may only 
be prescribed practically in the same cases as non-voluntary licenses (which result in mere rights to 
remuneration) or where the possible application of exceptions to or limitation of such rights is left 
directly to the application of the three-step test …
220
 
In relation to this it needs to be mentioned that earlier versions of the Copyright Amendment Bill 
purported to introduce a system of mandatory collective management in South Africa. However, 
version B13B-2017, approved by both houses of Parliament and awaiting the President’s signature, 
does not contain such a provision.221 
2. Compulsory Licensing  
A compulsory licence is a type of legal non-voluntary licence which occurs where the exclusive right 
of the copyright owner is reduced to a remuneration right, although, unlike in the case of a statutory 
licence, the amount of remuneration is determined by a negotiation between the copyright owner 
and the user, or where no agreement can be reached, by a competent authority.222 Both cases 
however entail a limitation of the exclusive right of the copyright owner, who cannot prevent or 
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control the use of their works, provided however that the user pays for the use of the works 
concerned.223 Often in a system of compulsory licensing (but not always) the rights must of 
necessity be administered by a designated CMO, although the rights-holder may not be required to 
be a member of such CMO.224 The underlying model of collective management in a compulsory 
licensing system may therefore be any of the models referred to above. In South Africa the 
compulsory licensing system applies in respect of so-called needle-time rights.225 In the South 
African system rights-holders may, theoretically, directly collect royalties without the mechanism of a 
collecting society,226 although in practice it may not be easy to do so. 
3. Statutory Licensing 
A statutory licence is another type of legal non-voluntary licence. The difference between a statutory 
licence and a compulsory licence is that whereas in the latter case the rights-holder is able to 
negotiate the amount of royalty payable, in the case of a statutory licence the amount of royalty is 
determined by statute or an administrative body.227 A notable example of a statutory licence is the 
US statutory mechanical licence provided for in section 115 of the US Copyright Act.228 The statutory 
mechanical licence, also termed a statutory recording licence,229 permits a manufacturer or any 
other person to make records of musical works which have previously been distributed to the public 
(so-called cover records or “sound-alikes”230) without the authority or consent of the copyright owner; 
provided notice in this regard is given to the copyright owner and the manufacturer pays the 
stipulated royalty. The statutory mechanical licence was first introduced in the United States 
Copyright Act of 1909, following the Apollo case,231 with the United Kingdom following suit in the 
1911 Copyright Act.232 In South Africa the statutory mechanical licence is provided for in section 14 
of the Copyright Act 1978 and the regulations promulgated thereunder.233 Collecting societies have 
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often played a major role in the administration of statutory mechanical licences on behalf of rights-
holders, where users approach the collecting society rather than the user for the processing of such 
licences.234  
4. Fair Dealing and other Copyright Exceptions  
Copyright exceptions are at the extreme end of the continuum depicting the exercise of authors’ 
rights from a more voluntary to a less voluntary basis, as dealt with by Dussollier and Colin.235 As in 
the case of compulsory licensing and statutory licensing, the essence of copyright exceptions is that 
they result in the loss of the exclusive right of control over copyright works by the rights-holder.236 It 
has nevertheless been observed that, while in the case of compulsory licensing and statutory 
licensing the loss is accompanied by compensation, in the case of copyright exceptions no 
compensation is available.237 This however is not an accurate description in every case. An example 
is the case of private copy levies. Private copy levies are a form of remuneration due to rights-
holders arising from the private use exception, which limits the copyright owner’s exclusive right of 
reproduction by permitting users to make copies of copyright works for private purposes. The 
collection of this levy and its payment to rights-holders is often carried out by collecting societies.238 
In this regard it needs to be noted that often the payment of compensation to rights-holders arising 
from the limitation of their rights (as in the case of the private copy levy system) is subjected to a 
system of mandatory licensing, as is the case in Canada. 
(b) Application to SAMRO 
SAMRO has, since its inception, administered rights on the basis of assignment of copyright. In 
South Africa it would seem that the use of assignments as the basis for the administration of rights 
by CMOs is viewed with suspicion and in a scandalous manner.239 In this regard it has been 
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observed, more vociferously that “[a]n assignment is a loss of ownership and there is nothing good 
about this, or helpful to the interests of authors or the country.”240 These assertions are made 
without indicating in what way the grant of an assignment to a CMO is not “helpful to the interests of 
authors or the country.” As indicated, most performing rights societies administer copyright on the 
basis of assignment, so this is not a uniquely South African situation. What is essential is that a 
CMO must enable a rights-holder to terminate his or her membership of the CMO when he or she 
chooses to do so, and upon termination of the membership the rights assigned to the CMO must 
revert to the rights-holder.241  
In relation to the foregoing it can be argued that, in administering the rights of their members on the 
basis of an assignment, performing rights societies in fact act as the “preservers” of these rights 
from “exploiting businesses who have an own interest in acquiring and exercising certain author’s 
rights.”242 This is so for example where prevailing modes of exploitation of copyright works “make it 
difficult or impossible for authors to control their creations on an individualized basis”.243 In this 
regard it is to be noted that “exploiting businesses” such as music publishers would be (and are 
invariably) interested in acquiring, by assignment, all copyrights belonging to the author (including 
the performing right), often in exploitative conditions.244 In this regard Von Lewinski’s summation is 
apt: 
Therefore, not surprisingly, exploiting businesses tend to argue in front of the legislator in favor of  
exclusive rights … which they would exercise … instead of remuneration rights (exercised by 
collecting societies), and to exercise pressure on authors to revoke rights from the collecting society in 
order to assign them to the exploiting businesses.
245
 
It is trite fact that such an assignment to music publishers is often non-reversionary and is often 
irrespective of whether the publisher actively exploits the work (for the benefit of the author) or not. 
On the other hand, the relationship that exists between a rights-holder and a collecting society 
where the rights-holder has assigned his or her rights to the collecting society can best be 
understood within the regime of equitable ownership that exists in common law jurisdictions such as 
the United Kingdom, Australia, Hong Kong246 as well as the United States.247 In such a regime a 
distinction is made between the legal owner of the rights (in this case the CMO), who has legal title, 
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and the beneficial owner (the assignor author), who has equitable title.248 This can be either as a 
result of agreement between the parties or “as a consequence of some fiduciary or trust relationship 
that exists between them.”249 In this regard it has been observed that “[a]lthough legal title to the 
copyright rests in one person …it may be shown that he holds the title as trustee for a third party 
having the beneficial ownership”,250 and that as a consequence of this, “the legal owner must 
transfer the legal title if called upon to do so.”251   
It is submitted that the foregoing describes the true nature of the assignment of the performing right 
to SAMRO by its members. It is submitted that this is evident from the provisions of clause 2(c) of 
the SAMRO Deed of Assignment, which provides the following: 
It is understood that the ORGANISATION shall hold the assigned rights for the purpose of 
empowering itself to exclusively exercise and enforce the said rights in its own name on the behalf of 
and for the benefit of the ASSIGNOR during the residue of the terms for which the said rights shall 
respectively subsist, or during such time as the said rights remain vested in or controlled by the 
ORGANISATION in accordance with the provisions of its Memorandum of Incorporation for the time 
being in force.
252
 
In this regard it is trite that a normal music publishing agreement, in which an author assigns his or 
her copyright to the music publisher, would not contain the phrase “on the behalf of and for the 
benefit of”, because that is not the intention of such an agreement. In a normal author-publisher 
agreement it suffices to simply provide that “the assignor hereby assigns, transfers and makes over 
to the assignee the rights of copyright”253 – in regard of which it has been observed: 
An assignment of copyright divests the assignor entirely of the right or rights concerned and these 
become the property of the assignee. The assignor thereafter no longer has any claim to such rights 
and is in fact no longer able to perform the acts covered by those rights himself without the authority of 
the assignee.
254
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From the foregoing it is clear that while SAMRO attains legal title to the rights assigned to it in terms 
of the SAMRO deed of assignment “for the purpose of empowering itself to exclusively exercise and 
enforce the said rights”, the author retains the beneficial title to the rights. Furthermore, the SAMRO 
assignment clause provides that the assignment is for “the residue of the terms for which the said 
rights shall respectively subsist, or during such time as the said rights remain vested in or controlled 
by the organization in accordance with the provisions of its Memorandum of Incorporation for the 
time being in force.”255 The first part of this phrase clearly refers to the term in which copyright 
subsists under the Copyright Act, namely the life of the author and fifty years after his or her 
death,256 and this has been the source of the objection to SAMRO administering rights on the basis 
of assignment. The second part of the phrase no doubt alludes to the provisions in the SAMRO MOI 
relating to what can be termed the “holding over” of the rights of a member for a period of time after 
the member has given notice of termination of membership (provided for in articles 8.2 and 8.3 of 
the MOI, read together with article 8.21 thereof).257   
The holding-over provisions of the SAMRO MOI are reasonable and consistent with international 
practice. In this regard items 18 – 20 of the WIPO Good Practice Toolkit for CMOs provide the 
following: 
18. A CMO should permit each member to terminate … his / her mandate, upon a reasonable notice 
period. 
19. In circumstances described in its Statute, a CMO may require that a rightholder’s rights continue to 
be included, for a reasonable period of time, in licensees granted to Licensee [sic] prior to termination.  
20. Notwithstanding the termination of a mandate, a rightholder should be entitled to his / her full 
share in the Rights Revenue collected.
258
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There are two possible reasons why a CMO may wish to hold over the rights of a member who has 
given notice of termination of membership: one, provided for in article 8.21 of the SAMRO MOI 
relates to a case where there may be pending legal proceedings that relate to the rights of the 
member filing notice of termination of membership. Although it is not practically possible for a CMO 
to institute infringement proceedings against every user that is infringing the works of its members - 
simply as a result of the sheer numbers involved in many cases – CMOs often carefully select 
matters that they can pursue, e.g. where such matters would set a legal precedent in cases where 
uncertainty prevails; or where in a particular industry a culture of flagrant infringement and / or 
disregard of the rights of copyright owners prevails.259  
The second instance relates to cases where it may be necessary or expedient for the CMO to retain 
control over the rights of the member in relation to a licence or licences granted to a user / users 
prior to the notice of termination.260 This may be so where for example, the rights-holder concerned, 
such as a major music publisher, may have a large “catalogue” of works that he / it may be 
withdrawing. Under such circumstances although performing rights societies generally conclude 
blanket licences (as opposed to transactional licences) with users, users may insist (as they are 
entitled to) or renegotiating the licence and claiming a reduced licence fee, based on the reduction 
of the repertoire of works controlled by the CMO. In this regard it needs to be noted that blanket 
licences are often durable for yearly periods (renewable, with the licence fee adjusted based on 
such considerations as the consumer price index), and the payment of the licence fee may be 
spread over the year period.261 A renegotiation of a blanket licence as a result of a member’s 
withdrawal of membership may affect the CMO’s annual distribution plan and its ability to pay rights-
holders affected by the withdrawal of an existing blanket licence. The process of renegotiation itself 
may become protracted, and this would not be in the best interest of rights-holders. 
As indicated above, the effect of termination of a member’s mandate is that henceforth the copyright 
assigned to the CMO for purposes of administration reverts to the member terminating the mandate. 
In this regard it cannot be argued that the assignment of copyright by rights-holders to CMOs is to 
their detriment. It is crucial that the grant of rights of administration to CMOs by rights-holders should 
empower and enable them to effectively administer the rights, including enforcing the rights against 
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 The licence agreement itself may be construed as being durable “for an indefinite period”, until terminated by either 
party, as is the case with most of SAMRO’s licence agreements. See http://www.samro.org.za/music-user-application 
(date of use: 05 August 2018) for a list of SAMRO’s licence agreements. However, the payment is itself an annual 
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infringing acts. In this regard an assignment of rights no doubt provides the most effective means of 
achieving this. A non-exclusive licence or mere agency relationship would be limiting on the CMO’s 
ability to fully enforce the protection of authors’ rights – especially where it becomes necessary, as it 
often is, to institute legal proceedings against infringers or defaulting licensees.262  
The question may be asked as to why the grant of an exclusive licence should not be sufficient to 
enable the CMO to administer the rights without impediments, seeing that an exclusive licensee has 
the same rights of action and is entitled to the same remedies “as if the licence were an 
assignment”.263 In this regard however it needs to be noted that such rights and remedies are 
“concurrent with the rights and remedies of the owner of the copyright”.264 More specifically section 
25(2) of the Copyright Act requires the exclusive licensee to give written notice to the copyright 
owner before instituting any infringement proceedings, who “may intervene in such proceedings and 
recover any damages he or she may have suffered as a result of the infringement concerned or a 
reasonable royalty to which he or she may be entitled.” This may have a negative impact in the 
CMO’s ability to speedily conduct litigation in respect of the infringement of works forming part of the 
exclusive licence.265 It stands to reason therefore that that collecting societies should be permitted to 
administer rights on the basis of an assignment of copyright with a reversionary interest in favour of 
the author assignor. This is more so in the case of performing rights societies like SAMRO, where 
the usage of works is generally based on a blanket licence.266 
Having highlighted the above it is submitted that the introduction of an extended collective licensing 
(ECL) system, as discussed above, would be a viable alternative in South Africa. As indicated, the 
ECL system enables non-member rights-holders to be treated in the same way as members of the 
CMO, since the licensing of the works by a CMO representing a substantial number of rights-holders 
in a particular field is deemed to include the licensing of the works of non-members in that field.267 
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 To surmount this difficulty SARRAL, which operated as an agency, inserted a clause in its agreement with its members 
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Another admirable feature of this system is that it permits rights-holders to opt out of the system and 
to administer the rights themselves. In this regard the system is a much better system than the legal 
presumption and mandatory licensing systems, which, as it was observed, limit rights-holders’ 
contractual freedom. Unlike earlier versions of the Copyright Amendment Bill, which sought to 
introduce a system of mandatory licensing, the version approved by both houses of Parliament and 
awaiting the President’s signature268 does not have a provision of that nature.269 In the Bill it is clear 
that while it will be illegal to purport to act as a collecting society without having received 
accreditation to do so, the member of an accredited collecting society may withdraw the 
authorisation given to a collecting society to administer his or her rights – thus implying that such 
former member may then administer the rights on his or her own.270 
However the current provisions of the Bill do not resolve an issue that has often been raised with 
regard to the system of collective management applicable in South Africa, namely the notion that 
collecting societies, in particular SAMRO, license the rights of non-members.271 To say that 
collecting societies license the rights of non-members and thus collect licence fees on behalf of such 
non-members is however, not entirely accurate. This, it is submitted, arises from a misunderstanding 
of what the blanket licence, the predominant form of licence used particularly by performing rights 
societies such as SAMRO, entails. For example, in the CRC report it appears that a distinction is 
made between the licences that performing rights societies issue to users, and a blanket licence, it 
being observed that the licences issued by collecting societies to users are “limited to [the CMO]’s 
repertoire”, yet “they operate as if they have blanket agreements with their respective users”, which 
is conceived to mean that the licensing extends to the repertoire of non-members.272 In fact it is the 
essence of a blanket licence that the works licensed are limited to works forming part of the CMO’s 
repertoire. The user is, in this regard, permitted to use any of the works forming part of the CMO’s 
repertoire, at any time, without the need to first obtain permission.273 In this regard the blanket 
licence is to be distinguished from a transactional or per-use licence.  
The use of a blanket licence clearly does not entail the licensing of the works of non-members. In 
this regard it is also useful, in understanding the nature of a blanket licence, to note that a blanket 
licence does not also imply that a user shall use all the works forming part of the CMO’s repertoire 
within the period covered by the blanket licence. It simply means that the user may do so.274 The 
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ostensible inclusion of non-members within the blanket licensing regime is generally a result of the 
indemnity provision often demanded by large users, such as broadcasters, when concluding blanket 
licences. In terms of the indemnity clause the CMO indemnifies the user in respect of any claims of 
copyright infringement from copyright owners relating to the user’s exploitation of the works of such 
copyright owners for purposes covered by the blanket licence. Where a CMO is a de facto monopoly 
in a territory, it is generally assumed that the CMO would represent all rights-holders in the particular 
territory. In this regard the ECL system would be a more viable legal instrument for ensuring that 
CMOs can legally represent all rights-holders, unless the rights-holder concerned specifically signals 
to the CMO that he or she does not wish to be represented by the CMO concerned. This system 
would also bring much certainty to users with regard to the repertoire represented by the CMO’s 
blanket licence, and would be a more legally-sound mechanism than the indemnity clause currently 
in use.     
6.7 Conclusion 
This Chapter was concerned with the elucidation of the important system of collective management 
of copyright, with a focus on the collective management of musical works. The importance of the 
system of collective management was highlighted. The Chapter also deal with the important role 
played by SAMRO in respect of Collective management in South Africa. In this regard it must be 
noted that SAMRO has, year-on-year, distributed royalties in line with its constitutive documents, 
since its inception. This is a notable observation because many African CMOs have struggled with 
distributing royalties to members and affiliated societies on a regular basis, and some have also 
failed to hold regular members’ meetings. This is not to vouch for the accuracy of SAMRO’s 
distribution of royalties. It is also acknowledged that, there have, over the years, been claims by 
some of non-payment of royalties due to them (including the famous Brenda Fassie matter). These 
are matters that have to be dealt with on a case-by-case basis. The situation is also not unique to 
SAMRO as there have been issues in this regard even among the more developed CMOs. This in 
fact owes to the very nature of the system of collective management, where accurate distribution of 
royalties is dependent on receiving accurate information on the usage of music from users, so that it 
has been acknowledged that the processing of royalties by CMOs is not an exact science but rather 
“rough justice”.275  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
of whether the Licensee elects to broadcast SAMRO’s Repertoire or not.” Emphasis added. Available at 
http://www.samro.org.za/forms#music-user-forms (date of use: 02 October 2018). 
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Chapter 7: The Protection of Musical Works under the Copyright 
Act 98 of 1978 
 
“Unfortunately … drafters … have tended to acquire Cyclopean tendencies. … Whether or not he is 
otherwise Cyclopean, the drafter must always put in the forefront of his mind the need for legal 
effectiveness. He must ensure, so far as he is able that the text of his Bill is apt to carry out the 
intentions of the government in promoting the legislation. … - FAR Bennion1 
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 Bennion Statute Law 36. 
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7.1 Introduction 
The purpose of this section is to highlight those provisions of the Copyright Act that have specific 
relevance to music copyright, in order to determine how and how effectively the Act provides 
protection to musical works. In particular the section does what has not been attempted before, 
namely providing a section-by-section analysis of the Copyright Act with a focus on those aspects 
that have a bearing on the protection of musical works. This will greatly contribute to the body of 
knowledge in this regard, as it will provide a contextual understanding of how those specific 
provisions of the Act are to be applied in practice. Music copyright is still a matter of copyright law 
and so from this perspective many of the provisions in the Copyright Act will apply to music 
copyright. The objective however is to highlight the more pertinent provisions in order to create a 
more vivid distinction of music copyright and to depict this area of copyright law as one capable of 
distinct consideration. In doing so the writer also makes a closer consideration of certain provisions 
of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 which have a bearing on the subject-matter under 
consideration. In this regard it is important to observe that the Bill was passed by both houses of 
Parliament and now awaits the signature of the President.2 The Bill, which has been long in the 
making, has proven very controversial and has perhaps received some of the fiercest criticisms of 
any legislation in the post-1994 period.3 Further commentary on the Bill is made in Chapter 9 below, 
where specific recommendations are given. 
With regard to the foregoing it needs to be mentioned that there are however, those that have hailed 
the Bill as being “historic” and for introducing “new, fair and practical limitations and exceptions”, 
amongst other laudations.4 Recreate South Africa particularly lauds the Bill for introducing what they 
label as “three key rights”, namely (i) the right to create, by which is meant the conviction that the 
introduction of a fair use exception shall “permit digital and other uses necessary to make original 
work and to exercise … freedom of expression; (ii) the right to own, which is a clear reference to 
clause 22 of the Bill, which relaxes the commissioning provisions provided for in section 21 of the 
Copyright Act;5 and (iii) the right to earn, which lauds the provisions that seek to regulate copyright 
contracts and collecting societies, to prevent “abuse and exploitation”.6 While the writer is in support 
of Recreate South Africa’s concept of “the right to own”, the writer only cautiously supports the idea 
of regulated contracts and the regulation of collecting societies. With regard to the so-called “right to 
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 Version B13B-2017m available at  https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 10 July 2019). 
3
 Some of the most scathing criticism of the Bill came from Professor Owen Dean, recognised by many, including the 
judiciary as the foremost authority on copyright law in South Africa. In very strong language Dean alleges a ‘”department 
capture” – a mindset inimical to intellectual property that has been imposed on the department [of Trade and Industry – the 
department responsible for intellectual property legislation] and the parliamentary portfolio committee, in the same nature 
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5
 See the discussion further below. 
6
 http://infojustice.org/archives/40692 (date of use: 21 January 2019). 
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create”, the writer argues that this is based on a convoluted and nihilistic conception of copyright as 
a system of law, depicting what Dean has termed “a mindset inimical to intellectual property”.7  
As highlighted in Chapter 5 above, the essence of copyright is that it is an exclusive right granted 
over a defined period, during which the copyright owner has the power to restrict others from using 
his work. Only once the period of protection has lapsed is the work released to the public domain to 
satisfy the public interest requirement of copyright law. What the likes of Recreate South Africa are 
demanding is in fact an early bite at the cake. Such a demand finds no support in the current 
international copyright system as undergirded by the WTO regime. The ensuing analysis shall, 
alongside considering provisions of the Copyright Act that have a bearing on music copyright, also 
consider those aspects of the Copyright Amendment Bill that would likewise, if passed into law, have 
an impact on music copyright. 
One of the idiosyncrasies of the Bill which commentators neglect to highlight however, is the fact 
that the Bill proposes to introduce elements of American copyright law into our law on a number of 
instances. Three notable instances in this regard are (i) the introduction of the US merger doctrine, 
which is associated with the idea / expression dichotomy;8 (ii) the introduction of the fair use 
doctrine9 and (iii) the introduction of the “first-sale” doctrine.10 This Americanisation of South African 
copyright law is inimical to the sentiments made by Berger J in Moneyweb v Media24,11 who, having 
noted earlier that English copyright law was “no different from of own” concerning the questions 
being considered,12 observed (as also pointed out in Chapter 1): 
… I understand that foreign authorities are referred to for guidance only. I also accept that I must be 
cautious in considering foreign law because each jurisdiction has its particular history and, in many 
cases, is bound and influenced by domestic statutory precepts. I therefore intend, for historical 
reasons, to focus on English authority.
13
 
In light of the introduction of American doctrines to our law through the Copyright Amendment Bill it 
appears that our courts will (if the Bill ultimately becomes law), be compelled to constantly refer to 
American copyright law when adjudicating matters touching on these doctrines. This, it is submitted, 
will bring about a minefield in the adjudication of copyright cases because of the complexity and 
uniqueness of the American legal system. For this reason, although this thesis has not followed a 
pure comparative approach but rather a historical and contextual approach, the writer deems it 
necessary to provide a bird’s eye view of the American legal system prior to considering the relevant 
provisions of the Copyright Act and the Copyright Amendment Bill, 2017. This is to give a sense of 
the hurdles that are to be expected when referring to American authority in adjudicating copyright 
cases under the new regime. Furthermore, it is necessary to do so from the point of view that 
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although “there is a presumption that the court must accept that foreign law is the same as South 
African law … a party relying on a foreign statute, and more particularly a foreign copyright statute, 
should generally speaking prove it before the court.”14 
7.2 An Overview of the United States Legal System 
7.2.1 Sources of Law and their Hierarchy 
Like South African law, American law follows the common-law tradition and has its roots 
“undeniably” in English law.15 Thus English law (“buttressed” by such sources as the US 
Constitution, court cases, statutes, decrees, etc.), forms an integral part of American law.16 After 
independence the new American states adopted statutes and constitutional provisions that followed 
the English common law to the extent that they did not conflict with the state and federal 
constitutions, with other states incorporating the common law through judicial decisions.17 The only 
exception is the State of Louisiana, which adopted a Napoleonic Code which, nevertheless, follows 
the doctrine of stare decisis.18 Furthermore, in the tradition of the English courts, American courts 
act as both courts of law and courts of equity, and with regard to the later, are enjoined to “fashion 
remedies as necessary to accomplish a just result.”19 The Blackstone Commentaries on the Law of 
England also played an important role in the reception of English law into American law.20 
It has been observed that it would be best to see the United States as comprised of “multiple 
sovereignties” with “one federal government and the more than fifty state and territorial 
governments, each of which has its own set of laws and its own court system”, giving the United 
States legal system “much of its richness, diversity, complexity, and conceptual challenge.”21 
America is in essence, comprised of “fifty-one legal systems”.22 This is important from a South 
African perspective when consideration has to be made as to which court’s law to use when seeking 
guidance with regard to copyright disputes arising from the American legal doctrines incorporated 
into our law. Will South African courts be free to choose which Circuit rulings to use, or will only 
decisions of the US Supreme Court be considered conclusive? It is for example trite that US courts 
“have applied the fair use defense inconsistently over the years.”23 In view of this a clear rule needs 
to be established as to how to apply US copyright law as a source of foreign law in South Africa.  
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 Moser and Slay Music Copyright Law 208. For example Greenleaf and Lindsay Public Rights 368, noting such 
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from that given by the Ninth Circuit, although the facts were similar. Galavis 2013 B.U.J.SCI. & Tech. L. highlights how the 
Ninth Circuit and the Second Circuit – which are the main jurisdictions for dealing with entertainment law cases and which 
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In terms of the hierarchy of legal sources federal legal sources of law have primacy over state legal 
sources.24 Federal legal sources, in order of primacy, are the US Constitution, Acts of Congress and 
treaties, Federal Common law and equity, and the remaining State hierarchy of laws (i.e. all other 
laws). On the other hand, state legal sources are the State’s Constitution, State statutes, Common 
law and equity25 and Contracts.26 Thus a federal supremacy rule applies, with the US Constitution 
constituting the supreme law of the United States.27 In terms of the enumerated powers doctrine, 
federal government has only those powers conferred upon it by the US Constitution in terms of 
Article 1, section 8 of the Constitution, thus giving states a certain level of discretion to determine 
laws that are best suited to their own circumstances.28 The United States is thus a federalist country 
following a dualist system of law, in which state law functions alongside federal law subject to the 
primacy of federal law in certain matters.  
In view of the foregoing it has been noted that “[t]he federal courts cannot be given authority beyond 
that conferred by the Constitution.”29 Thus, although states may make use of their own laws in a 
number of matters, in those matters in which the federal government has primacy under the 
Constitution, state law has to give way to federal law. This observation is important for our purposes 
because, as highlighted under 7.2.3 below, copyright law in the United States is a matter of federal 
law rather than state law. It is thus the federal law system that is applicable in respect of copyright 
matters. 
7.2.2 The Hierarchy of the Courts in the United States 
Related to the federal-state law hierarchy system is a federal-state court hierarchy system. Just as 
there are two sets of legal sources, with federal legal sources taking precedence over state legal 
sources in those matters in which the federal government has jurisdiction, so there is a dual court 
hierarchy system comprising of federal and state courts, in which federal courts rank higher than 
state courts.30 Both the federal and state court systems provide for three levels of courts, namely 
trial court, intermediate appellate court and final appellate court.31 It must be highlighted here that 
those cases falling within the ambit of federal rather than state law (as is the case with copyright 
matters) are dealt with through the federal court system and not through the state court system. 
Federal courts are said to comprise a “separate and independent system of courts” in that (apart 
from the US Supreme Court), they do not fulfil the function of appellate or superior courts for the 
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state courts.32 Instead, federal courts and state courts operate in a parallel manner, with the US 
Supreme Court functioning as the highest appeal court for both systems of courts.33  
It should also be noted that in certain circumstances (as in cases involving “supplemental 
jurisdiction”34), federal courts may hear matters relating to state law (provided that they apply state 
law to such cases);35 conversely, state courts can also hear matters arising from federal law except 
in the limited instances in which federal courts have exclusive jurisdiction to hear such matters, and 
provided that they apply federal law to such cases.36 In this regard it needs to be noted that 
Congress has given exclusive jurisdiction in respect of copyright (and other intellectual property) 
matters to the federal courts.37 Federal court jurisdiction generally relates to federal question 
jurisdiction (where the subject-matter dealt with arises from federal law), and diversity of citizenship 
jurisdiction, dealing solely with civil suits where the parties are from different states and the matter 
involves a controversy exceeding $75 000, whether or not the matter gives rise to a federal 
question.38  
The federal court system is comprised of district courts, which are interspersed across all fifty US 
states and are courts of first instance / trial courts.39 District courts have been termed “the general 
court[s] of original jurisdiction”.40 Appeals from district courts are lodged at the circuit courts (termed 
the US Courts of Appeal), totalling thirteen (13) and covering all US states (including Hawaii and the 
district of Washington D.C. (District of Columbia), which is deemed to be a federal territory and not a 
US state). The thirteenth circuit court is the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, a 
circuit court with nationwide jurisdiction in respect of certain specialised matters.41 Circuit courts also 
act as courts of first instance in relation to orders made by certain federal agencies.42 The last and 
highest court in the United States is the US Supreme Court, which is primarily an appeal court 
involved with petitions for a writ of certiorari,43 except in very rare cases where it can act as a court 
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of first instance.44 The US Supreme Court is also the last arbiter of disputes arising from state law 
referred from the state supreme courts.45 
America (just like the United Kingdom and South Africa) follows the principle of stare decisis.46 
Edlin47 distinguishes between what he terms vertical stare decisis, as dealing with “hierarchical 
judicial systems that require lower courts to obey the decisions of higher courts”, and horizontal 
stare decisis as the aspect of the doctrine which binds a court to its own previous decisions. Under 
the stare decisis principle “precedent cases” of a higher court are binding on a lower court, thus 
fostering such values as predictability, reliability, equality, expediency, adjudicative integrity (i.e. 
warding against arbitrary discretion), judicial efficiency, fairness to the parties etc.48 As Justice 
Cardozo has noted, adherence to precedent should be the rule and not the exception, as the labour 
of judges would be increased if a judge could not “lay one’s own course of bricks on the secure 
foundation of the courses laid by others who had gone before him”.49 While it is possible to highlight 
certain similarities between the US system of stare decisis and that of its South African counterpart, 
notable differences are evident also. In particular, the South African system can accurately be 
portrayed as simple and straightforward compared to the complex US system.50  
What would make the US system of legal precedent intriguing to the curious South African mind is 
its “application of varying stare decisis standards to different types of cases”, using somewhat of a 
                                                                                                                                                              
understand as an appeal) and a judicial review proper, seen as a controversial doctrine in the United States. See Johns 
and Perschbacher The United States Legal System 101 – 105.  
44
 Kim American Law 16. Kim refers to the case of Bush v Gore 531 U.S. (98) 2000, which the U.S. Supreme Court dealt 
with as a court of first instance on the basis of urgency, as the outcome of the 2000 U.S. presidential elections was under 
dispute. See also Scheb and Scheb II The American Legal System 36 – 41; Burnham Law and Legal System 175 – 186, 
and Wright and Kane Law of Federal Courts, generally, on the US court system. 
45
 As already indicated, the state court system is not relevant for present purposes as copyright is protected under federal 
law. Suffice it to say that the system is comprised of state trial courts, intermediate appellate courts and state supreme 
courts. See Kim American Law 15. 
46
 The other fundamental element of the U.S. legal system is the doctrine of legislative supremacy, which imposes an 
obligation on judges to apply the law contained in statutes, and arises from Article VI of the U.S. Constitution which 
provides that the Constitution, and the Laws of the United States made pursuant thereto and all Treaties made under the 
authority of the United States “shall be the Supreme Law of the land” (the so-called “supremacy clause”). See further in 
this regard Edlin Judges and Unjust Laws 41 – 46.     
47
 Edlin id at 33. 
48
 Edlin id at 38; Kim American Law 11. 
49
 Cardozo The Nature of Judicial Process 149. 
50
 Van Niekerk 2013 Fundamina 106 refers, it is believed correctly, to the “somewhat watered down and flexible version” of 
the doctrine of stare decisis in South Africa. In simple terms, the South African doctrine of stare decisis provides that a 
previous decision of the Supreme Court of Appeals, being the highest court in the land in respect of all matters except 
constitutional matters, is binding upon all other courts in the land (see Collett v Priest 1931 AD 290 at 297 - 298). It is also 
binding upon the Supreme Court of Appeals itself unless the decision was wrong due to a manifest oversight or 
misunderstanding or due to a “palpable” mistake (R v Nxumalo 1939 AD 580 at 232; Bloemfontein Town Council v Richter 
1938 AD 195 at 232). A Provincial division of the High Court is bound by its previous decisions unless a clear mistake was 
made (R v Manasewitz 1933 AD 165 at 170; R v Philips Dairy (Pty) Ltd 1955 (4) SA 120 (T) at 122), and those decisions 
are binding upon a local division or a single judge within the provincial court’s jurisdiction (Hughes v Savvas 1931 WLD 
237; SA Farmers Representatives v Bonthuys 1930 CPD 132 at 135). Local divisions have concurrent jurisdiction with the 
provincial divisions within which they exist, but only provincial divisions have appellate and review jurisdiction. Provincial 
divisions are not bound by the decisions of another provincial division, and neither is a single judge bound by the decision 
of a full bench in another provincial division (Lobley v Lobley 1940 CPD 420 at 434; Levitt v Schwartz 1938 CPD 47. In the 
latter case the decision of the full bench would have “strong persuasive value”. See MV Heavy Metal Palm Base Maritime 
SDN BHD v Dahlia Maritime Ltd 1998 (4) SA 479 (CPD) at 486B and S v Jafta 2005 (1) SA 108 (ECD) at 131B–C). Inferior 
courts (e.g. Magistrates’ Courts) are bound by the decisions of any division of the High Court, beginning with the dec ision 
of the High Court in the province in which the court operates, and where no court in the said province has set a precedent 
on the matter concerned, a decision of a court in another province would be applicable. 
281 
 
sliding scale.51 This sliding scale considers such factors as (i) the nature of the case involved (i.e. 
whether it is a constitutional, common law or statutory matter); (ii) whether the court that issued the 
precedent was a trial, appellate or high court and (iii) whether the court reviewing the precedent is a 
trial, appellate or high court.52 Under such circumstances, “the bindingness of precedent is directly 
proportional to the justification a court must proffer to deviate from the previous decision”, and for 
the first two factors mentioned above, “the precedential force of the previous case and its attendant 
binding weight on the deciding court increases as one moves up the scale”, while, with regard to the 
third factor, it decreases.53  
Another idiosyncrasy of the US stare decisis system is the fact that the system is “more stringently” 
applied in cases involving judicial statutory interpretation than it does in constitutional cases.54 
Perhaps of more interesting comparative value is the consideration, as a factor used to determine 
the applicability of stare decisis in the US court system, of the question whether the precedent case 
was ruled on by a court recognized as a leading court in the relevant subject-matter.55 This brings in 
the issue of “forum shopping” in the United States, a practice which, while of less relevance in the 
South African context due to its simple court structure, is more prevalent in the United States. 
“Forum shopping” is simply defined as “the act of seeking the most advantageous venue in which to 
try a case.”56 Although often seen as a somewhat unethical practice and frowned upon by some, 
Algero argues that forum shopping is in fact, “an intrinsic part of the American judicial system” 
necessitated largely by the complex US court system in which federal courts and state courts 
operate parallel to, and independent of each other – and in which the jurisdiction of the courts may 
overlap.57 
The issue of the parallel existence of federal and state courts is of course not relevant in respect of 
copyright cases because, as already hinted to, copyright is a federal question and therefore only 
federal courts may hear copyright cases. This however means in essence that any of the ninety-four 
(94) federal district courts of the United States may hear copyright matters and any of the thirteen 
(13) intermediate appellate courts (i.e. circuit courts) may hear appellate (and judicial) reviews of 
such cases. What is required under these circumstances is summed up in the words of Chief Justice 
Stone, when he remarked: 
[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject the defendant to a judgment in personam, if he be 
not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum contacts with it such that the 
maintenance of the suit does not offend “traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.”
58
 
                                               
51
 Edlin Judges and Unjust Laws 34. 
52
 Edlin id at 34 – 35. 
53
 Edlin id at 35. 
54
 Edlin id at 34. 
55
 See Kim American Law 12. 
56
 Algero 1999 Neb. L. Rev. 79. 
57
 Algero id at 80 – 82. 
58
 Quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940), in International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945). 
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This involves questions of both jurisdiction and venue selection, and is influenced by questions of 
choice of law. Jurisdiction generally relates to the subject-matter of the case (subject-matter 
jurisdiction) and the personal circumstances of the defendant relating to his contact with the forum in 
which the court sits (personal jurisdiction). As indicated earlier, federal courts have subject-matter 
jurisdiction only if a matter either gives rise to a federal question (as in copyright matters); or in the 
case of diversity jurisdiction (i.e. where the amount in question exceeds $75 000 and no plaintiff 
shares a state of citizenship with the defendant). As Subrin and Woo have observed, “In the United 
States, states vie with other states and with the federal government on jurisdiction and choice of law 
questions”, and in view of this “[c]lasses of litigants in this power battle have tried both to shape and 
use jurisdictional choices to enhance their overall strategic advantage in the litigation.”59 In this 
regard the authors refer to the four squares “that must be appropriately filled” in order to succeed in 
the “game” of litigation in the United States, namely personal jurisdiction, notice (through service of 
process), subject-matter jurisdiction and venue (i.e. “which of the courts with subject matter and 
personal jurisdiction bears the most sensible relationship to the claims asserted or to the parties, 
and hence, should hear the claim”).60  
All federal district courts spread all over the United States would have subject-matter jurisdiction in 
respect of copyright matters.61 The important question to consider when instituting copyright 
proceedings in the United States would therefore be whether the court in which the plaintiff intends 
to institute proceedings has personal jurisdiction over the defendant (i.e. whether the defendant is 
resident in the state concerned – i.e. a citizen of the said state or domiciled in the state; has property 
in such a state or has entered into a relationship that gives rise to legal status, e.g. marriage, 
adoption, guardianship).62 It would of course be difficult to determine beforehand where infringement 
of copyright or other disputes relating to copyright is likely to arise in respect of the copyright owner’s 
works. Nevertheless, it is also true that the US is a vast market for music usage and therefore 
infringement is likely to occur in many parts of the United States.63  
A music company would nevertheless wish that where copyright infringement takes place, it does so 
in a jurisdiction which is more favourable to its form of business. In this regard the music company 
may elect to set up its headquarters or at least maintain an office in a favourable jurisdiction, “even if 
those offices are not their primary headquarters.”64 In relation to this Nathan and Morgan state that 
“California’s laws and courts are commonly regarded as more favorable to artists and entertainers, 
while New York’s are regarded as more favorable to record companies and other large 
                                               
59
 Subrin and Woo Litigating in America 72. 
60
 Subrin and Woo ibid. 
61
 In view of the fact that copyright is a federal question and further that any federal court has diversity jurisdiction where 
the amount of controversy exceeds $75 000 and no plaintiff is a citizen of the same state as the defendant. 
62
 See Subrin and Woo Litigating in America 73 - 74. 
63
 A recent study has shown that some twenty-five (25) U.S. cities – from Nashville, New York, Los Angeles to San Antonio 
-  have “vibrant music scenes”. See http://www.citylab.com/design/2012/08/geography-americas-music-scenes/2709/ (date 
of use: 09 June 2015). 
64
 See Nathan and Morgan The Essentials 261.  
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businesses.”65 Nevertheless, wishing that copyright disputes will only arise in favourable jurisdictions 
does not mean that this will in fact be the case. In practice, and exacerbated by digital technologies, 
copyright infringement may occur anywhere in the country or the world.  In view of this, unless the 
defendant has consented to the jurisdiction of what the plaintiff may see as a favourable jurisdiction, 
personal jurisdiction will have to be determined in line with the rules governing personal jurisdiction 
in federal cases (i.e. only the district court where the defendant has physical presence or is 
domiciled can be a “forum state”66).  
Federal requirements for personal jurisdiction are subject to the constitutional requirement of “due 
process”, which requires that where the defendant is not present within the territory of the forum, the 
forum court may only subject him “to a judgement in personam” if the defendant “ha[s] certain 
minimum contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of 
fair play and substantial justice’”, as held in the International Shoe Co. case.67 This is often also 
dealt with within the concept of the “long-arm statutes”, such as Rule 4(k)(2) of the Federal Rules of 
Civil Procedure, in terms of which  
[e]ven if a copyright owner is unable to demonstrate the purposeful direction of defendant’s activities 
to a particular state, it may … establish jurisdiction for purposes of its copyright claim if the defendant 
purposefully directed its activity at the United States.
68
  
In relation to this the following has been observed: 
Washington Shoe is a high water mark in the extension of personal jurisdiction for copyright 
infringement, effectively requiring alleged infringers everywhere to be prepared to defend in the 
copyright owner’s home jurisdiction, however distant, and however removed from alleged 
infringement’s presence in the stream of commerce. …
69
 
7.2.3 The Protection of Copyright in the United States 
7.2.3.1 The Constitutional Basis of U.S. Copyright Law 
Unlike in South Africa, where the constitutional basis of intellectual property rights has been a 
debatable issue,70 there has never been such uncertainty in United States law. In what is generally 
                                               
65
 Ibid. See also Krasilovsky and Shemel This Business of Music 14, who state that “[m]ost recording contracts s  
66
 I.e. the state in which the copyright dispute is heard. See in this regard Goldstein Goldstein On Copyright 15:1 – 15:2. 
67
 International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)). 
See also Godstein id at 15:2 – 15:3. 
68
 Goldstein id at 15.4.1. In this regard the plaintiff must prove that the exercise of jurisdiction conforms to due process; 
that the claim arises under federal law and that the defendant is not subject to the personal jurisdiction of any state court of 
general jurisdiction. Goldstein ibid. See also for the concept of the “long arm statutes” Thomas Jackson Publg., Inc. v 
Buckner, 625 F. Supp. 1044  (D. Neb. 1985); Troma Entertainment, Inc. V Centennial Pictures Inc., 729 F.3d 215 (2d Cir. 
2013); Ham v. La Cienega Music Co., 4 F.3d 413, 416 (5
 
th Cir. 1993); Bridgeport Music, Inc. v. Still N the Water Publg., 
327 F.3d 472, 483 (6th Cir. 2003); Marvel Characters Inc. v. Kirby 726 F.3d 119, 107 (2d Cir. 2013). 
69
 Goldsteid at 15.8. 
70
 This was the case until the Laugh it Off case. See Laugh it Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International 
(Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International and Another 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC). See also the earlier ruling of the Supreme 
Court of Appeals in the same matter, Laugh it Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a 
Sabmark International and Another 2005 (2) SA 46 (SCA), at paras 10 – 11. Earlier, when the Constitutional Court was 
called upon to determine whether intellectual property rights were to be treated as fundamental rights under the 
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known as “the Copyright Clause”71, the Constitution of the United States of America empowers 
Congress  
to promote the progress of science and useful arts, by securing for limited time to authors and 
inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings and discoveries.
72
  
In this regard it was observed in Eldred v. Ashcroft73 that “it is generally for Congress, not the courts, 
to decide how best to pursue the Copyright Clause’s objectives.” As Nimmer and Nimmer have 
noted, Congress was acting upon this power when it enacted the first US Copyright Act in 1790, in 
this way “[beginning] federal copyright protection”.74 Thus Abrams has likewise noted: “American 
copyright law is rooted in the Constitution and given form by Congress.”75 This form is expressed in 
the federal copyright legislation,76 and provides the “structure and dimensions of copyright”.77 In this 
sense therefore American copyright law is (as is South African copyright law and the copyright laws 
of many other countries), “a creature of statute”.78 Commenting on this, Abrams reasons that “[t]his 
focuses the attention of courts and lawyers on the Copyright Clause of the Constitution and the 
Copyright Act as the foundation from which analysis of copyright cases and copyright problems must 
proceed.”79 This has given rise to the recognition of the so-called incentive theory as underpinning 
the rationale for intellectual property (and in this case, copyright) protection in the United States.80  
                                                                                                                                                              
Constitution that court in essence avoided dealing with the situation by holding that intellectual property rights were not 
universally recognised as fundamental rights. See Ex Parte Chairperson of the National Assembly: In re Certification of the 
Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (C), at 799. Rulings subsequent to the Laugh it Off case 
have confirmed that intellectual property is a Constitutionally-protected right. See See National Soccer League v Gidani 
(Pty) Ltd [2014] 2 All SA 461 (GJ); Moneyweb (Pty) Limited v Media 24 Limited and Another [2016] ZAGPJHC 81.  
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 Sometimes termed the “Copyright-Patent Clause” because of the fact that it in fact, deals with intellectual property in 
general, and more particularly copyright and patents. See Abrams Law of Copyright 1-2. 
72
 US Constitution, Art. I, § 8, Cl. 8. 
73
 537 U.S. 186, 212 (2003). 
74
 Nimmer and Nimmer Nimmer on Copyright OV-1. 
75
 Abrams Law of Copyright 1-2. 
76
 Currently the Copyright Act of 1976, cited as 17 U.S.C. § 101 according to its placement in the United States Code. 
77
 Abrams Law of Copyright 1-3. It needs to be noted however that the full contour of current U.S. Copyright law 
encompasses not only the 1976 Copyright Act but several pieces of legislation, including the Copyright Act of 1909, “which 
continues to govern pre-1978 causes of action as well as certain rights under the current Act”; the Sound Recording 
Amendment Act of 1971, which first accorded federal statutory protection to sound recordings under the 1909 Act; the 
current Copyright Act of 1976;The Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, which modified the 1976 Act in order to 
harmonise it with the requirements of the Berne Convention (and entered into force on March 1, 1989); the Uruguay Round 
Agreements Act of 1994, “which furthered the process of Berne harmonization but also injected entirely new elements into 
the copyright equitation”, and a whole number of other amendments to the current Copyright Act (including the Computer 
Software Act of 1980, the Record Rental Amendment Act of 1984, the Audio Home Recording Act of 1992 etc. See 
Nimmer and Nimmer Nimmer on Copyright OV-1 – OV-2. Thus the U.S. copyright universe is a much broader area than 
current South African copyright legislation, which can only be traced to three legislations starting with the Imperial 
Copyright Act of 1911, the Copyright Act of 1965 and the current Copyright Act. See in this regard the discussion under 
Chapter 4 supra and Dean and Karjiker’s observations on this. Dean Handbook of Copyright Law 3-1 – 3-2.  
78
 In this regard Abrams Law of Copyright 1-19, has noted: “Ever since Wheaton v Peters, one of the most basic premises 
of American copyright law is that copyright is strictly a creature of statute. …” 
79
 Abrams id at 1-19 – 1-20. 
80
 This rationale is explained well captured by Landes and Posner Intellectual Property Law (at 13): “The dynamic benefit 
of a property right is the incentive that possession of such a right imparts to invest in the creation or improvement of a 
resource in period 1 (for example, planting a crop), given that no one else can appropriate the resource in period 2 
(harvest time). It enables people to reap where they have sown. Without that prospect the incentive to sow is diminished. 
To take an example from intellectual property, a firm is less likely to expend resources on developing a new product i f 
competing firms that have not borne the expense of development can duplicate the product and produce it at the same 
marginal cost as the innovator…”; and further (at 20): ‘… Unless there is power to exclude, the incentive to create 
intellectual property in the first place may be impaired. Socially desirable investments (investments that yield social 
benefits in excess of their social costs) may be deterred if the creators of intellectual property cannot recoup their sunk 
costs. … That is the dynamic benefit of property rights, and the result is the “access versus incentives” tradeoff: charging a 
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7.2.3.2 The History and Uniqueness of U.S. Copyright Law 
Having highlighted the foregoing, it is important to consider more closely the historical “parallel 
tracks” of copyright law in the United States, in the form of federal (statutory) copyright law and state 
(common law) copyright.81 State copyright law developed “as an outgrowth of their common law 
patrimony” and exists “[a]longside, but wholly apart from” the provisions of the US Constitution and 
Copyright Act.82 Prior to 1978 common-law copyright automatically vested in a work from the 
moment of its creation and for perpetuity, if the work remained unpublished. However, as soon as 
the work was published, it forfeited state copyright protection and would then attain federal copyright 
protection for a limited duration, if the statutory formalities for attaining federal copyright protection 
were satisfied at the time of publication.83  
However, as observed, from January 1 1978 “these parallel tracks converged” through the system of 
federal pre-emption of state copyright laws, “effectively ending a dichotomy in United States 
copyright that had received judicial approval for a century and a half”.84 From that point it has been 
observed that “[t]he Copyright Act … is the sole reference point for the granting and regulation of 
copyright … [and the] various states and state courts play no significant role.”85 Writing on the nature 
of the federal pre-emption of state common law copyright Halpern, Ward and Port state: 
The 1976 Act … replaced the existing dual federal/state scheme with a unitary and virtually completely 
federal structure. Abolishing the “common law” or state law copyright, the Act (and the power of 
Congress) completely preempts any state-created rights that are equivalent to any of the exclusive 
rights of a copyright owner provided by the Act “in works of authorship that are fixed in a tangible 
medium of expression and come within the subject matter of copyright.” The preemption provisions 
specifically do not apply to state action as to “subject matter that does not come within the subject 
matter of copyright as specified by sections 102 and 103, including works … not fixed in any tangible 
                                                                                                                                                              
price for a public good reduces access to it (a social cost), making it artificially scarce … but increases the incentive to 
create it in the first place, which is a possibly offsetting social benefit.” First emphasis mine.  This position has also been 
applied in respect of copyright. Thus Balganesh observes: “[Copyright’s] purpose lies solely in encouraging creativity … 
[T]he incentive provided by copyright’s promise of exclusivity is also thought to correlate directly with the overall production 
of creative expression ….” Balganesh 2009 Harv. L. Rev. 1579. The US courts have endorsed this position. Thus it was 
observed in Eldred v. Ashcroft, 537 U.S. 186 (2003) at 212 n. 18: that “copyright law serves public ends by providing 
individuals with an incentive to pursue private ones.” See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 
539 (1985) at 558; Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151 (1975) at 156. Our courts have not, as such 
adopted the incentive theory to justify copyright protection, nor have they for that matter, developed a theory in this regard. 
The courts have merely affirmed the fact that copyright is “a creature of statute”. See Feldman NO v EMI Music Publishing 
SA (Pty) Limited, Feldman NO v EMI Music (Pty) Limited [2007] ZAGPHC 294, at para 5; King v South African Weather 
Services 2009 (3) SA 13 (SCA), at para 6. However, in Beecham Group Plc v Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd 738 JOC (T), 
at 748 - 749 Swart J, relying on Dean Handbook of Copyright Law, seemed to endorse the incentive theory as constituting 
the philosophy of South African copyright law. However, on appeal in Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group 
PLC 786 JOC (A); 2002 (4) SA 249 (SCA) at paras 11 – 12 Harms JA, after recounting the historical development of 
copyright from England, cast aspersions on the existence of a philosophical underpinning for the law of copyright, curtly 
observing (at para 12): “One … does not have to be a cynic in order to be sceptical about the philosophical premise.” What 
has now become clear however, is that modern South African intellectual property law, and by extension copyright law, 
must “be understood through the prism of the Constitution”. See Laugh it Off Promotions CC v South African Breweries 
International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International and Another 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC), at para 43; Moneyweb (Pty) 
Limited v Media 24 Limited and Another [2016] ZAGPJHC 81, at para 70.   
81
 See Nimmer and Nimmer Nimmer on Copyright OV-2.1.  
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 Nimmer and Nimmer id at OV-2  - OV-2.1. 
83
 Id at Ov-2.1. 
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 Ibid. 
85
 Halpern, Nard and Port United States Intellectual Property Law 2. 
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medium of expression [or] activities violating legal or equitable rights that are not equivalent to any of 
the exclusive rights … as specified by section 106.” …
86
 
The regime for the pre-emption of state copyright has however, led to complicated questions as to 
what rights are “equivalent” to the exclusive rights provided for under the federal Copyright Act, and 
what comes within the meaning the subject-matter of copyright as provided for the federal 
legislation.87 In this regard the US courts have held that pre-emption applies both “with respect to 
uncopyrightable as well as copyrightable elements”, if the matter is generally within the subject 
matter of copyright; that the expression “subject matter of copyright” includes “all works of a type 
covered by sections 102 and 103, even if federal law does not afford protection to them”; it being 
observed that “the scope of the Copyright Act’s subject matter is broader than the scope of the Act’s 
protections”.88 
Nimmer and Nimmer highlight another complexity in American copyright law, namely the changes 
brought about by the enactment of the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 (the BCIA), 
enacted to align American law with the Berne Convention after the United States resolved to join the 
Berne Convention from March 1, 1989.89 The authors opine that when introducing the BCIA the USA 
followed a minimalist approach (“the spirit of minimalism”), namely ensuring that the law was only 
amended ‘where absolutely necessary to comply with  “Berne strictures”, primarily in relation to 
observance of copyright formalities and change of certain definitions and adjustments of compulsory 
licences.’90  The authors then refer to “the Berne era”, which “started minimally in 1989, gained 
steam from 1990 through 1993, and received full expression in its Uruguayan phase at the end of 
1994”, after the enactment of the Uruguay Round Agreements Act of 1994 – resulting in the 
abandonment of the minimalist approach.91  
Just as is the case with South African copyright law, as highlighted in Chapter 4 above, there are 
distinct periods in American copyright law history.92 The treatment of American copyright law during 
these periods however increases in complexity as a result of various considerations that have to be 
made, including considerations relating to the era of the dual application of federal and state 
copyright laws. This would cause consternation to the minds of many a South African judge being 
called upon to adjudicate cases arising from the introduction of American elements in our law93 – 
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 Halpern, Nard and Port ibid. See also in this regard the discussion under Chapter 5 supra, where reference is made to 
the copyright protection of unfixed (i.e. live) performances of musical works under the California Civil Code.  
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 Halpern, Nard and Port id at 3. 
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 National Basketball Association v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841 (2d Cir. 1997); ProCD, Inc., v Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th 
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 Nimmer and Nimmer Nimmer on Copyright OV-2.1 – OV-3. 
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 Id at OV-4. 
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 Id at OV-4 – OV-6. 
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 Nimmer and Nimmer id at OV-5 – OV-6 refer to four ages of American copyright law, namely (a) the period before July 1 
1909, “which is now primarily of antiquarian interest”; (b) the period from July 1, 1909 until January 1, 1978, where the US 
1909 Act was in force; (c) the “decennial period”  - referenced by such phrases as “decennial publications”, “decennial 
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 As introduced by the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017, for which see the discussion under paragraph 7.3 below. 
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especially in respect of an area of law already described as both “technical” and “arcane”.94  In 
highlighting this complexity Nimmer and Nimmer have observed:  
In determining the corpus of law that governs a particular situation, the guiding principle should be to 
apply the law in effect when the infringement (or other activity), upon which suit is based, arises. … 
Thus the dividing line for applying the Copyright Act of 1976 is its effective date, January 1, 1978 – 
prior law continues to govern pre-existing causes of action, whereas the new law is effective as to 
subsequently arising undertakings. The same logic should govern amendments to the current Act. … 
Finally the Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988 should apply only to causes of action arising 
after March 1, 1989. …
95
 
In light of this, it is submitted that it was a mistake to introduce elements of American law into South 
African copyright law through the Copyright American Bill 2017, especially without showing evidence 
of having carried out a proper assessment of the impact that doing so would have on the protection 
of copyright in South Africa. This is more so in light of the observations of Harms ADP in King v 
South African Weather Services, where the learned judge, having placed reliance on English law in 
seeking to understand the scope and historical development of copyright made in the scope of a 
person’s employment, distinguished American law and its doctrine of a “work made for hire”. In this 
regard the learned judge observed that “[c]opyright law in the USA is somewhat different”, further 
noting that “policy considerations must differ.”96  
These observations are also consonant with the observations of Berger J in Moneyweb v Media24,97 
dealt with above, who highlighted the need for caution in placing reliance on foreign law, observing 
that “each jurisdiction has its particular history and, in many cases, is bound and influenced by 
domestic statutory precepts” and resolving for such historical reasons, “to focus on English 
authority.”98 Accordingly it needs to be highlighted that reliance on US law is likely to create many 
complexities and create a situation where judges will be prone to make mistakes in correctly 
interpreting US law.99  
7.3 A Consideration of Provisions of the Copyright Act 1978 and the 
Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 having an Impact on the Copyright 
Protection of Musical Works 
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7.3.1 Definitions – section 1(1) 
7.3.1.1 Definition of “adaptation” in relation to a musical work – Copyright Act 
 
Adaptation in relation to a musical work “includes any arrangement or transcription of the work, 
if such arrangement or transcription has an original creative character”.100 
 
The arrangement of musical works is very common in the music industry. This definition needs to be 
understood within the context of the right of adaptation of the work which is one of the bundle of 
rights available to the copyright owner in terms of section 6(f) – (g). In other words, the right of 
making an adaptation of a musical work in which copyright subsists is, and must be seen as being 
one of the exclusive rights of the copyright owner in relation to the musical work.  
 
The need to instil this understanding arises from the fact that often in the music industry confusion 
exists in relation to the role of the person termed an “arranger”. In this regard a distinction should be 
made between what we can term the “studio or producer arranger” and the “composer arranger”, i.e. 
the act of arrangement carried out by the studio / producer arranger needs to be distinguished from 
that carried out by the composer arranger. While the composer arranger’s act of arrangement would 
be an exercise of the exclusive right of adaptation provided for in section 6(f),101 the arranger 
popularly known in the music industry, i.e. the studio / producer arranger is generally the person who 
works in a music studio in order to assist a recording artist or a band to make a different version of 
an existing musical work, under direction from another to do so. The person giving this direction is 
usually a record company, which would do so after obtaining authorisation from the copyright owner 
to do so (seeing that the right to do the arrangement is an exclusive right of the copyright owner). In 
this sense the studio arranger is essentially a “hired gun” – an independent contractor who is 
occasionally engaged to arrange songs for recording artists.102  
 
The studio arranger, or anyone for that matter, may, with the authorisation of the copyright owner, 
arrange songs in which copyright subsists, or he may create new arrangements of songs that are in 
the public domain, as dealt with in Chapter 5 above. In this sense an arranger can be defined as the 
person who creates a new version of a work in which copyright subsists or a work that is in the 
public domain, under such circumstances that the new work satisfies the requirements of originality 
and thus becomes a new copyright work. The copyright owner of the parent work may, himself, 
make the arrangement or he may authorise or issue a licence for the making of a new arrangement 
of the work in line with the request and specifications of another (such as a record label). In all these 
instances, unless the copyright owner has agreed that the person authorised to make the 
                                               
100
 Emphasis added. 
101
 This is assuming that the composer arranger in this case is also the copyright owner. Where he is not the copyright 
owner he too would need permission from the copyright owner to make the arrangement. 
102
 Unless employed specifically for this purpose by the recording studio or record label. 
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arrangement  shall own the copyright in such arrangement or in a part of such arrangement, he will, 
for copyright purposes, remain the owner of the copyright in the arrangement of the work in line with 
section 6(f) – (g). This is because no other person can make an arrangement of the work, or have 
ownership of the copyright in such arrangement, pursuant to section 6(f) – (g), as this is the 
exclusive right of the copyright owner – unless the copyright owner would have specifically, in 
writing, assigned this right to such other person. This is so even if the original work was merely 
comprised of a basic melody and chord structure and the new arranged work displays greater 
musical skill.103  
 
The foregoing becomes clearer when one considers the fact that section 23(1) of the Copyright Act 
provides that infringement of copyright occurs when “any person, not being the owner of the 
copyright … [and] without the licence of such owner, does or causes any other person to do, in the 
Republic, any act which the owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to do or to authorize.” No 
one can, without the authorisation of the person owning copyright in certain musical works, purport 
to have the right to publish such musical works as contemplated in section 6(b) (i.e. to be such 
person’s music publisher). Such act of publication would, in terms of section 23(1), amount to 
copyright infringement. In the same manner, no one can, without the authorisation of the copyright 
owner in respect of certain musical works, purport to be the de iure arranger of such musical works 
pursuant to section 6(f) – in spite of the fact that such person is the de facto arranger of the works.  
The fact that the works so arranged without authorisation meet the originality requirements of a work 
as contemplated in section 2(3) of the Act does not set aside the application of the provisions of 
section 23(1).  
 
Having dealt with the meaning of “arranger” and “arrangement”’ it is also important to deal with the 
meaning of the term “transcription”. Section 1(1) of the Act defines an adaptation as including “any 
arrangement or transcription” of the work. A transcription is simply “an arrangement of a piece of 
music for a different instrument, voice, or group of these”.104 This often happens, particularly in the 
                                               
103
 This does not derogate from the provisions of s 2(3) of the Copyright Act, which provides that “[a] work shall not be 
ineligible for copyright by reason only that the making of the work, or the doing of any act in relation to the work, involved 
an infringement of copyright in some other work.” The essence of the contention made here is that any title of ownership to 
any such work would be a contested title because the owner of the copyright in the work from which the infringing work is 
derived would be entitled to file suit in terms of s 23(1), read with s 24(1), either to interdict the maker of the infringing work 
from using the work; or to claim damages; to claim delivery of infringing copies or to claim a reasonable royalty in terms of 
s 24(1A). See also Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-81 who explain the position as follows: “…[T]he owner 
of the copyright in work A could restrain uses of works B and C if he or his predecessors in title have not given a currently 
valid authorisation for the making and / or exploitation of works B and C. In effect, a derivative work is a dependent work as 
rights in and to it are subject to the rights in and to the source work(s). …” Emphasis mine. This means that the arranger’s 
ability to deal with the arranged work is at the behest of owner of the copyright in the original work. In practice also, the 
arrangement of a song presupposes prior agreement with the copyright owner / composer, to the extent that the name of 
an arranger is generally always mentioned besides the name of the composer of the original work in the authorship 
information of an arrangement. In this regard the normal practice, where the copyright owner has authorised the making of 
the arrangement, is for the copyright in the arranged work to be owned equally between the arranger and the copyright 
owner.  
104
 http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/transcription (definition 2). (Date of use: 23 September 2013). 
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field of “serious music”105, where a musical work originally written for one instrument (e.g. violin) or a 
group of instruments (such as orchestral music) or for one voice (e.g. soprano) is then transcribed 
for another instrument (e.g. cello) or another set of instruments (e.g. a jazz ensemble), or for another 
voice (e.g. tenor).106 The expression can however, refer to the notation of music that was previously 
not notated (such as improvised jazz music or traditional oral folk music), or the transcription of 
instrumental music into sheet music.107 What is important however is that a transcription is still an 
arrangement in the sense discussed above. The copyright owner and not the “transcriber”’, 
becomes the owner of the copyright in the transcribed works, unless he has, by assignment, 
transferred ownership to the “transcriber”. It is in this regard also important to observe that there is a 
distinction between the transcription right dealt with in Chapter 3 above,108 which is a genre of the 
reproduction right, and the right to make a transcription dealt with here, which is a genre of the 
adaptation right. This signifies the confusion that can often arise as a result of the indiscriminate use 
of terms which are understood within a particular context in the music business. Just as in the case 
of the term “arrangement” it is important to probe closely to determine the meaning intended in each 
case.   
 
It needs to be also recalled that a work is not ineligible for copyright by reason only that the creator 
of the work infringed copyright in an existing work when making the work or doing anything in 
relation to the work.109 Thus where a person, without the authorisation of the copyright owner, 
makes an adaptation of the work, copyright will subsist in the new work if it satisfies the 
requirements for the subsistence of copyright and the improvement is substantial and not 
superficial.110 However, the copyright owner shall be entitled to the remedies available to a copyright 
owner in respect of unlawful infringement. It is not clear why the legislator felt that it was necessary 
to emphasise that an arrangement or transcription has to be of an ‘original creative character’ for 
copyright to subsist in it. The requirement for copyright to subsist in a work in our law is simply that 
the work has to be original or of an original character. Referring to original creative character might 
suggest that, in respect of adaptations, there is a need for the work to display some “creative spark” 
as is required in US copyright law, rather than simply satisfying the requirement of judgment and 
skill applicable to our law.111 
                                               
105
 The expression “serious music”, also termed “‘art music”, is used in respect of music that is aligned to classical music, 
in respect of musical traditions that are seen to entail advanced structural and theoretical considerations and a written 
musical tradition. See in this regard Arnold (gen. ed) Companion to Music 111. 
106
 A famous transcription is that of Franz Liszt’s piano transcription of Beethoven’s original full symphony orchestra. 
107
  An example here is in the so-called “Blurred Lines” case (Williams v Gaye No. 15-56880 (9
th
. Cir. 2018)), where it was 
submitted that because Marvin Gaye could not write “or fluently read” sheet music, the copy of the sheet music deposited 
with the US Copyright Office in respect of his song, “Got to Give it Up”, was notated by an undescribed transcriber after 
Marvin Gaye had already recorded the song. 
108
 See also the discussion under section 6 of the Copyright Act below. 
109
 Section 2(3) of the Copyright Act. 
110
 See Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 908 JOC (A), at para 24.  
111
 In this regard see however Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd  id at para 35 where the court held that the 
requirement of “a minimal degree of creativity” as applicable to the United States of America in line with the case of Feist 
Publications Inc v Rural Telephone Service Co Inc 449 US 340 (1991) does not form part of our law. However, as 
suggested in Chapter 5, it may be that the Legislator expected a different standard in respect of arrangements and 
transcriptions, because of the proneness to otherwise ascribe copyright protection to arrangements that cannot be clearly 
distinguished from existing works. 
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7.3.1.2 Definition of author in relation to a literary and a musical work – Copyright Act 
 
An author, in relation to a literary and musical work “means the person who first makes or 
creates the work”112 
 
This definition should be self-explanatory. However, what was said before regarding the fact that a 
person would still be considered to be the author of a work even where another similar work exists 
or where two similar works are made simultaneously would have application here.113 What is 
required is that the author must satisfy the requirements of originality and that the work must 
emanate from him and must have been created independently of the other work.114 
 
Further to the foregoing, it would be relevant to indicate that, unlike in the literary publishing industry, 
the word “author” is not generally used in everyday language within the music industry. The more 
commonly-used expressions are “composer” and “songwriter”. The composer is the person who first 
creates the musical work (i.e. the “work consisting of music”), i.e. the person who first reduces an 
original musical work into material form, or rather the person who expresses musical sounds in a 
tangible form. In the past composers “wrote” music, i.e. they used some or other form of recognised 
music notation system, such as the staff notation or tonic solfa systems to express original musical 
sounds into a material form.  
 
In today’s world although the expression “write music” is still used, the advent of technology, 
especially recording technology means that a musical work does not need to be written down using 
a notation system any longer. The musical work can be reduced into material form by means of 
recording the musical sounds, previously through analog but increasingly now through digital 
recording mechanisms (e.g. MP3 or MP4 recording). The composer can in this regard, record 
himself playing a musical instrument, sing into the recording system or even hum or whistle the 
musical “tune” into the recording system. The use of computer software has also greatly assisted the 
process of musical composition (see paragraph 7.3.1.3 below).    
 
The expression “songwriter” on the other hand is used to refer to either a composer or the person 
who writes the words to be sung with a musical work (i.e. the lyricist), or both.115 It could best be 
seen as a general term to refer to the “author of music”, without specifying whether this is a 
reference to the composer or to the lyricist.116 The expression “lyricist” is itself not commonly used 
                                               
112
 The significance of including literary works here relates to the fact that a musical work often always includes lyrics 
(which are protected as literary works). 
113
 See Chapter 5 supra. 
114
 See further the discussion in Chapter 5 supra.  
115
 See https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/songwriter (date of use: 12 July 2019).   
116
 This delineation is not always evident in the case law, as can be seen from the Feldman cases dealing with the role of 
the late popular musician, Brenda Fassie, as both lyricist and composer in respect of certain works. In the High Court 
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and “songwriter” is used instead, with the explanation given where required, that in the particular 
context the reference is to the lyricist. Whenever the expression “songwriter” is used therefore, it 
needs to be determined if this is a reference to the composer or lyricist or if it is a reference to a 
composer who is also a lyricist.  
 
7.3.1.3 Definition of author in relation to a computer-generated literary and musical 
work 
 
Author, in relation to a computer-generated literary or musical work “means the person by 
whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work were undertaken” 
 
In the Haupt case117 the court defined a computer-generated work as a work “created by a computer 
in circumstances where there is no human author of the work.”’ Where there is a human author the 
work is computer assisted, with the computer merely used as a tool. It is submitted that the test used 
by the court in this case with regard to the distinction between computer-generated and computer 
assisted literary works and computer programs can assist in determining this question in respect of 
musical works. A lot of music in the modern age is created digitally. In the Haupt case, Streicher JA, 
in explaining how the computer was used in the creation of databases (which are protected as 
literary works), observed:  
 
The structures for the various databases were created by Coetzee.  Although he made use of the 
computer program Delphi to do so they were not generated by a computer: the computer merely 
assisted him in creating them. It is he who decided on the number of columns, their width and the field 
names. The creation of such a table is no different from the creation of a document by utilising a word 
processor. …”
118
  
 
Thus where a composer makes use of notes and other musical elements contained in a music 
software program, and arranges them into an original song, then the work should be treated as a 
computer assisted rather than computer-generated work. Another has expressed it in this manner:  
 
                                                                                                                                                              
judgment of Jajbhay J, for example, he refers to Brenda Fassie as being “co-author and / or co-composer” of the works in 
question, as if, in her capacity as co-composer she was not a co-author. See Feldman NO v EMI Music Publishing SA 
(Pty) Limited, Feldman NO v EMI Music (Pty) Limited [2007] ZAGPHC 294, at paras 9 and 26.  The reference to co-author 
here was to her capacity as lyricist but she was of course, also co-author in respect of the musical works. The case itself 
was about the question of joint- or co-authorship. This lack of clear distinction is also evident on appeal in the judgment of 
Hurt AJA, where it is observed that “the works listed (being music and lyrics for so-called ‘pop songs’) are works in which 
the late Ms Fassie collaborated with others to compose them.” Emphasis added. See Feldman NO v Emi Music SA (Pty) 
Ltd; Feldman NO v EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) Ltd 2010 (1) SA 1 (SCA), at para 2. The honourable judge most likely 
used the word “compose” here loosely, without seriously considering the fact that music is composed, but lyrics are written 
(although music can be written also, as in the case of sheet music). See Grove (ed) Dictionary of Music (I) 332 where it is 
observed: “Composition … is now almost exclusively applied to the invention of music – a novelist or a poet being never 
spoken of as a composer except by way of analogy”.  
117
 Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 458 (A) (at 918, paras 31 – 32). 
118
 Emphasis added. 
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In the case of an algorithm that creates music by randomly analysing what is listened on the Web, it is 
very unlikely that in the computer-generated [i.e. computer assisted] song there will be code pertaining 
to the creator program. A song is composed by musical notes, which can be expressed in digital form, 
but still are representations of notes. Since the song has been created by analysing the Web, that is 
that there were no notes or segments of songs, or anything else written on the creator program, then 
there is nothing copied from the latter into the former.
119
 
 
A computer-generated literary and musical work is clearly distinguished from a “normal” literary and 
musical work in relation to its authorship. Thus whereas the author of a “normal” literary and musical 
work is the person who first makes or creates the work, the author of a computer-generated literary 
and musical work is the person “by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work 
were undertaken”. The phrase “by whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work 
were undertaken” deserves further attention. This phrase, or its equivalent, is used in the Copyright 
Act in respect of the authorship of copyright in other works, in particular sound recordings and 
cinematograph films.120 These are cases where generally the person recognised as the author of the 
work concerned is a juristic rather than natural person, as contemplated in section 3(1)(b) of the 
Copyright Act, e.g. a company that pays for the making of the work. Seeing that the first owner of 
copyright is the author thereof,121 the juristic persons who make these arrangements then become 
the owners of copyright in such works, unless and until they transfer ownership to another in terms 
of Section 22.  
                                               
119
 Perry and Margoni 2010 LP Paper at para 4(a). The writer has inserted the expression “computer assisted” in square 
brackets after the phrase computer-generated” because this is how the phrase should be used within the South African 
context in light of the Haupt judgment. 
120
 See paragraphs (c) and (d) of the definition of “author” in s 1(1) of the Copyright Act. In this regard it needs to be 
highlighted however that there are slight differences between the expression used in respect of the authorship of copyright 
in sound recordings and cinematograph films, and that used in respect of the authorship of copyright in computer-
generated work. Thus while the author of copyright in a computer-generated work is “the person by whom the 
arrangements necessary for the creation of the work were undertaken”; the author of copyright in a sound recording and a 
cinematograph film is “the person by whom the arrangements for the making of the [work] were made”. The definition in 
respect of sound recordings and films thus excludes the word “necessary”, refers to the “creation” rather than the making 
of the work and refers to the arrangements being “made” rather than being “undertaken”. It is submitted that not much 
turns on the differentiated use of these words. Making should be seen as meaning essentially the same thing as “creation”. 
The use of the additional phrases “necessary” and “undertaken” in the case of computer-generated works should also not 
present difficulties, except perhaps in so far as the expression “undertaken” brings to more light the fact that “it is the 
person directly responsible for such arrangements, particularly in the financial sense, who is the author”, as Garnett, Davis 
and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 249 have observed. In this regard it may be instructive to note that the language 
employed in the South African Act with regard to the authorship of computer-generated works is, mutatis mutandis, exactly 
the same as that used in the UK Act in respect of sound recordings, where in that Act, the author of copyright in a sound 
recording is the producer, who is “the person by whom the arrangements necessary for the making of the recording were 
undertaken’ (Sections 9(2)(aa) and 178 of the UK Act. Emphasis added). The usage in English law could therefore be said 
to have been employed for purposes of adding emphasis. This can be borne out by the fact that the objective that this 
phraseology seeks to achieve in English law, as per Garnett, Davis and Harbottle, namely to make it explicit that the 
person who makes arrangements in this regard is “the person directly responsible for such arrangements, particularly in 
the financial sense”, is under South African copyright law, generally also achieved through the commissioning provisions of 
s 21(1)(c) of the South African Copyright Act. See Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-39, who asserts that 
the commissioner under such circumstances has an obligation “to pay for making of the work”.  This aligns with the 
position of Garnett, Davis and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 275 – 277. The UK phraseology in relation to the 
“arrangement provisions” may in this regard, have been necessitated by the fact that, while the 1956 UK Copyright Act 
contained “commissioning provisions” similar to those contained in s 21(1)(c) of our Act, these were done away with and 
replaced by the “arrangement provisions” under the 1988 UK Act. See in this regard Garnett, Davis and Harbottle Copinger 
and Skone James 280 – 281. This is instructive also from the point of view that the “arrangement provisions” in relation to 
computer-generated works, which as indicated, mimic the usage in English law, were enacted in 1992 – see Dean and 
Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 4-126, at n 15 – ostensibly to align with developments in English law where these 
provisions were introduced with the enactment of the English legislation in 1988.  
121
 Section 21(1)(a) of the Copyright Act. 
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This scenario however gives rise to a complication in respect of computer-generated works: For one 
thing it has been recognised that only a natural person (and not a juristic person), can be the author 
of a literary work, a musical work and an artistic work.122 The rationale for this contention is the fact 
that the term of copyright in respect of these works is reckoned from the death of the author, and 
that this is so required under the Berne Convention.123 Dean and Karjiker argue at some length in 
support of this position, rounding it out with the contention that  
[i]f it had been intended that juristic persons could be authors of literary, artistic and musical works it 
would have been necessary to change the method of determining the term of copyright of those types 
of works ... [which] … change would have been at variance with the Berne Convention.’  
However, this laudable argument is not consistent with the position regarding computer-generated 
literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works, which, in the Haupt case124 were held to be works 
“created by a computer in circumstances where there is no human author of the work”.125 This 
position creates confusion seeing that, although there may not be a “human author”, the person by 
whom the arrangements necessary for the creation of the work are undertaken can be a human (i.e. 
it does not have to be a juristic person, just as the author of a sound recording is usually - but not 
always - a juristic person).126 In this case the human author would not be the person who created but 
the person who undertook the necessary arrangements. The fact remains however that a juristic 
person can, in this instance, be considered to be the author of a literary, musical or artistic work 
(albeit only where such works are computer-generated). What needs to be accepted, sombrely, is 
the fact that ‘the use … of the term “author” in relation to these classes of works [i.e. where the 
author may be a juristic person] is not generally a happy one, and has been [rightly] the subject of 
criticism.’127  
It however, seems plausible to conclude that in all other respects a computer-generated literary or 
musical work, once it has satisfied the requirements of authorship, is protected in terms of all the 
other provisions relating to a “normal” literary and musical work (including the provisions relating to 
the scope of protection, infringement, and exceptions and limitation). Thus for example - to be 
simplistic - the provisions of section 27(3) in respect of the liability of a person who causes a literary 
or musical work to be performed in public while knowing that copyright subsists in the work and that 
performance constitutes infringement of copyright, would be equally applicable to computer-
generated literary and musical works and an argument to the contrary should not be possible. 
 
7.3.1.4 Definition of “broadcast” – Copyright Act  
                                               
122
 See Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-34 – 1-35 referring to the court’s remarks in this regard in 
Accesso CC v Allforms (Pty) Ltd 677 JOC (T) (Case no II) in relation to literary works, where the learned authors opine that 
this position should be extended to musical works and artistic works. 
123
 Dean and Karjiker id at 1-35. 
124
 Haupt v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 2006 (4) SA 458 (A) at 918 paras 31 – 32. 
125
 Emphasis added. 
126
 Garnett, Davis and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 234 – 235; 248 – 249 are supportive of this argument. 
127
 Garnett, Davis and Harbottle id at 248. 
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Broadcast, “when used as a noun, means a telecommunication service of transmissions 
consisting of sounds, images, signs or signals which— 
(a) takes place by means of electromagnetic waves of frequencies of lower than 3000 GHz 
transmitted in space without an artificial conductor; and  
(b) is intended for reception by the public or sections of the public, and includes the 
emitting of programme-carrying signals to a satellite, and, when used as a verb, shall 
be construed accordingly. 
 
The definition of “broadcast” plays a crucial part in the copyright administration of musical works, 
seeing that the act of broadcasting provides one of the most significant and reliable sources of 
royalty income for authors, composers and music publishers.128 The right of broadcasting a musical 
(and literary) work is one of the important exclusive rights of copyright owners under the Copyright 
Act,129 and forms part, together with the right of performing the work in public and the right of 
transmission in a diffusion service, of the so-called performing right.130  
 
What is clear from the above definition of broadcast is that it is comprised of both a technical 
component and a normative component. The technical component of the definition is phrased in a 
technology-neutral manner,131 and it would seem that from this perspective, all forms of 
broadcasting currently known would be covered by the definition.132 This would include forms of 
broadcasting such as “narrowcasting”, “podcasting”, the transmission of ringtones as well as 
streaming (including retransmission by way of streaming).133 In this regard the definition includes the 
emitting of a programme-carrying signal to a satellite.134 What would be more critical in determining 
whether an act of broadcast has taken place therefore is whether the act falls within the ambit of the 
                                               
128
 As an illustration, in 2018 broadcasting income constituted 68% of SAMRO’s total licensing income, of which 38% 
related to income from television broadcasting and 30% related to income from radio broadcasting. See the SAMRO 2018 
Integrated Report, available at http://www.samro.org.za/sites/default/files/SAMRO%202018%20Integrated%20Report.pdf 
(date of use: 15 February 2019). 
129
 The right is provided for in s 6(d) of the Act, and has, over the years, become the most important with regard to the 
bundle of rights constituting the rights-holders’ performing right.   
130
 For a discussion of the historical development of the performing right see Chapter 2 supra. For the essence of the 
modern performing right see Chapter 3 supra, in particular paragraph 3.2.2. 
131
 The argument in support of the submission that the definition of “broadcast” in the Act was intended to be technology 
neutral arises from the fact that the original definition of the expression “broadcast” was linked to the definition of the term 
in s 1 of the Broadcasting Act, 1976 (Act 73 of 1976), which was a technical definition. See Dean and Karjiker Handbook of 
Copyright Law 4-126 at n 15A.   
132
 In this regard it has been observed that AM radio carrier frequencies are on average in the frequency range of 535 – 
1605 kHz, while FM radio band is from 88 to 108 MHz. VHF high and UHF frequencies for television range up to 806 MHz. 
See http://hyperphysics.phy-astr.gsu.edu/hbase/Audio/radio.html  (date of use: 15 February 2019).  Both frequencies are 
much lower than 3000 GHz and are thus covered by the technical element of the definition. 
133
 See in respect to the inclusion of narrowcasts within the definition of a broadcast Dean and Karjiker Handbook of 
Copyright Law 1-15 – 1-17, who also rely on the Australian decision of Australasian Performing Right Association v Telstra 
Corp Ltd (1997) 38 IPR 294 (HC of A). In respect of the transmission of ringtones see the Canadian decision of Canadian 
Wireless Telecommunications Association v Society of Composers, Authors and Music Publishers of Canada, (2008 FCA 
6) where it was held that the unauthorised transmission of ringtones amounted to a communication to the public of a 
musical work “by telecommunication”; and in respect of streaming see the ECJ decision of ITV Broadcasting Ltd and 
others v TV Catchup Ltd, C-607/11. 
134
 See also Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-15, who state that “[t]he ‘up-leg’ of a programme-carrying 
signal to a satellite is … a broadcast.”  
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normative description of a broadcast, namely the fact that it must be “intended for reception by the 
public or a section of the public”. The meaning of the expressions “public” or “section of the public” 
was dealt with at length above.135 The fact that an act of transmission constitutes a broadcast if it is 
“intended” for reception by the public or a section of the public means that not only free-to-air 
broadcasts are covered by the definition but also subscription-based programming which is limited 
only to the subscribers (e.g. pay television like MNET). If the broadcasters of such services thus 
broadcast programmes embodying musical works without the authorisation of the copyright owner, 
this would constitute copyright infringement.  
 
On the same note however, if a broadcast meant for a section of the public (as in the case of 
subscription-based programming) is intercepted or decrypted without authorisation by persons who 
are not subscribed to the channel concerned, then it can be argued that the broadcaster in this case 
would not be liable for copyright infringement in respect of the works embodied in the broadcast, 
because the broadcast was not intended for that section of the public. Intricate questions relating to 
the applicable legal position in the case of cross-border transmissions of broadcasts (whether 
intended or unintended) arise, in light of the territorial nature of copyright (i.e. which copyright law 
applies in such cases – is it the law of the country from which the signal is emitted, or is it the law of 
the country in which the signal is received?).136 Such considerations are outside the scope of this 
work.   
 
7.3.1.5 Definition of “collecting society” – Copyright Act 
 
A collecting society is simply defined as “a collecting society established under this Act.” In this 
regard it needs to be noted that this definition was inserted in the 2002 amendment to the Copyright 
Act in order to introduce the regime of public-play or “needle-time” rights.137 It should thus be noted 
that the usage of the expression “collecting society” in the current Act is thus limited to those 
collecting societies that are involved in the administration of the needle-time rights and to which the 
2006 “Needle-time Regulations” apply138. It does not apply in respect of the traditional authors’ 
                                               
135
 See Chapter 3 supra,at paragraph 3.2.2. 
136
 Various theories are used in an attempt to deal with this situation, such as the so-called emission theory, Bogsch theory 
and effect theory. See in this regard Matulionyte Law Applicable to Copyright 87 – 98 and generally. 
137
 Namely the rights of public performance in respect of sound recordings. For a helpful explanation of these rights see 
Chapter 3 supra, at paragraph 3.1.4.2. 
138
 The Regulations on the Establishment of Collecting Societies in the Music Industry GN 517 in GG 28894 of 1 June 
2006 (the Needle-time Regulations).  Ramsden appears to confuse these regulations with the original regulations in 
respect of the reproduction of musical works through the manufacturing of records as provided for in s 14 of the Act, 
namely the Copyright Regulations, 1978 GN R2530 in GG 6252 of 22 December 1978 (as amended). See Ramsden A 
Guide to Intellectual Property 36, where after inserting the provisions of s 9A of the Copyright Act (which deal with royalties 
in respect of needle-time rights), the author then states: “See s 14 for the regulations relating to royalties for sound 
recordings.” See further at 43 where the author refers to “the determination and payment of sound recording royalties.” In 
fact s 14 does not deal with “royalties for sound recordings” but rather royalties for usage of musical works through the 
manufacture of records (which process entails embodiment of the musical work in a sound recording). The royalties 
payable are due to the owner of the copyright in the musical work and not to the owner of copyright in the sound recording. 
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societies.139 In the past these societies were defined as “licensing bodies” in both the current 
Copyright Act and the 1965 Copyright Act. The definition of “licensing body” was however, along 
with the definition of “licence”, repealed in a 1992 amendment,140 apparently to avoid limiting the 
scope of the meaning of “licence” to those instances provided for in the definition.141 
 
While the deletion of the expression “licence” is commendable and would indeed remove the 
ambiguity that would arise as to the ambit of the term “licence”, it is submitted that the deletion of the 
expression “licensing body” does not serve any useful purpose and could only have contributed to 
confusion in this area. Copeling,142 dealing with how to better appreciate the function, and thus the 
scope of jurisdiction, of the Copyright Tribunal, highlights the importance of understanding the 
expressions “licence”, “licensing body” and “licence scheme”. It is submitted that this position would 
still apply today in respect of the expression “licensing body”. This is because while the expression 
“licensing body” has been deleted, it continues to feature both in the provisions relating to the 
referral of a dispute to the Copyright Tribunal under Chapter 3 of the Act (which also apply in respect 
of referrals of needle-time disputes in terms of s 9A(2)(c)), as well as the needle-time rights 
regulations themselves.143 This engenders confusion as needle-time as one then has to read the 
expression “licensing body” to mean “collecting society” within the needle-time meaning, under such 
circumstances. Retaining the definition of “licensing body” would have ensured a clear distinction 
between those collecting societies that are not, at present, required to be accredited (termed 
“licensing bodies”’) and those that are required to be accredited (termed “collecting societies”), thus 
avoiding interpretational problems.144  
 
7.3.1.6 Definition of “collecting society” – Copyright Amendment Bill 
 
While the Needle-time Regulations were meant to only regulate “needle-time” collecting societies, it 
was observed in the preamble that “[d]uring stakeholder consultations, there was a common 
understanding that all rights in the copyright regime should be managed through collecting societies 
                                               
139
 In this regard it needs to be noted that the regulatory environment in respect of collecting societies ushered by the 
Needle-time Regulations, empowering the Registrar of Copyright to have oversight over collecting societies, does not 
apply to the traditional societies such as SAMRO and the now defunct SARRAL and NORM (which has been replaced by 
CAPASSO, as dealt with in Chapter 6 supra).  
140
 Act 125 of 1992.  
141
 See in this regard Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 4-129 at n 17B, where the authors remark that ‘… the 
effect of [the deletion of the definition of ‘licence’] is to empower the Copyright Tribunal to deal with applications for any 
type of licence under copyright and to clarify that the term “licence scheme” only has reference to the provisions of the Act 
dealing with the Copyright Tribunal …’. The authors add that  the deletion of the definition of  “licensing body” ‘ … is 
consequential to the deletion of the definition of “licence” …’. 
142
 Copeling Copyright Law 223. 
143
 See reg 3(1) of the Needle-time Regulations. 
144
 Prior to the deletion a “licensing body” was defined, in respect of licences relating to literary, musical and artistic works, 
as “a society or other organization which has as one of its objects the negotiation or granting of such licences, either as 
owner or prospective owner of copyright or as agent for the owners or prospective owners thereof”, while in respect of 
licences relating to sound recordings it was defined as “any owner or prospective owner of copyright in sound recordings 
or any person or body of persons acting as agent for any owners or prospective owners of copyright in sound recordings in 
relation to the negotiation or granting of such licence.” While the issues raised herein may seem only pedantic, it needs to 
be noted that the court in Shapiro v South African Recording Rights (SGHC) unreported case no 14698/04 (6 November 
2009) was seized with having to determine this question in relation to the application of the Needle-time provisions to 
collecting societies not dealing with needle-time rights. 
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in future.” Earlier versions of the Copyright Amendment Bill attempted to implement this by 
introducing a system of mandatory collective management of copyright in respect of all rights in 
copyright.145 This of course would have been problematic, as certain rights (e.g. rights in computer 
programs and broadcasts) have not traditionally been administered through a system of collective 
management and are best administered by the rights-holders themselves individually or through a 
system of voluntary joint licensing. 
 
The intention to introduce a system of mandatory collective management in respect of all rights also 
went against the recommendations of the Copyright Review Commission (CRC) appointed “to 
assess concerns and allegations against the collecting societies model that is in place for the 
distribution of royalties to musicians and composers of music.”146 The CRC’s recommendations were 
that “[d]ue to the recent collapse of SARRAL and inadequate protection of its members”, “all relevant 
collecting societies” should be regulated, and that a system of “one collecting society per set of 
rights” in respect of all music rights governed by the Copyright Act should be introduced.147 
Thankfully, later versions of the Bill, including the current version,148 removed the provisions relating 
to the imposition of a system of mandatory collective management. The system of collective 
management introduced in the current version of the Bill seems to be voluntary in the sense that 
rights-holders could administer rights individually; however, if a “person” acts or intends to act as a 
collecting society, such person has to be accredited.149 
 
In light of the policy objective of subjecting all collecting societies to the regulatory oversight of the 
Companies and Intellectual Property Commission (CIPC) the need to review the definition of 
“collecting society” in the Bill was highlighted. The revised version now reads as follows: 
 
‘collecting society’ means a non-profit company contemplated in the Companies Act, 2008 
(Act No. 71 of 2008)— 
(a) that is owned by holders of rights in terms of this Act or the Performers’ Protection 
Act, 1967 (Act No. 11 of 1967); 
(b) whose only members are holders of rights in terms of this Act or the Performers’ 
Protection Act, 1967 (Act No. 11 of 1967); 
(c) to whom members have granted mandates to license, manage or otherwise represent 
rights contemplated in this Act or the Performers’ Protection Act, 1967 (Act No. 11 of 
                                               
145
 Thus for example clause 9B(1) of the 2015 version of the Copyright Amendment Bill (version BX-2015) provided the 
following: “There shall be one Collecting Society per copyright and per set of rights with regard to all music rights such as 
performance, needletime and mechanical, to be registered and regulation by the Commission.” See the Bill available at 
https://pmg.org.za/bill/581/ (date of use: 13 July 2019). 
146
 See https://www.gov.za/sites/default/files/gcis_document/201409/crc-report.pdf (date of use: 15 February 2019). 
147
 CRC Report id at 46, paragraph 6.3.4. 
148
 Version B13B—2017, approved by both houses of Parliament and awaiting the President’s signature, available at 
https://pmg.org.za/committee-meeting/27878/ (date of use: 13 July 2019). 
149
 Clause 22B of the Bill, in respect of the need for accreditation for persons acting or intending to act as collecting 
societies, and clause 22C(b) with respect to the ability to withdraw membership of a collecting society. 
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1967), on behalf of and for the benefit of those members or exercise any of the actions 
contemplated in section 22C(2)150; and 
(d) whose primary purpose is executing the mandates contemplated in paragraph (c) 
 
It would appear that the definition of collecting society contemplates, in respect of rights in sound 
recordings, the existence of a collecting society representing copyright owners only and a separate 
one representing performers. This would go against developments in which the needle-time 
operations of the “old” South African Music Performance Rights Association (SAMPRA), which only 
represented copyright owners of sound recordings (i.e. record companies), merged its operations 
with the Performers Organisation of South Africa (POSA), a trust founded by SAMRO, which 
represented performers needle-time rights, to form the “new” SAMPRA.151 In fact a consideration of 
the provisions of clause 22B(2) of the Bill would confirm this suspicion not only in respect of rights in 
sound recordings but also in respect of for example, the collective management of performing rights 
and mechanical rights.152 This would be an untenable and regressive situation indeed.  
 
Another problematic aspect of this definition is the fact that it prescribes that a collecting society has 
to be incorporated as a non-profit company under the Companies Act. This is because other forms 
of non-profit entities exist, in particular a non-profit trust established under the Trust Property Control 
Act,153 or a non-profit organisation established under the Nonprofit Organisations Act.154 This would 
also mean that profit entities such as the Dramatic, Artistic and Literary Rights Organisation 
(DALRO), a wholly-owned subsidiary of SAMRO, would be forced to cease operations as the Bill 
specifically provides that a collecting society has to be a non-profit company.155 It is submitted that 
the Bill should permit the administration of rights by profit companies in circumstances similar to 
those in which DALRO exists or in cases where such entities can administer ancillary rights related 
to the rights administered by the parent company.156 Other than these observations the definition is 
commendable and is in fact, broader than the now-repealed definition of “licensing body”, which only 
focussed on the licensing role of a collecting society. 
 
7.3.1.7 Definition of “commercial” – Copyright Amendment Bill 
                                               
150
 Section 22C(2) deals with the functions of a collecting society under the Bill. 
151
 See in this regard http://www.samro.org.za/news/articles/sampra-samro-reach-agreement-needletime-rights-impasse-
support-and-blessing-principle (date of use: 15 February 2019). Regulation 3(1)(c) of the Needle-time Regulations makes 
provision for a collecting society “administering on behalf of 50 or more copyright owners and performers jointly”, or on 
behalf of organisations representing such group of rights-holders, and this was a preferred position with regard to the 
administration of needle-time rights in the new regime.   
152
 See the further discussion in respect of clause 22B of the Bill below. 
153
 Act No. 57 of 1988. The Performers Organisation of South Africa (POSA) was for example, established as a trust under 
this Act. This was necessitated by the fact that the Needle-time Regulations required the organisation that administers 
needle-time rights to be controlled by its members. This therefore became the only practicable way for SAMRO to satisfy 
these requirements while maintain some form of connection to the entity in its capacity as Founder of the trust.  
154
 Act No. 71 of 1997. 
155
 DALRO was formed by SAMRO to administer reprographic rights (essentially the right of copying in respect of literary 
works).  
156
 For example, the administration of dramatico-musical rights, as is the case with DALRO, which administers such rights 
in addition to the reprographic rights. 
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“Commercial” is defined as “the obtaining of economic advantage or financial gain in 
connection with a business or trade” 
 
The introduction of the concept of “commercial” in the definitions section of the Bill, as well as the 
introduction of the concepts of “commercial purpose”, “commercial exploitation”, “commercial nature” 
etc. within the text of the Bill, especially where this is used beyond cases dealing with limitations and 
exceptions, is a novel approach in our copyright law and is a matter for serious concern. This is 
because this suggests that, even beyond the case of recognized limitations and exceptions, the 
criterion to be used to determine if a particular act amounts to an infringement of a copyright work is 
whether the use was commercial or non-commercial. Such an approach is problematic because it 
encroaches into the exclusive nature of the rights of authors in respect of their copyright works, 
which entails the exclusive right “to do or to authorize the doing” of any act associated with the use 
of the particular work. In this regard it matters not if the use is of a commercial nature or not (except 
in the case of limitations and exceptions): the rights-holder has the exclusive right to do the acts 
relating to the exploitation of the work, or to authorize such exploitation.157  
 
A notable example in this regard is Clause 11 of the Bill, which introduces amendments in relation to 
section 9A of the Copyright Act. The proposed section 9A(1)(aA), which introduces provisions 
relating to the obligation of users to submit reports of their usages of sound recordings for purposes 
of “needle-time”, suggests that such an obligation will only apply if the usage is “for commercial 
purposes”. This is a very worrying situation because it implies that if the usage is not for commercial 
purposes, then such usage is permitted and no payment of royalties or no music usage report is 
required under such circumstances. This means that any entity that can argue that its use of needle-
time rights is not for commercial purposes will be exempt from paying royalties and submitting music 
usage reports. This, it is submitted, would include the South African Broadcasting Corporation 
(SABC) – a major user of needle-time rights - because it would be very easy for the SABC to argue 
that, at least in respect of its public service offerings, it is not “obtaining [a] direct economic 
advantage or financial gain”158 when using needle-time rights. This will have a dire negative effect on 
the livelihoods of authors. 
 
7.3.1.8 Definition of “copy” – Copyright Act 
A copy is defined as “a reproduction of a work, and, in the case of a literary [and a] musical 
work … also an adaptation thereof” 
                                               
157
 The position that the fact that a performance is given for no charge was of no significance in determining whether the 
act concerned constituted infringement was affirmed much earlier, as in the case of Harms (Inc.) Ltd v Martans Club Ltd 
[1927] 1 Ch 526. 
158
 The definition of “commercial” in the Bill. 
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The definition of “copy” becomes very crucial when determining the question as to whether a work 
has been published or not. This does have a bearing on copyright owner’s exclusive right of 
“publishing the work if it was hitherto unpublished”, provided for in section 6(b) of the Act as one of 
the copyright owner’s bundle of rights in respect of literary and musical works. Section 1(5)(e) 
provides that, in respect, inter alia to a musical and literary work, the work shall be deemed to have 
been published “if copies thereof have been issued to the public”. In order to understand what would 
constitute an infringement of the publication right, it would, in the first instance, be necessary to 
understand what the “footprint” of this right is. 
“Copy” refers to those copies that result from duplication or replication, as well as those that are 
derivative forms of the work (i.e. those arising from the adaptation of the work). This is because a 
copy is defined as a “reproduction”’, and in this regard it needs to be also noted that a reproduction 
is defined as including a reproduction of a reproduction as well, and, in respect of a musical and 
literary work, “a reproduction in the form of a record or a cinematograph film”.159 Thus in respect of a 
musical work and the lyrics of a song the work would be deemed to have been published not only 
where copies are made available to the public directly from the original works, e.g. sheet music 
available as copies of the original sheet music160 but also where the musical work and lyrics are 
copied from copies of the copies of the original sheet music and / or recorded in sound recordings 
and cinematograph films; furthermore not only where the copies are made from the original sound 
recordings  or cinematograph films161 but also where they are made from copies of these sound 
recordings and films, and lastly, not only in respect of the form in which the work existed originally 
but also in the form of derivative versions or adaptations of the work.  
It is clear therefore from the foregoing that there is a wide scope with regard to what constitutes the 
publication of a musical or literary work, even in circumstances where the act, “taken on face value, 
would not appear to constitute publication.”162 This has a bearing on the so-called “first sale” doctrine 
introduced by the Bill in clause 13 thereof163 and may have a welcome ameliorating effect in this 
regard.164 
The issuing of copies and the doctrine of the exhaustion of rights 
Understanding the full footprint of the publication right is crucial also within the context of the 
concept of “exhaustion of rights”.165 Various jurisdictions would deal with the doctrine of exhaustion 
                                               
159
 See definition of “reproduction” in s 1 of the Copyright Act. 
160
 Where sheet music is still used. As observed earlier, the market for sheet music has declined. 
161
 Termed ‘master recordings’, which as we have seen, are deemed to be ‘reproductions’. 
162
 See Smith Copyright Companion 7. 
163
 The proposed section 12B(6) in the Bill. 
164
 See the discussion further down of clause 13 of the Bill. 
165
 “Exhaustion of rights” is defined as ‘[a] term usually applied to the position resulting when the right to distribute a 
particular copy of a work has been once exercised; the right is then said to be “exhausted” as regards that copy.’ Sterling 
World Copyright Law 1226. The principle of exhaustion of rights is thus used in respect of the distribution (i.e. publication) 
right. Generally two forms of exhaustion can be identified, namely “national exhaustion”, “where the national law provides 
that once the rightowner has authorised the distribution of a particular copy within the national territory, the right to 
authorise further distribution of that copy in that territory has ceased”; and “international exhaustion”, “the principle that a 
copy, once placed on the market by or with the rightowner’s consent anywhere in the world, can circulate freely in any 
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of rights in different ways, depending on the nature of the work. In the United States the exhaustion 
principle is popularly known as the ‘first-sale doctrine’. In the interesting case of Lee v ART Co.166 
the ambit of this doctrine was dealt with. ART Co., the defendant-appellee (i.e. respondent), had 
bought certain notecards and lithographs created by the first plaintiff-appellant at an outlet, mounted 
them on ceramic tiles (in the process covering the art with transparent epoxy resin), and sold them. 
The plaintiff-appellants contended that the tiles were, in terms of US Copyright law, derivative works 
and could therefore not be prepared without the permission of the copyright proprietor. Remarking 
on how this matter would be dealt with if this was a simple first-sale doctrine issue and the plaintiff-
appellants had not raised a claim in relation to an alleged infringement of a derivative work, the court 
remarked: 
Now one might suppose that this is an open and shut case under the doctrine of first sale, codified at 
17 U.S.C. § 109(a). A.R.T. bought the work legitimately, mounted it on a tile, and resold what it had 
purchased. Because the artist could capture the value of her art's contribution to the finished product 
as part of the price for the original transaction, the economic rationale for protecting an adaptation as 
"derivative" is absent. … An alteration that includes (or consumes) a complete copy of the original 
lacks economic significance. One work changes hands multiple times, exactly what § 109(a) permits, 
so it may lack legal significance too.
167
 
In this case the court concluded that because it was not possible to obtain copyright in a ‘card-on-a-
tile’, the defendant’s action did not amount to the preparation of a derivative work. The card-on-a-tile 
did not amount to an original work of authorship ‘because it is no different in form or function from 
displaying a painting in a frame or placing a medallion in a velvet case’, it was no an art production 
as required for a derivative work; was not transformed in the slightest and still depicted ‘what it 
depicted when it left Lee’s studio’.168 
                                                                                                                                                              
country, unimpeded by national exercise of the distribution right.” Sterling id at 1227. As Sterling has noted (ibid), while the 
principle of exhaustion of rights is well understood and accepted in respect of national exhaustion, it is not in respect of 
international exhaustion. In the United States the exhaustion principle is known as the “first sale” doctrine and is provided 
for in 17 U.S.C. § 109(a). In United States v Wise 550 F.2d 1180 (9
th
 Cir. 1977) it was held (at 1187) that the first-sale 
doctrine means that where the proprietor of copyright parts title with a particular copy of his copyright work, he thereby 
divests himself of the right to “vend” such copy, so that “[w]hile the proprietor’s other copyright rights (reprinting, copying 
etc.) remain unimpaired, the exclusive right to vend the transferred copy  rests with the vendee, who is not restricted by 
statute from further transfers of that copy.”  
166
 125 F.3d 580 – Court of Appeals, 7
th
 Circuit 1997. 
167
 Id at 581. 
168
 Id at 581 – 582. The essence of this judgment is of course, the fact that, because the alleged infringing work did not 
qualify as a derivative work (i.e. an adaptation), the copyright owner was not entitled to any economic benefit because her 
publication (distribution) right had been exhausted through the first-sale doctrine. This case is dealt with here merely to 
illustrate the essence of the first-sale doctrine in US law. In this regard it needs to be remembered that US copyright law 
can be distinguished from South African copyright law in several ways. With reference to this case, in South Africa a 
different finding would have been possible under similar circumstances. The courts would probably have arrived at the 
same finding with regard to the question whether the ‘card-on-a-tile’ was an adaptation (derivative work) or not. However, if 
the question was whether the existence of an adaptation ruled out the simultaneous or continuing existence of the 
publication right, the answer would have to be in the negative in the South African situation, because the footprint of 
publication (being defined as the issuing of copies to the public, and with reference to the definition of ‘copy’, which 
includes an adaptation) includes an adaptation.    
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Generally it is accepted that the copyright owner’s rental and lending rights are not affected by the 
exhaustion doctrine.169 Furthermore, the encroachment of the distribution right, such as through the 
exhaustion principle, is often ameliorated through provisions that control or restrain the importation 
of copyrighted works. Dutfield and Suthersanen express the view that the TRIPs Agreement170 
provides a specific right in respect of the prevention of pirated copyright goods.171 However, it is safe 
to indicate that the national laws of many countries do not provide for an exclusive right to control 
importation but rather deal with this in the infringement provisions of the copyright legislation. In 
South Africa this is dealt with in s 23(2)(a) of the Copyright Act, which provides that copyright shall 
be infringed by a person who, without the licence of the owner of the copyright and at a time when 
copyright subsists in a work, ‘imports an article into the Republic for a purpose other than for his 
private and domestic use’, knowing that the making of such an article constituted an infringement of 
the copyright ‘or would have constituted such an infringement if the article had been made in the 
Republic.’  
The case of Mr Video (Pty) Ltd v Nu Metro Filmed Entertainment (Pty) Ltd172 dealt with the alleged 
infringement of copyright in cinematograph films through parallel importation as contemplated in s 
23(2)(a), and in particular a claim for the delivery-up of infringing copies under s 24(1) of the 
Copyright Act. Dean has, (and it is contended correctly) criticised the court’s decision in this case for 
not seeing the need for the authorised local distributor of the DVDs embodying the cinematograph 
films concerned, which were made overseas, to prove that the reproduction, locally, of such films by 
the appellant-defendant constituted the making of infringing copies because such reproduction, if it 
was done by the overseas manufacturer of the films in South Africa, would have constituted an 
                                               
169
 See Sterling World Copyright Law 1226, where he notes that, generally, rental and lending ‘do not exhaust the 
distribution right.’ Thus the British Copyright Act, in defining the scope of the exhaustion of the publication right, provides: 
‘References … to the issue to the public of copies of a work are to the act of putting into circulation copies not previously  
put into circulation, in the United Kingdom or elsewhere, and not to  … any subsequent distribution, sale, hiring or loan of 
those copies … except that in relation to sound recordings, films and computer programs the restricted act of issuing 
copies to the public includes any rentals of copies to the public.’  S 18(2) British Copyright Act. However, while UK law 
includes sound recordings, films and computer programs in the rental exception, US copyright law only includes sound 
recordings (and the musical works embodied in them), and computer programs in the exception to the first-use doctrine, 
and this only where the ‘rental, lease or lending’, (or any act ‘in the nature of rental, lease or lending’) is for direct or 
indirect commercial purposes. 17 U.S.C. § 109(b)(1)(A). In the United States films are for example, not included in the 
rental exception and thus once films have been distributed into the market they can be freely traded by way of rental, lease 
or lending. It has been said that the reason for the non-inclusion of films in the rental exception arose from the Betamax 
decision (Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417 (1984)), which ‘weakened the debate 
surrounding videotape rentals’ by holding that videotaping for time-shifting purposes was a fair use. Chatterjee 1995 
Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. 396. Chatterjee  argues however that the Betamax decision has not unduly 
burdened the movie and television industry because it did not result in unauthorised and wholesale copying, because of 
the high quality of rental videos as opposed to copies thereof, and because while people generally listen to repeats of 
musical works, they do not generally do so in respect of movies. Chatterjee 1995 Fordham Intell. Prop., Media & Ent. L.J. 
399.  
170
 In particular Art. 44(1) read with Arts. 50(1) and 51 thereof. 
171
 Dutfield and Suthersanen Global Intellectual Property Law 88. The emphasis here should be on ‘pirated copyright 
goods’ or ‘infringing copies’ in the context of the South African Copyright Act, so that ‘[a] copyright holder (ie the copyright 
owner or an exclusive licensee) can only claim copyright infringement for dealing in grey goods if these goods are 
infringing copies (actual or deemed) and the dealing is done without his authority. It is not sufficient that the goods are 
merely dealt in without his authority. … In practice many exclusive distributors of goods embodying copyright works labour 
under the misapprehension that their exclusive distribution right per se entitles them to prevent trading in grey goods. Such 
a right per se only binds the other contracting party and confers no rights enforceable against grey goods dealers. ’ Dean 
op cit note … at 1-84. 
172
 1097 JOC (A). 
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infringing of the reproduction rights in the films.173 In the case the court held that it sufficed to infer 
that the making of such DVDs in South Africa by the overseas manufacturer ‘would have constituted 
an infringement.’174 In this regard Dean has (and again it is contended, correctly), remarked: 
The real crux of the matter, whether in the case of imported goods or locally made goods, is not,: Did 
the maker of the article hold the right to infringement if made by the importer but rather what the 
position would have been if the actual maker who made the article abroad had instead made the 
article in South Africa. This turns on the question of the geographical scope of the reproduction right 
held by the actual maker of the article.
175
   
South African copyright law does not appear to have provisions relating to the exhaustion of rights 
as dealt with above. For one thing, s 1(5)(a) of the Copyright Act dealing with the scope of the 
publication right makes it clear that publication has to take place with the consent of the copyright 
owner.176 No act within the distribution value chain therefore (i.e. no act that would constitute a 
‘publication’ of the work) can be undertaken by anyone other than the copyright owner, or someone 
                                               
173
 Dean op cit note … 1-84 – 1-85. 
174
 Nu Metro Filmed Entertainment supra n 447 para. 8. Dean id at 1-85, counters, arguing that ‘… the onus was on the 
claimant to prove all the essential elements of its case and one of those elements was that, for purposes of delivery-up, the 
contentious DVDs were made by a person who did not hold South African reproduction rights and were thus infringing 
copies. The fact that the respondents infringed the copyright in the films by distributing them (irrespective of whether they 
were infringing copies, in terms of s 8(1)(g) of the Act) does not in itself make the DVDs infringing copies of the films.’ In 
this regard the learned author concludes: ‘ With respect, this case evidences confusion between reproduction rights and 
distribution rights and unduly equates them …’. Ibid. It is submitted that this is the correct approach.  
175
 Dean id at 1-82. 
176
 It would appear, from the provisions of s1(5)(e), that the requirement that the copyright owner needs to give consent 
does not apply in respect of musical and literary works (the works in s 6), artistic works (s 7) and computer programs (s 
11B). However, such a view would conflict with the provisions of s 6(b), s 7(b) and s 11B(b), which make provision for the 
exclusive right of ‘publishing’ and authorising publishing, in respect of these works. As indicated earlier (in the discussion 
of the meaning of ‘copy’ in respect of musical and literary works), a work would be deemed to have been published in 
respect of musical and literary works where copies are made available to the public directly from the original works (e.g. 
copies of original sheet music); where the musical work and lyrics are copied from copies of sheet music; where the 
musical works and lyrics are recorded in sound recordings and cinematograph films; where copies of these original sound 
recordings  or cinematograph films (embodying the musical and literary works) are made, and lastly, not only in respect of 
the form in which the work existed originally but also in the form of derivative versions (arrangements and transcriptions). 
However it should be obvious that all the owner of copyright in a musical and literary work needs do in order to have 
copies of the work to be available to the public (i.e. to have the works published) is to authorise the reproduction of these 
works (in whatever form they are originally in), by means of the making of copies of the original works, or through use in 
records, films, and adaptations. When the licensee disseminates copies of sound recordings, cinematograph films etc, 
embodying these musical and literary works, to the public, such act will, simultaneously, constitute a publication of the 
musical and literary works. Furthermore, where a person seeks for authorisation from the owner of copyright in a musical 
or literary work to make an adaptation of the work, if permission is given to do so and the licensee makes an adaptation of 
the work, then the making of such an adaptation would constitute a publication of the musical and literary work, even if the 
licensor has not specifically authorised publication of the work. The musical and literary copyright owner therefore does not 
need to specifically give consent for the musical or literary work to be published under these circumstances, and where the 
licensee or another party makes copies of these works available to the public the works would be deemed to have been 
published, whether the copyright owner had specifically given such consent or not (provided that he had given 
authorisation in respect of the reproduction of the works). Within the circumstances of the publication of a musical or 
literary work it can furthermore be argued that the act of authorising reproduction creates an implied licence for publication, 
thus rendering unnecessary express consent. It should also be noted that, as the court in Fichtel and Sachs 
Aktiengesellschaft v Road Runner Services 174 JOC (W) held (at 182), ‘a positive act of offer is not a pre-requisite [for 
publication] and passive availability suffices.’ On the other hand in the case of sound recordings, where the copyright 
owner has given authorisation for the reproduction of the sound recordings such authorisation would impliedly include the 
licensee’s right to sell records embodying such sound recordings, seeing that ‘sale’ of records does not constitute an 
exclusive right in respect of the owner of copyright in a sound recording (see the provisions of s 9 of the Copyright Act, 
which specifically excludes the ‘sale’ of the sound recording). Where however, a person sells records of the sound 
recording where the owner of copyright in respect of the sound recordings had not authorised the reproduction of the 
sound recording (through such records), such action would constitute an infringement of the copyright owner’s rights in 
terms of s 23(2)(b).  
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authorised to do so by the copyright owner.177 Furthermore, the Copyright Act clearly provides for 
the lending right as an exclusive right of the owner of copyright in a sound recording178 and thus 
does not deal with it as an exception to the exhaustion doctrine, as other jurisdictions do.179  
Having indicated this, it is submitted that it is possible to detect certain manifestations, effects or 
residues of the exhaustion principle in the construction of certain provisions of our Copyright Act. For 
one thing, (i) it is clear, in respect of musical and literary works, that the publication footprint ends 
with the making of an adaptation of the original.180 However, from the definition of ‘copy’ the footprint 
does not appear to extend to the making of copies of the adapted work, i.e. the making of such 
copies would be beyond the footprint of the publication right in respect of the original work and 
would thus not constitute an infringement of the publication right in respect of the original work.181 
Further to this, (ii) the fact that the right to control and restrict importation applies only in respect of 
infringing copies can be seen as another manifestation of the exhaustion principle. This aspect is 
particularly important to note because parallel importation is very much frowned upon in the music 
industry.182As Dean has so articulately expressed, the fact that the activity of the importer in 
distributing the contentious articles without the authority of the copyright owner infringes upon the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights of distribution does not, in itself, make the articles ‘infringing 
                                               
177
 On this see however the foregoing discussion, ibid.  
178
 Section 9(b). The same position applies in respect of cinematograph films in terms of s 8(g). The case of Nu Metro 
Filmed Entertainment (Pty) Ltd supra n 447 dealt with the unauthorised rental of infringing copies of cinematograph films. 
The position would be equally applicable in respect of sound recordings because the wording dealing with this right in 
respect of films (in s 8(g) ) is exactly the same as that used in respect of sound recordings in s 9(b). 
179
 See, in this regard, the discussion on how this is dealt with in UK and US law, op cit note 344.  
180
 Contrast this with the position in the United States, where adaptation is clearly excluded from the distribution right. Thus 
in the case of Mirage Editions, Inc. v Albuquerque Art Co., 856 F. 2d 1341, another ‘tile’ case in which the appellant-
defendant had taken images from a book and placed them on a tile, whereafter the prepared tiled images were sold, the 
court held (at 1344): ‘We recognize that, under the “first sale” doctrine as enunciated at 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) and as 
discussed in Wise, appellant can purchase a copy of the Nagel book and subsequently alienate its ownership in that book. 
However, the right to transfer applies only to the particular copy of the book which appellant has purchased and nothing 
else. The mere sale of the book to the appellant without a specific transfer by the copyright holder of its exclusive right to 
prepare derivative works, does not transfer that right to appellant. The derivative works right, remains unimpaired and with 
the copyright proprietors …. As we have previously concluded that appellant's tile-preparing process results in derivative 
works and as the exclusive right to prepare derivative works belongs to the copyright holder, the "first sale" doctrine does 
not bar the appellees' copyright infringement claims.’ 
181
 This should not, however, be taken to imply that the infringer would be absolved from any liability in respect of 
publishing unauthorised copies of the adapted work. While such unauthorised copies would not constitute an ‘infringing 
copy’ in respect of the original work, they would clearly constitute an infringing copy in respect of the adapted work. In 
other words, even though making copies of the adapted work would not constitute publication in respect of the original 
work, such activity would constitute publication in respect of the adapted work. Where in this case the owner of the 
copyright in the original work has not assigned the adaptation right to another, the unauthorised publication of copies of the 
adapted work would infringe upon what could be termed the copyright owner’s ‘adaptation exercise right’ in respect of the 
original work, i.e. the right provided for in s 6(g) of the Copyright Act, seeing that one of the exclusive rights of the copyright 
owner is not only to make an adaptation of the work in terms of s 6(f), but also ‘doing, in relation to an adaptation of the 
work, any of the acts specified in relation to the work in paragraphs (a) to (e) inclusive’ (s 6(g)). Thus, one of the copyright 
owner’s rights in this regard would be the right to publish the adapted work in terms of s 6(b) read with s 6(g). Where 
however, the owner of the original copyright work has assigned the adaptation right to another, where a person makes 
infringing copies of the adapted work, he would be infringing the copyright in the adapted work and not the copyright in the 
original work. In other words, the publication right in respect of the original work would have been exhausted.  
182
 See for example s 2 of the Code of Conduct for the members of the Recording Industry of South Africa (RiSA), under 
the heading ‘Parallel Imports’, enjoins its record producer members not to ‘knowingly, import into South Africa, or sell, any 
product in breach of the valid contractual rights [of] any other member.’ See http://www.risa.org.za/, ‘About’, then ‘Code of 
Conduct’. (Date of use: 22 October 2013). These parallel importation restrictions have however, fallen foul of competition 
authorities elsewhere. See, in respect of this, the decision of the Swiss Competition Commission to fine the International 
Federation of the Phonographic Industry (IFPI) of Switzerland for the use of such parallel import restrictions in respect of 
sound recordings and videos. http://www.internationallawoffice.com/newsletters/detail.aspx?g=461619db-c1a7-4757-8127-
46e9572097e1 (date of use 22 October 2013). 
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copies’.183 Rather the test here is whether the person who made the imported article would, if he had 
made the article in South Africa, infringed upon the reproduction right in respect of the article. In this 
regard it can be argued that the importation of copies that are not infringing copies as contemplated 
in the Copyright Act,184 is a form of exhaustion of the distribution rights of the copyright owner, 
seeing that such importation would not amount to copyright infringement.185  [This means for 
example that if a South African owner of copyright in sound recordings authorises a record producer 
in Kenya to manufacture recordings in Kenya, but does not do so in respect of the South African 
territory; where a South African trader purchases a large stock of music CDs from the Kenya 
manufacturer and resells them in South Africa, such CDs would not constitute infringing copies in 
South Africa.] Further to this, (iii) the fact that a “sale” is excluded from the exclusive rights of the 
owner of copyright in a sound recording and is only prohibited if it relates to the sale of an infringing 
copy (i.e. a copy the making of which in South Africa would have amounted to the maker thereof 
infringing the reproduction right in the work),186 can be seen as yet another form of the exhaustion. 
[Nevertheless, to the extent that the exhaustion rule has application in South Africa, its usefulness is 
reduced by the fact that the act of lending in respect of both sound recordings and cinematograph 
films is prohibited.] 
7.3.1.9 Definition of “diffusion service” 
An understanding of this definition is important for purposes of understanding the right to transmit a 
work in a diffusion service, which forms part of the performing rights in musical works – a subset of 
the bundle of rights available to the owner of copyright in a literary and musical work.187 The 
essential difference between a broadcast and a diffusion service is that while the former uses 
                                               
183
 Dean op cit note … 1-85. The learned author also observed: ‘It is not sufficient that the goods are merely dealt in 
without his authority. No infringement occurs in this situation’ unless the goods are ‘infringing copies’. Id at 1-84. 
184
 A possible scenario here is where the overseas copyright owner has not assigned his copyright to a local person. Thus 
in territories where no one owns the copyright locally (through a transfer of the rights by assignment or an exclusive 
licence), anyone would be able to exercise the distribution right in respect of works embodying the copyright, without being 
liable for copyright infringement as the goods would not amount to ‘infringing copies’. In this regard Dean has observed: ‘In 
order to bring about a situation where imported goods made by or with the license [sic] of the copyright owner can become 
‘infringing copies’ for purposes of s 23(2) of the Act, foreign copyright owners have resorted to the expedient [sic] of 
assigning their South African copyright in works embodied in imported goods to a South African distributor. Once such 
assignment has taken place, it follows that goods thereafter manufactured by or with the license [sic] of the former 
copyright owner embodying reproductions of the works in question will, in terms of the deeming provisions of the section, 
become technically infringing copies.’ Dean id at 1-82. 
185
 Compare this position with that of the United States as expressed in the recent Supreme Court case of Kirtsaeng v 
John Wiley & Sons Inc. 654 F. 3d 210. Kirtsaeng had imported books published by Wiley Asia, an assignee of the 
respondent, by asking friends and family to buy them for him in Thailand and to mail them to the United States, where he 
sold them, reimbursed his friends and family members and kept the profit. The respondent argued that Kirstsaeng had 
infringed upon its distribution right in terms of U.S.C. §106(3), read with §6029a)(1) (which prohibits unauthorised 
importation of copies of a work). Kirtsaeng argued that he was entitled to sell the imported books in terms of the first-sale 
doctrine provided for in §109. The legal question was whether the words ‘lawfully made under this title’ with regard to 
works made abroad restricted the scope of the first-sale doctrine geographically. The US Supreme Court, overruling the 
decision of the District court and the Second Circuit, agreed with Kirtsaeng that the first-sale doctrine applies in respect of 
copies of copyrighted works lawfully made abroad, holding that the phrase ‘lawfully made under this title’  means ‘in 
accordance with’ or ‘in compliance with’, rather than limiting the first-sale doctrine geographically, and arguing that both 
historical and the contemporary statutory context showed that Congress did not have geography in mind when writing the 
present version of §109(a). Pp 7 – 33.  In contrast South African law, which as we have indicated, does not specifically 
provide for the exhaustion principle, still deals with the importation provisions within the context of geographical limitation. 
See in this regard Dean ibid. 
186
 In terms of s 23(2)(b) of the Copyright Act. 
187
 See s 6(e) of the Copyright Act. 
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wireless technology (“takes place by means of electromagnetic waves … without an artificial 
conductor”) the latter “takes place over wires or other paths provided by material substance” (e.g. a 
music-on-hold service or a transmission of a musical service to rooms in a hotel from a central 
place, using wire). Furthermore while a broadcast may be intended for reception by the public or a 
section of the public, a diffusion serve is intended for reception “by specific members of the public” 
(e.g. members of a hotel establishment). In other jurisdictions, such as the United States, 
transmission of content through a diffusion service is a major part of the broadcasting industry, 
through the use of “cable television”, which uses fixed optical fibres or coaxial cables to transmit 
content, rather than using the over-the-air method.188   
7.3.1.10 Definition of “distribution” and “distributor” 
These expressions are important only in so far as it is necessary to note the fact that they are used 
in respect of programme-carrying signals and not in respect of musical copyright. In practice the 
music copyright enthusiast shall often be confronted with the concept of “distribution” and 
“distributor” within the context of the music industry. It is important to note that this is not the sense 
in which these expressions are used in the Act. The expressions are not used in respect of music 
copyright or the music industry. In contrast, the exclusive right of “distribution” is an important 
component of the laws of many jurisdictions. Thus the US Copyright Act189 makes provision for the 
exclusive right “to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease or lending”.190 The importance of the concept of 
“distribution” in the music industry is illustrated by the fact that entities called “distributors”191 play an 
important role with regard to disseminating recorded music to the public.  In essence this 
“distribution right” is the same as the “publication right”’ provided for in the South African Copyright 
Act.192 Thus if the facts of a music rights case make reference to “distribution” in South Africa this 
would very likely be a reference to the concept of “publication” in the Copyright Act and not to the 
                                               
188
 See https://www.encyclopedia.com/media/encyclopedias-almanacs-transcripts-and-maps/cable-television-system-
technology (date of use: 20 July 2019). 
189
 § 106. 
190
 UK Copyright law does not specifically provide for this right, but the understanding that this right exists is there, as is 
evident from the use of the phrase “subsequent distribution” in s 18(3)(a) (within the context of dealing with the right “to 
issue copies of the work to the public” dealt with in s 16(1)(b) of the UK Copyright Act, read within s 18).  
191
 “[T]he wholesaler that sells … records to the stores and also distributes … music digitally”. Passman All You Need to 
Know about the Music Business 73. 
192
 See s 1(5) of the Copyright Act. The term “publication” is not specifically defined, but the Act deals with the scope of the 
concept or rather what the term entails. For example, a musical and literary work is deemed to have been published “if 
copies thereof have been issued to the public” (s1(5)(e)), and the publication of a sound recording is the “‘sale, letting, hire 
or offer for sale or hire, of copies thereof” (s1(5)(b)). This accords with the definition of “publication” under s 175(1)(a) of 
the UK Copyright Act. See further in this regard Baloyi 2012 SA Merc LJ 219 - 220 where the connection between the 
expressions “publish”, “publication”, “distribute” and “distribution” is made. There seems however to be a confusion in this 
regard, and some have called for the introduction of a stand-alone right of distribution in the Copyright Act through the 
process of the Copyright Amendment Bill and this has in fact now been incorporated in the Bill. See clause 4 of the Bill 
(version B13B-2017) in respect of literary and musical works and clause 6 of the Bill in respect of artistic works, available 
at https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 13 July 2019).  It is not clear why there has been a selective inclusion of this 
right. See the observations further below in respect of clause 4. 
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definition of “distribution” or “distributor” in the Act. The concept of “distribution” is also used often in 
the music industry in respect of the distribution of royalties, especially by collecting societies.193 
7.3.1.11 Definition of “exclusive licence” 
An “exclusive licence” is defined as “a licence authorizing a licensee, to the exclusion of all 
other persons, including the grantor of the licence, to exercise a right which by virtue of this 
Act would, apart from the licence, be exercisable exclusively by the owner of the copyright; 
and ‘exclusive licensee’ shall be construed accordingly” 
This is self-explanatory but it needs to be noted that an exclusive licence should not be confused for 
a so-called “exclusive songwriter agreement”, which simply means that a songwriter is engaged by a 
music publisher to compose musical works solely for the music publisher during the period of 
engagement and may thus not compose musical works for another party.194 See further in this 
regard the comment below in respect of clause 4 of the Bill. 
7.3.1.12 Definition of “infringing copy” 
“Infringing copy” is defined, in relation to a literary and musical work, as “a copy thereof … being 
… an article the making of which constituted infringement of the copyright in the work [or] 
recording …, or in the case of an imported article, would have constituted an infringement of 
that copyright if the article had been made in the Republic” 
What is important to note here is that defining an infringing copy in relation to a musical and literary 
work as “a copy thereof”, where (i) “publication” (i.e. distribution) is defined in relation to the issuing 
of “copies” of a work; (ii) “copy” is defined to include a reproduction and an adaptation, and (iii) a 
“reproduction” is defined to include a reproduction in the form of a record or cinematograph film and 
a reproduction of a reproduction; and “adaptation” is defined to include an arrangement and a 
transcription,195 can only bring us to the conclusion that the same acts that give rise to the 
publication of a work as discussed above also give rise to the infringement of a work through 
copying, if such copying was unauthorised.196 Thus the footprint of the publication right in this case 
would define the footprint of the infringement of the work through unlawful copying.197  
                                               
193
 Such a usage is very prevalent in the Copyright Amendment Bill. 
194
 See Poe Music Publishing 99. During this period if the songwriter composes musical works or writes lyrics for the 
benefit of others, the original music publisher could claim ownership of the copyright in these songs or lyrics. The exclusive 
songwriter agreement is sometimes termed a “staff writer contract” and is distinguished from a “single-song contract”, 
where the songwriter is engaged to compose a specific number of songs, and could therefore, after doing so, enter into a 
songwriting agreement with other publishers. See Poe id at 90 – 91. 
195
 See the definitions of “copy”’, “reproduction” and “adaptation” in the Copyright Act, as well as the discussion above in 
relation to “‘adaptation” and “copy”.  
196
 It needs to be emphasised that this observation is limited to instances where a work is infringed through unauthorised 
copying. This would affect three exclusive rights of the copyright owner, namely (i) the right to “reproduce the work” (s 6(a), 
seeing that the definition of “copy”’ includes a “reproduction” of the work), and (ii) the right to publish the work (s 6(b), 
seeing that publication entails the issuing of copies of the work to the public (s 1(5(a) and (e)) and the (iii) the right to make 
an adaptation of the work (s 6(f)), seeing that the definition of “copy”’ includes an adaptation of the work). It would 
however, not affect the “performing rights” dealt with in s 6 (c) – (e), since these do not constitute the issuing of copies 
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The above observations are important because, as contended below in the analysis of the proposed 
section 12B(6) in clause 13 of the Bill, the structuring of the proposed first-sale doctrine in the Bill 
would nullify many of the current provisions relating to the regime for “infringing copies” in our law. 
7.3.1.13 Definition of “licence scheme” 
“Licence scheme” is defined “for the purposes of Chapter 3, in relation to licences of any 
description”, as “a scheme prepared by one or more licensing bodies, setting out the classes 
of cases in which they are willing, or the person on whose behalf they act is willing, to grant 
licences of that description, and the charges, if any, and terms and conditions subject to 
which licences may be granted in those classes of cases, and includes anything in the nature 
of such a scheme, whether described as a scheme or as a tariff or by any other name” 
It is important first to note that the expression “licence scheme” is used “for the purposes of Chapter 
3”, which contains provisions dealing with the Copyright Tribunal. Thus a licence scheme, or a tariff 
as it is commonly known in the music industry, is particularly important for purposes of referring a 
matter to the Copyright Tribunal. In this regard it needs to be noted that a dispute that is referred to 
the Copyright Tribunal must relate to a licence scheme that “is in operation”,198 which is referred to 
the Tribunal, or where a person (who has presumably been refused a licence) requires a licence in 
accordance with the licence scheme, or else requires a licence in a case not covered by the licence 
scheme.199 In all instances the existence of a licence scheme (or a submission that an existing 
licence scheme does not cover the usage concerned) must form the basis for the reference of a 
matter to the Copyright Tribunal. 
The second issue to note here is the fact that a licence scheme sets out the classes of cases in 
which the licensing bodies (namely the CMO) or the persons on whose behalf they act “are willing … 
to grant licences” of the description concerned. This emphasises the nature of copyright as an 
exclusive right of the copyright owner, who has the sole right to use the work or to authorise others 
to use it. In this regard the copyright owner may decide to allow usages of his work in certain 
classes,200 and also decide not to allow certain usages in other classes or in respect of certain 
classes of persons. It is under those circumstances, i.e. (i) where the copyright owner is not willing 
to issue licences in respect of certain classes of usages or classes of persons;201 or (ii) where the 
copyright owner is not willing to issue a licence apart from the payment of a certain licence fee, that 
                                                                                                                                                              
(including infringing copies) to the public (see s 1(5)(d) for the specific exclusion of the rights forming part of the performing 
rights). 
197
 I.e. through the issuing of infringing copies. See further in this regard the discussion above regarding the definition of 
‘copy’. 
198
 Section 31(1) of the Copyright Act. 
199
 Section 30 of the Copyright Act. See further in this regard Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-102 - 103. 
200
 SAMRO for example has “53 different tariffs for various uses”’. See http://www.samro.org.za/news/articles/public-must-
pay-play (date of use: 15 February 2019); http://www.samro.org.za/node/686 (date of use: 23 October 2013). These 
classes of usages include radio, pubs, live music venues, cinemas, ‘spaza shops’, car washes, hairdressers, etc. See 
http://www.samro.org.za/samro-music-users-south-africa/who-needs-a-music-lincene-from-samro (date of use: 23 October 
2013). 
201
 See in this regard Johannesburg Operatic and Dramatic Society v Music Theatre International and Others Patent 
Journal March 1969 223. 
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the role of the Copyright Tribunal comes into the fore. This role amounts to the issuing of a licence 
to compel the copyright owner to allow the usage of his work in a prescribed manner upon payment 
of a prescribed fee.202   
A licence scheme may also prescribe certain “charges” that need to be paid, or impose certain terms 
and conditions. For example, the SAMRO standard broadcast tariff and licence provides that the 
licence fee is “subject to a surcharge or discount of 1% in respect of every increase or decrease of 1 
complete point in the weighted average figure of the [official Consumer Price Index of 100 
points]”.203 Furthermore, it is a condition of the licence agreement that the user, in addition to paying 
the licence fee, has to provide SAMRO with music usage information204 to enable the latter to 
distribute royalties to the correct rights-holders. 
7.3.1.14 Definition of “musical work” 
A “musical work” is defined as “a work consisting of music, exclusive of any words or action 
intended to be sung, spoken or performed with the music” 
The definition of the term “musical work” is of course, crucial to understanding the protection 
accorded to this type of work under copyright.205 It has, in this regard been observed that there are 
“surprisingly” few definitions of the expression “musical work”’ in national and international copyright 
law; there is no internationally-accepted definition of the expression and that ‘many legislative  
bodies, both national and international, accept that the terms “music” and “musical work” are 
inherently difficult to define’.206 At one stage Canadian law defined music as “a combination of 
melody and harmony”, but this definition was abandoned when it presented problems.207  
                                               
202
 That is, the Copyright Tribunal authorises the issuing of a “compulsory licence” in respect of the usage concenred. See 
in this regard Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-102. 
203
 Furthermore, the licence fees payable by the broadcaster are payable “less any commission payable by the 
[broadcaster] to advertising agents subject to a maximum of 16.5% of advertising income and any levies paid by the 
[broadcaster] to the South African Advertising Research Foundation subject to a maximum of 0.5%  of advertising 
revenue”.  This information was correct as at, and verified from actual documents received by the writer from SAMRO 
officials on, 18 April 2013. 
204
 That is, information reflecting the usage of SAMRO-controlled musical works by the user, such as “programme log 
sheets” in the case of broadcasters. 
205
 Although it has been suggested that, “… from the point of view of legislators it is not necessary to define the terms 
[“music” and “musical work”’] strictly in order to provide protection to musical works under copyright.” Macdonagh 2012 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 408. 
206
 Macdonagh id at 407 – 408. Macdonagh highlights the fact that apart from the fact that the Berne Convention makes 
provision for the protection of “musical compositions with or without words”, international treaties do not define the 
expressions “music” or “musical work”, as also is the case in many jurisdictions such as Germany and the United States. 
See also Chapter 3 supra for the discussion on the historical development of treatment of musical works in copyright law. 
207
 See Sanderson Musicians and the Law 20. The full definition was “any combination of melody and harmony, or either of 
them printed, reduced to writing, or otherwise graphically produced or reproduced.” This definition was in fact based on the 
definition of the expression in the Musical (Summary Proceedings) Copyright Act 1902 (2 Edw. 7, c.15), as highlighted in 
Chapter 3 supra, which, as indicated, was criticised by Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 96 for 
being “too restrictive … as sounds which are neither in melodic nor harmonic combination may equally be recognised to be 
music.” Sticking to this definition the Canadian Federal court in CTV Television Network Limited v  Canada (Copyright 
Board) [1993] 2 FCR 115 concluded that the telecommunication of musical works did not amount to a communication to 
the public of a musical work, but rather was a communication to the public of the performance of a musical work, so that 
such communication did not amount to a performance in public of the musical works. After CTV the Canadian Copyright 
Act was amended and now defines a musical work as “any work of music or musical composition, with or without words, 
and includes a compilation thereof.” S 2 Canadian Copyright Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-42).  
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The definition of “musical work” in our copyright law is similar to that in UK law.208 The fact that 
words sung or spoken with the music are excluded from the definition results from the fact that 
words, in this case in the form of lyrics, are protected in their own right as a literary work.209 In the 
same vein, “action … performed with the music” is excluded because the action, such as a dance 
set to the tune of the music, would, if it satisfies the requirements for the subsistence of copyright,210 
be protectable as a “choreographic work”, which is a genre of a dramatic work (which in turn is 
protectable as a literary work).211 In the Sawkins case212 Mummery LJ held that the essence of 
music is “combining sounds for listening to”, further remarking that: 
Music is not the same as mere noise. The sound of music is intended to produce effects of some kind 
on the listener’s emotions and intellect. The sounds may be produced by an organised performance 
on instruments played from a musical score, though that is not essential for the existence of the music 
or of copyright in it. Music must be distinguished from the fact and form of its fixation as a record of a 
musical composition. The score is the traditional and convenient form of fixation of the music and 
conforms to the requirement that a copyright work must be recorded in some material form. But the 
fixation in the written score or on a record is not in itself the music in which copyright subsists. There is 
no reason why, for example, a recording of a person’s spontaneous singing, whistling or humming or 
                                               
208
 Section 3(1) of the UK Copyright Act. In this regard observations made in respect of the application of the definition in 
English law would, in many cases, also have relevance in South African law. In this regard Garnett, Davis and Harbottle 
Copinger and Skone James 97 have noted, with regard to the definition of the expression “musical work” in Sawkins v 
Hyperion Records Ltd (see Chapter 5 supra) as “sound … intended to produce effects of some kind on the listeners’ 
emotions and intellect”, that this intention is the intention of the author-composer, “and it is irrelevant whether he is 
successful in the attempt to affect the listener’s emotions or intellect.” The intention is thus not that of the musician who 
interprets the musical work by singing it. Furthermore, the authors have made other important observations worth 
repeating: “In music copyright the sounds are more important than the notes, as is shown by the fact that it is possible to 
infringe a musical work without taking the actual notes. In principle, there is no reason for regarding the actual notes of 
music as the only matter covered by musical copyright, any more than, in the case of a dramatic work, only the words to be 
spoken by the actors are covered by dramatic copyright. Accordingly it is wrong in principle to single out the notes as 
uniquely significant for copyright purposes and to proceed to deny copyright to the other elements that make some 
contribution to the sound of the music when performed, such as performing indications, tempo and performance practice 
indicators, if they are the product of a person’s effort, skill and time, bearing in mind the relatively modest level of the 
threshold for a work to qualify for protection. … While words which are sung with music do not form part of the musical 
work, the human voice can constitute a part of the overall orchestration of the musical work, as with a musical instrument 
in a band or an orchestra. A passage of silence set within musical sounds and intended to be appreciated as part of those 
sounds is clearly part of the musical work as a whole. …” Davis and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James id at 97 – 98. 
209
 This brings us to the vexing question as to the basis for the recognition as music of chant-based “music” forms such as 
rap (and closer to home, kwaito) – “in which the words of a song are not sung, but spoken in time to music with a steady 
beat” (Longman Dictionary of Contemporary English 2003). In this regard it is submitted that this question needs to be 
determine on a case-by-case basis. It has been said of “raps” that they “are lyric poems organised into verses … [which] 
are performed most often in rhythm to a beat with a vocal delivery that ranges from sing-song to conversational. Their most 
distinguishing poetic feature is rhyme, which rappers employ in full and slant, monosyllabic and multisyllabic forms at the 
end of and in the midst of a line.” http://adamfbradley.com/presskit/Bradley-Rap-Intro.pdf  xxxi. Emphasis added. (Date of 
use: 23 October 2013). The test as to whether the rapping itself, apart from the accompanying musical performance, 
constitutes a musical work in its own right would be the extent to which there are melodic elements in the rapping. In other 
words, can the rapping be expressed musically (i.e. with reference to any of the notes in the musical scale), or is it merely 
conversational? If the rapping is only conversational, then it can clearly not be protected as a “musical work” and would be 
protectable in the same way as the recitation or performance of a poem is protected, namely, either as a literary work that 
is being performed (provided the words of the rap have been reduced to writing and otherwise meet the requirements for 
the subsistence of copyright), or as a performance. The music accompanying the rapping can, of course, be protectable as 
a “musical work” and a “sound recording” (if recorded), provided its making met the requirements for the subsistence of 
copyright in a work. In this regard it needs to be noted that the practice of “sampling” is very much associated with rap and 
related forms of music (such as hip-hop and kwaito), and where such sampling is not authorised by the copyright owner, 
this would constitute copyright infringement. See generally for a discussion (including critical analysis) of the problem of 
sampling Schumacher 1995 Media, Culture and Society 253 and Lindenbaum Music Sampling and Copyright Law 1999.
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 Such as choreography, which has been defined as “a written record of dances”, derived from the Greek for “dance” and 
“write”. See http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/choreography (date of use: 25 October 2013). 
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 See in this regard Hadley v Kemp [1999] E.M.L.R. 589, at 597. 
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 Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd [2005] 1 W.L.R. 3281. 
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improvisations of sounds by a group of people with or without musical instruments should not be 
regarded as “music” for copyright purposes.
213
 
It is important, in dealing with the definition of “musical work” to confine understanding of the term to 
its definition in the Copyright Act and not, for example, to confuse this with the usage of the 
expression in other legislation.214 In addition it is appropriate to mention the fact that the expression 
“song”, which is used in popular language, refers to a combination of music (i.e. the musical work) 
and the words (i.e. lyrics, protected as a literary work), that are sung or spoken in conjunction with 
the music.215  
7.3.1.15 Definition of “performance” 
Performance “includes any mode of visual or acoustic presentation of a work including any 
such presentation by the operation of a loudspeaker, a radio, television or diffusion receiver 
or by the exhibition of a cinematograph film or by the use of a record or by any other means 
... and references to ‘perform’ in relation to a work shall be construed accordingly: Provided 
that ‘performance’ shall not include broadcasting or rebroadcasting or transmitting a work in 
a diffusion service”216 
The right of public performance is, in addition to the right of broadcasting and transmission in a 
diffusion service, one of the three rights constituting the “performing right”.217 This is the original 
performing right, before the right was extended to the other usages as a result of technological 
developments. The definition of “performance” in the Act in fact captures the historical development 
of the right of public performance in the Imperial Copyright era, where the right was adapted from a 
simple stage right to take into account modern forms of performance. Thus it was held in a number 
of the so-called “loudspeaker performance” cases that the playing of music through the use of 
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 Id at 53. This decision has, however, been criticised as introducing a rather “broad definition of the musical work”. See 
Macdonagh 2012 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 409. See also Rahmatian 2009 
International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 560; also Griffin 2010 Legal Studies 653. The writer has 
commented at length on the Sawkins decision in Chapter 5 supra. 
214
 Thus for example the Consumer Protection Act 68 of 2008 defines “goods” as including “music”’, and defines “services” 
as including “the provision of any entertainment or similar intangible product” (s1). In this context a musical work, within its 
understanding in copyright law, would be more akin to the phrase “the provision of any entertainment or similar intangible 
product”, within the definition of “services”, than it would to the understanding of “music” as “goods”. The concept of music 
as “goods” would be more akin to the definition of “record” in the Copyright Act, where such record embodies the recording 
of a musical work. See also s 61(2)(c)(iii) of the Electronic Communications Act 36 of 2005, which provides that if the 
music or lyrics of a musical work broadcast by a South African broadcasting service “was or were principally performed by 
musicians who are South African citizens” then such musical work would qualify as “South African music”. Within copyright 
law such music would not be considered to be “South African music” in the sense of music authored by South Africans, if 
the authors or composers of the music are in fact, foreign persons (except that generally a work published simultaneously 
in South Africa and a foreign jurisdiction within a period of 30 days would be regarded to be of South African origin, within 
the concept of a “first publication” in terms of s 4(1) read with s 1(5)(c) of the Copyright Act).   
215
 See Hadley v Kemp [1999] E.M.L.R. 589, at 597, where it was observed: “There are two copyrights in the song: one in 
the music (the “musical work” …), and one in the lyrics (the “literary work” …).” In the same vein Grove (ed) Dictionary of 
Music (III) 584 defines a song in the following manner: “In relation to the study of music, a song may be defined as a short 
metrical composition, whose meaning is conveyed by the combined force of words and melody, and intended to be sung 
with or without an accompaniment”, which makes the song to “belong equally to poetry and music.” 
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 Emphasis added. 
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 Section 6(c) – (e) of the Copyright Act. 
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loudspeakers constituted public performance.218 It for example, comes as a surprise to many people 
that they should be held liable for infringing the right of public performance through the public use of 
a radio or television set (e.g. at a restaurant, hair saloon, pub or a similar public place), where the 
music played emanates from a radio or television broadcast. The confusion becomes even more 
pronounced when the users would have paid a TV licence or where the broadcast emanates from a 
subscription service such as MNET / DSTV. 
The courts have however been clear that such use of radio and TV receivers, where copyright works 
are performed, would constitute an infringement of the copyright owner’s right of public performance 
if no license has been received from the copyright owner (or his duly-authorised representative, e.g. 
a performing right society like SAMRO).219 The fact that a person has a television licence or that a 
person pays a subscription fee to the broadcaster does not change the situation, as the licence 
issued to the broadcaster for the use of the musical works is for purposes of broadcasting the works 
for reception by the public or a member of the public in their homes or domestic circle. Similarly the 
performance of films or video cassettes where they were audible to a section of the public,220 as well 
as the related playing of music records (e.g. as background music) were held to constitute a 
performance in public.221 To the mind unschooled in copyright law this might seem odd, where the 
person so performing the music records (e.g. CDs) bought and paid for the records. However, in 
copyright law the position is clear that the rights of ownership of copyright are “distinguishable from 
the rights of ownership in the physical object which is the subject of the copyright … [and thus] the 
transfer of ownership of the physical object … does not necessarily transfer the ownership of the 
copyright”.222  
7.3.1.16 Definition of “record” 
“Record” “means any disc, tape, perforated role [sic] or other device in or on which sounds, 
or data or signals representing sounds, are embodied or represented so as to be capable of 
being automatically reproduced or performed therefrom” 
The phrase “disc, tape, perforated [roll] or other device” reflects the historical development of the 
recording industry,223 in which the protection of sound recordings was first recognised through the 
accordance of copyright in perforated rolls as an embodiment of sound recordings and as a 
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 See Performing Right Society Ltd v Hammond’s Bradford Brewery Co Ltd [1934] Ch 121; Ernest Turner Electrical 
Instruments Ltd v Performing Right Society Ltd [1943] Ch. 167; Performing Rights Society v Harlequin Record Shops 
[1979] 1 WLR 851; Southern African Music Rights Organisation Ltd v Svenmill Fabrics (Pty) Ltd 1983 (1) SA 608 (C). 
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 For radio see Performing Right Society Ltd v George (1936) 30 April, 1936, unreported, referred to in Performing Right 
Society Ltd v Camelo [1936] 3 All ER 557, which also dealt with a similar matter; South African Music Rights Organisation 
v Trust Butchers (Pty) Ltd 1978 (1) SA 1052 (E); ICPL Performing Right Society v Kwik-Fit Group Ltd [2008] EC.D.R (2) 13 
(Outer House, Court of Session, Scotland).. For television see Football Association Premier League Ltd v QC Leisure 
[2008] EWHC 1411 (Ch); [2008] F.S.R. 32, at para 266. 
220
 Australian Performing Right Association Ltd v Commonwealth Bank of Australia (1992) 25 I.P.R. 157; Rank Film 
Production Ltd v Dodds [1983] 2 NSWLR 553. 
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 Performing Rights Society v Harlequin Record Shops [1979] 1 WLR 851; Australasian Performing Right Association Ltd 
v Tolbush Pty Ltd (1986) 62 A.L.R. 521.  
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 Electronic Media Network Ltd v Naidoo and Another 2006 BIP 309 (W) at para 11. 
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 Though not necessarily in a chronological sense. 
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mechanism for copying musical works,224 which was replaced by the shellac and then vinyl 
record.225 Compact cassettes or rather “cassette tapes” took over as a medium of sound recording 
embodiment, until they were replaced by the current compact disc (CD).226  
The expression “or other device” is an attempt to make the definition of “record” technology-
neutral.227 However, does the usage of the term “device” not imply that a tangible object is intended? 
If that is the case, would this then exclude digitised music from the definition of “record”? It needs, in 
this regard, to be noted that electronic devices, i.e. devices capable of storing digitised data and 
information, would also qualify as a “device”. In this regard storage of digital music in computers, 
cellphones, IPods and other similar devices “on which sounds, or data or signals representing 
sounds, are embodied or represented so as to be capable of being automatically reproduced or 
performed therefrom”, as the definition of “record” provides, would meet the requirements of the 
definition. Further to this, the expression of the sound recording copyright owner’s exclusive right in 
respect of the making of a record as “making, directly or indirectly, a record embodying the sound 
recording”228 would confirm the view that a record is not only to be limited to a physical record. 
7.3.1.17 Definition of “Registrar” 
“Registrar”’ means “the Registrar of Copyright, who shall be the person appointed as Registrar 
of Patents under section 7 of the Patents Act, 1978” 
Thus the Registrar of Patents is also the Registrar of Copyright. The Copyright Registrar’s main 
function under the Copyright Act relates to the operations of the Copyright Tribunal provided for in 
Chapter 3 of the Act.229 Another important function of the Registrar relates to his supervisory and 
regulatory role over needle-time collecting societies under the Needle-time Regulations, as 
highlighted above in the commentary on the definition of “collecting society” in the Act.  
7.3.1.18 Definition of “reproduction” 
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 See the discussion supra in Chapter 3. Prior to the use of perforated (or piano) rolls music was primarily reproduced by 
means of phonograph cylinders. While phonograph cylinders are rarely available today, piano rolls are still available 
commercially today, though as a small niche market, with QRS Music claiming to be “the only manufacturer of piano rolls 
in business today, with over 5,000 master recordings and 45,000 music rolls.” 
http://www.qrsmusic.com/music.asp?cid1=28 (date of use: 23 October 2013).  
225
 A type of “disc”. Like the piano roll, vinyl records are no longer mass produced, although a niche market still exists, 
especially in the electronic and hip hop music scenes, where DJs prefer the vinyl to the CD because of the advantage of 
direct manipulation through techniques such as slip-cueing, beatmatching and scratching on turntables. See 
https://historyofthehiphop.wordpress.com/hip-hop-cultures/djingscratching/ (date of use: 20 July 2019). 
226
 It has, however, been observed that the cassette is well and alive in certain parts of the world. This is, for example, true 
of certain parts of Africa such as Zimbabwe, Mozambique and Botswana, where it has been said that the cassette is 
experiencing a boom, garnering more sales even more than the CD. In Zimbabwe, where it is said that the cassette is 
preferred to the CD because of considerations of affordability, durability and the belief that it is more difficult to pirate than 
the CD, a record company recently opened a cassette plant in Harare in order to meet this growing demand. See in this 
regard http://edition.cnn.com/2011/BUSINESS/06/07/cassette.culture.zimbabwe/index.html. (date of use: 25 September 
2013) 
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 I.e. not dependent upon the usage of a particular technological device, which, when it gets out of use would mean that 
copyright protection would also have ceased. 
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 Section 9(a) of the Copyright Act. 
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 In this regard his role has been rather passive and has only recently been brought to light, with the referral of disputes 
in relation to “needle-time rights”. See the observation in Chapter 1 in this regard. 
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See in this regard the discussion above on the definition of “copy”. See also the discussion below in 
respect of section 6 of the Act, which deals with the bundle of rights protected in respect of literary 
and musical works. 
7.3.1.19 Definition of “sound recording” 
“Sound recording” is defined as “any fixation or storage of sounds, or data or signals 
representing sounds, capable of being reproduced, but does not include a sound-track 
associated with a cinematograph film” 
Although this work is concerned with the copyright protection of musical works (and their related 
lyrics), it is important to make a short observation regarding sound recordings because, firstly, they 
are the most common and popular way in which musical works are embodied in a material form and 
secondly, together with musical works, musical sound recordings constitute the essence of what is 
commonly termed “music” in the modern day.230 Prior to the advent of recording technology the 
expression “music’ referred largely to printed (or otherwise written) music, which could be performed 
vocally or instrumentally (or in both ways).231 The improvised or other vocal performance of 
unwritten music could, of course, also be termed a performance of “music”’ (albeit not “serious 
music”).232 For copyright purposes however only music reduced to a material form is recognised, 
and in the modern day this invariably takes place through the recording of the performance of a 
musical work, in this way embodying the musical work in a sound recording.233  
Just as with the definition of “record”, it needs to be observed that the fact that the definition of 
sound recording is not limited to the “fixation or storage of sounds”’ but extends to the “fixation … of 
… data or signals representing sounds” means that the digital storage or compression of sound 
through a process such as MP3 technology234 would meet the requirements of the definition. Thus it 
can be said that the definition also applies in the digital environment. It is also important to note that 
the sound-track associated with a film is excluded from the definition of “sound recording”, as it is 
protected as part of the film. 
7.3.1.20 Definition of “work of joint authorship” 
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 Of course when a performer performs written music that has not been recorded, that too is a performance of “music”. 
However, amongst the popular masses the expression “music” refers to the recorded music that they can buy at shops, 
play in their cars and homes, and listen to on radio. 
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 See Chapters 2 and 3 supra generally in this regard. 
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 The term “serious” or “legitimate” music refers generally to notated, Western art music or rather musical traditions that 
entail advanced structural and theoretical considerations and a written musical tradition. Arnold (gen. ed) Companion to 
Music 111. However, although traces of music notation can be detected from ancient times, “[u]ntil very recently, the vast 
majority of music belongs to some form of oral tradition.” Scelta http://www.thisisgabes.com/images/docs/musicsymbol.pdf 
1 (date of use: 23 October 2013). 
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 Printed music of course continues to be used, especially in orchestral and other “serious music” performances, hence 
the continued recognition of “print rights”  (see the discussion in Chapter 2 above). However, this market constitutes a 
small part of the music industry today when compared to the “pop music” scene. 
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 MP3 stands for MPEG-1 or MPEG-2 Audio Layer III, and has been defined as “a computer file format for the 
compression and storage of digital audio data”. http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/mp3 (date of use: 24 October 
2013)  
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A “work of joint authorship” is defined as “a work produced by the collaboration of two or more 
authors in which the contribution of each author is not separable from the contribution of the 
other author or authors” 
This definition is important to refer to, if only to emphasise the fact that collaboration between 
authors (whether composers or lyricists or both) is very prevalent in the music industry. A lot of 
music has been produced through this collaboration. As Dean235 has noted, disputes as to who 
should be recognised as the author in works involving collaboration can become very difficult. Many 
disputes in music copyright cases relate to this issue. Often musicians would collaborate to create a 
satisfactory “piece” that can then be recorded for commercial release, without having reached 
agreement as to how ownership of copyright in the song shall be dealt with. This may happen 
amongst members of a band236 or in a studio environment, where a would-be recording artist with no 
ability to play musical instruments may sing her song, known to her mentally but not written down, to 
a studio band, which, following on (while the song is recorded “informally” by the studio engineer), 
thrashes the song out, removing unwanted elements, until a final version that is pleasing to the 
artist237 is arrived at.  Under such circumstances who owns the copyright in the song?238  
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 Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-33, where the learned authors observe: “If a work has gone through 
various development phases involving input by several people before reaching finality, it can be a difficult question of fact 
to assess whether a particular individual must be considered to be a co-author.” 
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 In this regard Chislett One, Two, One, Two 22 distinguishes between the scenario where “the band is a vehicle for the 
creative expression of one individual who has basically hired musicians to play with him” and one where the band “is more 
of a creative collective”’. While in the former case, the band owner would more likely be the owner of copyright in the songs 
created, in the latter case “the songwriting process will be far more organic and involve more members of the band.” 
Speaking further on the latter case Chislett opines (ibid): “For example, if the singer comes into the practice room humming 
a melody around which the rest of the band creates a song, the singer can be said to have originated the song, as melody 
is central to any song. However, seeing as it is only part of a song, all the further work that is done on any such song by 
other band members means that they become co-writers and originators of any such song.” It is submitted that each case 
would have to be determined on its own merit, as also in the former case it is possible that on the facts of the case the 
other band members are seen as being co-authors. Guidelines can be found from the English decision of Stuart v Barret 
[1994] E.M.L.R. 448, where collaboration on pieces of music by members of a pop group was seen to amount to works of 
joint-authorship. 
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 And presumably to everyone else. 
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 This is not an easy question to answer. Firstly, while it has been recognised that “[a] composer who composes a piece 
of music entirely in his head … will be creating a musical work”, it is further recognised that such musical work, unless it 
has been reduced into material form, does not attract copyright. See Garnett, Davis and Harbottle Copinger and Skone 
James 98. Seeing that the artist in our example had not reduced the musical work into a material form, clearly no copyright 
existed in the musical work prior to the informal studio recording. The question that comes to mind is: While the informal 
studio recording was taking place, whose copyright in respect of the song was being created? Was it the copyright of the 
artist, or that of the studio band members, or of both? It needs to be recalled that it has been observed that ‘[t]here is no 
reason why, for example, a recording of a person’s spontaneous singing, whistling or humming or improvisations of sounds 
by a group of people with or without musical instruments should not be regarded as “music” for copyright purposes.’ 
Sawkins v Hyperion Records Ltd supra 487 at 53. In this case the singing may, of course, not have been spontaneous, as 
it may have been a singing of a song that the artist had composed in her mind. This does not make a difference, as the 
important consideration relates to the fact that no copyright subsisted in the song prior to the studio recording. It is 
submitted that in such a case the artist would have copyright in the song; however, if, in assisting the artist to produce a 
record-ready version of the song the other musicians added new elements to the artist’s original tune, then the musicians 
can also claim copyright in the musical work as co-authors, seeing that “where a musician plays music which has not 
previously been composed, what is produced is a musical work”. Garnett, Davis and Harbottle ibid. However which of the 
musicians can claim copyright is not an easy question to answer, and will depend upon the facts, including an analysis of 
each of the musical instruments that the musicians played to determine if they contributed original elements to the song. 
Such a determination would be difficult where there was no prior recorded version of the bare tune of the vocal artist, as it 
would not be easy to see what new elements were created. The present scenario would however, be similar to a situation 
where two or more people contribute to a literary work’s final expression, “one being the person actually responsible for 
committing the work to paper, [in this case being the artist who sings the song as it is recorded] the other providing an 
input into what is recorded [being the musicians playing the instruments, who can be said to be providing an input to what 
the artist is record through their playing].” Garnett, Davis and Harbottle id at 245, quoted with approval in Peter-Ross v 
Ramesar 2008 JDR 0660 (C) at 17. However, if what the band members do is to merely apply their skills as performers to 
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It has been said that for a work of joint-authorship to exist ‘all the collaborators must answer the 
description of an “author”, as that concept is properly to be understood.”239 The work must of course, 
also meet all the requirements for the subsistence of copyright, including material embodiment. As 
indicated, material embodiment of a musical work can take place with the spontaneous recording of 
a person’s singing, whistling or humming, including the recording of instrumental or non-instrumental 
improvisation of musical sounds.240 The contribution of one party need not be equivalent to, or of the 
same kind as that of the other, so that “someone whose principal role is to arrange the songs written 
by his collaborators can be a joint author.”241 However, it needs to be remembered that authorship is 
a question of status and fact, so that where a person is not an author in the legal sense, he cannot, 
by agreement of the parties, become a co-author (although he can, by agreement become a co-
owner).242 The effect of joint-authorship is co-ownership of the work of joint authorship, so that a co-
author vested with such joint-ownership may not sue for damages in respect of the work of joint-
authorship without joining the other co-authors or showing entitlement to sue alone.243  
A final point to make in this regard relates to the distinction that must be made between the position 
in the United States and that in South Africa. The US legislation defines “joint work” as “a work 
prepared by two or more authors with the intention that their contributions be merged into 
                                                                                                                                                              
play a virtually finished song, without contributing to the words or music in the song, it would appear that they cannot 
qualify as joint-authors. See Hadley v Kemp [1999] E.M.L.R. 589. Note however that in this case the English court made 
reference to “significant contribution”; however, what is required in terms of our law for a work to become a work of joint 
authorship is simply that “the contribution of each author is not separable from the contribution of the other author or 
authors” (definition of “work of joint authorship”).  
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 Garnett, Davis and Harbottle id at 244. Though the authors are commenting on UK copyright law, it is submitted that 
this is the correct approach. In this regard it was held in Peter-Ross v Ramesar ibid that the contribution of each 
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this implies that there must be intention, it appears that the intention is one that is “directed towards the creation of [the] 
work”, rather than one in which each author “intend[s] the other to be a joint author.” In contrast, in the majority of US 
cases this stringent requirement that each author must intend that the other be a co-author is applicable. See in this regard 
Lind Copyright Law 73. 
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 Proving material embodiment however, is a different issue. In this regard the party that can prove the earliest date of 
material embodiment would succeed in proving authorship and ownership of copyright in the work. What has often 
happened in South Africa is that unsuspecting artists would go to recording studios and sing their tunes to a studio band, 
after which an unscrupulous producer would take the recorded tune and “notify” it with SAMRO (i.e. register it as being a 
work in which he holds copyright). If the artist would not have embodied the song in material form prior to this, the producer 
would, under such circumstances, succeed in claiming copyright ownership on the basis of being able to prove an earlier 
date of material embodiment (the SAMRO notification, and producing by SAMRO of the original recording or sheet music 
lodged with it, being proof of such earlier embodiment).   
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 Garnett, Davis and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 245. See also Peter-Ross 2008 JDR 0660 (C) at 17. See 
further in this regard the case of Godfrey v Lees [1995] E.M.L.R. 307, where a person who contributed orchestral 
arrangements to songs written by members of a pop band was seen to be a co-author. 
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 Garnett, Davis and Harbottle id at 247 – 248. This is important to note in view of the fact that many times unscrupulous 
studio producers demand of new artists that they should “recognise” them as co-authors of their works, in exchange for 
receiving assistance from them in securing recording deals or similar favours. Unless the artist-composer has specifically, 
in writing, assigned a share of his copyright in the song to such producer, the producer should not succeed in a claim of 
either co-authorship or co-ownership. Where such assignment has taken place however, the producer, under these 
circumstances, would become a co-owner of the copyright but not a co-author. 
243
 See Feldman NO v Emi Music SA (Pty) Ltd; Feldman NO v EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) Ltd 2010 (1) SA 1 (SCA). 
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inseparable or interdependent parts of a unitary whole.”244 An example of an inseparable joint work 
is a novel or painting, and an example of an interdependent joint work is the words and music of a 
musical composition.245 The effect of a joint work is that each author is regarded “as the joint owner 
of an undivided interest in the entire work”.246 Thus the joint work, even in the case of an 
interdependent work which may, in effect, comprise of two different works (as in the case of the 
words and music of a musical composition), is seen as constituting a unitary work247 in which the 
contributors become joint-authors.  
It is submitted that South African copyright law does not make provision for a joint work that is in the 
nature of an interdependent work, providing instead only that “the contribution of each author [must] 
not [be] separable from the contribution of the other author or authors”.248 Joint work is thus in this 
regard, to be viewed in the sense of an inseparable joint work in US law, such as a novel or a 
painting. While a work comprising solely of music with no lyrics can be seen as a joint work, a 
musical work with lyrics must not, on the basis that someone contributed the musical work, while the 
other contributed the lyrics (i.e. the literary work), be seen as a joint work, as it is possible to 
separate the lyrics from the musical work. Thus in a musical work with lyrics, where the person who 
composed the musical work is different from the person who wrote the lyrics, two distinct works 
exist, even if the parties worked together in arriving at a final version of the music and the words. If 
that is the case, two joint works would exist (namely a joint musical work and a joint literary work).  
This seems to be the issue that the court in Feldman NO v EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) Limited, 
Feldman NO v EMI Music (Pty) Limited249 had to grapple with. In this case the court made the 
following observation: 
It was also contended on behalf of the plaintiff that the requirements of the definition of “Works of Joint 
Authorship” in Section 1 of the Copyright Act, would not be satisfied, and consequently no joint 
ownership of copyright would vest, where the contributions of the various parties was capable of being 
differentiated. In this regard, the example of one person composing the music, and a second person 
writing the lyrics, was offered. This analogy is not apposite. In both the particulars of claim and in 
Annexure “A” thereto, the Late Brenda Fassie is identified as the joint author and the joint composer in 
respect of the works in question. On these particulars, the contribution of the various parties is 
consequently indistinguishable and inseparable from the contribution of other co-authors and 
composers.
250
 
It appears in this case that the requirements of the definition of “work of joint authorship” was seen 
to have been satisfied because the late Brenda Fassie was both a joint author of the lyrics and a 
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joint author (i.e. a joint composer) of the musical works. She was thus a joint author in respect of two 
separate works. Having indicated this, for practical purposes,251 in the computation of royalties, 
royalty-paying entities such as collecting societies and music publishers have treated the author of 
lyrics and the composer of the music in a song as jointly sharing in a hundred percent of the 
royalties payable in respect of the song as an inseparable work.252  
7.3.1.21 Definition of “writing” 
“Writing” “includes any form of notation, whether by hand or by printing, typewriting or any 
similar process” 
With regard to this definition it is important that the expression “writing” has relevance to musical 
works not only in respect of the lyrics that are often associated with musical works, but also in 
relation to musical works in their own right. In this regard it has been observed: 
To the extent that notation or words are written down and are intended to represent sounds which 
qualify as music …, it seems that they are excluded from the definition of literary work, even though 
they can in one sense be read.
253
   
7.3.2 Other relevant general sections of the Copyright Act   
7.3.2.1 Section 1(2)(A) – A substantial part of the work 
“Any reference in this Act to the doing of any act in relation to any work shall, unless the 
context otherwise indicates, be construed as a reference to the doing of any such act in 
relation to any substantial part of such work” 
The concept of “substantial part” is a very important concept in copyright law, and more so in 
respect of music copyright where infringement is rife. Many musicians labour under the impression 
that “borrowing” (albeit without permission) from an existing song by taking only a “few” bars from 
the song would not constitute copyright. This however is not correct, as “substantial part” is 
reckoned on the basis of the “quality” rather than the “quantity” of what has been copied, so that “the 
unauthorised copying of a small but essential part of a work constitutes copyright infringement.”254 In 
the area of music, a short refrain or what is termed the “hook” of the song would often be seen as 
amounting to an essential part of the song.255  
In the English case of G. Ricordi & Co. v Clayton and Waller Ltd256 it was held that taking eight bars 
from a song would constitute copyright infringement. Likewise, in Hawkes & Son (London) Ltd v 
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Paramount Film Service Ltd257 the copying of 28 bars, although it only amounted to less than a 
minute of a composition lasting for about four minutes, was considered to amount to a substantial 
part of the work. The determination of what constitutes a substantial part also often has to do with 
the degree of similarity between the original work and the alleged infringing work.258 In this regard 
what has to be considered is what is original in the original work, so that what would be considered 
as prior art in the original work would be excluded from the determination.259 In music rights cases 
evidence as to the degree of similarity between the two works is often led by experts, who are called 
in “to identify and explain the significance of similarities and differences between the works.”260 
As indicated, the focus in this regard must be on what has been taken from the original work - 
particularly drawing the court’s attention to those parts of the work that are alleged to have been 
reproduced - and not what portion of the infringing work qualitatively infringes the original work.261 As 
highlighted in Chapter 5 supra, what is copyrightable (or rather “what the copyright work is”) is not 
dependent upon what the claimant “chooses to say it is”, but is to be determined objectively by the 
court.262 In this regard it was noted that a claimant may narrowly confine the subject-matter of his 
claim in order to deprive the defendant of a good defence to the effect that what he took did not 
amount to a substantial part.263 In this regard courts have warned against cherry-picking those 
features of the work that are the same with those of the alleged infringing work, as being the 
material copyright work, without regard to the surrounding melody (i.e. the notes, duration and 
rhythm).264 
In the recent Australian Federal Court decision of EMI Songs Australia Pty Limited v Larrikin Music 
Publishing Pty Limited265 the court distilled many of the principles relating to the concept of 
“substantial part” in respect of musical works, which are worth rehearsing hereunder:  
(a) In some musical works comprising of several smaller, discreet works (such as operas), 
copyright may subsist in an air or melody and may be infringed by copying a part or the 
whole of the air or melody. Essentially, “[t]here will be an infringement if that in which the 
whole meritorious part of the original work consists is incorporated in a new work.”266 
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(b) Copyright shall be infringed if all the bars that “consecutively form an entire air or melody”’ 
are copied without material alteration. However, if the bars are taken in a different order or 
broken by an intersection of other bars this will not necessarily constitute infringement of the 
original work.  Furthermore, the adaptation of an air or melody by transferring it from one 
instrument to another, if such air or melody “can still be recognised by the ear”’ would 
constitute infringement.267 
(c) Infringement shall take place when the substance of the original work is taken, even if the 
actual notes are not taken, such as where the new work is arrived at by imitation and 
appropriation.268 
(d) “… The originality of a particular musical work may be due, not to the sequence of the notes, 
but to the treatment, accentuation and orchestration by the composer.” Furthermore, “[it] is 
the musical work as a whole that is entitled to the protection of copyright”, and even where 
the bars of a song may be seen to constitute a substantial part, there will be no infringement 
of copyright if such bars “are not the most distinctive or important part of the original air”.269  
(e) “When dealing with the word substantial in the context of infringement of copyright in a 
musical work, it is appropriate to consider whether or not the amount of the copyright musical 
work that is taken is so slender that it would be impossible to recognise it …. However, even 
though the alleged infringement is not very prolonged in its reproduction, there will 
nevertheless be infringement if what is reproduced is a substantial, vital and essential part of 
the original ….”270 
(f) Further to the above, “there will be infringement if the bars of a musical work that are taken 
contain what constitutes the principal air or melody of the copyright work, which anyone who 
heard the alleged infringing work would recognise as being the essential air or melody of the 
copyright work. …’271 
(g) When determining whether a musical work infringes the copyright in another, it is often 
appropriate to analyse the musical features and structure of both works, noting the points of 
similarity and difference in order to determine if the degree of similarity is definite or 
considerable.272 
(h) A part that is not original would not constitute a substantial part as there is no copyright in an 
unoriginal part that may, however form part of a whole in which copyright subsists.273 
Furthermore, the part taken from the original work, though required to be substantial, does 
not need to form a substantial part of the infringing work, and a substantial part can be taken 
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from the original work even if the infringing work bears no resemblance to the original 
work.274  
 
7.3.2.2 Section 1(2)(3) – application of Act in respect of ships and aircraft 
“The provisions of this Act shall with reference to any act or omission outside the territorial 
limits of the Republic by or on any ship or aircraft registered under any law in the Republic 
apply in the same manner as it applies with reference to acts or omissions within the 
territorial limits of the Republic” 
This provision clearly arises from the international law rule that ships sailing on international waters 
(the “high seas”’) and aircraft flying in international airspace need to bear the nationality of (and fly 
the flag of, in the case of ships, or bear the registration markings of, in the case of aircraft), the State 
in which they are registered, which then exercises jurisdiction over them.275  On this basis, collective 
management organisations have tariffs that apply in respect of the usage of music in aircrafts. Thus 
the scope of the airline tariff of the UK performing rights society, PRS for Music, relates to 
“performances of copyright music … in aircraft registered in the United Kingdom by any means other 
than by live performance”,276 including but not limited to radio or television; record or compact disc 
players; audio or video tape players; cinematograph equipment and “any other mechanical and / or 
electronic device(s) for performing musical works”.277  Frith278 illustrates the significance of royalty 
income from this type of tariff in respect of the PRS’ licence to British Airways, in the following 
manner: 
In 1997 the PRS received a little under £1m from airlines for the rights to play PRS members’ works 
as part of inflight entertainment and as piped-in ‘taking-off and landing music’. The fee charged to 
each airline was calculated according to the number of passengers hours involved … In 1998 British 
Airways appealed to the Copyright Tribunal for a reduction in its annual fee (which the PRS had raised 
to £953,000). BA argued that this fee was unreasonable when compared with the fees charged by 
ASCAP and BMI to airlines using US airports … [and] made a number of other points about the 
unfairness of the existing airline fee formula. [It was argued that] [m]ost passengers … weren’t actually 
listening to music during take-off and landing; no passengers were listening when inflight 
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entertainment was not available …; few passengers listened to inflight services all the time they were 
available. The tribunal reduced the fee to £700,000.
279
 
7.3.2.3 Section 1(2)(5) - Publication 
This section deals with the issue of “publication”. See the discussion above on the meaning of 
“copy’, as well as below in Chapter 9 with regard to the recommendations relating to the proposed 
section 12B(6) in clause 13 of the Bill. 
7.3.2.4 Section 3(2)(a) and (c) – The term of copyright 
This section deals with the term, or duration of copyright. In the case of a literary and musical work 
the term of protection is the life of the author and fifty years “from the end of the year in which the 
author dies”. However, if the author died before the work, or its adaptation, was published, 
performed in public, offered for sale to the public by means of records, or broadcast, copyright shall 
continue to subsist in the work concerned for a period of fifty years “from the end of the year in 
which the first of the said acts is done”. This is a very important section to note in respect of music, 
since it happens many times that a prolific composer would die without having “released”, or done 
any of the afore-mentioned acts in respect of some of his works. In the case where for example, the 
work of a deceased composer is discovered fifteen years after the composer’s death, for the sake of 
argument – then the fifty years posthumous protection of the work shall only be counted from the 
end of the year in which any of the afore-mentioned acts first takes place. 
It will be noticed that the acts mentioned in this section relate to most of the rights forming part of the 
bundle of rights in relation to musical and literary works but exclude the acts of reproduction and 
transmission in a diffusion service. It is submitted, in respect of the former, that its inclusion would 
be inferred from the fact that publication, performance in public, offering for sale and broadcasting 
would not be possible without prior reproduction of the work. However, it should be noted that the 
act of reproduction in itself, without being linked to or associated with one or more of the other acts, 
is not of much significance as it does not involve commercial exploitation or exchange.280 It is not 
clear however, why the legislature excluded the act of transmission of the work in a diffusion service, 
as this act does, in itself, involve commercial exploitation and rights-holders do issue licences in this 
regard.281   
Finally, section 43(d) provides, in respect of the term or period of subsistence of copyright applicable 
(for our purposes) to musical and literary works, where the author died prior to the exploitation of the 
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work as contemplated in section 3(2)(a)  (namely fifty years from the end of the year in which the 
first act of exploitation took place); that if this period would have expired at the commencement of 
the Copyright Amendment Act, 1984,  
it shall be deemed that, subject to any rights acquired by any person after the lapse of that period and 
before the said commencement, copyright did not expire on [the ground of lapse of the said period].  
7.3.2.5 Section 3(4) – Term of protection in respect of works of joint-authorship 
“In the case of a work of joint authorship the reference … to the death of the author shall be 
taken to refer to the author who dies last, whether or not he is a qualified person.” 
In view of this, the term of copyright protection in certain cases could be fairly long in works of joint 
authorship. Suppose two persons co-author a musical work, both at the age of twenty (20). 
Composer A dies at the age of fifty (50), while composer B dies at the age of eighty (80). In terms of 
this provision, the copyright in the co-authored work will be durable for an effective posthumous 
period of eighty (80) years when reckoned from the end of the year in which composer A died. If 
however, the duration is reckoned to include the lifetime of both composers, the work would have 
been protected for a period of one hundred and thirty (130) years. Having indicated this, what was 
said above (when discussing the definition of “joint-authorship”) needs to be taken to note here – 
namely the fact that matters of joint authorship tend to be difficult to resolve. It may thus be left to 
the courts to rule as to whether a person claiming to be the last-dying of the co-authors of a work 
was in fact, a co-author – a determination that would have a bearing on whether copyright still 
subsists in the work concerned.  
Where the assignee or heir of a person considered to be the last-dying of two or more co-authors 
exploits the work commercially by issuing licences in respect thereto and receiving payment of 
royalties, and it is found that the said person does not satisfy the requirements of co-author, 
disastrous outcomes can arise from such a situation. For example, the effect of such a ruling would 
be that the supposed rights-holder would have commercially exploited the work also in a period 
when the work had, in fact, gone into the public domain, i.e. at a time when it was freely available to 
be used by anyone without having to pay any compensation for such usage.282 Any licences issued 
during such period would therefore, be of no effect, potentially making the “rights-holders” liable for 
repayment of any moneys received by way of royalties during the period. It is thus important to tread 
carefully in this situation. 
7.3.2.6 Section 20 – Moral rights 
Section 20 deals with moral rights. Moral rights are “the right to claim authorship of the work … and 
to object to any distortion, mutilation or other modification of the work where such action is or would 
be prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author”. This provision is akin to the provisions of 
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article 6bis(1) of the Berne Convention.283 The right to claim authorship of the work is generally 
known as the paternity right, while the right to object to the distortion, mutilation or other modification 
of the work, where such action would be prejudicial to the honour and reputation of the author, is 
termed the integrity right.284 It needs to be noted that, under the current Copyright Act, the moral 
right applies in respect of literary and musical works, and not in respect of sound recordings.285 The 
moral rights of the author remain intact despite the transfer of copyright ownership in the work.  
Regarding the paternity right, it has been said that the usage of the phrase “the right to claim 
authorship” implies that there is no obligation on others to recognise the author as such whenever 
the work is used, if the author has not “require[d] that authorship be attributed to him”.286 In 
Technical Information Systems v Marconi287 it was held that  the removal of all references to the 
applicant as being the publisher of a computer programme constituted a violation of the applicant’s 
moral right to claim authorship in the programme, “thereby infringing such right and consequently 
the applicant’s copyright.” English law provides that any reasonable form of identification may be 
used to identify the author, unless the author has specified a particular form of identification, in 
which case such form should be used.288 Thus in the case of Hyperion Records Ltd v Sawkins,289 
where the author’s contribution was merely acknowledged in the CD booklet (as one who had 
prepared performance materials),290 this was held as being inadequate to identify him as the author 
of the “performing editions”.291 Furthermore, the form of identification “required” by the author in a 
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letter was not followed.292 Consequently the court held: “Although the CD sleeve named Dr Sawkins, 
it did not identify his authorship.”293  
With regard to the integrity right the Copyright Act does not give an indication of the types of acts 
that would constitute “distortion, mutilation or other modification”, as well as what would amount to 
action that is “prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author”. In this regard it is submitted that 
South Africa can draw inspiration from the manner in which this matter is dealt with in English law, in 
particular because English law generally employs the same linguistic usage in dealing with this right 
as does South African law, as both draw from the Berne Convention. English law defines the 
integrity right as “the right … not to have [one’s] work subjected to derogatory treatment”.294 
“Derogatory treatment” is then defined as treatment which “amounts to distortion or mutilation of the 
work or is otherwise prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author or director”’.295 It is however, 
the definition of “treatment” that sheds more light as to the types of acts that would infringe the 
integrity right. In this regard “treatment”, in respect of a work, is defined as  
any addition to, deletion from or alteration to or adaptation of the work, other than— 
(i) a translation of a literary or dramatic work, or 
(ii) an arrangement or transcription of a musical work involving no more than a change of key or 
register.
296 
Examples of acts that have been held to constitute “treatment” are: adding a single word to a poem 
(which, it is submitted, would include adding a word to the lyrics of a song); destroying an entire 
work, even if the work “remains recognisable as such”; altering a single note of a musical work, and 
“virtually any change to the work”’.297 However, in English law the ambit of “treatment”’ does not 
extend to translations of literary and dramatic works (as in the translation of lyrics from one language 
to another) and an arrangement or transcription of a musical work “involving no more than a change 
of key or register”, on the ground that “such changes would not affect the basic integrity of the 
work.”298 This exclusion has however, been criticised as not being capable of justification under the 
Berne Convention, seeing that “if a translation or change of key or register is so inept or unsuitable 
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mutilations of a work. See Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-112 – 1-113, where the learned author 
continues to highlight the difficulty that may be experienced “in practice to distinguish between changes which are, on the 
one hand, modifications and those which, on the other hand, are distortions or mutilations.” 
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as to amount to a derogatory treatment, there seems no good reason why the author should not 
have a remedy.”299  
It has been noted that the integrity right would apply even if the prohibited act is carried out in 
respect of an addition to, deletion from or alteration to or adaptation of (i.e. treatment of) the work, 
which was carried out by someone other than the author, “if the result is seen to be the work of the 
original author.”300 Furthermore, action which is a distortion or mutilation would not constitute 
infringement of the author’s integrity right unless it is also prejudicial to the honour or reputation of 
the author.301 In this regard it has been observed that if there was no such qualification, this 
provision “would pose great difficulties in its application” because of its subjective nature, as the 
author might consider action (such as editing) carried out in respect of his work as seriously 
impairing the work’s worth, while others may see the alteration as being insignificant, or even as an 
improvement.302 The distortion of a work is said to involve “some form of twisting or perversion”, 
while mutilation “involves some form of cutting or destruction so as to render it imperfect”.303 
Prejudicial treatment on the other hand, refers to all usages of the work, which, though not 
amounting to a distortion or mutilation,304 “is nevertheless prejudicial to the honour or reputation of 
the author”, although it would not be easy to think of examples in this regard.305 
There are conflicting positions as to the duration of moral rights, namely Dean and Kajiker’s position 
that it is for the term of the copyright in the work or the life of the author, whichever is shorter; Visser 
et al’s position that it is for the full duration of the copyright in the work, since the Copyright Act is 
silent on the issue and seeing that moral rights emanate from copyright; and Copeling’s position that 
it is for the full term of copyright, on the basis of an interpretation of article 6bis of the Berne 
Convention.306 Dealing with this question, Garnett, Davies and Harbottle have observed that this 
“has been a matter of controversy in the international treatment of these rights.”307 It appears to the 
current writer that Dean and Karjiker’s position has more plausibility.308 The fact that moral rights, 
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just like personality rights, adhere in the person of the author, are not transmittable and are only 
enforceable by the author, would strengthen this position.309 However, the position has been 
vehemently opposed by some.310 The main thrust of this opposition is the argument that “[t]he 
author’s moral rights form part of his or her copyright and are not rights of personality” and further 
that there is no reason why these rights “cannot be transferred expressly.”311  
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the position that moral rights are in the nature of personality rights is 
however, one that is generally accepted, particularly as a result of their emanation from the 
Continental droit moral and the latter’s roots in Kantian and Hegelian personhood theories.312 So is 
the position that they are unalienable,313 so that Klopper et al’s view that “[t]here does not appear to 
be any reason why these rights cannot be transferred expressly”314 seems rather far-fetched. 
Although moral rights may at times devolve to heirs, this is something that is left to national 
legislation to determine.315 In this regard support for Dean and Karjiker’s view that moral rights, in 
the case of a natural person, would cease to exist at the person’s death, can further be found on the 
fact that the Brussels text of the Berne Convention, which South Africa acceded to in respect of 
substantive provisions,316 only requires that moral rights are protected for the author’s lifetime. In thi 
regard the Brussels text leaves it to national legislation to extend this protection until the expiration 
of copyright in the work.317 Seeing that the South African Copyright Act has not made any provision 
regarding the duration of moral rights, Dean and Kajiker’s position appears to be the most plausible 
under these circumstances.  
It is also important to note that the infringement of moral rights is treated as being an infringement of 
the copyright in the work so that the author can institute infringement proceedings as if he were the 
owner of the copyright in the work.318 Furthermore, it needs to be noted that the author’s moral rights 
supersede the instances of copyright created by operation of law mentioned in s 21(b), (c) and (d) of 
                                                                                                                                                              
before the termination of copyright in the work. The former case would take place where the author of the work is a juristic 
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the Copyright Act. This means that the author of a literary or a musical work created in the course of 
such author’s employment, and the author of a sound recording created under a commissioning 
agreement retains his or its moral rights in such work despite not being the owner of copyright 
thereto. A final consideration regarding this subject relates to the use of a work “in a context which 
may be highly injurious to the reputation of the author”, such as where, for example, the work of a 
Christian artist singing Gospel music is used in a sexually-explicit music video.319 It has been said 
that “as a matter of UK law”’ such action would not amount to “‘derogatory treatment”, seeing that 
the definition of “treatment” in UK law is limited to “addition, deletion, alteration or adaptation”, so 
that the use of the work may be derogatory, while its “treatment” is not.320 It is submitted that this is 
as far as South African law can borrow from UK law with regard to acts that would constitute an 
infringement of the author’s moral rights. A resort to the provisions of the South African Act would, it 
is submitting, render such conduct as infringing the moral rights of the author.  
In this regard Garnett, Davis and Harbottle321 acknowledge the fact that this outcome in UK law 
“appears not to be consistent with art.6bis of the Berne Convention”, in particular its reference to the 
author’s right to object to any derogatory action322 which would be prejudicial to his honour or 
reputation. It is submitted that in South African law the use of an author’s work out of context as 
explained herein would clearly amount to action that “is or would be prejudicial to the honour or 
reputation of the author.”323 
7.3.2.7 Section 21 – Copyright conferred by operation of law 
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This section deals with instances of copyright created “by operation of law”.324 Section 21(1)(b) and 
(d) deals with cases where copyright is created in the course of a person’s employment,325 while 
section 21(1)(c) deals with the instance where copyright is created through a commission.326 It is 
submitted that these cases (and more particularly the commissioning situation) can best be 
understood from a simple understanding of the concept of “works-made-for-hire”’ used in United 
States copyright law. In other words, these are instances where copyright does not belong to the 
author but rather belongs to the person who hired the author to create the copyright work.  
It is important to, in particular, consider the types of works that may be subject to a commissioning 
arrangement in terms of section 21(1)(c), since confusion often arises in this regard. While all works 
would be subject to the position regarding ownership of copyright by the employer when the work is 
created in the course of a person’s employment,327 it is clear, from the reading of section 21(1)(c), 
that not all works are subject to the transmission of copyright through commissioning. In relation to 
music copyright it would be noticed that only sound recordings are subject to the commissioning 
regime, and that copyright in literary works (i.e. lyrics) and musical works cannot be transmitted 
through commissioning. This is important to note because often in the music industry people speak 
about “commissioning a composition”, implying “commissioning” the making of a musical work (and 
many times, with the attendant lyrics). A musical or literary work cannot however, be 
“commissioned” within the meaning of the word in the Copyright Act. It is thus submitted that any 
such purported “commissioning” of a musical or literary work will not result in the transmission of 
copyright from the author to the purported commissioner, unless the transaction complies with the 
requirements for transfer of copyright by means of a written assignment.328  
In other words, in order to transfer ownership of copyright in a musical or literary work, it would be 
important to effect a valid instrument of assignment, and any purported commissioning of the 
musical or literary work, if it does not satisfy the requirements for a valid assignment, would be of no 
effect.329 The fact therefore, that a “commissioning agreement” in respect of musical or literary works 
was entered into does not mean that there was a transference of copyright to the commissioner if a 
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written assignment of copyright was not concomitantly (or separately) effected. On the other hand, a 
commissioning agreement (just like an employment relationship) does not have to be in writing, and, 
it is submitted, can be implied from the facts. The effect of the section 21(1)(b) – (d) provisions is to 
put aside the rule in respect of first ownership of copyright works, as provided for in section 21(1)(a), 
which states that the author is the first owner of copyright in a work.330 Instead, these provisions 
confer first ownership of copyright on someone other than the author “by operation of law”.  
This position is not, however, absolute, as such ownership can, in terms of section 21(1)(e), be 
specifically excluded by agreement.331 Furthermore, in all these instances, the author’s moral rights 
remain intact, as indicated above.332 It would be useful to indicate that while the commissioning 
provisions in respect of sound recordings find general application in the mainstream commercial 
recording business, the provisions relating to ownership of musical works in an employment 
scenario are not very prevalent.333 
7.3.2.8 Section 22 – Assignment and licences in respect of copyright 
It is important, in considering the provisions of section 22 to indicate that the Copyright Amendment 
Bill proposes to make far-reaching amendments to this section that are also important to consider, in 
the event that the Bill becomes law. For this reason the discussion here is divided into a 
consideration of the current provisions and a consideration of the provisions in terms of the Bill. 
(a) A Consideration of the Provisions of the Copyright Act 
The current position in relation to the provisions of section 22 can be summed up as follows:  
(a) Just as with assignment, both existing and future copyright may be transmitted as movable 
property by testamentary disposition.334 In the same vein, copyright can pass to the heirs in 
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terms of the laws of intestate succession where there was no will.335 In all these cases the 
copyright forms part of the copyright owner’s deceased estate and will pass to the heirs in 
the normal way after winding up of the estate. In Disney Enterprises Inc v Griesel NO & 
Others336 the executor (or estate representative) represented the author’s deceased estate 
with regard to an application relating to a claim of copyright infringement in respect of the 
author’s musical copyright. 
 
(b) Furthermore, a testamentary disposition, just as with an assignment, can be limited in 
respect of only some of the acts constituting the bundle of rights in respect of a work; or in 
respect of part of the term of copyright in the work, or in respect of a specified country or 
geographical area.337 
 
(c) Where a deceased copyright owner bequeaths to an heir “material on which a work is first 
written or otherwise recorded”, such bequest shall be taken to include the copyright or future 
copyright embodied in such work and vesting in the deceased at the time of death.338 This 
provision is an exception to the general position that the transfer of title in the physical 
material does not, without a specific transfer of the underlying copyright, entail a transfer of 
the ownership of such copyright.339 For example, a popular musician may, in his will, state: “I 
bequeath the Verbatim CD-R containing my unreleased [or unpublished] compositions to my 
son Harry.” Harry would, on this basis, be taken to be the owner not only of the CD-R but 
also of the copyright in the said compositions. 
 
(d) Where the owner of copyright had granted a licence in respect of a work, such a licence will 
be binding on every successor-in-title (thus including an heir), except a purchaser in good 
faith who did not have notice, whether actual or constructive, of the existence of such a 
licence, or any person deriving title from such a purchaser. Furthermore, any act authorised 
by the grantee of a licence or a person deriving title from him, shall, if done within either the 
express or implied terms of such licence,  be deemed to be done with the licence of the 
grantor and every person upon whom the licence is binding (thus also including any 
successor-in-title to the copyright concerned). 
 
(e) A last observation regarding the assignment of copyright to foreign persons warrants 
addressing here. Regulation 10(1)(c) of the Exchange Control Regulations340 requires the 
permission of the National Treasury prior to entering into any transaction in which capital or 
any right to capital is directly or indirectly exported from the Republic. In the case of Couve 
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and Another v Reddot International (Pty) Limited and Another341 the question was whether 
the assignment of intellectual property in the form of patent rights, to a person or entity 
outside the Republic  amounted to the export of capital as contemplated in the Exchange 
Control Regulations. The court decided in the affirmative, ruling that such an assignment, 
without the prior approval of the Treasury, contravened the provisions of Regulation 10(1)(c) 
and renders the assignment null and void. This decision was however overturned in the 
recent Appeal Court decision of Oilwell v Protec International Ltd and Others,342 where the 
court found that the decision was incorrect and that intellectual property (this time in the form 
of trademarks) should not be regarded as capital for purposes of the Exchange Control 
Regulations.  
 
(f) National Treasury however acted swiftly to restore the position under the Couve decision, 
amending the Exchange Control Regulations by including “any intellectual property right, 
whether registered or unregistered”, in the definition of “capital”, and by providing that the 
expression “exported from the public” includes “the assignment or transfer of any intellectual 
property right, to or in favour of a person who is not resident in the Republic.”343 It is 
submitted that subjecting the owners of copyright, as an unregistered intellectual property 
right, to the often expensive and complex process of obtaining exchange control approval, 
amounts to imposing unnecessary burdens on rightsholders. This is more so in the case of 
many forms of “cultural copyright” such as musical works and general arts and crafts, seeing 
that the authors of these works are usually small-scale players lacking the financial and other 
resources to function within such a sophisticated system.   
 
(b) A Consideration of the Provisions proposed in the Copyright Amendment Bill344 
 
(i) Clause 23(a) of the Bill 
Clause 23(a) of the Bill amends section 22(1) of the Act by adding the proviso that “copyright owned 
by, vested in or under the custody of the state may not be assigned.” 
Based on the observation above, where it is noted that currently the State may assign copyright 
vesting in it, it is now clear that the Bill introduces a different position, where the State may not 
assign copyright that vests in it. It is not clear why this proviso was introduced, but it may have to do 
with the row that erupted recently in respect of the national anthem, where claims of ownership of 
copyright in the anthem by individuals have been made.345 On face value it would appear that there 
is nothing untoward with a provision of this nature, as it would ensure that the State can be assured 
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of copyright ownership in circumstances similar to those relating to the making of the national 
anthem under the direction or control of the State, thus avoiding contestations. Indeed in the past 
legislation was passed in terms of which individuals assigned copyright to the State for purposes of 
State ownership of the national anthem.346  
The problem however is that, phrased in the manner in which it has been phrased, the proviso 
introduced in clause 23(a) is not limited to the creation of the national anthem. It would in fact apply 
in all cases where copyright “is owned by, vested in or under the custody of the state”. The 
significance of this becomes clear when one considers that the term “state” would include entities 
known as organs of State, such as the South African Broadcasting Corporation (SABC).347 
Understood from this perspective, the effect of the proviso introduced by clause 23 of the Bill is that 
under no circumstances may the SABC ever assign copyright to a composer who created copyright, 
whether under the circumstances provided for in section 5 of the Act or under those provided for in 
section 21.348  
During the process of the public hearings in respect of the Bill a furore had erupted in respect of an 
earlier insertion in the Bill, namely the proposed amendment to section 5(2) of the Act by adding a 
provision that stated that the section also applied to works “funded by the State”. Read together with 
section 21(2), which provides that copyright conferred in terms of section 5 “shall initially vest in the 
state”, composers and other rights-holders argued that this meant that rights-holders were unlikely 
to own copyright in commissioned works, in terms of which the likes of the SABC paid for the 
making of the work “in money or money’s worth”, as contemplated in section 21(1)(c).349 What this 
means therefore is that the drafters of the Bill have stealthily brought back the harsh provisions in 
respect of ownership of copyright by the State, which had sparked an outcry. It appears however 
that rights-holder groups have not been able to detect this situation, in their sense of achievement 
and victory that section 5(2) of the Act that sought to introduce funding provisions in respect of 
ownership of copyright by the State, have now been removed. It is submitted therefore that the 
proposed amendment to section 22(1) of the Act through clause 23(a) of the Bill would have a 
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subjected to “any agreement excluding the operation thereof”, in terms of subsection (1)(d) thereof. Thus in South African 
Broadcasting Corporation v Pollecutt 1996 (1) SA 546 (A), where the SABC had commissioned the production of a film, ‘[i]t 
was a term of the appointment that the respondent would retain ownership of all his copyright in and to all music composed 
by him, but he granted the SABC “the perpetual right to broadcast the music and to license the broadcast of the music …” 
This has been a common practice in commissioning arrangements, and gives the composers and musicians an 
opportunity to pursue other markets of exploitation for the musical works outside of broadcasting (e.g. commercial release 
of recordings), as was the case in the Pollecutt case.  
349
 This was compounded by the fact that earlier versions of the Bill made the provisions of section 21(1)(c) to apply in 
respect of all works and not only the works currently specifically mentioned therein (which exclude musical works, as 
highlighted above). 
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limiting effect on the ability of composers and other musicians to earn a living, as copyright shall 
under such circumstances never ever be assigned to them. 
(ii) Clause 23(b) of the Bill – the proposed amendment to section 22(3) of the Act 
In a working draft of version B13-2017 of the Bill considered prior to the final version approved by 
Parliament the proposed amendments to section 22(3) of the Bill limited the requirement for an 
assignment of copyright and an exclusive licence to be in writing only to literary and musical works. 
Furthermore, this would only be the case where such an assignment concerned the assignment of 
copyright “by an author to a publisher”,350 and further only in cases dealt with in the proposed 
Schedule 2 (i.e. in relation to see translation licences, as this is what Schedule 2 is concerned with). 
This would have been a grave error as it is an internationally-recognised legal position that an 
assignment of copyright and an exclusive licence have to be in writing in respect of all works. 
Fortunately this insertion has now been removed in the version approved by Parliament and 
awaiting the President’s signature (version B13B-2017).  
What remains worrying about the proposed amendment to section 22(3) of the Act however is the 
subjection of the section to the proposed Schedule 2 to the Act.351 It is submitted that subjecting the 
content of section 22(3) to the proposed Schedule 2 shall nullify the effect of this subsection, which 
is crucial because it deals with the fact that an assignment and an exclusive licence have to be in 
writing. By subjecting the subsection to Schedule 2 however this therefore means that only licences 
contemplated in that Schedule352 will be required to be in writing (thus implying that all other licences 
do not need to comply with the writing requirement). This of course was clearly not the intention but 
this just illustrates what happens when those with no technical knowledge and expertise in legal 
subject-matter are tasked with writing legislation.  
An important innovation in the proposed amendment to section 22(3) is the introduction of a proviso 
that states: “Provided that assignment of copyright in a literary or musical work shall only be valid for 
a period of up to 25 years from the date of such assignment.” This is thus an attempt to introduce a 
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 Clause 23(b) of Draft 3 of version B13-2017 of the Bill, available at 
https://www.parliament.gov.za/storage/app/media/uploaded-files/Copyright%20Amendment%20Bill%20Draft.pdf (date of 
use: 12 July 2019). This in essence meant that if the assignment was by an author to another person or entity that is not a 
publisher (e.g. to a construction company, for whatever reason), or if the assignment was by someone other than an 
author, e.g. an assignee of copyright, to another person, then the assignment provisions would not apply. 
351
 The full proposed amendment to section 22(3) reads as follows: “No assignment of copyright and no exclusive licence 
to do an act which is subject to copyright in such work [sic] shall have effect unless it is in writing and signed by or on 
behalf of the assignor, the licensor or, in the case of an exclusive sub-licence, the exclusive sub-licensor, as stipulated in 
Schedule 2”. Emphasis added. 
352
 It appears that the intention with respect to the amendments proposed in terms of the Schedule 2 is to avail South 
Africa to the rights accorded to developing countries in respect of the translation and reproduction of works pursuant to the 
Appendix to the Berne Convention (although this seems to be a deviation from the provisions of the Appendix to the Berne 
Convention which makes provision for a system of non-exclusive and non-transferable licences. In this regard it needs to 
be mentioned that the Berne Convention requires a developing country that wishes to avail itself of the provisions of the 
Appendix to deposit a notification with the Director-General of WIPO to the effect that it will avail itself of such provisions 
(see art. 1 of the Appendix to the Berne Convention). If the insertion of Schedule 2 is an attempt by the drafters to avail 
South Africa to the provisions of the Appendix to the Berne Convention then it begs the question whether South Africa has 
deposited such a notification to the Director-General. 
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reversionary interest in relation to copyright in literary and musical works.353 In the writer’s view this 
in fact is a good amendment and one of the few commendable amendments in the current Bill, as it 
will give more control to authors with regard to the exploitation of their works and finding new 
markets for the use of such works.354 
(ii) Clause 23(b) of the Bill – the proposed amendment to section 22(4) of the Act 
Another perplexing amendment is the proposed amendment to subsection 4 of section 22 of the Act. 
If the proposed amendments are accepted, this is how section 22(4) of the Copyright Act shall read: 
(4) A non-exclusive licence to do an act which is subject to copyright may be verbal or in writing, or 
may be inferred from conduct, and may be revoked at any time: Provided that such a licence granted 
verbally or in writing, or an electronic equivalent thereof, shall not be revoked, either by the person 
who granted the licence or his or her successor in title, except as the contract may provide, by a 
further contract or by operation of law.
355
 
The phrase “such a licence granted verbally or in writing, or an electronic equivalent thereof” 
replaced the phrase “such a licence granted by contract”. Deleting the phrase “by contract” and 
replacing it with the phrase “verbally or in writing, or an electronic equivalent thereof” misses the 
point with regard to the original intention relating to the section.356 The original wording is meant to 
illustrate that generally, a non-exclusive licence can be verbal or in writing, and may be revoked at 
any time.  The principle of revocability of a non-exclusive licence was thus established. However the 
current provision goes further to state that where the non-exclusive licence is in writing, by means of 
a contract, it can only be revoked “as the contract may provide”.  
Given the foregoing explanation the proposed amendments clearly miss the point. The insertion of 
the phrase “verbally or in writing, or an electronic equivalent thereof” suggests amongst others that a 
non-exclusive licence given verbally may only be revoked “as the contract may provide”. Firstly, this 
goes against the principle that a non-exclusive licence “may be revoked at any time”. Secondly, 
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 See Chapter 3 above for a discussion of the reversionary interest provided for under the Imperial Copyright Act. 
Compare §203 of the US Copyright Act, which makes provision for a reversion (or the termination of a copyright transfer) 
after 35 years of such transfer. It is also worth noting that initially this proposed amendment applied to all works. After 
much lobbying, the drafters then limited this to literary and musical works. It is also worth mentioning that this proposed 
amendment is clearly an implementation of a recommendation in the CRC Report in this regard (see paragraph 10.12.10 
of the CRC Report). 
354
 The writer has elsewhere strongly advocated for this, where the writer has argued that because of the transferability 
principle in copyright law emanating from the English copyright law tradition, many authors feel compelled to part with the 
copyright in their works through assignment, because of a low bargaining position and also because of lack of resources, 
which places them in a position where they cannot “act entrepreneurially” in respect of their works and thus feel that they 
need a partner to assist. At the time however where they are in a position to invest in the music careers, they awaken to 
the reality that they do not own copyright in their works and thus cannot use those works in entrepreneurial endeavours. 
See Baloyi 2014 PELJ 176 – 196 and generally. 
355
 The underlined parts reflect the proposed amendments introduced by the Bill. The italicisation is that of the writer, to 
highlight the problematic parts. 
356
 It is interesting in this regard that while the word “contract” is removed, it is later referred to (in line 5), yet in 
circumstances where there is no referral point for its usage. If the term was deleted and replaced with another phrase, why 
is it then resurrected here?  
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since the term “contract” is connected to the expression “in writing”, the proposed amendment 
suggests that a verbal non-exclusive licence may be in writing. This of course is not possible. The 
phrase “by a further contract or by operation of law” at the end adds to the confusion. Furthermore, 
although the phrase “or an electronic equivalent thereof” is useful to show that a contract made 
electronically would also satisfy the requirements of a contract, it is not necessary because the legal 
position in this regard is clear, especially in light of the provisions of the Electronic Communications 
and Transactions Act.357   
7.3.2.9 Section 39 – Regulations 
Section 39 provides that the Minister responsible for the Act (currently the Minister of Trade and 
Industry) may make regulations (i) relating to any matter required or permitted by the Act to be 
prescribed by Regulation; (ii) regarding the tariff of fees payable in respect of proceedings before the 
Copyright Tribunal, and the remuneration and allowances payable to members of the advisory 
committee contemplated in s 40, and its sub-committees, and the conditions of appointment of such 
members; (iii) in respect of the establishment, composition, funding and functions of the collecting 
societies contemplated in section 9A (i.e. the needle-time societies), and any matter necessary or 
expedient to ensure proper functioning of such societies, and (iv) generally, in respect of any matter 
which he deems necessary or expedient to prescribe to ensure achievement of the purposes of the 
Act. In the cases mentioned in (ii) – (iii) the relevant Minister makes the regulations in consultation 
with the Minister of Finance. 
There are two main sets of regulations promulgated under the Copyright Act, namely those (i) 
relating to the general exceptions in respect of the reproduction of works, in terms of section 13; the 
special exception in respect of records of musical works in terms of section 14; authors of 
cinematograph films in terms of section 26(6), and the Copyright Tribunal in terms under sections 29 
– 36 of the Act,358 and (ii) those relating to needle-time rights societies, as contemplated in section 
39(cA) of the Copyright Act.359 Some confuse these two sets of regulations, often labouring under 
the impression that there is only one set of regulations.360  
7.3.2.10 Section 41 – Savings 
                                               
357
 Act 25 of 2002. 
358
 The Copyright Regulations, 1978, published in GN R2530 in GG 6252 of 22 December 1978, as amended by GN 
R1211 in GG 9775 of 7 June 1985 and corrected by GN 1375 in GG 9807 of 28 June 1985 (the 1978 Regulations). 
359
 Regulations on the Establishment of Collecting Societies in the Music Industry GN 517 in GG 28894 of 1 June 2006 
(the Needle-time Regulations). 
360
 See for example in this regard Ramsden A Guide to Intellectual Property 36 where the author, dealing with royalties 
payable in respect of needle-time rights as contemplated in s 9A of the Act, refers the reader to s 14 of the Act ‘for the 
regulations relating to royalties for sound recordings’, which he deals with under the general rubric of ‘the Copyright 
Regulations’ (see p. 43). This is further supported by the fact that, when later dealing with s 39 of the Act and the subject of 
regulations, the author further observes that ‘[a]ll references in this book to ‘the Copyright Regulations’’ are to the 1978 
Regulations (at 95). S 14 however has nothing to do with needle-time rights and deals rather with the special exception in 
respect of the manufacturing of records of musical works, something dealt with under the 1978 Regulations. The royalties 
contemplated in s 9A of the Copyright Act are instead deal with under the Needle-time Regulations. 
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No copyright “or right in the nature of copyright” subsists except in terms of the Copyright Act or 
similar legislation (section 41(4)). Copyright is thus a creature of statute and there is no common-law 
copyright.361 Having indicated this, it is important to note that there are other areas of law outside the 
copyright system which often have a bearing on the activities of musicians and other persons or 
entities having exclusive rights in music and performances. Section 41(3) contemplates these cases 
when it provides:  
The provisions of this Act shall not derogate from any rule of law relating to confidential or privileged 
information, unlawful competition or personality rights.  
These areas represent very important interests for musicians and other “celebrities”, although they 
are not subject to copyright protection.362 Dean and Karjiker indicate, and it is submitted correctly, 
that the right of privacy, the right to restrain unlawful competition and the right to restrain others from 
passing off their works as being those of the author constitute special remedies available to the 
author in addition of his right to restrain the infringement of the copyright in his work(s).363  
7.3.2.11 Section 43 – Application of the Act to works made before the commencement 
of the Act 
Section 43(a) (i) and (ii) provides that the Act applies in respect of works made before its 
commencement in the same way as it applies in respect of works after such commencement, 
provided that this shall not affect the application of the 1965 Copyright Act in respect of the 
ownership, duration or existence of copyright subsisting in terms of the said Act; and further subject 
to the fact that this shall not be construed as creating copyright in a work in which copyright could 
not subsist prior to 11 September 1965. 
This establishes the important principle that copyright created under repealed legislation will 
continue to subsist under such previous legislation with regard to the question of who owns the 
copyright (which would of necessity include who the author is, seeing that the author is usually the 
first owner of copyright; as long as the requirements for the subsistence of copyright as provided for 
in such repealed legislation are met, and as long as the term of protection in respect of such 
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 See Ramsden id at 96. See also Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 1-4D. 
362
 In this regard copyright (and trademark) law has been criticised as providing limited protection in these cases. See in 
this regard Louw Sport Law 446. The cases contemplated in s 41(3) of the Copyright Act often fall within the spectrum of 
privacy and / or publicity rights. In South Africa both the common law and the Constitution recognise a right of privacy, 
defined as comprising “the sum total of information or facts which pertain to an individual in the state of solitude [which] are 
thus excluded from disclosure to outsiders [and embrace] all personal facts”. Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright 
Law 1-119. South African law recognises a privacy right both in terms of the common law and the Constitution. With regard 
to the common law position see Neethling, Potgieter and Visser Law of Personality, generally. The constitutional protection 
is provided for in terms of s 14 of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. South Africa recognises some 
form of publicity right (see regarding the ambit of this right the recent high court case of Kumalo v Cycle Lab (Pty) Ltd 
ZAGPJHC 56); however, such recognition falls short of that recognised in other jurisdictions such as the United States, 
where this is seen as “the right of each individual to control and profit from the commercial value of his or her own identity 
… [protecting] the unauthorized commercial exploitation of a celebrity’s name …, image, or likeness, as well as other 
aspects of identity such as biographical facts and records of performace.” Biederman et al Law of the Entertainment 
Industries 557. See in this regard generally Louw Sports Law 446 – 455.  
363
 Dean and Karjike Handbook of Copyright Law 1-110. For the authors’ discussion of these rights see pp 1-114 – 1-120. 
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copyright has not expired.364 The scope of protection (i.e. relief sought) and issues relating to 
infringement are however, to be determined in terms of the current Copyright Act.365 The 1965 
Copyright Act had similar provisions.366 This principle was applied successfully in the case of Disney 
Enterprises Inc v Griesel NO & Others,367 where the court accepted the arguments of the executor of 
the deceased estate of Solomon to the effect that the provisions related to the reversionary interest 
in the song Mbube (later adapted as The Lion Sleeps Tonight in the Disney movie The Lion King) 
under the 1916 Copyright Act continued to apply despite the repeal of the 1916 Act through the 
1965 Act; and despite the repeal of the later Act through the 1978 Act.  
7.4 Conclusion 
This chapter was concerned with the exposition of relevant provisions within the Copyright Act that 
have a bearing on the protection of musical works, lyrics (protectable as literary works) and the 
concept of music in general.. In this sense the chapter provides the gist of what constitutes modern 
copyright law in relation to musical works in South Africa today. As part of the Chapter’s explorations 
it was recognised that a brief overview of the US legal system and the historical and Constitutional 
basis of US copyright law needed to be considered. This was as a way of giving a sense to the 
complexity of United States copyright law owing the complexity of the US court systems. What 
necessitated this is the fact that several provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill clearly derive 
from the position in US law, with the result that if the Bill is passed into law in its current state, South 
African judges would be compelled to refer to US copyright law on a number of occasions in order to 
adjudicate matters relating to such provisions. This analysis thus served to discourage the course of 
action taken by our legislators in this regard and insists on keeping the English law roots of South 
African copyright law. 
The rest of the chapter was a consideration of specific provisions of the Copyright Act that have a 
bearing on musical works and using a contextual approach that takes into account the context and / 
or environment in which music business practices take place. As in other chapters, the judicial 
decisions of various jurisdictions were highlighted throughout the Chapter, and examples from real 
life were also given. Aspects of the Copyright Amendment Bill that had a bearing on the subject-
matter under consideration were also highlighted, with a view to either supporting the proposed 
amendments or finding fault therewith. In a nutshell therefore the Chapter represented an attempt to 
provide a comprehensive analysis of the copyright protection of musical works in South African 
copyright law, with a view to providing reference material for those wishing to probe the intricate 
aspects of this complicated area of law. 
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 See further in this regard the discussion under Chapter 4 above, including the discussion on the concept of a two-way 
traffic in the application of legislation in this regard. 
365
 See in this regard Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright Law 3-3. 
366
 See s 48 read with the sixth schedule of the 1965 Copyright Act in this regard.   
367
 Disney Enterprises Inc v Griesel NO & Others 895 JOC (T).  
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Chapter 8: Digital Technology and Music Copyright’s 
Continuing Struggle for Survival  
“Recently, a heated debate has taken place as to whether the impact of computer networks will lead 
simply to a further evolutionary development of copyright law or whether the implications are so 
great as to necessitate revolutionary responses to the traditional concepts of copyright law.”1  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
1
 Makeen Copyright in a Global Information Society xix. 
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8.1 Introduction  
Since the enactment of the Statute of Anne in 1710, and in particular since the interpretation of this 
statute as providing protection to musical works in the case of Bach v Longman,2 copyright law has 
been the main legal instrument used to provide legal protection to musical works.  In Bach v 
Longman Lord Mansfield remarked that the words of the Statute of Anne were “very large”, providing 
protection for “books and other writings”.3 To a large extent copyright law has been successful and 
enduring in fulfilling the role of “Protector” of music rights. Nevertheless, as shown above, it is also 
true that the advancement of technology has always presented problems in relation to the copyright 
protection of various works, including musical works. As Jones has noted, the Statute of Anne was 
responding to the challenges of print technology, “and so [began] the close and inevitable 
relationship between copyright and technology.”4 In the twenty-first century, the advent of digital 
technology has brought about perhaps the most daunting challenges ever to the copyright protection 
of various copyright works.  
Particularly, the prevalence of copyright issues in relation to the digital exploitation of music has 
brought to the fore the question “whether to focus on the future of copyright law generally or on the 
future of music copyright more specifically.”5 Generally the digital revolution has given rise to issues 
relating to the appropriate subject-matter, scope and duration of intellectual property rights. In the 
area of music the digital revolution has nevertheless given rise to further issues relating to “the law’s 
division of rights between producers, distributors, and consumers of music.”6 Consequently it is often 
argued that tailored solutions, rather than a broad review of copyright law as a whole, would be 
more suited to resolving current music copyright issues.7 The foregoing can be further supported by 
the fact that attempts by the international community to address digital copyright issues, e.g. through 
the WIPO “Internet Treaties”,8 have proven inadequate. This has been ascribed to “the unrestrained 
versatility of innovation in the digital arena”, which has led to the WIPO Internet Treaties   
… [falling] considerably short in what was to be their central mission, namely to provide a relevant and 
credible source of norms to facilitate knowledge creation in the global digital context.
9
    
Similar problems have been detected in respect of attempts aimed at resolving this problem in 
national law. In this regard it has been observed that US courts have struggled to apply the 
provisions of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), enacted in 1998 to align US copyright 
law with the WIPO Internet Treaties, as a result of enormous, persistent technological changes.10 
These problems have particularly been noted in respect of the digital exploitation of musical works. 
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 (1777) 2 Cowp. 623. See for a full discussion of this case Chapter 2 supra. 
3
 Bach v Longman id at 623 - 624. 
4
 Jones 2010 European Journal of Law and Technology 4. 
5
 See Carrol 2005 Florida Law Review 910. 
6
 Carrol id at 908. 
7
 Carrol id at 911. 
8
 The WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT) of 1996. 
9
 Okediji 2009 Fordham L. Rev. 2380. 
10
 See http://about.bloomberglaw.com/law-reports/dmca-provisions-proving-problematic-for-courts-but-revisions-will-take-
time/ (date of use: 16 May 2017). 
342 
 
In this Chapter the author seeks to highlight the challenges faced by music rights-holders as a result 
of the digital exploitation of music, with a focus on how current digital technologies have disrupted 
the traditional music value chain system and the fragmentation of copyright. The Chapter also seeks 
to highlight how copyright as a legal system is experiencing challenges in properly providing 
protection to music rights-holders in respect of the online exploitation of their musical works and 
expressions. As South Africa is struggling with ensuring that South African copyright law is reformed 
to make it more relevant in the digital environment – which is one of the objectives of the Copyright 
Amendment Bill, 2017 – the writer hopes that this Chapter can be of assistance understanding the 
critical issues that need to be addressed by such a reform process. 
8.2 Dealing with Digital Technology  
8.2.1 The Beginning: Napster and P2P Technology 
How did we arrive here? How did it all begin? At times, when dealing with the complex questions 
posed by digital technology it is so easy to forget that the state of uncertainty experienced today 
came to the fore not so many moons ago – through the advent of the new peer-to-peer (P2P) file-
sharing technology that came to popular use towards the end of the 1990s.  In this regard the 
complex legal issues arising from the use of this new technology were brought to the fore in the 
precedent-setting Napster case,11 a decision of the US Court of Appeals for the Ninth circuit. Unlike 
other peer-to-peer file-sharing services, Napster was different in that it offered a service whereby 
information about users and the music files used on their computers was indexed on a central 
server.12 This created a searchable list of music that was easily accessible to anyone connected to 
the Napster network. This is what has been termed a “hybrid P2P architecture”.13 The court found 
not only that users of the Napster service were liable for direct infringement of copyright (by violating 
the plaintiffs’ reproduction and distribution rights),14 but more importantly that Napster itself was 
liable for both contributory and vicarious infringement.15 The court also rejected Napster’s fair use 
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 A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (2001). 
12
 This service was accessed after the user downloaded the MusicShare software from the Napster website onto his own 
computer. 
13
 Other forms of P2P designs are so-called Closed P2P architecture; Pure P2P architecture (the two also termed 
“decentralised or semi-structured P2P services”); and so-called next-generation P2P architectures, dealt with briefly below. 
See in this regard Goldschmied Digital Music Piracy v Music Industry 99 – 103; Dean & Dyer Introduction to Intellectual 
Property 431 – 435. 
14
 See para 19, A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (2001). 
15
 In US copyright law contributory infringement occurs when a person “with knowledge of the infringing act, induces, 
causes or materially contributes to the infringing conduct of another”, or rather “engages in personal conduct that 
encourages or assists the infringement.” Napster id at para 48; emphasis added. In such cases the contributory infringer 
must know or have reasons to know (or should have known) that direct infringement was taking place; and must materially 
contribute to such infringement. See paras 50 and 58 of the Napster case. In this regard it was observed:  “… [Without] the 
support services defendant provides, Napster users could not find and download the music they want with the ease of 
which defendant boasts.” Id at para 58.  Under South African copyright law the principles of contributory infringement are 
found in the law of delict, where a person “aids and abets” the commission of copyright infringement by another, and such 
person knew or had reasons to believe that the acts he aided and abetted constituted an infringement of copyright. In this 
regard it has been observed: “I think it is plain … that, upon ordinary delictual principles, it is unlawful to incite or aid  and 
abet the commission of a civil wrong, and I do not think it matters whether it is a wrong at common law or whether it is a 
wrong created by statute …” Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd v Aventis Pharma SA; Aventis Pharma SA and Others v Cipla Life 
Sciences (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (4) SA 579 (SCA), at paras 34 – 39 generally, and para 39 specifically. See also Dean 
Handbook of Copyright Law (2015) 1-88 – 1-90. In this regard it would seem that the South African test is more general 
than the US test, which requires material contribution in addition to knowledge, although the outcome in practice would be 
343 
 
defences raised on the grounds that (i) the sampling of music by Napster users through the 
download of MP3 files “in order to decide whether to purchase the recording” was fair use; and that 
(ii) “space-shifting” of music files by a Napster user in order to listen to music that such user already 
owned on audio CD was fair use.16  
In responding to the sampling question the Ninth circuit made some important findings that would be 
worth considering by our courts if a matter of this nature were to come before our courts.17 It 
affirmed the district court’s finding, in line with US fair use requirements, that sampling is a 
commercial use “even if some users eventually purchase the music” and further that “even 
                                                                                                                                                              
similar.  Thus in the case of Atari Inc, and Another v JB Radio Parts (Pty) Ltd, Case No 17419/83 TPD, unreported, the 
court granted an interim interdict restraining the respondent from selling a device aimed at making reproductions of the 
applicant’s computer games protectable by copyright on the ground that, by selling the device and promoting sales thereof 
by drawing customers to the capabilities of the device, the respondent instigated or facilitated the making of unauthorised 
copies of the computer games by third parties. Regarding vicarious liability under US copyright law this is seen as 
extending “beyond an employer/employee relationship to cases in which a defendant has the right and ability to supervise 
the infringing activity and also has a direct financial interest in such activities.” Napster id at para 60; emphasis added. In 
South Africa vicarious liability occurs when a person who is in a position of authority, i.e. a person who has the right and 
ability to supervise another instigates or instructs the commission of an act that infringes copyright, and may be a form of 
causal infringement as provided for in s 23(1) of the Copyright Act, which provides that copyright is infringed by a person 
who “does or causes any other person” to do an act restricted by copyright, without the authority of the copyright owner. 
Emphasis added. See also Dean id at 1-90. Nevertheless it is submitted that it may be difficult in the South African context 
to hold internet service providers (ISPs) liable for the copyright infringement on the basis of vicarious liability (except in 
relation to the ISP’s own employees). This is because in South Africa vicarious liability has largely been used in respect of 
the employer-employee relationship or at most, in “situations which are analogous to that of the employer-employee 
relationship”. Du Bois Wille’s Principles 1224. (A different scenario of course concerns a situation where the owner of a 
motor vehicle can be found to be vicariously liable for someone negligently causing an accident while driving the owner’s 
vehicle, but this is not the concern for present purposes). A clear situation “analogous to that of the employer-employee 
relationship” is the principal-agent relationship and the principle of vicarious liability has naturally been extended to this 
relationship. Nevertheless, since the existence of an agency relationship necessitates the contractual grant of authority by 
the principal (in this case the ISP) to the agent (in this case the person using the ISP’s platform to infringe copyright), it 
would be an overstretch to suggest that such a contractual relationship exists ordinarily between an ISP and a copyright 
user (i.e. to suggest that the ISP has in fact, contractually granted such authority to the user). Even if the relationship 
between the ISP and the user could be said to be a mandatory-mandatary relationship, which, though considered to fall 
within the concept of agency, does not involve the grant of authority by the mandatory to the mandatary, it has been 
observed that “[t]he real issue is … what degree of control the [mandatory] had over the [mandatary] when the delict in 
question was committed.” In US copyright law, as evident from the Napster case, ISP vicarious liability is made possible by 
the fact that the test used is that the defendant must have “the right and ability to supervise the infringing activity and a lso 
[have] a direct financial interest in such activities.” Napster ibid. No such specific requirement exists in the South African 
law relating to mandate agreements; thus the observation that “a mandator should never (except where he has been at 
fault himself) be liable for the wrongs committed by a mandatary” seems to be a more rational encapsulation of the South 
African law relating to ISP vicarious liability. See Du Bois id at 1226, n 69, referring to the opinions of Van der Merwe and 
Olivier, and Neethling, Potgieter and Visser. See further in this regard Saw and Chik 2012 SAcLJ 707 – 708, paras 20 and 
21, who, in reviewing the English and other common-law authorities, while acknowledging that ordinarily an employer-
employee or principal-agent relationship would give rise to vicarious liability, observe: ‘By definition, no defendant would 
ever be able to confer on a third party the right or permission to do the act complained of, or to “clothe [a third party] wi th 
authority, particularly legal authority, thereby giving a right to act” – simply because the defendant is not himself the 
“principal” (in whom actual authority, which is capable of being granted, resides) nor the owner of copyright in the subject-
matter in question. … Even in the case of an employer-employee or principal-agent relationship, the employer or principal 
(the alleged authoriser) does not possess any authority whatsoever that he can possibly grant to the employee or agent 
(third party) to commit the underlying act of infringement, for the same reason (because he is neither a true “principal” who 
is capable of granting actual authority nor the owner of copyright.)’ It is submitted that the South African position in relation  
to vicarious liability for copyright infringement is more aligned to this position and is sharply distinguishable from the 
position in American law. 
16
 See Napster id at paras 38 – 45. A further fair use defence raised by Napster, namely the contention that certain acts of 
reproduction by Napster users amounted to “permissive reproduction” as a result of permission granted by certain 
independent or established artists; and further that certain other uses on the Napster system, such as the use of chat 
rooms, message boards and Napster’s New Artist Program were non-infringing uses, was not opposed by plaintiffs and 
was not challenged on appeal. See Napster id at para 46.   
17
 This would of course need to be done taking into account the unique status of our copyright law vis-à-vis US copyright 
law; and further considering the fact that further technological developments have taken place since the Napster case 
came before the courts, in particular the fact that while the digital download market was at its infancy when the case was 
heard, it has now been overtaken by the streaming market. This notwithstanding it is to be noted that the digital download 
market is still a fertile market in South Africa and our courts are yet to be confronted by a case dealing with these matters. 
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authorized temporary downloading of individual songs for sampling purposes is commercial in 
nature."18 Furthermore it was demonstrated that while Napster users downloaded “a full, free and 
permanent copy of the recording”, the free promotional downloads provided by the record 
companies consisted of thirty-to-sixty second samples; or where full songs were provided, they were 
programmed to “time out” and thus only existed for a short time on the downloader’s computer.19 
The court also quelled the argument made by Napster – and often made by other proponents of 
fewer restrictions on access to digital music – which suggested that the sampling of music resulted 
in increased sales of audio CDs, observing: “… [I]ncreased sales of copyrighted material attributable 
to unauthorized use should not deprive the copyright holder of the right to license the material. … 
Nor does impact in one market, here the audio CD market, deprive the copyright holder of the right 
to develop identified alternative markets, here the digital download market.”20  
With regard to the space-shifting question Napster had argued that a previous ruling of the court21 
had found that the space-shifting of musical compositions and sound recordings was fair use, and 
that space-shifting was analogous to time-shifting, which had been found to constitute fair use in the 
Betamax case.22 The court refused to uphold the “shifting analyses” in this case on the ground that 
they were “inapposite because the methods of shifting in these cases did not also simultaneously 
involve distribution of the copyrighted material to the general public”, but only exposed the material 
to the original user. In the present case however, once a user listed a copy of music on the Napster 
system it became available to millions of other users.23 This ruling of the court led to the demise of 
Napster, a technological wonder that, at its peak, boasted some eighty million registered users.24  
8.2.2 Second –Generation Closed Systems – Grokster and Kazaa 
In an attempt to circumvent the legal shortcomings of Napster’s centralised hybrid P2P system the 
technologists introduced newer, decentralised P2P platforms, termed closed and pure P2P 
                                               
18
 A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (2001), at para 40. Under US copyright law a requirement of one of 
the four factors that need to be considered when making a fair use determination, namely the “purpose and character of 
the use”, is a consideration of whether the infringing use was commercial or non-commercial. See Napster id at para 25. If 
the use is non-commercial then it is likely to be a non-infringing use. Apart from the specific exceptions provided for in the 
Copyright Act 1978 (i.e. the fair dealing and other exceptions provided for in ss 12 – 19B of the Copyright Act) South 
African copyright law does not embody a concept of commercial v non-commercial use, and every unauthorised usage of a 
copyright work apart from the permitted uses shall constitute copyright infringement, whether the usage is for commercial 
or non-commercial purposes. This observation is apt in light of the provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill, 2017 
approved by both houses of Parliament (version B13B-2017), available at https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 2019), 
which introduces provisions relating to the making of commercial considerations when determining if a use is acceptable or 
not, in addition to a broad fair use regime. References to “commercial” are found throughout the Bill. Clause 1(c) of the Bil l 
defines “commercial” as “to obtain direct economic advantage or financial gain in connection with the business or trade of 
the user of the work in question”. Provisions relating to the fair use defence are introduced by clause 10 of the Bill; clause 
10(1)(b)(iii)(bb) provides: “In determining whether an act done in relation to a work constitutes fair dealing or fair use, all 
relevant factors shall be taken into account, including but not limited to … the purpose and character of the use, including 
whether … it is of a commercial nature …” The Bill awaits the signature of the President. See also Chapter 9 for a detailed 
comment on the Bill.  
19
 Napster id at para 40. 
20
 Id at paras 41 – 42. 
21
 Recording Industry Association of America v Diamond Multimedia Systems Inc. 180 F.3d 1072 (9
th
 Cir. 1999), at 1079. 
22
 Sony Corporation of America et al. v Universal City Studios, Inc., et al. 464 U.S. 417. See the discussion supra under 
paragraph 3.1.1.4. 
23
 A&M Records, Inc. v Napster, Inc. 239 F.3d 1004 (2001) at para 45.  
24
 See https://www.pcworld.idg.com.au/article/22380/requiem_napster/ (date of use: 28 April 2018). 
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architectures.25 A common feature of these second-generation P2P systems is that the users did not 
have to rely on a central database to share files, but could share the files between one another. 
Platforms using a closed P2P systems have included Grokster and Kazaa (both now closed); while 
Freenet is an example of a pure P2P system.26 Dealing with the differences between closed P2P 
networks and pure P2P networks Goldschmeid has observed: 
In order to locate files on a closed network, a peer routes a search to the next peer in the network via 
a node. The peer that is connected then checks whether it has that file. If this is the case, it sends the 
file back to the peer via a node from which the search originated. Alternately, the peer on sends the 
request in conjunction with the IP address of the originating peer to the next peer in the network. This 
process is repeated until the file is available from another peer. … Pure P2P architecture’s most 
significant difference is that the destination peer who holds the file requested by the originating peer 
does not transfer the file directly to the originating peer. Instead the destination peer routes the file to 
the next peer in the request chain. Each of these peers then retain a copy of the file before sending it 
on to the next immediate peer in the request chain, who in turn does the same, until it reaches the 
originating peer from which [sic] the request was made. … [E]ach peer is aware of only those IP 
addresses of the directly previous and following in the chain. …
27
  
By decentralising the system in this way the providers hoped to avoid liability (whether contributory 
or vicarious), since they believed they could argue that “they did not have knowledge of their users’ 
activities or the ability to control them.”28 The various mechanisms to either avoid or conceal liability 
for copyright infringement did not deter rights-holders from fighting for the survival of music 
copyright. Litigation instituted by rights-holders led to the eventual demise of both Kazaa and 
Grokster.29 The Grokster case gave rise to some important principles noteworthy for the South 
                                               
25
 Goldschmied Digital Music Piracy v Music Industry 100 – 102; see also Johnsen, Karlsen and Birkeland 2005 
http://web.cs.ucla.edu/classes/cs217/05BitTorrent.pdf (date of use: 28 April 2018). 
26
 Goldschmied Digital Music Piracy v Music Industry 101 – 102. 
27
 Goldschmied Digital Music Piracy v Music Industry 101 – 102. In this regard a node is a local server, and each computer 
in the network becomes a node. Dean & Dyer Introduction to Intellectual Property 432. 
28
 Dean & Dyer id at 433. 
29
 Kazaa was sued by Burma / Stemra in the Netherlands in 2001 at the District Court of the Netherlands, for copyright 
infringement. The court found that Kazaa violated Dutch copyright law be enabling its users to download music using its 
software and that by offering the P2P software in conjunction with its website’s search engine it could be regarded as the 
user of the music; and ordered Kazaa to take measures to prevent the software from being used to infringe Burma / 
Stemra’s copyrights. The court furthermore ordered the parties to continue with their negotiations. Kazaa opted rather to 
shut down its website but appealed the judgment to the Court of Appeal of Amsterdam, which ruled instead that in so far 
as there were acts of infringement, these were attributable to the users of the software and not to Kazaa itself. It was held, 
against the spirit of the US courts in the Napster case, that the mere provision of means of publication and multiplication of 
copyright works did not amount to an act of publication or multiplication per se. It was further held that because Kazaa’s 
software was also used to share works that were in the public domain and works where the authors had given permission 
of use, the software could not be said to be unlawful. This decision of the Court of Appeal was upheld by the Dutch 
Supreme Court on 19 December 2003. See in this regard http://merlin.obs.coe.int/iris/2004/2/article31.en.html (date of use: 
28 April 2018). Meanwhile Kazaa, which had since been sold to a Vanuatu-based company, Sharman Networks, in 2002, 
was embroiled in yet another litigation, this time in the United States and involving co-defendants Grokster and 
Streamcase Networks (owners of Morpheus). Although Kazaa eventually pulled out – see the district court’s observation in 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster 259 F.Supp.2d 1029 (C.D.Cal. 2003), at para 13 – the case proceeded at the district 
court and on appeal in the Ninth Circuit – Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster 380 F.3d 1154 (9
th
 Cir. 2004) – 
culminating in the Supreme Court ruling in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster 545 U.S. 913 (2005). Kazaa also faced 
litigation in Australia (through its parent company) in the case of Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v Sharman License 
Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 1242, where the Federal Court of Australia held that six respondents had authorised acts that 
infringed copyright in sound recordings by users of the Kazaa software. The court found that the use of the software had 
infringed the reproduction right and the right of communication to the public of the sound recordings concerned. The court 
affirmed that the test to determine if a person has authorised copyright infringement was that the person must have 
sanctioned, approved or countenanced the primary infringing act. The court found that the respondents were aware of the 
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African environment also and it would thus be useful to consider the case in some depth. In the 
Grokster case the plaintiffs / applicants had sued Grokster and Streamcast for knowingly and 
intentionally distributing their file-sharing software to enable users to reproduce and distribute 
copyright works in violation of copyright legislation. In the Supreme Court decision30 it was noted that 
though the respondents did not know when particular files were copied as a result of the 
decentralised nature of their file-sharing networks, “a few searches using their software would show 
what is available on the networks the software searches.”31 Grokster and Streamcast in turn alluded 
to the significant potential non-infringing nature of their software, “even if infrequent in practice.”32 
The court nevertheless observed that evidence by MGM (the first applicant) showed that the 
majority of downloads related to infringing acts and “the probable scope of copyright infringement is 
staggering.”33 
It was further noted that the respondents were not merely passive recipients of information about 
infringing use. Apart from the fact that they had occasionally received emails from their users with 
questions on how to play copyright-protected movies that they had downloaded, when they first 
distributed their free software they made it clear that the objective was to download copyright-
protected works. Thus it was observed that “… each took active steps to encourage infringement”, 
with Streamcast planning to be the next Napster and thus specifically targeting former Napster users 
in the event that Napster shut down.34 Just as in the Kazaa case in Australia, the Grokster court also 
noted that the respondents’ business model was to generate income through the sale of advertising 
space and streaming the advertising to its users; which demonstrated their support for the use of 
their software to download copyright-protected works. The court further noted that no evidence 
existed to show that the companies made efforts to filter copyright-protected materials from their 
users’ downloads or to block the sharing of copyright-protected files.35 
The lower courts ruled out contributory liability on the part of the respondents on the ground that the 
respondents had no actual knowledge of direct infringement; and read the Betamax case36 “as 
                                                                                                                                                              
infringement of copyright occurring through the Kazaa software and failed to implement measures to prevent such 
infringement, even though the evidence showed that they had the power to do so or to at least substantially reduce the 
infringing activity. The court opined that they did not do so because they had a financial interest in maximising copyright-
infringing file-sharing, as they derived advertising revenue from this. The court found that the six respondents had in fact, 
actively encouraged users of the system to increase their file-sharing activity and that their warnings and end-user licence 
agreements were ineffective in preventing copyright infringement. Justice Wilcox found that, on the facts of the case the 
respondents could not rely on s 112E of the Australian Copyright Act, which provides that a person who provides facilities 
for the making or for facilitating the making of a communication is not considered to have authorised the infringement of 
copyright merely because another person uses such facilities to commit an act restricted by copyright. Furthermore, while 
persons who do not themselves make copyright material available on the internet cannot be found liable for primary 
communication of the material to the public, they can nevertheless, in terms of s 22(6) of the Australian Copyright Act 
(which provides that a communication other than a broadcast is considered to have been made by the person responsible 
for determining the content of the communication), be found liable for authorising the communication of the copyright 
material.  
30
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster 545 U.S. 913 (2005). 
31
 Id at 4. 
32
 Ibid.  
33
 Id at 5. 
34
 Id at 5 – 7. The evidence showed that, to a less extent, Grokster also wished to capture the Napster market and 
promoted its ability to provide particular, popular copyright-protected materials. 
35
 Id at 8 – 9. 
36
 Sony Corporation of America et al. v Universal City Studios, Inc., et al. 464 U.S. 417. See supra at paragraph 3.1.1.4. 
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holding that distribution of a commercial product capable of substantial non-infringing uses could not 
give rise to contributory liability unless the distributor had actual knowledge of specific instances of 
infringement and failed to act on that knowledge.”37 The lower courts also found that the 
respondents had not materially contributed to their users’ infringing conduct “because it was the 
users themselves who searched for, retrieved, and stored the infringing files, with no involvement by 
the defendants beyond providing the software in the first place.”38 Contributory liability was also 
ruled out on the ground that “the defendants did not monitor or control the use of the software, had 
no agreed-upon right or current ability to supervise its use, and had no independent duty to police 
infringement.”39 In granting its judgment the court made very important observations with regard to 
the tension between two values, namely, (i) the value of supporting creative pursuits through 
copyright protection; and (ii) the value of protecting innovation in new communication technologies 
“by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement.” The court observed that this tension 
was at the core – or rather the subject – of the case.40  
While the court noted that there was a concern that imposing liability “could limit further development 
of beneficial technologies”41 it nevertheless provided a noteworthy rationale for imposing liability in 
cases where the use of technologies would encourage rampart infringement of works. In this regard 
the court observed: 
The argument for imposing indirect liability in this case is … a powerful one, given the number of 
infringing downloads that occur every day using Streamcast’s and Grokster’s software. When a 
widely-shared service or product is used to commit infringement, it may be impossible to enforce rights 
in the protected work effectively against all direct infringers, the only practical alternative being to go 
against the distributor of the copying device for secondary liability on a theory of contributory or 
vicarious infringement.
42
 
This observation is an important one, especially in the South African context when copyright law is in 
a state of development to align it with the digital environment.43 In the debates that have ensued in 
relation to the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 some have called for more “flexibility” in the copyright 
legislation in light of technological changes.44 These arguments often fail to consider what the impact 
of such technological changes often is on the ability of rights-holders to enforce their rights. It is 
submitted that South Africa can benefit from the cautionary approach taken by mature jurisdictions 
                                               
37
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster 545 U.S. 913 (2005), at 10. 
38
 Ibid. 
39
 Ibid. 
40
 Id at 10 – 11. 
41
 Id at 11. 
42
 Id at 12. For the application of the theory of vicarious liability within the South African context see the discussion below 
under paragraph 8.4.2.3. 
43
 See the Copyright Amendment Bill (version B13B – 2017), approved by both houses of Parliament and now awaiting the 
signature of the President, available at https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 13 July 2019). 
44
 See for example the submission made by Google in respect of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017, where it is noted: 
“Flexibility is the heart of a modern copyright law because creativity, innovation and technological change are dynamic. 
One cannot have a dynamic, creative environment if our copyright laws are static.” 
https://libguides.wits.ac.za/ld.php?content_id=33934566 (date of use: 29 April 2018). This argument is, in the writer’s view, 
faulty in that it suggests that certainty is not an important consideration in relation to copyright laws. It suggest that 
copyright legislation needs to be fluid enough to adjust to every technological change per se, without considering what the 
impact of such technological changes is to the safeguarding of the rights of rights-holders. 
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like the United States in relation to these matters; and this would in fact align with the provisions of 
section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution,45 which provides that when interpreting the Bill of Rights (which 
includes intellectual property rights) a court, tribunal or forum “may consider foreign law”. In the 
quest to make South African copyright law more flexible in light of technological developments it is 
important to also note the downside of doing so in relation to the ability of rights-holders to enforce 
their rights and to thus create an appropriate balance in this regard.46 It is submitted that such a 
cautionary approach must not only be employed by courts when interpreting laws but also by the 
legislature when enacting new legislation.  
8.2.2.1 Seeking Relief in the theory of Secondary Liability 
Reverting to the case it is important to note how the Supreme Court distinguished the Grokster case 
from the earlier Sony (Betamax) case, relied upon by the lower courts to rule in favour of Grokster 
and Streamcast. The court noted that in the Betamax case there was no evidence to show that 
Sony’s object in introducing its videocassette recorder (VCR) was to violate copyright law or that 
Sony had taken active steps to profit from unlawful taping. Furthermore, the uses for which the VCR 
was intended (e.g. recording favourite shows and building a library of recorded programs) were non-
infringing uses.47 As a result,  
the only conceivable basis for imposing liability was on a theory of contributory infringement arising 
from [the] sale of VCRs to consumers with knowledge that some would use them to infringe. … But 
because the VCR was “capable of commercially significant non-infringing uses,” we held the 
manufacturer could not be faulted solely on the basis of its distribution. …
48
 
The court showed that the theory of contributory infringement was adapted from the “staple article of 
commerce” doctrine in US patent law,49 in terms of which if an article of commerce is capable of 
substantial lawful and unlawful uses, the manufacture would only be held liable in “instances of more 
acute fault than the mere understanding that some of one’s products will be misused.”50 The court 
pointed out however, that the focus should not be on the design and the distribution of the product 
concerned (e.g. whether it was or not capable of substantial non-infringing uses), to the disregard of 
the existence of “an actual purpose to cause infringing use”; in this regard the court found that the 
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 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
46
 An example in this regard in relation to the Copyright Amendment Bill, 2017 approved by both houses of Parliament and 
currently awaiting the President’s signature, available at https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 13 July 2019), relates to 
clause 27 of the Bill, which purports to prohibit the use of a technological protection measure circumvention device “in 
respect of a work protected by a technological protection measure”, vis-à-vis clause 28P, which in fact permits the use of 
such a device under the pretext that it is used for purposes of performing a “permitted” act or “to overcome security 
measures” for purposes of performing a “permitted” act.   
47
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster 545 U.S. 913 (2005), at 14. 
48
 Ibid.  
49
 In the Cipla case our Supreme Court of Appeals observed that the South African Patent Act  has no provisions 
comparable to those in the US Patent Act relating to the staple article doctrine, but further noted that our law does 
nevertheless, have “a remedy against intentionally aiding and abetting infringement”. See Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd v Aventis 
Pharma SA; Aventis Pharma SA and Others v Cipla Life Sciences (Pty) Ltd and Others 2013 (4) SA 579 (SCA), at para 33. 
For a full discussion on the application of the doctrine of secondary liability under South African copyright law see the 
discussion under paragraph 8.4 below. 
50
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster 545 U.S. 913 (2005), at 15. In this regard ‘where an article is “good for nothing 
else” but infringement … there is no legitimate public interest in its unlicensed availability, and there is no injustice in 
presuming or imputing an intent to infringe …’ Ibid. 
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Ninth Circuit erred in its interpretation of the Betamax decision, as it converted the case “from one 
about liability resting on imputed intent to one about liability on any theory.”51 The court observed, 
importantly, that the rule in the Betamax case did not displace other theories of secondary liability; 
was not meant to ignore evidence of intent if such evidence occurs and further was not meant “to 
foreclose rules of fault-based liability derived from the common law.”52  
Accordingly, while the theory of secondary liability provided a safe harbour from liability, if the 
evidence shows “statements or actions directed to promoting infringement, Sony’s staple article rule 
will not preclude liability.”53 Under such cases the defendant would be found liable based on the rule 
of inducement (persuading or enticing another to infringe copyright or taking active steps to 
encourage the direct infringement of copyright). Thus where for example, a person uses 
advertisement to promote infringing use or provides instruction to do so an “affirmative intent” that 
the product be used for infringing use is shown.54 In adopting the inducement rule the court was 
mindful of the need “to keep from trenching on regular commerce or discouraging the development 
of technologies” with the capability of both non-infringing and infringing use. In this regard the court 
observed that liability would not result from mere knowledge of infringing potential or actual 
infringing uses; or from ordinary acts “incident to distribution” (e.g. offering customers technical 
support or product updates). Rather it arises from “purposeful, culpable expression and conduct”.55 
In this regard the court made an important observation that holding the defendant liable on the basis 
of the inducement rule under such circumstances “does nothing to compromise legitimate 
commerce or discourage innovation having a lawful purpose.”56 
8.2.2.2 Lessons for South Africa from the Grokster judgment 
The observations made in the Grokster decision are apt for the South African environment, where, it 
appears, an attempt is being made to limit the liability of users in the name of promoting 
technological developments, by means of introducing an expanded exceptions regime. In this regard 
the outcome will be to render otherwise infringing uses lawful through legislative enactment. This 
situation is apparent from the provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017.57 Lessons can be 
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 Id at 16. 
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 Id at 17. Emphasis added. 
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 Id at 17 and 19.  
54
 Id at 17 and 18. 
55
 Id at 19. This would pre-eminently be demonstrated by messages sent out by the defendant that prove, “by a 
defendant’s own statements that his unlawful purpose disqualifies him from claiming protection”.  In the present case the 
court found additional evidence of culpable expression and conduct on the part of the respondents: First, each company 
demonstrated that it aimed to satisfy the demands of a market comprising former Napster users - a known source of 
demand for copyright infringement; secondly, neither company developed filtering uses or other mechanisms to diminish 
infringing use; thirdly, the respondents had an interest in high volumes of use of the software because this generated 
advertising revenues for them, because the evidence showed that the more the software was used, the more the ads were 
sent out, resulting in higher advertising revenues. The court also observed that in addition to such evidence there had to 
be evidence of actual infringement by the recipients of the device concerned (in this case the software); which it founded to 
also exist.  Id at 21 – 23. 
56
 Id at 19 – 20. 
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 Version B13B-2017, approved by both houses of Parliament and now awaiting the signature of the President. See for 
the Bill https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 13 July 2019). The Bill has evoked a heated debate with respect to the 
direction that South African copyright law is taking, and has pitted the so-called pro-user camp against the pro-rights camp, 
with over seventy submissions made. For a representation of the divergent views expressed in this regard and a synopsis 
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learnt from the observations made in the Grokster decision in this regard. Just as in the case of US 
law, our rules on contributory liability also emanate from our common law.58 As observed in the 
Grokster decision, in finding a defendant liable on the basis of secondary liability, the focus cannot 
be on the technology or the good that it can achieve (i.e. the non-infringing uses that it is capable 
of); rather it should be on whether there is nonetheless evidence of an intent to cause infringing use. 
The determination of whether there is such infringing intent is of course a competence of the courts 
and generally becomes an issue when a case has been brought before the courts. In this regard the 
submission by Google, as part of submissions made to the parliamentary portfolio committee in 
relation to the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017, that “[n]o legislature can decide a priori when a 
particular song will infringe another song” 59 is thus partially correct. This does not, however, detract 
from the responsibility of the legislature to exercise diligence in law-making to ensure that legislation 
does not itself, become an instrument for the encouragement of infringing activities.  
The Google argument highlighted above is aligned with the argument, often made by those 
favouring substitution of the fair dealing exception with a fair use exception, that a fair use standard 
shall eliminate the need for legislatures to constantly amend copyright legislation in response to new 
technologies.60 In this regard it is argued that the fair use defence would “futureproof” copyright 
legislation – by which is meant that “a flexible fair use provision ‘will enable [copyright legislation] to 
adapt to changing technologies and uses without the need for legislative intervention’”.61 This 
argument nevertheless neglects the fact that in the United States, where the fair use defence 
originates and which is in fact the main jurisdiction where the defence is used more frequent 
                                                                                                                                                              
of some of the areas of concern raised by the rights-holder camp see 
https://libguides.wits.ac.za/Copyright_and_Related_Issues/SA_Copyright_Amendment_Bill_2017 and 
https://www.adamsadams.com/south-africas-copyright-law-knife-edge/ (date of use: 29 April 2018).  The complicated (and 
convoluted) issues raised in the Bill has are so grave that at one stage when the Bill was before Parliament it was reported 
that this situation left members of the parliamentary committee tasked with finalising the Bill “so confused” that it has been 
observed that “[t]he reworked, technically improved Copyright Amendment Bill is unlikely to complete its passage through 
Parliament unless National Assembly Trade and Industry Committee members spend time familiarising themselves with 
the many complex issues it seeks to address.” See http://legalbrief.co.za/login/?next=/diary/legalbrief-today/policy-
watch/legislation-copyright-bill-process-limps-on/ (date of use: 3 May 2018). 
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 Cipla Medpro (Pty) Ltd v Aventis Pharma SA; Aventis Pharma SA and Others v Cipla Life Sciences (Pty) Ltd and Others 
2013 (4) SA 579 (SCA), at paras 34 – 39. 
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Australian Law Reform Commission made in response to terms of reference to determine if the current exceptions and 
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Review of 2006 and the Hargreaves Review of 2011. See Gowers Review of Intellectual Property 2006 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/228849/0118404830.pdf at 6; 44; 61 et seq 
(date of use: 21 May 2018) and Digital Opportunity – A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, An Independent Report 
by Professor Ian Hargreaves, May 2011 (“the Hargreaves
 Review”) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32563/ipreview- finalreport.pdf at 44 para 
5.13 (date of use: 21 May 2018), respectively. 
61
 ALRC Report ibid. 
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amendments to the copyright legislation occur than in many other jurisdictions. In fact the US courts 
have themselves argued that it is not the role of the courts, but that of Congress, to respond to major 
technological innovations by amending or reforming copyright legislation.62  
In light of the above, the argument that fair use would be of assistance to rights-holders because of 
its flexibility and will thus “save the legislature from constant law reform to ‘catch up with new 
technologies and uses”63 is wanting. In this regard it is apt to make an important observation: in 
circumstances where the legislation has not been clear as to the protections available to rights-
holders in respect of particular technologies the fair use defence has been used to support the user 
and not rights-holders, as was the position in the Betamax case. In cases dealing with new 
technologies like the Napster and Grokster cases where the US courts found in favour of rights-
holders it was not the fair use standard that came to the aid of the rights-holders. Instead it was the 
existence of other doctrines of law64 – not as such originating from copyright legislation – which 
rendered the application of fair use inappropriate and thus came to the aid of the rights-holders.  
Perhaps one of the most enigmatic arguments posited by those who favour a fair-use defence is the 
argument that because fair use is a technology-neutral standard it would be of assistance not only to 
users but also to rights-holders, as it will bring about certainty and predictability in cases of new 
technology.65 First, the argument that fair use is technology-neutral is a rather stretched argument, 
according primacy to exceptions in relation to the technological neutrality rationale rather than to the 
right itself.66 In this regard it needs to be noted that traditionally the technological neutrality rationale 
has primarily been concerned with the protection granted to authors by copyright and not with the 
exceptions to that protection.67 Secondly, the assertion that fair use would bring about certainty 
                                               
62
 See Sony Corporation of America et al. v Universal City Studios, Inc., et al. 464 U.S. 417 (the Betamax case) at para 25, 
where it is observed that “Congress has the constitutional authority and the institutional ability to accommodate fully the 
varied permutations of competing interests that are inevitably implicated by … new technology.” Similar observations were 
made in Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster 545 U.S. 913 (2005) (the Grokster case) and in the dissenting judgment of 
Scalia J in American Broadcasting Companies, Inc. v Aereo, Inc. 573 U.S. _ (2014) (the Aereo case), at para 13.   
63
 ALRC Report 2013 https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/copyright-report-122 at p 97, para 4.48. 
64
 In particular the doctrines of secondary liability. 
65
 ALRC Report 2013 https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/copyright-report-122 at pp 95 – 97. 
66
 This, it is submitted, is part of the emerging trend in copyright law discourse under the broader rubric of “users’ rights”, 
which clearly seeks to re-interpret the very foundation of copyright law.   
67
 See for example Gendreau 2000 Science, Truth and Justice 198, generally, for an overview of the historical 
development of the technological neutrality rationale in copyright treaty law. See also Von Lewinski International Copyright 
Law 140, observing in respect of the right of “reproduction in any manner or form” under art 9(1) of the Berne Convention, 
that “[t]he notion of ‘reproduction … in any manner or form’ is technically neutral and very broad, so that it does not 
exclude any technique by which the reproduction is effected … [and] also should be understood as including reproduction 
in a different dimension …”. See also WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention 54. In this regard it has been observed in 
respect of the reproduction right: “Oddly enough this right, which is the very essence of copyright, did not appear in the 
Convention as one of the minima until as late as Stockholm (1967). Though the right was recognised, in principle, by all 
member countries, the problem was to find a formula wide enough to cover all reasonable exceptions but not so wide as to 
make the right illusory.” WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention ibid. In other words, while it was deemed necessary to 
specify the ambit of the exceptions, the right of reproduction itself was phrased in a technologically-neutral manner. Of 
course it is understood that as an offshoot of the technological neutrality rationale this would be extended to the exceptions 
relating to the protection concerned but it is submitted that it is faulty to accord primacy to this rationale in relation to the 
exceptions themselves. Even within the context of the revitalised assessment of the principle of technological neutrality by 
the Canadian courts, the principle has not, where the courts have denied relief to rights-holders, been deemed to arise 
from the operation of the fair dealing defence but rather seen as being premised on the scheme and object of the copyright 
legislation and the intention of the legislature. The courts have thus first recognised and affirmed the protections due to 
rights-holders, and held either that, based on the principle of balance and technological neutrality, no further remedy was 
due to the rights-holders - see Entertainment Software Association v SOCAN 2012 SCC 34; or, where the existence of a 
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requires further justification, seeing that one of the main arguments levelled against the fair use 
defence is its lack of certainty vis-à-vis fair dealing which does bring about certainty as to the scope 
of the exceptions concerned.68 Thirdly, in support of the argument that fair use does bring about 
certainty it has been observed that a consideration of the fair use cases that have come before the 
US courts reveal certain patterns  or “policy clusters”, which make it possible to predict whether a 
use is likely to be fair or not.69 Doing so however means that one has to peruse previous cases to 
determine whether the case at hand falls within any of the proposed policy clusters. Such an 
exercise would of necessity be required within the context of litigation or seeking legal advice, as 
lays persons would not be able to do so without legal training.70 This however supports the argument 
that fair use is litigation-intensive and would result in “an American style proliferation of high cost 
litigation”.71  
In light of the foregoing it is the duty of the legislature to ensure that copyright legislation provides 
enough certainty to eliminate the need to frequently seek recourse from the courts. Copyright 
legislation cannot be a regime of limitations and exceptions (thus a regime of users’ rights), with the 
rights of authors not clearly defined.72 The propensity for legislators to stray from exercising their 
legislative diligence function provides the justification for the system of judicial review, which in 
South Africa has since the advent of the new constitutional dispensation, been elevated to the level 
of constitutional review. In this regard judicial review is defined as: 
                                                                                                                                                              
remedy was recognised, held that the licence fee was inappropriate since the Copyright Board had failed to consider the 
principles of balance and technological neutrality when determining the fee – see CBC v SODRAC 2015 SCC 57.   
68
 See in this regard the Hargreaves Report where it was noted that introducing fair use in the United Kingdom would bring 
about “massive legal uncertainty because of [fair use’s] roots in American law”. Digital Opportunity – A Review of 
Intellectual Property and Growth, An Independent Report by Professor Ian Hargreaves, May 2011 (“the Hargreaves
 Review”) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32563/ipreview- finalreport.pdf at 44 para 
5.13 (date of use: 21 May 2018). Fair use is also seen as a general criterion employed at the discretion of the judge and 
“not limited to certain purposes of the allegedly infringing act”. See Brenncke 2007 Heft 71 at 5; also Burrell 2001 I.P.Q. 
364 – 365, who criticises fair use for “providing flexibility at the expense of certainty”. In this regard it needs to be noted 
that some who support a fair use defence in the place of fair dealing have levelled the same criticism of uncertainty to fair 
dealing. Thus it has been argued that “[t]he close-ended nature of the fair dealing exceptions creates uncertainty, because 
it can be difficult to determine if a particular use falls into one of the specified purposes.” In this regard reference is made, 
in the Australian context, to the case of TCN Channel Nine v Network Ten Ltd (2002) 118 FCR 417, where the focus was 
on the question whether the use of clips in an entertainment show amounted to news reporting or criticism and review, and 
it is concluded that “[f]air use would avoid this problem, by not confining the exception to a set of prescribed purposes.” 
See in this regard ALRC Report 2013 https://www.alrc.gov.au/publications/copyright-report-122 at p 115 para 4.130. It is 
submitted that such an assertion is rather far-fetched as it can be argued that this was an exception to the norm and that in 
the majority of cases such uncertainty does not exist.  
69
 See Samuelson 2009 Fordham Law Review and Sag 2012 Ohio State Law Journal, generally. Samuelson ibid identifies 
some of these policy clusters as including free speech and expression fair uses, authorship-promoting fair uses, uses that 
promote learning etc. 
70
 Samuelson 2009 Fordham Law Review 2621 states: … [J]udges and commentators should … look … for common 
patterns in the fair use caselaw upon which to build a predictable body of fair use law. Analyzing fair uses in light of cases 
previously decided within the same policy cluster will make fair use more rule-like …” Emphasis added. Likewise Sag 2012 
Ohio State Law Journal 49 observes: “… [W]hile there are many shades of gray in fair use litigation, there are also 
consistent patterns that can assist individuals, businesses, and lawyers in assessing the merits of particular claims to fair 
use protection.” Emphasis added. 
71
 Digital Opportunity – A Review of Intellectual Property and Growth, An Independent Report by Professor Ian 
Hargreaves, May 2011 (“the Hargreaves
 Review”) 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32563/ipreview- finalreport.pdf at 44 para 
5.13 (date of use: 21 May 2018). 
72
 The current Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 contains more provisions that relate to “users’ rights” or exceptions and 
limitations, than it does provisions that relate to authors’ rights and thus can be properly termed a “users’ rights law”. 
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… the power of the courts to scrutinise and declare unconstitutional any type of legislation, whether 
original or delegated, … that infringes on the rights in the Bill of Rights … or otherwise offends against 
provisions of the Constitution.
73
 
“Any type of legislation” includes intellectual property legislation and in this case, copyright 
legislation. As section 2 of the Constitution74 provides, the Constitution is the supreme law of the 
Republic and “any law or conduct inconsistent with it is invalid”. Thus in the constitutional 
dispensation a Damocles’ sword hangs over every type of legislation that manifests what has 
elsewhere been termed “bad legislative intent” or “constitutionally-forbidden legislative intent”.75 It 
was indicated above that the Grokster court identified a tension between the values of (i) supporting 
creative pursuits through copyright protection and (ii) protecting innovation in new communication 
technologies “by limiting the incidence of liability for copyright infringement”, in the case that came 
before it.76 This tension is perfectly reflected not only in the debates that have raged with regard to 
South Africa’s Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 but also in the Bill itself. In this regard it is submitted 
that the Bill has failed to create a proper balance between these two competing values, and clearly 
shows a bias towards so-called “users’ rights” to the detriment of “authors’ rights”.77  
More particularly, it is submitted that the conversion of what is supposed to be an author’s rights 
legislation into a users’ rights legislation, without also providing a mechanism for proper 
compensation for authors, would bring about a legislature-induced promotion of copyright 
infringement.78 This pitting of users against authors in legislation reflects a bad or constitutionally-
forbidden legislative intent. The resultant legislation cannot thus stand constitutional muster and 
would almost immediately be ripe for constitutional review. This is also exacerbated by the apparent 
lack of proper consultation with rights-holder groups - also required by the Constitution79 – prior to 
                                               
73
 Hoexter Administrative Law 113. Emphasis added. In this regard it needs to be noted that our courts have since clearly 
recognised that intellectual property rights are also protected under the Bill of Rights (as a genre of the property rights 
provided for in s 25 of the Constitution), where earlier in the Certification case – Ex Parte Chairperson of the Constitutional 
Assembly : In re Certification of the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa 1996 1996 (4) SA 744 (CC), at 799 – the 
Constitutional Court had been ambivalent in this regard. See in this regard Laugh It Off Promotions CC v The South 
African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a Sabmark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus 
Curiae) 2006 (1) SA 144 (CC); Laugh It Off Promotions CC v The South African Breweries International (Finance) BV t/a 
Sabmark International (Freedom of Expression Institute as Amicus Curiae) 2005 (2) SA 46 (SCA) paras 10 – 11;  National 
Soccer League v Gidani (Pty) Ltd [2014] ZAGPJHC 33, at paras 96 and 105. See also Currie and De Waal Bill of Rights 
Handbook at 539, where it is observed: “‘Property’ for purposes of s 25 should … be seen as those resources that are 
generally taken to constitute a person’s wealth, and that are recognised and protected by law. Such resources are legally 
protected by private law rights - … intellectual property rights in the case of intellectual property. …”    
74
 Constitution of the Republic of South Africa, 1996. 
75
 See Hasen 2006 Wisconsin Law Review and Fallon 2016 Harvard Law Review, respectively. 
76
 Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Inc. v Grokster 545 U.S. 913 (2005), at 10 – 11. 
77
 This is borne out by the fact that in many instances in the Bill users are bizarrely identified as parties that must share in 
the payment of royalties in the same way as authors. The Bill is replete with such provisions but see for a few examples, 
clauses 4, 5, 6, and 8 of the Bill. See also for an analysis of this issue Hollis https://www.adamsadams.com/south-africas-
copyright-law-knife-edge/ (date of use: 30 April 2018). 
78
 This also defeats the stated purpose of the Bill as outlined in the Memorandum on the Objects of the Bill, namely “to 
protect the economic interests of authors and creators of work [sic] against infringement …” See the Memorandum on 
page 35 of the Bill, available at http://infojustice.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/05/South-Africa-Copyright-Amendment-Bill-
2017.pdf (date of use: 28 April 2018).  
79
 See Doctors for Life International v The Speaker of the National Assembly and Others 2006 (6) SA 416 (CC) and 
Matatiele Municipality and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others (2) 2007 (1) BCLR 47 (CC), 
where the constitutional obligation for the legislature to facilitate reasonable public participation in respect of legislative 
processes was highlighted. In this regard it was stated in the  Matatiele case (at para 68): “The nature and the degree of 
public participation that is reasonable in a given case will depend on a number of factors. These include the nature and the 
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introducing the Bill in Parliament. In this regard the following was stated in one of the submissions 
made to Parliament: 
… [T]he sudden appearance of the 2017 Bill raises real concerns about whether there has been 
proper consultation and engagement with the relevant stakeholders. Given the controversial nature of 
the 2017 Bill … and its complexity, it is, once again, necessary to question the time period allotted for 
comment; it smacks of another attempt to pass ill-considered, and ineptly drafted, legislation, without 
affording interested parties adequate opportunity to formulate and voice their concerns about the 
consequences and implications of the proposed legislation. It is even arguable that this type of modus 
operandi could leave legislation of this nature open to constitutional challenge, given the fact that 
there is flagrant disregard for the substance and spirit of the constitutionally-enshrined principals, with 
a mere veneer of procedural formality being applied.
80
 
In the Poverty Alleviation Network case81 the Constitutional Court ruled that consultation is 
concerned with the process of engagement and not its outcome. Thus Parliament does not have to 
be “swayed by public opinion in its ultimate decision”, and reasonable public participation would 
have taken place in spite of such public opinion not being taken into account in the ultimate 
decision.82 This notwithstanding it is submitted that (i) the process of engagement in respect of the 
Copyright Amendment Bill was itself defective because no proper opportunity was afforded to the 
sectors mainly affected by the Bill, to present their opinion; (ii) Parliament cannot pass a law that 
itself, is in contravention of the Constitution, the supreme law of the land. With regard to the latter 
observation the concern is not limited to depriving authors of their property rights as provided for in 
section 25 of the Constitution (through the displacement of such rights by so-called “users’ rights”83) 
: it also relates to the fact that the Bill is likely to also give rise to a contravention of international law. 
This point requires further elaboration. 
                                                                                                                                                              
importance of the legislation and the intensity of its impact on the public. The more discrete and identifiable the potentially 
affected section of the population, and the more intense the possible effect on their interests, the more reasonable it would 
be to expect the legislature to be astute to ensure that the potentially affected section of the population is given a 
reasonable opportunity to have a say.” It is submitted that this fits squarely the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017, which 
indeed is an important legislation having a dire impact on the public and affecting directly the livelihoods of musicians and 
other rights-holder groups. Musicians fit the description of a “discrete and identifiable … section of the population” even 
more, based on the fact that they were identified in the Copyright Review Commission (CRC) of 2011 as a particularly 
vulnerable community, with a final recommendation to “assess the efficiency of legislation in South Africa” to address the 
issues faced by this community. The Memorandum to the Bill itself also makes reference to the CRC as being one of the 
instruments that motivated the formulation of the Bill. It is thus surprising that the majority of the provisions of the Bill have 
turned out to be anti-author and pro-user. For the CRC see   http://www.gov.za/documents/copyright-review-commission-
report-2011 (date of use: 28 April 2018). For the inadequacy of the consultation process in relation to the rights-holder 
community see Hollis https://www.adamsadams.com/south-africas-copyright-law-knife-edge/ (date of use: 28 April 2018), 
who refers to a “perceived lack of proper and meaningful stakeholder engagement … with the report under the 
Government’s Socio-Economic Impact Assessment System (SEIAS) not indicating any independent research  - or any 
research at all – on the impact of the Bill, especially its proposed exceptions and the ‘fair use’ clause.” 
80
 The Anton Mostert Chair of Intellectual Property Law http://blogs.sun.ac.za/iplaw/files/2017/06/CIP-Comments-
Copyright-Amendment-Bill-2017.pdf at 2 (date of use: 30 April 2018).   
81
 Poverty Alleviation Network and Others v President of the Republic of South Africa and Others 2010 (6) BCLR 520 (CC). 
82
 Id at paras 62 and 63. 
83
 The concept of a “user’s right” is alien to international copyright law. The conceptual basis for the idea of a "users' right", 
rather than referring to a limitation of authors' rights under certain circumstances, was found or rather given traction in the 
highly-publicised Canadian case of CCH Canadian Ltd v Law Society of Upper Canada [2004] 1 SCR, 2004 SCC 13, 
where Justice McLachlin observed (at para 48), that the fair dealing exception, "like other exceptions in the Copyright Act, 
is a user's right", and warned against deeming exceptions as mere defences to an action of copyright infringement. Earlier 
writers such as Patterson and Lindberg had advocated for a similar position. See Patterson and Lindberg The Nature of 
Copyright, generally. However, neither international copyright law nor the laws of most jurisdictions (or perhaps all other 
jurisdictions) make provision for a “user’s right”.  
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Reference was made above to section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution, which provides that, when 
interpreting the Bill of Rights a court, tribunal or forum may consider foreign law.  Section 39(1)(b) 
provides that, under similar circumstances the court, tribunal or forum must consider international 
law. Further to this, section 233 of the Constitution provides that when interpreting any legislation 
any reasonable interpretation consistent with international law must be preferred to any inconsistent 
interpretation. In this regard it is important to note that it has often been observed that there is, as 
such, no system of international copyright, there being no “single code governing protection across 
national borders, nor a unitary multi-national property right”; and that what exists is in fact “a 
complex of copyright relations among sovereign states, each having its own copyright law applicable 
to acts within its territory”.84 Nevertheless it is submitted that it remains correct to refer to copyright 
as being part of a system of international law in the sense of treaty law or rather “a body of rules 
made by states in their interactions with each other.”85 Such a construction is, it is submitted, 
consistent with the provisions of section 231 of the Constitution, which recognises “international 
agreements” as being part of international law.  
In the area of copyright the most important international agreements are the Berne Convention86 - 
the “most widely adhered to international law treaty in the sphere of copyright”87 – and the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPs Agreement), 
recognised as being “the most comprehensive international instrument on intellectual property 
rights” by the scope of its coverage.88 There are a number of ways in which the current Copyright 
Amendment Bill as introduced in parliament would be in conflict with international copyright law. As 
an example, the newly-introduced provisos in the Bill to the section 6, 7 and 8 rights make it 
mandatory for authors who have assigned their rights, to share in fifty percent of the royalties 
attributable to the use of the works concerned. This can be seen as reducing rights in copyright to 
Rome Convention-type remuneration rights, in spite of the fact that such rights are, in terms of the 
Berne Convention minimum standards, exclusive in nature. More relevant to the current discussion 
is the introduction of an expanded exceptions regime and in particular, the introduction of a US-style 
fair use exception, been hailed as being crucial for technological developments by some.89 Doing 
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 Baumgarten “Primer on International Copyright” 470 – 471. National courts have also emphasised the territorial nature of 
copyright. See for example Gallo Africa Ltd and Others v Sting Music (Pty) Ltd and Others [2011] 1 All SA 449 (SCA) at 
paras 15 – 17. 
85
  Definition of “international law” in Du Bois Wille’s Principles 108.  See also Von Lewinski International Copyright Law 3 – 
4 and Ruse-Kahn Intellectual Property in International Law, generally, for the recognition of intellectual property law as 
forming part of international law. 
86
 Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works of September 9, 1886, completed at Paris on May 4, 
1886; revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908; revised at Berne on March 20, 1914; revised at Rome on June 2, 1928; 
revised at Brussels on June 26, 1948; revised at Stockholm on July 14 1967; revised at Paris on July 24, 1971 and 
amended on September 28, 1979 (“the Berne Convention”). 
87
 Fraser 1997 J. Marshall J. Computer & Info. L. 762. 
88
 See Correa Intellectual Property Rights and Developing Countries 1. With regard to substantive protection the Berne 
Convention remains the most important agreement and its provisions have accordingly been incorporated within the TRIPs 
Agreement. However the TRIPs Agreement deals with other provisions relating to principles of protection, enforcement 
mechanisms, dispute prevention and settlement, and miscellaneous provisions relating to developing countries and 
institutional provisions. See in this regard Part II of the TRIPs Agreement and more specifically, Articles 9 – 14 thereof. By 
being part of the WTO dispute settlement system however the TRIPs Agreement remains the most forceful global 
framework on intellectual property rights. 
89
 See the Google submission in respect of the Bill, available at https://libguides.wits.ac.za/ld.php?content_id=33934566 
(date of use: 29 April 2018). 
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this without having conducted a proper assessment of the impact of doing so on the livelihoods of 
rights-holders would, it is submitted, runs foul of the requirements of the three-step test embodied in 
both the Berne Convention and the TRIPs Agreement.90 In this regard it is instructive to indicate that 
doubts have been cast as to the compliance of the fair use system with the three-step test.91  
The three-step test requires that limitations and exceptions to the exclusive rights granted in terms 
of copyright must only be imposed (i) in certain special cases; (ii) that do not conflict with a normal 
exploitation of the work and (ii) do not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author. 
In a WTO Dispute Resolution Panel decision92 which concerned exceptions introduced under the US 
Copyright Act93 the Panel, relying on article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement, observed that “[t]he three 
conditions apply on a cumulative basis, each being a separate and independent requirement that 
must be satisfied”, so that “[f]ailure to comply with any of the three conditions results in the Article 13 
exception being disallowed. …”94 In this regard the Panel further observed: 
It may be noted at the outset that Article 13 cannot have more than a narrow or limited operation. Its 
tenor, consistent as it is with the provisions of Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention (1971), discloses 
that it was not intended to provide for exceptions or limitations except for those of a limited nature. …
95
 
After analysing each of the three conditions in respect of the exceptions concerned the Panel found 
that an exception which exempted a broad range of retail and restaurant establishments (the so-
called business exception) from liability for the public performance of musical works by means of 
communication of radio and television transmissions, contravened article 13 of the TRIPs 
Agreement and Article 9.2 of the Berne Convention. There is no indication that in introducing the 
expanded exceptions regime the drafters of the current Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 have 
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 The three-step test is provided for in Article 9 of the Berne Convention (1971), in particular Article 9(2)). Article 9 of the 
Convention provides the following: “(1) Authors of literary and artistic works protected by this Convention shall have the 
exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any manner or form. (2) It shall be a matter for legislation 
in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of such works in certain special cases, provided that such 
reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate 
interests of the author.” (Emphasis added). The highlighted phrases constitute the Berne three-step test. The TRIPs 
Agreement contains similar provisions in Article 13 thereof but is broader in the sense that the application of the test is not 
only limited to the reproduction right, as is the case under Berne. 
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 See for example Burrell R “Reining In Copyright Law: Is Fair Use the Answer?” 2001 I.P.Q. (4), who casts doubt as to 
the compliance of the fair use defence with the three-step test (at 384 – 385). 
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 WTO Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July 2000, DSR 
2000: VIII, p. 3769. 
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 The exceptions were introduced through the Fairness in Music Licensing Act of 1998, which amended s 110(5) of the 
US Copyright Act 1976. The amendment dealt with two exceptions, which have been called the home-style exception 
(introduced by sub-paragraph (A)), and the business exception (introduced by sub-paragraph (B)). Both exceptions dealt 
with the public performance of music in bars, shops, restaurants etc by means broadcasts, regardless of whether or not 
the broadcasts were original over-the-air or satellite broadcasts, rebroadcasts by terrestrial or satellite means, cable 
retransmission of original broadcasts, or original cable transmissions or other transmissions by wire. The business 
exception, which the Panel dealt with first, permitted certain food, drink and retail establishments conforming to certain size 
requirements and equipment limits to play non-dramatic musical works transmitted through radio or television broadcasts 
without payment of a royalty, provided the establishment concerned did not charge directly for the transmission and did not 
display the service beyond the boundaries of the establishment concerned.  The home-style exception, which applied to 
smaller establishments in respect of “communication of a transmission embodying a performance or display of a work by 
the public reception of the transmission on a single receiving apparatus of a kind commonly used in private homes”, unless 
a direct charge is made to see or hear the transmission or the transmission is further transmitted to the public.   
94
 WTO Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July 2000, DSR 
2000: VIII, p. 3769, at para 6.97. 
95
 Ibid. Emphasis added. 
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carefully assessed their adherence to the three-step test.96 It is submitted that if many of the newly-
introduced exceptions or limitations were subjected to a rigorous three-step test as exercised by the 
WTO Panel they would be found wanting. Thus we find that on at least three fronts, namely (i) 
deprivation of the property rights provided under section 25 of the Constitution; (ii) lack of proper 
consultation and (iii) non-adherence to the three-step test, the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 
would, if passed into law, fail to pass constitutional muster. 
8.2.3 BitTorrent and Other New Generation P2P Networks – The Pirate Bay 
The legal challenges faced by and ultimate demise of Napster, Kazaa and Grokster did not as such 
deter users from making use of P2P file-sharing technologies. This prompted rights-holders, in 
particular through the agency of the Recording Industry Association of America (RIAA), to initiate a 
much-criticised process of instituting legal proceedings against a reported thirty thousand-odd 
individual offenders, “includ[ing] children, grandparents, unemployed single mothers, college 
professors”.97 This initiative too did not yield the desired results, prompting the RIAA to announce, 
after reaching agreement with several internet service providers (ISPs), that it would cease the 
initiative and instead cut off subscribers’ connections if they ignored warnings to stop their infringing 
activities.98 On their part the technologists sought for new ways to continue making use of the file-
sharing technology while eliminating detection “or seeking to make the task of the content industry 
significantly more difficult in trying to prevent their activities.”99 The BitTorrent technology, with its 
ability to eliminate the use of central servers, has been such technology. 
In this newer or next generation of P2P systems the focus has been on concealing the sources from 
which the shared files emanate by masking the detection of the individual’s “cyber footprint”.100 In 
this regard BitTorrent technology is described as “a communications protocol of peer-to-peer file 
sharing … used to distribute large amounts of data and electronic files over the internet”, enabling a 
user to download files from (or uploaded them to) multiple users simultaneously, rather than from a 
single source.101 This is done using software termed a BitTorrent Client, which is used to access a 
Torrent file which can be downloaded or uploaded simultaneously by a group of users (termed a 
“swarm”) and contains information about various files and their location.102  No central server is 
needed to do this as the P2P file-sharing is facilitated through the use of BitTorrent trackers or 
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 None of the newly-introduced exceptions in the Bill in fact specifically provide that the exceptions shall be subject to the 
application of the three-step test.  
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indexes (e.g. The Pirate Bay) and the files are shared between users connected to the swarm 
through their computers, who either have the entire file or portions thereof.103  
The modus operandi of the BitTorrent technology has been explained as follows: 
Users (called ‘seeders’) who wish to make a file on their computer available to other users (called 
‘leechers’) have to create a torrent file through the BitTorrent client. Torrent files refer to a central 
server (called a ‘tracker’) which identifies the users available to share a particular torrent file as well as 
the underlying media file. These torrent files are uploaded by the seeders to an online sharing platform 
… which then proceeds to index them so that they can be found by the users of the online sharing 
platform and the works to which those torrent files refer can be downloaded onto the users’ computers 
in several segments through their BitTorrent client.
104
  
The Pirate Bay (“TPB”), a Swedish company founded in 2003, has been perhaps the best 
exemplifier of the essence and notoriety of BitTorrent technology. Despite having been subjected to 
a number of legal challenges, including the blocking of its domain name in several jurisdictions, the 
raiding of its offices by law enforcement agents, the hacking of its servers and the personal 
prosecution of its founders, TPB has somehow had a way of reinventing itself – in particular through 
the use of different domain names and “frequently replac[ing] its iconic pirate ship logo”.105 TPB has 
also made use of the practice of “bulletproof hosting”, namely moving its operations to jurisdictions 
that would permit the operations, or hosting its websites through ISPs that would be unlikely to stop 
these operations.106 TPB’s furtive manners may however, be nearing the same fate faced by 
Napster, Kazaa and Grokster before it, following a recent ruling of the Court of Justice of the 
European Union (CJEU) (the “Pirate Bay” case).107  
8.2.3.1 The Pirate Bay case 
The Pirate Bay case was a referral from the Supreme Court of the Netherlands to the CJEU, for a 
preliminary ruling to determine, in the main: 
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Whether there was a communication to the public within the meaning of Article 3(1) of the EU 
Directive of 2001,[108] “by the operator of a website, if no protected works are available on that 
website, but a system exists … by means of which metadata on protected works which are present 
on the users’ computers are indexed and categorised for users, so that the users can trace and 
upload and download the protected works on the basis thereof”.109  
In this regard the case followed the trend of other European decisions in which the question of digital 
infringement was approached on the basis of an infringement of the right of communication to the 
public, unlike the American cases dealt with above where the matter was approached from the basis 
of the infringement of the right of reproduction and distribution.  
The applicant in the current case sought relief in the form of an order compelling the respondents to 
block the domain names and IP addresses of TPB to prevent them from being used to infringe the 
copyright and related rights of rights-holders represented by the applicant. It was acknowledged by 
the referring court that the actions of TPB made protected works available to the public without the 
rights-holders authorisation and thus infringed the rights-holders copyright and related rights. The 
referring court nevertheless sought clarity as to whether in doing so, TPB was communicating such 
works to the public within the meaning of the 2001 EU Directive.110 The CJEU encapsulated the 
legal question as requiring it to determine if the concept of communication to the public should be 
interpreted as  
covering … the making available and management, on the internet, of a sharing platform which, by 
means of indexation of metadata relating to protected works and the provision of a search engine, 
allows users of that platform to locate those works and to share them in the context of a peer-to-peer 
network.
111
 
The court observed that the concept of “communication to the public” had to be interpreted broadly, 
seeing that the objective of the EU Directive of 2001 was “to establish a high level of protection for 
authors, allowing them to obtain an appropriate reward for the use of their works, including on the 
occasion of communication to the public.”112 The court further observed that the concept of 
“communication to the public” within the meaning of the 2001 Directive required an individual 
assessment involving two cumulative criteria, namely (i) an act of communication of a work and (ii) 
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and the communication of the work to “a public”.113 In determining whether an act of communication 
to the public has taken place one has to consider the “deliberative nature” of the user’s intervention. 
Thus where the user intervenes, knowing fully the consequences of his action, to give access to a 
copyright-protected work to his customers, “particularly where, in the absence of that intervention, 
those customers would not be able to enjoy the broadcast work, or would be able to do so only with 
difficulty”, an act of communication would have taken place.114 “Public” refers to an indeterminate 
number of potential viewers and implies “a fairly large number of people.”115  
Further to the above, for a protected work to satisfy the requirements of “communication to the 
public” the work must have been communicated using “specific technical means” different from 
those previously used; or else it must have been be communicated to a “new public” – i.e. “a public 
that was not already taken into account by the copyright holders when they authorised the initial 
communication of their work to the public”.116 Having considered relevant case law the court 
concluded that the making available and management of an online sharing platform, where the user, 
with full knowledge of the facts, provides its customers with access to copyright-protected works, 
amounted to an act of communication to the public within the meaning of the EU Directive of 
2001.117 In providing its reasons the court made the following observations: 
(1) Although the users and not the platform operators themselves had placed the works online,  
the fact remains that those operators, by making available and managing an online-sharing platform 
…intervene, with full knowledge of the consequences of their conduct, to provide access to protected 
works, by indexing on that platform torrent files which allow users of the platform to locate those works 
and to share them within the context of a peer-to-peer network.
118
  
In this way the operators played an essential role in making the works concerned, available;119 and 
(2) The operators were not merely providing physical facilities for enabling or making a 
communication.120 In addition to providing a search engine TPB provided an index “classifying the 
works under different categories, based on the type of the works, their genre or their popularity … 
with the platform’s operators checking to ensure that a work has been placed in the appropriate 
category”; and also deleting obsolete or faulty files and actively filtering content.121 
Regarding the question whether the communication was a communication to “a public” the court 
noted that the concept of “public” involves a de minimis threshold and thus excluded from the 
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concept “groups of persons … which are too small or insignificant.”122 In order to determine the 
sufficient number the cumulative effect of making the works available to potential recipients had to 
be taken into account: thus not only the number of persons having access to the same work at the 
same time is to be considered, but also “how many of them have access to it in succession”.123 This 
observation clearly captured the BitTorrent modus operandi and, as the court observed, “all of the 
platform’s users” were thus included within the concept of “a public”; since “[t]hese users can 
access, at any time and simultaneously, the protected works which are shared by means of the 
platform” (fulfilling the requirement of an “indeterminate number of potential recipients” involving a 
large number of persons”).124 This public was furthermore a public that the copyright holders had not 
taken into account when they authorised the initial communication, particularly because “a very large 
number of torrent files [on the TPB platform] relate to works published without the consent of the 
rightholders.”125 
8.2.3.2 Conclusion 
Important lessons can be learnt from the manner in which the European Union has dealt with the 
interpretation of the concept of “communication to the public”, especially since South Africa does not 
know such a concept in respect of musical works.126 This observation is even more relevant in view 
of the fact that the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 seeks to incorporate exceptions relating to 
temporary acts of reproduction that clearly emanate from article 5(1) of the EU Directive of 2001127 
(albeit haphazardly). Some of the CJEU’s elaboration on the ambit of the right of “communication to 
the public” have been based on an interpretation of the effect of the exceptions introduced in terms 
of article 5(1) of the EU Directive of 2001.128 It is submitted that if South Africa wants to introduce a 
truly-effective exception based on EU law, the South African legislature must, in enacting the 
legislation in question, take into account (i) all the considerations made by the EU in introducing 
such an exception; and (ii) the latest developments in relation to the legislative status and the 
judicial interpretation of the said exception in EU law. This will prevent the occurrence of issues that 
have been ascribed to the unfettered use of foreign law, namely: 
[a] fixation on legal rules and concepts and a neglect of legal culture and context; considering foreign 
legal rules and judgments in isolation and failing to situate them within a larger legal system and 
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tradition; using foreign law as authority for a certain standpoint rather than as a basis for comparison 
and a source of constitutional arguments …
129
 
In relation to the foregoing the use of the communication right in EU law to counter the possible 
adverse application of the temporary reproduction exception provided for in article 5(1) of the EU 
Directive of 2001 would be something worth considering if the temporary reproduction exception is 
introduced in South African copyright law.130 In this regard the deference to EU law would not only 
be justified by the fact that the proposed temporary reproduction exception in question is based on 
EU law. More than this, it would be justified on the ground that the UK position, which South African 
courts would generally refer to due to South Africa’s historic connection to UK copyright law,131 is, in 
relation to this matter, now consonant with the EU position.132 It is in this regard acknowledged that 
the UK is in the process of withdrawing from the EU through the “Brexit” decision. Nevertheless, 
intellectual property law is likely to assume the status of “retained EU law”, together with other types 
of EU law that currently applies directly in the UK.133  
With regard to the foregoing it needs to be noted that the current interpretation of the concepts of 
“public”, “the public” or “in public” by South African courts in relation to the public performance of 
copyright works is based on earlier English law.134  In these earlier English decisions it was held that 
the reference to “public” in this case is a reference to the copyright owner’s public,135 i.e. it “must be 
considered in the light of the relationship between the audience and the owner of the copyright and 
not in the light of the relationship between the audience and the performer”.136 Dean argues that this 
interpretation would equally apply in respect of the use of the term “public” in the definition of 
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“broadcasting” in our Copyright Act.137 It must be observed that such a view would be in conflict with 
position applicable under the Berne Convention, which makes a distinction between the 
broadcasting right and the public performance right.138 Thus the correct position regarding the 
meaning that must be accorded to the term “public” within the context of the broadcasting right can 
be determined from how this concept is understood within the purview of the Berne Convention. In 
this regard Goldstein and Hugenholtz have, with regard to the right of broadcasting or 
communicating a work to the public provided for in article 11bis(1)(i) of the Berne Convention, made 
the following observation: 
It is central to this right, as to the other aspects of the broadcasting right, that some form of receiver 
intermediate between the performer and the audience. But, for conduct to fall within the right, it is 
necessary only that signals be emitted; “it is immaterial whether or not they are in fact received.” Thus, 
even if no single member of the public views or hears the signal, it will nonetheless constitute a 
broadcast to the public.
139
 
In this regard it must be noted that, in like manner, UK copyright law has also always made a clear 
distinction between the treatment of the public performance right and the right to broadcast a 
work;140 and that this is in fact a position that has been followed under South African copyright 
law.141 This position has been retained in current UK copyright law, where the concept of “public” in 
respect of the act of public performance differs from the concept as it is used in respect of the act of 
broadcasting (as subsumed within the concept of communication to the public under EU law).  Thus 
while the traditional test used in Jennings v Stephens142 still applies in respect of the concept of 
“public” in relation to the act of public performance; other considerations apply in respect of the use 
of the concept in relation to the act of communication to the public (which, as indicated, 
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encompasses the act of broadcasting). Such considerations include the consideration as to 
“[whether] the communication is made by a broadcaster other than the original one, and to a public 
which is different from the public to which the original broadcast was addressed.”143 Thus even if 
South African courts were to continue to refer to UK law post-Brexit, the current EU position with 
regard to the treatment of the right of communication to the public would in all likelihood, still 
apply.144 Accordingly, the observation made above regarding finding assistance in EU law in relation 
to the right of communication to the public would still be relevant.145  
8.3. The Traditional Music Market and the Role of Copyright in 
Organising the Market 
8.3.1 Understanding the Traditional Music Market 
The concept of a “value chain” 146 has been used conveniently both to describe and make sense of 
the various activities and complex relationships that exist within the music industry and to properly 
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delineate the essential market segments that exist within the industry. The three main market 
segments within the music industry are (a) songwriting and music publishing; (b) music recording 
and (c) live performances.147 Traditionally the music business value system was rather clear-cut and 
straightforward,148 straddling between these three main market segments. In the songwriting and 
music publishing segment one would, for example, find, upstream, songwriters and music publishing 
companies and downstream, collecting societies; in the music recording segment one would find 
upstream, recording artists, recording studios and record labels, and downstream, music distributors 
and must retail stores;149 and in the live performance segment one would find performing artists, 
music managers, talent agents, venues and concert promoters.150 This clear-cut music industry 
segmentation also gave rise to distinct, defined royalty streams associated with each of the various 
music market segments, which the participants in such markets would have a legitimate expectation 
to receive once the work or performance would have been commercially exploited. 
One of the features of the traditional music market segmentation was its reliance on intermediaries, 
where the author or performer of music needed intermediaries such as music publishers, record 
labels and music retail stores to get his or her work or performance to be commercially exploited. 
This dependence on intermediaries gave rise to a gigantic and sprawling, inter-connected global 
industry which fed off a constant supply of “hit songs” and rousing performances from an equally 
seemingly incessant queue of would-be “hit makers”. The concept of a value chain has, until 
recently, been useful in deciphering this inter-connected and inter-dependent system comprising the 
“music industry”. The digital revolution has however, arguably disrupted this neat, straightforward 
structure of the music industry and given rise to a condition that can largely be described as “market 
disintermediation”.151 In this regard it has been suggested that digital technology has brought about 
a shift from a value chain to a value network in the music industry, making the value chain for the 
new media music industry much more complicated.152 This phenomenon is well-captured in the 
following observation:  
Traditional music publishing can be presented as a linear value chain of content creation (produce), 
production (manufacture), distribution and consumption …. The supply chain was structured to 
distribute and sell media content through a simple distribution network, at fixed time windows. 
However, the rise of digital platforms like the Internet and devices like MP3 players, smart phones and 
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 See in this regard Simon 2012 http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC69816.pdf at 21 – 29 (date of use: 21 May 2017). 
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 When for example, compared to the value chains that exist in technology licensing. 
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 And more recently, collecting societies (e.g. needle-time societies). 
150
 See further below for an elaboration on the concepts of upstream and downstream markets. It is not easy to delineate 
between upstream and downstream markets in respect of live performances but one would think of formal concert and tour 
performances as constituting the upstream market, and activities like corporate and private party gigs, and the new trend 
of live streaming, as constituting the downstream market. 
151
 In the context of the music industry market disintermediation, or “cutting out the middleman”, is the notion that the digital 
revolution has resulted in, or facilitated, the elimination of traditional intermediaries in the music industry such as record 
labels, music publishers and collecting societies (or at least rendered them somewhat redundant), by making it possible for 
the music creator and performer to directly disseminate or exploit his or her work through direct access to digital 
technology and by using the services of digital service providers. See generally in this regard Bernardo F “Dodging the 
Middleman: Insights on Disintermediation in the Independent Music Sector”, in Guerra and Moreira Underground Music 
Scenes at 337 – 348; McConn Disintermediation Effects of the Internet and Pitt Direct Licensing and the Music Industry. 
152
 See Simon 2012 http://ftp.jrc.es/EURdoc/JRC69816.pdf 55 (date of use: 21 May 2017). 
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tablets and the resulting change in consumer behaviour, have changed the relations in the value 
chain. Traditional business models became insufficient for the digitalized music market. Especially the 
roles of intermediaries have changed. Functions such as A&R, marketing and promotion have partly 
been migrated to the internet. Functions like manufacturing and distribution have partly been replaced 
by digital technologies like home recording, downloading and file sharing …. It became possible for a 
whole set of companies – which were traditionally not involved in the music industry – such as ISPs, 
consumer brands, ICT companies and digital intermediaries for rights clearance or online billing, to 
play a role in the music industry ….
153
 
Lastly, it would be useful, in considering the value chain that exists from the first stage of exploitation 
of musical works (e.g. as printed works or as works recorded in sound recordings) to advanced 
levels of exploitation (e.g. public performances and broadcasts of music records), to consider the 
concepts of upstream and downstream usages and / or markets which exist within the value system 
of the music industry. These concepts are used often when dealing with economic activities in which 
royalties are paid as compensation generally, and with reference to intellectual property licensing in 
particular.154 In this regard reference is made to “the phenomenon of dependent markets” comprised 
of an “upstream licensing market” and a “downstream goods market”.155 The “upstream” market is 
essentially the supply market, involving authors who must create works that must then be exploited 
either through licensing them to others or through a transfer of rights; and the “downstream” market 
relates to the distribution and making available to the public of products and other media embodying 
the works (whether through record sales, digital distribution, public performance, broadcasts etc.).156  
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 Simon id at 55 – 56. One of the new non-music entities that entered the music industry as a result of the digital 
revolution is iTunes, a digital media platform owned by Apple, that is now “comfortably the largest music retailer in the 
world.”  https://www.theguardian.com/technology/2013/apr/28/itunes-10-years-old-best-idea-apple-ever-had (date of use: 
26 June 2016). iTunes revolutionised the way in which music is consumed through the iPod and digital downloads and 
now through streaming. http://www.macworld.com/article/2932738/apple-music-turns-itunes-into-a-streaming-service.html 
(date of use: 26 June 2016). 
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 For the usage of these concepts in respect of oil and gas royalties see Colson 1999 U. Colo. L. Rev., generally; in 
respect of patent licensing see Lowe and Marquis European Competition Law  312 – 325; Rey and Salant 2012 Int J Ind 
Organ 518 - 527 and in respect of copyright see Drexl Research Handbook on Intellectual Property  58 – 62 and Jiang 
China and EU Antitrust Review 92- 111. It is possible to learn and benefit from the principles applicable to patent licensing 
when dealing with issues relating to upstream and downstream markets in relation to copyright works (which are, 
essentially, competition issues). In this regard see Gallini 2011 RERCI 6, who reasons that a uniform (rather than IP-
specific) competition policy would apply equally in respect of both patent pools and “copyright collectives”, because their 
“efficiency implications” are qualitatively similar in circumstances where members “(1) are vertically integrated into the 
downstream (product) market; (2) face competition in the upstream (input) market and (3) and own downstream products 
that do not require a license on the pooled IP but compete with products that do.” 
155
 Drexl id at 60. 
156
 See Hoeg-Guldberg and Lets 2005 
http://culturaldata.arts.gov.au/sites/www.culturaldata.gov.au/files/A_Statistical_Framework_for_the_Music_Sector.pdf (iv) - 
(v) (date of use: 25 June 2016). Dealing with these concepts within the field of filmmaking (in the French context) 
Benhamou and Peltier 2011 Revue d'économie industrielle VII observe: “The author of an audiovisual work (or fictional 
film) receives compensation in two stages. He or she collects incomes prior to the first distribution of the work (upstream 
compensation) and afterwards (downstream compensation).” In this regard a statement made by Jajbhay J in Feldman NO 
v EMI Music Publishing SA (Pty) Limited, Feldman NO v EMI Music (Pty) Limited [2007] ZAGPHC 294 (albeit without 
elaboration), is apt. In the matter, after observing that the law regulating music in South Africa is largely regulated through 
copyright law, and after mentioning all the works that are protected by copyright in terms of s 2(1) of the South African 
Copyright Act, Jajbhay J then notes (at para 5): “These works have an impact on the ultimate musical product.” He then 
mentions the various ways in which a musical work can be exploited in terms of s 6. This is an apt characterisation 
because alludes to the fact that musical works, through the acts provided for in s 6, can find exploitation through the other 
works protected under the Copyright Act. The exploitation of musical works in one or more of those works gives rise to the 
music copyright market, whether upstream or downstream / primary market or secondary market.  
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The concepts of “upstream” and “downstream” markets are related to the concepts of primary uses / 
markets (also termed “first-generation” uses / markets) and secondary uses / markets (also termed 
“second-generation” uses / markets), with the creator or owner of copyright involved with the 
licensing of primary uses and another agency, e.g. a collecting society, involved with the licensing of 
secondary uses, generally after the work has already been published.157 An understanding of these 
concepts can be of great assistance in understanding the licensing regimes applicable in the music 
rights value system.158 The relationship between value chains and upstream / downstream markets 
in intellectual property licensing is well captured by O’Connor159 in the following manner: 
… [V]alue chains are increasingly central to commercialization and delivery of products in a global 
economy. But their complexity and the need for IP rights to flow through them in a controlled manner, 
mean that specialized licensing systems had to be developed. The scope and structure of any 
particular licenses will depend quite a bit on the location of the license in the value chain. For example, 
if there will only be one manufacturing step between an IP rights holder and the sale of goods to end 
users, then the rights holder will not have to worry as much about controlling the IP as when the value 
chain is longer and multiple manufacturing steps will be involved …. In the latter case, different 
interests will arise as between ‘upstream’ and ‘downstream’ players in the value chain, and IP will exist 
(and newly arise) at many points along the chain. The key question is how far down the chain an 
upstream player’s IP-based control should reach. … 
An understanding of the concepts of upstream and downstream uses / markets is also helpful in 
understanding the various royalty “streams” that are available to rights-holders in respect of the 
exploitation of their works. It is common practice for authors of works of original authorship160 to 
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 See in this regard Towse and Handke Digital Creative Economy 275 – 276. See further for these concepts Thomas and 
Leonard  Beyond the Lens 37 - 39 (in respect of photographic works) and Hooijer and Baloyi Collective Management 
Organizations 11 – 12 (in respect of sound recordings). Having indicated this, the reference to primary and secondary uses 
here should not be confused with what has been termed the “hierarchical” distinction between primary and secondary uses 
contemplated in US copyright law within the context of limitations and exceptions (as contemplated in art 13 of the TRIPs 
Agreement), where, it is submitted, the US’s application of the regime for limitations and exceptions contemplates ‘a 
hierarchical order between “important” and “unimportant” rights’. In this regard it is said that the contested US view 
suggests a distinction between ‘ “primary” performance and broadcasting’, which are considered to be ”the most important 
forms of exploitation”, and ‘ “secondary” uses of broadcasts’, apparently considered less important because rights holders 
obtain ‘only a minor part [of their remuneration] from “secondary” uses’.  See in this regard Ginsburg and Trepozz 
International Copyright Law 460 – 461.   
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 Internationally certain legal rulings have dealt with issues relating to value chain licensing in primary and secondary 
markets (i.e. in respect of upstream and downstream usages). Notable in this regard are two copyright cases decided by 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ), namely Radio Telefis Eireann (RTE) and Independent Television Publications Ltd v 
Commission of the European Communities ECJ, Joined Cases C-241/91 P and C-242/91 P [1995] (popularly known as the 
“Magill case”) and IMS Health GmbH & Co. OHG v NDC Health GmbH & Co. KG ECJ, Case C-418/01 [2004]. The US 
Supreme Court ruled on similar issues in respect of patents in Quanta Computer, Inc., et al. Petitioners v LG Electronics, 
Inc. 553 U.S. 617 (2008). For the usage of the phrase “value chain licensing” see Litan Handbook on Law 294.   
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 O’Connor S “Controlling the Means of Innovation”, in Litan Handbook on Law 294. 
160
 The expression “works of original authorship” is used here to refer to works whose authorship can be attributed to a 
natural person, such as literary works, musical works and artistic works, as distinguished from so-called “entrepreneurial 
works” (giving rise to entrepreneurial rights), i.e. works whose authorship is usually attributed to someone (usually a 
corporate entity) other than the original author, e.g. sound recordings, films, broadcasts, published editions etc. See in this 
regard Torremans Intellectual Property Law (2016) 217 - 223 and generally. This distinction between works of original 
authorship and entrepreneurial works is more vivid in UK copyright law, where s 1(1) of the UK Copyright Act distinguishes 
between “original literary, dramatic, musical or artistic works” and other works, e.g. sound recordings, films and 
typographical arrangement of published editions. (Emphasis added). While the distinction between works of original 
authorship and entrepreneurial works, as a descriptive method, is useful and can thus be used safely within the South 
African context, an important, inexorable distinction between UK and South African law needs to be highlighted here: The 
distinction between original works and entrepreneurial works envisaged in UK law goes further than merely providing a 
descriptive method. In the UK scenario, the requirement of originality is limited to those works considered to be original 
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assign the copyright in their works to others such as music publishers, usually as a result of not 
having the resources to exploit the works themselves and in the hope that the latter will exploit the 
work for their mutual benefit. In this regard reference can be made to upstream compensation and 
downstream compensation. Upstream compensation, which is generally subject to negotiation 
between the parties, “falls within the context of individual rights management” and is paid directly to 
the author by the party to whom the rights have been assigned (e.g. the music publisher) based on 
the transfer of rights agreement.161 On the other hand, downstream compensation is paid “after 
commercialization of the work” and may be based on individual rights management (e.g. in the case 
of commercialisation of a sound recording or film, or the making of adaptations of the work), or on 
collective management of the rights, as in the case of broadcast mechanical rights and performing 
rights.162     
The distinction between upstream, primary markets and downstream, secondary markets is often 
highlighted in relation to competition issues where issues relating to the abuse of a dominant 
position are raised. Hayashi and Wu highlight this in respect of collective management of copyright 
in the following manner: 
A music copyright collecting society is a platform acting as an intermediary between two markets: an 
upstream market where it carries on business of managing music copyright entrusted by copyright 
holders, and a downstream market where it carries on business of licensing managed musical works 
associated with broadcast use. … Once a collecting society signs license agreements with most of the 
broadcasting organizations in the downstream market, competitors’ market entry in the upstream 
market will be hindered because of indirect network effects. Subsequently, in the upstream market, 
incentives for copyright holders to entrust their works to other collecting societies will be reduced or 
even eliminated. …
163
  
The bundle of rights that exists in respect of copyright works becomes the stretched threads used to 
weave the colourful tapestry of the full value chain licensing system and / or fooprint, from upstream 
to downstream markets. The following section seeks to explore how the copyright system has been 
used historically to organise the music value chain system. 
8.3.2 The Role of Copyright in Organising the Traditional Music Market 
                                                                                                                                                              
works (i.e. literary, dramatic, musical and artistic works) and does not extend to entrepreneurial works. See Torremans id 
at 223. See also Garnett, Davis and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James 137; 159 – 160. It was argued in the UK 
situation that “lack of originality in content for such works was irrelevant, and all that was required was to exclude copyright 
to the extent that the work was taken from an existing work”. Garnett, Davis and Harbottle id at 159 – 160 at n965. This is 
clearly not the position in South African law, as s 2(1) of the Copyright Act requires that all works protected under the Act 
must be original to be “eligible for copyright”. 
161
 Benhamou and Peltier 2011 Revue d'économie industrielle VII. (Emphasis in text).   
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 See also Benhamou and Peltier id at VII – VIII.  The expression “broadcast mechanical rights” refers to the mechanical 
rights applicable when musical works are reproduced in the process of broadcasting such works. 
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 Hayashi and Wu 2015 http://ascola-tokyo-conference-2015.meiji.jp/conference_working_papers.html (date of use: 26 
June 2016). 
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The role and efficacy of copyright as an organising instrument for the music market arose from its 
characteristic as a “bundle of rights”.164 This means that in many cases, copyright in a work does not 
only involve one restricted act but a number of restricted acts, which the copyright owner has 
exclusive rights to perform or authorise.165 It has been said that this enables the copyright owner to 
license “less than her entire bundle of rights to a licensee …”166, if the owner chooses to do so. This 
gives rise to the phenomenon of fragmentation of rights, namely the fact that various authorisations 
are required in respect of various types of usages of a particular copyright work – further 
compounded by the fact that “each right in the bundle … can be divided contractually by territory, 
language, type of media etc.”167 Thus the bundled nature of copyright and its susceptibility to 
fragmentation or fragmented usages lent itself to its pliability as an organising mechanism for music 
markets and value chains.  
The efficacy of copyright as an organising tool for the music industry arises not only from the fact 
that copyright in respect of a particular work (e.g. musical works) can be fragmented into various 
exclusive rights in respect of that work (e.g. the reproduction right, the publishing right and the 
performing right in respect of musical works, as provided for in section 6 of the South African 
Copyright Act168); but also from the fact that any of the individual rights forming part of the bundle 
may, themselves, be further fragmented  into specific, market-determining “sub-rights” (e.g. the 
reproduction right can be further fragmented into mechanical rights, print rights, synchronisation 
rights etc., relating to a mechanical rights market, print rights market, synchronisation right market 
etc., respectively). Furthermore, the copyright owner may not only assign any of the fragmented 
rights in the bundle of rights, but also any of the sub-rights separately, while retaining the copyright 
in the rest of the fragmented rights and / or sub-rights.169 Thus it has been noted that the divisibility 
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 This has sometimes been referred to in a number of ways, e.g. “an abstract bundle of legal relations”; “a cluster-right”; 
“a complex aggregate of rights”; “a range of ownership rights along the ownership spectrum”; “a bundle of dist inct and 
specific monopolies” etc.  See Zemer The Idea of Authorship 49 – 51. See further in this regard Dean Handbook of 
Copyright Law 1-81. 
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 Some copyright works may only have one restricted work, e.g. copyright in programme-carrying signals and copyright in 
published editions in Sections 11 and 11A of the South African Copyright Act. In the majority of cases however two or 
more restricted acts are involved. 
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 Lemley 1999 Cal.L.Rev. 144. 
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 Gervais Collective Management of Copyright (2016) 3 – 4. See also Zemer The Idea of Authorship 50, who asserts that 
“[t]he bundle of rights in copyright is highly fragmented and covers many different entitlements that affect the delicate 
stability of the system.” In the same vein Gervais ibid refers to the “apparent paradox of copyright” which, while aiming to 
maximise the creation and dissemination of new works, imposes restrictions on the creation of new works based on 
existing works (i.e. derivative works), and similarly grants copyright owners exclusive rights to prevent the dissemination of 
the works (by preventing users from copying, performing or communicating the works to the public).   
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 Act 98 of 1978 as amended. (the Copyright Act). 
169
 This is the doctrine of the subdivision of copyright. Unlike the 1909 Act which specifically prohibited the subdivision of 
copyright, the current US Copyright Act (17 U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq.) specifically gives recognition to the doctrine of 
subdivision of copyright in s 201(d)(2), where it is stated that “[a]ny of the exclusive rights comprised in a copyright, 
including any subdivision of any of the rights specified by section 106, may be transferred and owned 
separately.” Emphasis added. See further on the doctrine as applied in the United States, Michael Gardner and Bien 
Licensing Agency , Inc., v. Nike, Inc., 279 F.3d 774 (9th Cir. 2002). In the UK s 90(2)(a) of the Copyright, Designs and 
Patents Act 1988 (c 48) states that “[a]n assignment or other transmission of copyright may be partial, that is, limited so as 
to apply … to one or more, but not all, of the things the copyright owner has the exclusive right to do”. (Emphasis added). 
However s 16, dealing with the exclusive rights of the owner of copyright in a work, makes reference to “acts” and not 
“things”. In this regard Garnett, Davies and Harbottle Copinger and Skone James note (at 299): ‘The word “things”, rather 
than “acts”, was used in s.90(2)(a) with the intention of making it clear that an assignment of copyright may be limited to 
narrower classes of exploitation than these principal categories of “acts”. So, as well as divisions into such rights as the 
reproduction, public performing or broadcasting right, further subdivisions are possible, for example the right to reproduce 
a work on records (often referred to as the “mechanical right”), broadcast by satellite, and so on.’ Like the UK, the South 
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of copyright permits “a considerable amount of flexibility to a copyright owner in the commercial 
exploitation of the rights in issue.”170 Rand J, remarking on the scope of copyright in musical works 
under Canadian law, noted: 
It is distributed into a number of interests both "vertical" and "horizontal". By s. 3 of the statute the 
copyright holder has the sole right "to produce, reproduce", say, a song in sheet form for ordinary sale; 
to perform it in public; to make a record of it by means enabling it to be performed mechanically; to 
adapt and present it publicly by cinematograph or radio communication. These rights, again, may be 
limited to sale or production or performance in specified areas of specified countries and they may be 
exclusive to one person or open to the market.
171
 
In this regard Lee172 has noted that copyright fragmentation (or copyright divisibility) occurs on 
various levels, including market structure. It has likewise been observed that copyright fragmentation 
enables “the market to determine each work’s [optimal] modular structure”.173 This market-facilitating 
nature of the divisibility of copyright also arises from the fact that the various rights and sub-rights 
comprising the bundle of copyright in a particular work “can be granted simultaneously and 
                                                                                                                                                              
African Copyright Act makes reference to “acts” when referring to the individual exclusive rights that form part of the bundle 
of copyright in respect of a particular work. The difference with the UK Copyright Act is that while the UK Act makes 
reference to “things” when dealing with the partial assignment of copyright, the South African Act continues to make 
reference to “acts” in this regard, providing in s 22(2) that “[a]n assignment or testamentary disposition of copyright may be 
limited so as to apply to some only of the acts which the owner of the copyright has the exclusive right to control”. 
(Emphasis added). Does this imply that South African copyright law does not provide for the subdivision of copyright? It is 
submitted that the contrary is true.  Garnett, Davies and Harbottle ibid make reference to the case of British Actors Film Co 
Ltd v Glover [1918] 1 K.B. 299, decided under the British Copyright Act of 1911 (the so-called Imperial Copyright Act), in 
which the court held that a partial assignment can be made of the right to perform a work “professionally”.  The Imperial 
Copyright Act was incorporated as a schedule to the South African Patents, Designs, Trade Marks and Copyright Act 9 of 
1916 and thus formed part of South African copyright law. In dealing with the scope of copyright in a work the Imperial 
Copyright Act referred to copyright (in s 1(2)) as a “sole right” to perform certain acts, without specifically using the 
expression “acts” but by actually mentioning the various acts forming part of the sole right comprising copyright (e.g. “the 
sole right to produce or reproduce the work …, to perform … the work … in public; … to publish the work …” etc.). In s 5(2) 
the Act provided that “[t]he owner of the copyright in any work may assign the right either wholly or partially”, and in s 5(3) 
it provided: “Where, under any partial assignment of copyright, the assignee becomes entitled to any right comprised in 
copyright, the assignee as respects the right so assigned, and the assignor as respect the rights not assigned, shall be 
treated … as the owner of the copyright …”.  It is submitted that despite the non-mention of the expression “acts”, the 
usage in these sections is consistent with the usage in our current Copyright Act with respect to the “exclusive right to do 
or to authorize the doing” of certain “acts”. (See for example in this regard ss 6 and 9 of the Copyright Act in respect of 
music copyright).  Garnett, Davies and Harbottle have asserted that the Imperial Copyright Act had the same effect in 
respect to partial assignment of copyright as the 1988 UK Act, and that the Glover decision referred to above “seems to 
have been to the same effect.” See Garnett, Davies and Harbottle id at 299 – 300 and n 369 in Chapter Five. Another 
support for this position can be found in Canadian copyright law. The current Canadian Copyright Act (R.S.C., 1985, c. C-
42), although it has incorporated many modern provisions, is still in many respects based on the Imperial Copyright Act. 
See in this regard  Gendreau Emerging Intellectual Property Paradigm 298, who asserts that the Canadian Copyright Act 
of 1921, based on the Imperial Copyright Act, “still forms the basis of today’s legislation.” In this regard it is noteworthy that 
the provisions of s 5(2) and (3) of the Imperial Copyright Act, which, as highlighted above, have been interpreted to give 
rise to the doctrine of divisibility to the extent contemplated in the UK Copyright Act of 1988, are repeated, almost verbatim, 
in s 13(4) and (5) of the Canadian Copyright Act. Furthermore, s 3 of the Canadian Copyright Act still mimics “the three 
general rights” of reproduction, public performance and publishing contained in s 2 of the Imperial Copyright Act. 
Accordingly, and inevitably one would add, the Canadian courts have asserted the applicability of the doctrine of divisibility 
of copyright in Canadian law. See in this regard Euro-Excellence Inc. v. Kraft Canada Inc., [2007] 3 SCR 20, at para 117, 
where the Supreme Court of Canada held: “Vertical and horizontal divisibility is, arguably, a hallmark of copyright …”, and 
further that “the economic objectives of copyright law are furthered through the transferability of either full or  partial 
copyright interests.” See further in this regard Canadian Performing Right Society v Famous Players Canadian Corp. Ltd 
(1927) 60 O.L.R. at 280 and 614, where the transferability of the performing right was recognised.    
170
 See in this regard McKeown JS Fox Canadian Law of Copyright and Industrial Designs (Thompson Reuters Toronto 
2012) at 19-1(e)(ii). 
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 Muzak Corp. v. Composers, Authors, and Publishers Association of Canada [1953] 2 S.C.R. 182, at 188 – 189. 
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 Lee J-A, “Overlapping Rights in Different Business Models”, in Liu and Hilty Remuneration of Copyright Owners at 18. 
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 Notes 2011 Harvard Law Review at 1758 – 1759. 
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independently.”174 In this regard it has been noted that the rights in the copyright bundle often 
overlap so that it would sometimes be necessary to infringe more than one right in the bundle for an 
infringement claim to arise.175 Furthermore, the fragmentation of copyright helps to organise music 
markets and the music value system by enabling copyright owners “to fully capture the value of 
copyright work [sic] with the help of others.”176 Thus fragmentation both facilitates and enhances the 
music value system. In this regard fragmentation exists within different music value chains and in 
the music value system as a whole. This is expressed through an elaborate value system or 
copyright exploitation footprint comprised of primary / upstream and secondary / downstream value 
chains reflecting the full panoply of bundled music rights (namely songwriting / publishing, recording 
and live performance rights).  
It is true that copyright fragmentation or divisibility is not always viewed positively. One of the 
criticisms levelled against copyright fragmentation is that it leads to increased transaction costs and 
the so-called “tragedy of the anticommons”.177 A contrary view points to provisions in copyright law 
itself that provide a “safety valve” against excessive transactions costs created by fragmentation, 
and reduce “the social costs of inefficient divisions of rights.”178 It has furthermore been argued that 
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 Lee 2016 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. at 119.  
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 Perfect 10, Inc., v Google Inc. 508 F.3d 1146 (9
th
 Cir. 2007) at 1161. The US 9
th
 circuit here mentioned the example of 
the making of a derivative work (i.e. an adaptation of a copyright work), that would not infringe copyright unless it 
‘"incorporate[s] a protected work in some concrete or permanent 'form.'"’. It is submitted that this is in line with the position 
under South African law that the restricted act of adaptation in respect of a work shall only occur if the work is transformed 
“in such a manner that its original substantial features remain recognisable.” Dean and Karjiker South African Copyright 
Law 1-73. This overlapping of the rights in the copyright bundle of rights thus facilitates the use of copyright works through 
new means, in the process creating new markets for the work. 
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 Lee 2016 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 123.  
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 In this regard Lee J-A, “Overlapping Rights in Different Business Models”. in Liu and Hilty Remuneration of Copyright 
Owners notes (at 18) that “[a]lthough divisibility has provided flexibility for copyright owners’ utilization of their works, it 
creates significant costs for copyright transactions and enforcement.” See also in this regard Perritt 2011 Vand. J. Ent. & 
Tech. L. generally; Lee 2016 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 117 – 163 generally; Macmillan  Copyright Law at 285 (where high 
transaction costs are deemed to be a “‘malfunction’ in the market”). 
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 Notes 2011 Harvard Law Review 1761 – 1762. Here the author refers to three regimes within copyright law that create 
a safety valve against high transaction costs, namely the “first sale” doctrine; the prohibition of “copyright servitudes”, and, 
to a limited extent, the “first use” defence. It is admitted that all these regimes are of American origin and do not have any 
particular relevance in South African law. We elaborate on these three safety valve cases below, with a focus on their 
impact, if any, on South African law. (i) The South African Copyright Act does not currently incorporate the first sale 
doctrine (also known as the exhaustion of rights doctrine), although the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 (version B13B – 
2017), approved by both houses of Parliament and currently awaiting the President’s signature, and available at 
https://pmg.org.za/bill/705/ (date of use: 13 July 2019), proposes such a doctrine with international reach (so-called 
international exhaustion; see the proposed s 12B(6) of the Bill). It is also worth noting that the TRIPs Agreement avoids 
dealing with the exhaustion of rights (see art. 6 of the TRIPs Agreement); (ii) The prohibition against copyright servitudes 
is a prohibition against the imposition of a condition in copyright licences “that further works incorporating the licensed 
material be made available on the same terms … [where] these terms of openness are detailed and potentially conflict with 
later visions of openness” (e.g. the Wikipedia GNU Free Documentation Licence).  See Ayotte and Smith (eds) Economics 
of Property Law at 119. Another example would be where the owner of intellectual property issues a licence to a firm 
without at the same time extending such licence to the firm’s customers. See Quanta Computer v LG Electronics, Inc. 128 
S. Ct. 2109 (2008). It appears that US law prohibits copyright servitudes just as it prohibits chattel servitudes (i.e. 
servitudes in respect of movable goods.). See Calboli and Lee (eds) Research Handbook on Intellectual Property 56 – 63; 
although Robinson argues that, both in respect of chattel and intellectual property the prohibition on servitudes is not 
absolute, noting in the case of the latter that, “in the field of intellectual property … the now ubiquitous use of restrictive 
licensing agreements has created the functional equivalent of personal property servitudes.” Robinson 2004 The University 
of Chicago Law Review generally and at 1452. The prohibition against chattel servitudes, which is said to exist both in 
European and American law, is generally justified on the ground that servitudes “can seriously impede the use and 
transferability of property”. Vaver (ed) Intellectual Property Rights285.  The relevance of the position regarding the 
prohibition against chattel servitudes to intellectual property in general and copyright in particular is in view of chattels that 
embody copyright works and patented inventions. Under such circumstances “IP owners argued that their exclusive rights 
should give them extra power to control downstream resale and use of the embodiments of their intangible property.” 
Calboli and Lee (eds) Research Handbook on Intellectual Property 56. It is submitted that in South Africa this line of 
argument is non-sequitur because South African law recognises personal servitudes in respect of movable goods. See in 
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copyright fragmentation is “legally confusing in the digital market”.179 All this cannot however counter 
the role that copyright fragmentation has played in organising the traditional music business market. 
The ensuing discussion considers how the advent of the internet digital technology has threatened 
to disrupt this traditional role of copyright fragmentation in facilitating the structuring of the traditional 
music market into clearly-defined primary and secondary music value chains. 
8.4 Blurring the Lines – “Safe Harbour” and the Disruption of the Value 
Chain 
8.4.1 Introduction 
Music rights-holders have often complained about the “safe harbour” provisions in digital copyright 
laws,180 which, it is argued, “[allow] digital providers the opportunity to profit from the unauthorized 
use of copyrighted music without paying licensing fees.”181 In this regard it has been argued that due 
to the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) in the United States, “there’s nothing you can 
                                                                                                                                                              
this regard Du Bois (gen. ed) Wille’s Principles 604; Zimmermann and Visser (eds) Southern Cross 809. By recognising 
personal servitudes in respect of movable goods South African law does not however, need to entertain the question 
whether or not a personal servitude would be permissible in respect of movable goods embodying copyright works; such a 
question is best left to the determination of the validity of the contract creating the relationship between the parties (see the 
discussion below). It is common cause that for an assignment of copyright or exclusive licence to take place there has to 
be a valid, underlying contract reflecting an intention to transmit rights by offer and acceptance. Thus “even if on the face 
of it the requirements set forth in the Act have been met”, if there is no agreement satisfying the requirements of a valid 
contract no assignment or exclusive licence can take place. Dean and Karjikger Copyright Law 1-144 and 1-150 – 1-151. 
Even in those jurisdictions in which there is a general prohibition against chattel servitudes (and by implication, copyright 
servitudes) it has been acknowledged that “… by means of contract, a seller can retain rights against the initial purchaser, 
with whom he is in privity of contract.” Vaver (ed) Intellectual Property Rights 285. Thus in South African law any terms in a 
contract dealing with the licensing of items embodying copyright works (e.g. a contract dealing with the licensing of music 
sound recordings) which seek to impose any restrictive or limiting conditions in the nature of a servitude can be easily dealt 
with in two manners: (a) they could be seen to constitute justus error, thus rendering the terms invalid on the ground that 
they constitute a stipulation (namely the imposition of a servitude) that cannot normally be expected to form part of an 
agreement transmitting  copyright. See in this regard Frocks Ltd vs Dent and Goodwin (Pty) Ltd 1950 SA 717 (C) at 725; 
Du Toit vs Atkinson’s Motors Bpk 1985 (2) SA 893 (A) and George v Fairmead (Pty) Ltd 1958 (2) SA 465 (A) 471, quoted 
with approval in Accesso CC v AllForms (Pty) Ltd 677 JOC (T) at 686. This defence would however, only succeed if the 
licensee or assignee’s attention was not specifically drawn to such stipulation. If the licensee / assignee’s attention was 
drawn to such terms, (b) the terms might still fall foul of the constitutional standard relating to the validity of contracts, 
where the position is that “courts [can] decline to enforce contractual terms that are in conflict with the constitutional va lues 
[found in the Bill of Rights] even though the parties may have consented to them.” Barkhuizen v Napier (5) SA 323 (CC), at 
para 30; and  (iii) With regard to the fair use doctrine the South African equivalent is the fair dealing doctrine. The South 
Gauteng High Court has recently given a ruling that provides the first South African case law clarity on the scope of the fair 
dealing defence, in Moneyweb (Pty) Limited v Media 24 Limited and Another [2016] ZAGPJHC 81. In para 113 Berger J 
stipulated a non-exhaustive list of factors that need to be taken into consideration when determining if the use of a work 
falls within the fair dealing defence. These factors, given not in any order of priority, seem to emphasise the publication of 
the two works (the parent work and the work using the parent work), with a consideration of the time lapse between the 
publication of the two works, the amount of the parent work used and whether the use is acknowledged. The factors thus 
seem to provide an opportunity for the two legitimate usages of the works, namely, commercial exploitation of the work and 
fair dealing with the work. It is submitted that a proper interpretation of the court’s ruling in this regard is that the owner of 
the copyright in the parent work needs to be afforded a reasonable time to exhaust at least the primary markets for the use 
of the work, after which fair dealing in the work should almost invariably be permissible in such markets. This, it is 
submitted, will create a proper balance between the rights of the copyright owner and fair dealing in the work, and will be in 
line with the three-step test that requires that limitations to the copyright owner’s exclusive rights will be permitted (a) in 
certain special cases, provided that the use (b) does not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and (c) does not 
unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the author (see art. 9(2) of the Berne Convention for the Protection of 
Literary and Artistic Works (1967 version). 
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 Lee 2016 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 125. See in this regard paragraph 8.4 below dealing with the challenges confronting 
copyright law in the digital environment. 
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 Such as those contained in s 512 of the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act 1998, article 14 of the EU E-Commerce 
Directive of 2000, or ss 70 – 81 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA) 25 0f 2002 in South 
Africa. 
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 See US Copyright Office 2015 https://www.copyright.gov/policy/musiclicensingstudy/copyright-and-the-music-
marketplace.pdf at 79. (Date of use:14 September 2017). 
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realistically do to stop your songs from appearing on YouTube.”182 Some have referred to ‘an 
impossible game of “whack-a-mole”’, in which content removed as a result of the notice-and-
takedown regime of the DMCA “is frequently reposted, requiring the owner to serve another 
takedown notice” – thus affording digital companies the opportunity to freely exploit infringing 
content “unless and until a notice is sent”.183  
The foregoing has resulted in music industry representatives bemoaning the existence of a “value 
gap”, defined as the current state in the digital exploitation of music “where fair revenues are not 
being returned to those who are creating and investing in music”; and “the growing mismatch 
between the value that user upload services, such as YouTube, extract from music and the revenue 
returned to the music community”.184 The value gap is considered to be “the fundamental flaw in 
today’s music market” and the greatest threat to its future sustainability.185 It has in this regard been 
asserted that creating “a level playing field for the digital market” is the industry’s “single highest 
legislative priority”, and is crucial for securing the future of the music industry.186 To best understand 
the theory or notion of a value gap in the music industry one would need to understand the 
traditional segmentation and / or categorisation of the music industry in terms of “value chains”, as 
dealt with above. As indicated, the best analysis in this regard is to see the music industry as having 
been comprised of a “value chain system” - namely a system comprised of several value chains.187 
These include the music publishing value chain, the music recording value chain, the live music 
value chain etc.188 In this regard it is postulated that the advent of digital technology and the digital 
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 Ambert 2003 http://www.ilo.org/empent/Publications/WCMS_117682/lang--en/index.htm 10 - 26 (date of use: 23 June 
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value chain, namely, that relating to beginnings (music education and training etc.), production (songwriting, recording 
etc.), circulation (promotion, collective management, distribution etc.), audience reception and feedback (market and 
audience development, competitions and awards etc.) and delivery mechanisms (retail outlets, internet, broadcasting etc.). 
Apart from the fact that some activities are repeated in the different segments mentioned, it is appropriate to say that this is 
effectively a contrived characterisation as (i) the various designated segments do not actually reflect sequential stages 
giving rise to a “chain”, and (ii) the various recognised industries constituting what can be termed “the music sector”, e.g. 
the publishing industry, the recording industry, the live music industry etc.  are indeed veritable, stand-alone industries 
clearly reflecting distinct value chains within themselves. In this regard it is however necessary to note that the phrase 
“music sector” is not often used and “music industry” is preferred by many, while it is recognised that the various 
components of this “industry” are themselves separate “industries”. In the present case the phrase “music sector” is used 
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distribution of music, with its related complications (e.g. user-generated content; uncertainty as to 
the party / parties liable to rights-holders for the exploitation of works etc.) has to a large extent 
eliminated the “traditional gatekeepers” and disrupted the traditional value chain system.189 
8.4.2 Dealing with Difficult Questions in the Digital Environment: Stopping the Internet, or Stopping 
Copyright? 
8.4.2.1 Introduction 
As highlighted, the digital era, in particular that ushered in by MP3 (and MP4) technology coupled 
with internet technology has given rise to new problems and questions regarding the status of the 
internet vis-à-vis the protection of copyright. Since the nature of the internet is its ability to easily 
disseminate information and content across borders,190 should copyright law be used to curb the 
operations of this technology? One technology that has brought this matter to a head is “linking” 
technology, which ensures ease in the embedding and sharing of audio, video and other multimedia 
content in the internet environment. It is this technology that has enabled YouTube, the Google 
video-content channel, to thrive and to become a very successful business model for Google, 
enabling the production of user-generated content while simultaneously causing much consternation 
for copyright owners.  
The embedding of music videos or other copyright material on a website, sometimes termed “inline 
linking”, is a controversial and hotly-debated issue internationally. In particular, the question as to 
whether linking in general, whether in the form of simple hyperlinking, so-called deep linking, inline 
linking, framing and system caching constitutes copyright infringement is answered divergently in 
different jurisdictions. There is no international treaty dealing specifically with this issue and much 
depends on the local copyright laws of each jurisdiction. The fact therefore, that a form of linking is 
acceptable in one jurisdiction does not mean that it would be acceptable in another jurisdiction, just 
as national copyright laws often have different provisions with regard to acts that infringe copyright, 
particularly in relation to digital and other new media usages of copyright.191 
8.4.2.2 Unravelling Linking Technology 
It would be important to first provide some explanation of the various forms of linking in order to gain 
understanding of the acts involved and as a way of seeking answers to the question whether such 
acts would constitute an infringement of copyright. The first form of linking to consider in this regard 
is so-called hyperlinking. Section 1 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act defines 
a “hyperlink” as “a reference or link from some point in one data message directing a browser or 
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other technology or functionality to another data message or point therein or to another place in the 
same data message.”192 Essentially hyperlinking, or so-called simple, normal or ordinary linking 
(also “out linking), refers to highlighted or otherwise accentuated text (termed a “hypertext”) using 
some internet code such as HTML, appearing on one website (“the linking website”), which, when 
tapped, clicked on or hovered over, enables the user to access or transfer to another website (“the 
target website”), usually landing on the home page of the target website.193   
Deep linking follows the same process but rather than landing on the home page of the target 
website, the user is enabled to land on some other page on the target website.194 Inline linking on 
the other hand, occurs when material from a different website (“the host website”) is placed on a 
web page of the linking website, usually through a coded image such as JPEG or Gif.195 Regarding 
inline linking it has been said that when the link to the image on the viewer’s website is an img-src 
link, the web page concerned only “appears to contain the image”, i.e. the image only “seems to be 
present” as a part of the Web page being viewed, when in fact “… [the] presence of the image is 
only virtual … in the sense that the image file is not physically present at the server for the Web site 
being viewed.”196  
Framing occurs when the screen of a web page is broken up into multiple, juxtaposed but non-
overlapping windows, with each window containing a display from a separate HTML file (e.g. a web 
page from another web site fetched by automatically hyperlinking to it).197 Lastly, system caching 
involves the “automatic and interim storage of material” on a web page, “with a view to making the 
onward transmission of [such] material to third parties or subscribers more efficient.”198 
8.4.2.3 Legal Questions around Linking – General Observations 
As indicated, whether linking amounts to copyright infringement is dependent on the particular laws 
of each country as there is no international framework dealing with the issue. Furthermore, where 
infringement is said to have occurred, one often also needs to determine what type of infringement 
has taken place. In this regard it needs to be stated that copyright infringement can be direct, 
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indirect, contributory or vicarious. Direct infringement occurs when a person infringes any of the 
restricted acts in respect of a copyright work (e.g. those relating to the bundle of rights related to the 
work concerned, such as those provided for in section 6 of the Copyright Act). Indirect infringement 
occurs in certain limited cases provided for in the copyright statute (e.g. the importation of infringing 
copies of copyright works). Contributory infringement occurs when a person “aids and abets” (i.e. 
assists) the commission of a copyright act by another, where the person doing so knew or had 
reasons to believe that the acts he aided and abetted constituted an infringement of copyright.199 
Vicarious liability occurs where a person who is in a position of authority, i.e. a person who has the 
right and ability to supervise another, instigates or instructs the commission of an act that infringes 
copyright. In South Africa vicarious liability for copyright infringement can take the form of what is 
termed causal infringement.200  
An observable trend internationally is not to treat linking as amounting to direct copyright 
infringement. This is mainly because it is said that no reproduction takes place in cases of linking.201 
Nevertheless if a case of linking can be seen to amount to a reproduction of the linked image (i.e. 
where the image is not merely indexed or bookmarked, but is actually embedded on the viewed web 
page), this would be seen as amounting to an unauthorised reproduction.202 This would, for example 
be the position where a case of inline linking is in fact, similar to or effected through framing or 
system caching, where the material linked is actually embedded on the webpage rather than merely 
appearing to be embedded. Framing and system caching would thus almost invariably be 
considered to give rise to direct copyright infringement.  
Having indicated this, the fact that no direct infringement of copyright exists does not mean that 
infringement would not exist completely in cases of linking. The internet service provider may still be 
held liable for contributory infringement; i.e. even if the linked material may not be actually 
embedded on the service provider’s webpage, the service provider may be held liable for aiding and 
abetting another person to commit copyright infringement, where the internet service provider knew 
or had reason to believe that the use of the linked material would amount to an infringement of 
copyright (i.e. the service provide knew or had reasons to believe that using or accessing the 
copyright material was not authorised and thus would amount to copyright infringement). It is on the 
basis of contributory infringement that internet service providers have mostly been held liable for 
copyright infringement. 
8.4.2.4 How the Problems Arising from Linking have been dealt with Internationally 
(a) The European Union 
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In the European Union (EU) the question as to whether linking (both with regard to normal linking 
and embedded linking) constitutes an infringement of copyright has been clarified in recent times by 
the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU). An earlier case in this regard was Svensson and 
Others v Retriever Sverige AB,203 decided in 2014. This decision dealt with the question whether the 
use of hyperlinks by the linking site which redirects internet users to copyright protected works in the 
host site amounted to copyright infringement. In this case Retriever Sverige operated a website 
which provided hyperlinks which enabled users to access newspaper articles published by a 
newspaper by redirecting the users to the newspaper’s website. The hyperlinked articles were freely 
available and accessible on the newspaper’s website, but Retriever Sverige had not obtained 
permission from the claimants, who were the journalists who wrote the articles, to link the articles on 
its website. The question brought before the court was whether providing a simple link to articles in 
another website amounted to a “communication to the public”, a restricted act belonging solely to the 
copyright owner and which would thus infringe upon the rights of the copyright owner under EU law.  
In its ruling, the CJEU held that Retriever Sverige had not violated the authors’ copyright, finding that 
permission from the copyright owners was only necessary if the hyperlinks are directed at a “new 
public”. The court defined a “new public” as one that “was not taken into account by the copyright 
holders when they authorised the initial communication to the public”. The court then concluded that, 
since the articles were freely accessible on the target site, the users of the linking site did not 
constitute a “new public” and thus Retriever Sverige had not infringed any copyright. The court 
further held that this position was correct even if the users had “the impression that [the work] is 
appearing on the site on which that link is found, whereas in fact that work comes from another 
site”.204 
The second decision of the CJEU, also made in 2014, concerned the question whether embedding a 
video in which copyright subsisted amounted to copyright infringement, where the source video was 
uploaded without the permission of the rights holder. This was in the case of BestWater International 
GmbH v Michael Mebes and Stefan Potsch205 In this case the defendants had embedded a 
promotional YouTube video of the claimant on their websites through inline framing, apparently in 
order to point out their disagreement with a statement made in the video. The video had been 
uploaded on YouTube without the claimant (Bestwater)’s permission. In its ruling the court held that 
the embedding in a website of a copyright work that is publicly accessible on another website 
through a link using framing technology “does not by itself constitute communication to the public 
within the meaning of [the EU Copyright Directive]”, where the act of communication was not done 
through a technical means that is different from the one used in the initial communication, it could 
only be a communication to the public if it was communicated to a “new public” (as held in the 
Svensson case above).206 In this regard the court further argued that it did not matter that the source 
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video was itself uploaded without permission. The ruling did not change the copyright breaching 
status of the original upload but merely protected internet users from liability where they embed 
copyright materials from other websites.  
Following the above rulings another case came before the CJEU, where the CJEU had the 
opportunity to clarify its earlier decision in the Svensson and and Bestwater cases.  The case in 
question was GS Media BV v Sanoma Media Netherlands and Others207, a 2016 ruling referred by 
the Supreme Court of the Netherlands. In the case the appellant had created a hyperlink to another 
website, where certain nude photographs whose copyright was controlled by the respondents had 
been posted without the respondents’ authorisation. Internet users were able to use the hyperlink to 
have access to those photographs. The pertinent question before the CJEU was whether GS 
Media’s action constituted an unauthorized communication of the photographs to the public. 
In clarifying its earlier decisions the court held that, although in principle creating a link to illegal 
content does not amount to a communication to the public in EU law, where a person creates a link 
to a website where copyright material was posted without the authorisation of the copyright owner, 
such act would infringe the copyright owner’s right of communication to the public. In its judgement 
the court asserted the fact that the expression “communication to the public had to be interpreted 
broadly, taking into account the objective of establishing a high level of protection for authors, 
“allowing them to obtain an appropriate reward for the use of their works”. 208 After assessing the 
facts the court came to this conclusion: 
… [I]t cannot be inferred either from the judgment of … Svensson and Others … or from the order of 
BestWater International … that posting, on a website, hyperlinks to protected works which have been 
made freely available on another website, but without the consent of the copyright holders of those 
works, would be excluded, as a matter of principle, from the concept of ‘communication to the public’, 
within the meaning of Article 3(1) of Directive 2001/29. …
209
 
In this regard the court considered three factors that lent themselves to the conclusion that the 
creation of a hyperlink under such circumstances amounted to an unauthorised communication to 
the public: (a) Where the person creating such a hyperlink knew or ought to have known that the 
hyperlink created access to a work that was illegally placed on the internet; (b) where the link “allows 
users of the website on which it is posted to circumvent the restrictions taken by the site where the 
protected work is posted”, in order to allow access only to its subscribers, and (c) where the posting 
was carried out for a profit.210 
The above analysis makes the EU position regarding the issue of normal linking and embedded 
linking very explicit: In Europe both acts do not constitute copyright infringement unless the linked 
copyright material is communicated to a “new public”, i.e. a public other than that intended by the 
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copyright owner. The ruling in the GS Media BV case has then clarified the circumstances under 
which a communication would be deemed to constitute a communication to such new public. It 
needs in this regard to be highlighted that these CJEU decisions do not imply that courts elsewhere, 
or the South African courts in particular, will follow this approach. It is also important in this regard to 
highlight that in the EU itself, member states of the EU had divergent approaches to dealing with this 
issue before the above-mentioned CJEU rulings211 The considerations made in the GS Media BV 
case are interesting and appear to be sound considerations to make in such cases, even though the 
EU obsession with the concept of “a new public” may not be one that is appealing to other 
jurisdictions.  
It would also be necessary, in considering the EU position, to also take account of recent sweeping 
developments in the EU aimed, amongst others, at addressing the problem of the “value gap” and 
are calculated to drastically change the legal position in this regard. These relate to a recent vote of 
the European Parliament, in favour of the adoption of the Directive on Copyright in the Digital Single 
Market,212 following the so-called “trilogue negotiations” between the European Commission, the 
Council of the European Union and the European Parliament. The value gap is particularly dealt with 
in article 17 of the Directive, which in essence settles the question with regard to what constitutes a 
communication to the public in the online environment. Critical to article 17 is paragraph (1) thereof, 
which provides that giving access to copyright-protected works and other protected subject-matter is 
an act of communication or making available to the public and thus requires the authorisation of the 
rights holders. It would seem in this regard that the questions that gripped the attention of the CJEU 
with respect to whether a communication is a communication to a “new public” or not, are no longer 
relevant.  
More importantly, paragraph 3 of article 17 limits the ability of internet service providers to rely on 
the safe harbour (i.e. notice and takedown) provisions of article 14(1) of the EU Electronic 
Commerce Directive (Directive 2000/31/EC), by providing that such provisions “shall not apply to the 
situations covered” by article 17. Article 14(1) of the Electronic Commerce Directive essentially 
absolves internet service providers from liability for the use of unauthorised copyright-protected 
material on their platforms, if they had no knowledge, whether actual or constructive, of such 
unauthorised use, and if, having been made aware of such unauthorised use, they acted 
expeditiously to remove the unauthorised material.213 In this regard this article fulfils a similar 
objective to that of section 512 of the US Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 1998 and sections 70 – 
81 of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA) 25 of 2002 in South Africa.   
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Article 17 of the Copyright in the Digital Single Market Directive is perhaps the most-controversial 
part of the Directive, with critics arguing that it will lead to the introduction of what has been termed 
“upload filters”, for purposes of scanning content before it is uploaded in order to remove material 
that is likely to infringe copyright.214 Opponents of the Directive have thus decried the provision, 
arguing that it has signalled “a dark day for the open web”.215 On the other hand proponents have 
hailed the Directive as being capable of “clos[ing] the value gap and boost[ing] investment into new 
… music and other content” and ushering in a new era of “a fair and sustainable internet”.216 It 
remains to be seen what the full effect of this provision will turn out to be, but generally the principle 
of safeguarding the interests of rights-holders in the digital environment is something to be welcome. 
(b) The United Kingdom 
The position in the United Kingdom (UK) before the CJEU decisions is particularly important for our 
purposes. This is because South African copyright law is historically based on UK copyright law and 
thus our courts would be inclined to follow the position of the UK courts on a matter in which our law 
is silent, rather than that of the EU in general. This is particularly important when considering the 
manner in which the UK has dealt with the issue of linking outside of the influence of EU law. This is 
evident in the UK decision of PRCA Ltd v NLA & Ors (Meltwater).217 In this case Meltwater provided 
its clients with hyperlinks to newspaper articles formed from the headline of the articles so that when 
users clicked on the hyperlink, they were taken to the article on the publisher’s website. In classical 
UK copyright law style the lower courts had held that Meltwater’s actions would amount to copyright 
infringement in that when clicking on the link and viewing the webpage content, a user would also 
make a copy of the webpage on the user’s computer and Internet cache. This would make the 
owner of the linking site liable for copyright infringement as a secondary infringer (i.e. on the basis of 
contributory infringement). Moreover, where the hyperlink in itself had sufficient copyright character 
to constitute a protectable work,218 making use of the link without authorization could in itself amount 
to copyright infringement.  
In arriving at this decision the UK lower courts had given an interpretation that accorded with 
traditional UK copyright law jurisprudence. This ruling of the UK lower courts was however, rejected 
by the UK Supreme Court, relying on article 5(1) of the EU Copyright Directive. This article creates 
an exception to the general rule that reproducing a copyright work without the authorization of the 
copyright owner, in any manner or form, constitutes copyright infringement. Article 5(1) creates an 
exception to this position by permitting temporary acts of reproduction of works if the reproduction is 
(i) transient or incidental; (ii) is an integral and essential part of a technological process and (iii) its 
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sole purpose is to enable a transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, or a 
lawful purpose. Relying on this exception, the UK Supreme Court held that Meltwater had not 
infringed the copyright in the news articles.219 Having indicated this it needs to be noted that, even 
on the basis of the Meltwater decision, inline linking entailing the unauthorized embedding of 
copyright material would not ordinarily be a permissible act in UK law. This is because in the 
Meltwater decision the UK Supreme Court ruled that downloads do not constitute a temporary copy. 
Thus clicking on a link to download material would constitute copyright infringement.220  
(c) Canada 
Canada, like South Africa, developed its copyright law from English copyright law and has largely 
adhered to this tradition in its jurisprudence. Regarding normal linking it was recognized in the 
Canadian Supreme Court case of Crookes v Newton221 that links are at the core of how the internet 
operates and that the internet cannot function as intended without them. In the case it was further 
observed (at paragraph 30) that hyperlinks are similar to a footnote or a reference in that they “[b]oth 
communicate that something exists, but do not, by themselves, communicate its content.” In 
Warman and National Post v Fournier222 the Canadian federal court went further in this regard by 
suggesting that the owner of copyright in a work gives an implied licence to use the work by posting 
it on his or her website.223 Thus no communication to the public or reproduction takes place through 
the use of a simple hyperlink (e.g. providing a link to a photograph accessible on a photographer’s 
website), and therefore no copyright infringement takes place by providing such a link.224  
With regard to embedded links and framing, the position is outlined in Century 21 Canada Ltd. 
Partnership v. Rogers Communications, where it was held that embedding copyright-protected 
material would generally not amount to copyright infringement if the copyright holder made the 
material available online and the medium chosen to make the material available does not prohibit 
embedding or framing in its terms of service.225 However where a “terms of use” agreement (such as 
the so-called “browse-wrap” or “click-wrap” licences) prohibits the embedding of the material, and 
such agreement is found to be valid, embedding the material would constitute a breach of such 
agreement and thus amounts to copyright infringement. 
(d) United States 
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In US copyright law hyperlinking, including deep-linking, where no copying is involved does not 
amount to copyright infringement. This position was confirmed in the case of Ticketmaster Corp, and 
others v Tickets.com, Inc.226 However, for copying to be held not to exist the link must refer the user 
to the “genuine web page”, to prevent deception, and that “[t]his is analogous to using a library’s 
card index to get reference to particular items, albeit faster and more efficiently.”227 Furthermore, it 
was held that the defendant could also rely on the fair use doctrine, which can be relied upon in 
particular cases to exempt a user from copyright infringement, e.g. where what was copied related 
to factual information, which, according to the doctrine, is non-protectable. The position is however 
not so clear with regard to embedded linking. In Leslie A Kelly v Arriba Soft Corporation228 it was 
held that embedding or framing images from another site on a linking site violated the rights-holder’s 
exclusive right of public display. However in Perfect 10 v Google229 it was held that the framing of 
photographs by Google in its image search results did not amount to copyright infringement, since 
the framed photographs were in fact links enabling users to view on Google part of a webpage 
which had originally posted the photographs.  
Similarly in Flava Works v Gunter dba myVidster230 the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals held that 
the framing of third party content by websites did not amount to copyright infringement. In this case 
the actual videos belonging to a third party were displayed on myVidster.com, but the videos were 
not hosted on myVidster.com but were “linked and framed” from other parts of the internet. It needs 
to be understood further that in this case, the videos were posted by the users themselves and not 
by myVidster, and myVidster only provided the linking and framing technology. Users who intended 
to make available streams of the videos would “bookmark” them on myVidster. Upon receiving the 
bookmark, myVidster would then automatically request the video’s embed code from the hosting 
server.231 Using this embed code, myVidster would then automatically create a webpage that makes 
the video to appear to be on myVidster’s site. When another user visited the webpage the videos 
embedded on the webpage appeared as thumbnails, i.e. miniature pictures of a video’s opening 
screen shot. A click on the thumbnail activated the video’s embed code, connecting the visitor’s 
computer to the hosting server, in this way enabling the visitor to watch the video. The visitor would 
in fact watch the video through a frame created by myVidster around the video, containing ads. 
While the visitor might think that he or she was watching the video on myVidster, in fact the video 
was being transmitted directly from the server in which the video was stored, to the visitor’s 
computer. 
The District Court had held that myVidster users were guilty of direct infringement of Flava’s 
copyrights by posting and making back-up copies of its videos on myVidster, i.e. infringing the 
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reproduction right; and by displaying its videos on myVidster without Flava’s permission. Secondly, 
the District Court held that myVidster itself was guilty of contributory infringement by materially 
contributing to the infringing activity. The Appeal Court overruled the decision of the District Court. It 
is however important to understand the rationale of the Appeal Court in overruling the decision of the 
District Court. The Appeal Court did not rule that the embedding of videos from another site does not 
constitute copyright infringement: it merely ruled that in this particular case there was no admissible 
evidence of copyright infringement. The court in fact confirmed that generally, a user who uploads 
and bookmarks a video on myVidster infringes copyright when the video is watched by the public. 
Furthermore, when a website operator provides an inline link to an infringing video, the website 
operator can be held liable for contributory infringement of copyright for facilitating the unauthorized 
public performance of the video. In this particular case however the court did not find admissible 
evidence to support such a conclusion. 
A recent development in the United States involving BMG Rights Management, a music publishing 
company and Cox Communications, the third largest ISP in the United States, is worth noting. BMG 
filed suit against Cox Communications alleging copyright infringement on the part of Cox. This was 
on the basis of contributory liability for the infringement of its copyrights by subscribers to Cox’s 
internet service. The US Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that Cox could not rely on the 
safe harbor provisions provided for in section 5(12)(a) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act for 
failing to implement its policy in a consistent and meaningful manner, “leaving it essentially with no 
policy”.232 The court nevertheless found that the district court had erred in giving responsibility to the 
jury to determine the intent necessary to establish contributory infringement, thus affirming the 
decision of the district court in part, reversing it in part, vacating it in part and remanding it for a new 
trial. It has in this regard been reported that the parties reached a “substantial settlement” in favour 
of BMG, avoiding a retrial.233 
Just like the EU, the USA underwent a major development in its copyright law in 2018, particularly in 
relation to the music industry. This took the form of the Music Modernization Act,234 which was 
signed into law on 11 October 2018. The Act seeks to modernize US copyright law with respect to 
making and distributing records (“phonorecords”) of nondramatic musical works through “digital 
phonorecord delivery”, e.g. digital streaming. The focus however is not in dealing directly with issues 
relating to the liability of online service providers; rather it is to extend the mechanical compulsory 
licensing system to the digital environment and in this regard, to ensure that rights-holders duly 
receive royalties for such uses.  
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8.4.2.5 How would South African Courts deal with the Matter? 
(a) The form of Infringement applicable 
Having provided the above analysis it would be useful to consider directly what the position is, under 
our own law. It is important in this regard to note that the Copyright Act has not been amended to 
take into account the technological developments that were ushered in by the digital revolution that 
started in the 1990’s, which has completely changed the manner in which creative works are created 
and consumed. The Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 has been touted as introducing changes that 
take into account digital developments. However, in respect of rights holders such changes are not 
far-reaching and are largely limited to provisions relating to the introduction of the rights of 
communication to the public and making available in sections 6, 7, 8 and 9 of the Act.  
In providing a guideline as to how to deal with issues relating to the internet in light of this 
shortcoming in our law, the leading authority on copyright law in South Africa, Owen Dean, makes 
this observation:  
When applying copyright law to the internet it is important to dissect the process of the dissemination 
of the subject matter material and then to apply basic copyright principles to the various steps involved 
in the process. The mystique which surrounds the internet can to a large extent be avoided if the 
basics are applied in a step by step analysis of the manner in which information bearing materials are 
dealt with.
235
  
As highlighted above, copyright infringement takes the form of direct infringement, indirect 
infringement, contributory infringement and causal infringement (the last two constituting cases of 
“joint wrongdoing”). The discussion below is concerned with the element of direct infringement and 
contributory infringement, as these are the main forms of infringement in terms of which infringement 
cases in the online environment are dealt with.236  
(i) Direct Infringement 
Direct infringement involves an infringement of the restricted acts, namely the bundle of rights that 
the Copyright Act stipulates as being subject to the exclusive rights of the copyright owner, r by 
doing such acts, authorising another to do such acts, and as Dean and Karjiker add, causing the 
doing and causing the authorisation of the doing of such acts.237 In respect of musical works the 
restricted acts are provided for in section 6 of the Act, in respect of music videos this is provided for 
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in section 8 of the Act,238 and in respect of sound recordings this is provided for in Section 9 of the 
Act. Of the various restricted acts dealt with in these sections, the most relevant act with regard to 
the question of copyright infringement is the act of reproduction, provided for in section 6(a) in 
respect of musical works,239 in section 8(a) in respect of cinematograph films240 and in section 9(a) in 
respect of sound recordings.241 The essence of the manner in which the reproduction right is 
expressed in these sections is that the right is not limited to one form of reproduction but includes 
reproduction “in any manner or form”, or “directly or indirectly”, which connotes the same meaning.  
Expressing the reproduction right in this manner has greatly assisted South African copyright law 
with regard to exploitation of copyright works in the digital environment in light of the general “digital 
vacuum” in the Act, because any manner of reproduction, whether in a material or a non-material 
form, (and the making of any record of a sound recording in which a musical work is embodied, 
whether directly or indirectly),  would constitute and infringement of the work concerned.242 
Moreover, the ambit of the reproduction right is made wider by the fact that not only a direct copy, 
but also a copy of a copy (the so-called indirect copying) is covered by the definition of 
reproduction.243 This wider application of the expression “reproduction” makes it applicable without 
any hindrance in the digital environment.  
In the writer’s view, it could be concluded that cases of normal linking (including deep linking) would 
not constitute copyright infringement under the South African Copyright Act because a feature of 
these forms of linking is that the link merely refers the user to another site, the target site, where the 
copyright material is stored, and does not itself result in a copy being stored in the server of the 
linking site, i.e. it does not result in the reproduction of the work on the linking site.244 The same 
cannot however, be said of embedded or inline linking, where material from a different website is 
placed on a web page of the linking site. In such cases it has been argued that a reproduction is in 
fact made.245 This would also be the case when understood from the position taken by several 
European courts prior to the Svensson and BestWater decisions of the CJEU (discussed above), as 
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well as what can be understood as the classical UK copyright law position before the influence of EU 
law (as reflected in the decisions of the lower courts in the Meltwater case discussed above),. Under 
such circumstances the embedding of copyright material from a host website to a linking website 
without permission of the copyright owner, would, where the hyperlink in itself has sufficient 
copyright character to constitute a protectable work (e.g. where it is in fact a copy of the music 
video), constitute copyright infringement.  
  
Returning to the UK Supreme Court ruling in the Meltwater case, it is submitted that a South African 
court would have given a ruling that is more in line with the decision of the UK lower courts in this 
matter (holding that the act concerned constituted copyright infringement), since South Africa does 
not currently have an exception similar to that provided for in article 5(1) of the EU Copyright 
Directive. In this regard the following general principle espoused by Dean and Karjiker in this regard, 
is worth noting: 
The storage of extraneous material by a service provider in its system, which material is 
obtained from third parties, constitutes reproduction of that material and the unauthorized 
storage could thus give rise to copyright infringement.246 
If the conclusion is that a reproduction takes place when a copyright work (e.g. a music video) is 
embedded on a website the question to ask is who is responsible for this direct infringement of 
copyright? It is submitted that this would be dependent on who actually placed the copyright material 
on the internet service provider (ISP)’s website. In the myVidster case discussed above users 
posted the videos themselves through a process of bookmarking, and myVidster only supplied the 
linking and framing technology to embed the videos on its website. Thus it can be concluded that the 
person who posts the copyright material on the ISP’s website through a similar process (e.g. a 
subscriber) would be guilty of direct copyright infringement. However, where the ISP actively 
encourages the subscribers or other users over which it has control, to post and / or share files and 
content, even if the ISP does not itself posts them, the ISP could be held liable for direct 
infringement of copyright for causing or authorising the making of reproductions of the music video 
(i.e. for causal or vicarious infringement).  
The above would accord with the Warman decision of the Federal Court of Appeal of Canada, 
where it was held that for an internet service provider or platform to be held liable for copyright 
infringement, “… [the] platform must first be held to have authorized such reproduction.” 
Authorisation would occur where the ISP gives the impression to the users that it has the right to 
permit the posting of the music videos on its platform. To avoid this the ISP should take precautions, 
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e.g. in its “Terms of Use”, to make it explicit that the ISP does not authorise users to post 
unauthorised copyright material on its website. The conclusion is therefore that to avoid a claim for 
direct infringement the ISP should not embed any copyright material (e.g. music videos) on its 
website, nor should it authorise others to do so, without first obtaining permission to do so from the 
owners of copyright in such works or ascertaining that such permission was obtained. Where the 
ISP neither posts the music videos itself, nor can be said to have “authorised” users to do so, the 
question left would be whether the ISP, although not guilty of direct infringement of copyright, would 
nevertheless be guilty of contributory infringement as dealt with further below.   
It needs to be understood that many times in the music industry artists are not the copyright owners 
of the music videos in which they feature, and the copyright often belongs to the record label or 
some other financial sponsor who financed the making of the music video. In this regard the ISP 
needs to be careful regarding the material posted on its website and not merely assume that 
because an artist has posted a music video in which he features, the copyright in such music video 
accordingly belongs to him. It needs furthermore to be also understood that where, in the case of a 
music video, an unauthorised reproduction takes place, not only the copyright in the music video 
concerned (i.e. the cinematograph film as contemplated in section 8 of the Copyright Act) is 
infringed, as the copyright in the sound recording embodied in the music video, and the copyright in 
the musical and literary works embodied in the sound recording, would also be infringed. Thus the 
ISP may find itself liable for copyright infringement against various parties, namely the owner of the 
copyright in the music video, the owner of the copyright in the sound recording (and sometimes the 
owner of the performer’s right also), and the owner of the copyright in the underlying musical work. 
Having indicated this, it needs to be mentioned that clause 13 of the Copyright Amendment Bill 
2017247 seeks to insert a new section 12C to the Copyright Act, which introduces a temporary 
reproduction and adaptation exception that mimics (although it can also be distinguished from) 
article 5(1) of the EU Copyright Directive. The proposed section 12C provides the following: 
12C. Any person may make transient or incidental copies or adaptations of a work, including reformatting, 
where such copies or adaptations are an integral and essential part of a technical process and the 
purpose of those copies or adaptations is— 
(a) to enable the transmission of the work in a network between third parties by an intermediary or 
any other lawful use of the work; or  
(b) to adapt the work to allow use on different technological devices, such as mobile devices, as long 
as there is no independent, economic significance of these acts.
248
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In light of the above, if the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 becomes law and retains the proposed 
section 12C, it is submitted that our courts shall in view of this be compelled to follow the decisions 
of the UK Supreme Court and the CJEU in the Meltwater case,249 rather than that of the court a quo 
as submitted above. Having indicated this, it needs to be mentioned however that there is a problem 
in the manner in which the temporary reproduction exception has been introduced under the 
Copyright Amendment Bill. In the first instance while the EU right is only concerned with “temporary 
acts of reproduction”, the South African version extends to “adaptations of a work”. In this regard the 
South African version is overly expansive, and entails as it were, a “double dipping” into the 
exclusive rights of copyright owners. It is not clear why it was felt that the exception needed to 
extend to the right of adaptation.  
Further to the above, while in the EU Copyright Directive this exception is specifically subjected to 
the three-step test,250 this has not been done in the proposed introduction of this right under the 
Copyright Amendment Bill. It is clear therefore that the proposed introduction of this exception under 
the Copyright Amendment Bill was either done haphazardly, or with the clear intent of favouring 
users at the expense of rights-holders. 
What was said above is limited to the infringement of the right of reproduction through the 
embedding of copyright-protected works.251 In the cases that have come before the courts (including 
some of the cases discussed above, such as the EU cases of Svensson, BestWater and GS Media 
BV, and the Canadian case of Warman) the right of communication to the public (and in the US the 
public performance and public display right also) has been the subject of infringement cases arising 
from the unauthorised embedding of copyright material. In South Africa the right of communication 
to the public is not well developed except in respect of sound recordings.252 In respect of other works 
such as musical works and cinematograph films the Act still refers to the restricted act of 
broadcasting the work. In view of this, the decisions that dealt with the question of communication to 
the public would, it is submitted, not have much relevance in the current South African context. It 
also needs to be observed that the argument given by the CJEU in respect of the question why it 
believed that the embedment of works did not infringe the right of communication to the public - 
namely the submission that because the copyright owner had already made his or her copyright 
work available online, the embedment of such work on a linking website would not constitute 
copyright infringement because the work was disseminated to the same public and not a “new 
public” - is controversial and it is submitted, foreign to our law, as this would amount to an unjustified 
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exhaustion of the right of communication to the public.253 It is submitted that this is a uniquely 
European invention and though current UK law has been influenced by this, our courts should not 
follow such a position.    
(ii) Contributory Infringement 
As indicated, contributory infringement occurs when a person “aids and abets” the commission of an 
infringing act by another (i.e. assists another to commit an infringing act), while knowing, or having 
reason to believe that the act which he aids and abets constitutes an infringing act. Contributory 
infringement is a form of joint wrongdoing as known in the common law of delict.254 On this basis, 
even where the ISP has not itself used the copyright materials or authorised others to do so, the ISP 
may still be held liable for assisting the infringers to commit copyright infringement. The difference 
between authorising another to commit an infringing act and assisting them (i.e. aiding and abetting 
them) to do so is that in the former case, the person authorising another to commit an infringing act 
creates the impression to the other that he or she has authority to permit such an act, while in the 
case of aiding and abetting, the person concerned creates the means, or makes it easy or possible, 
for another to commit copyright infringement.255 Contributory infringement has traditionally been the 
basis upon which internet service providers have been held liable for copyright infringement. 
Providing the means for another to commit copyright infringement often happens through the making 
available of a technological device, means or platform which makes it easy for another to commit 
copyright infringement. In the case of Haupt t/a Softcopy v Brewers Marketing Intelligence (Pty) Ltd 
& Others256 it was held that one Coetzee assisted the first and second respondents to infringe the 
appellant’s copyright in a Data Explorer program “by providing the source code in respect of the 
search function and also the source code required to incorporate the graphics server.” In this regard 
the court observed:  
In the premises Coetzee made common cause with the first and second respondents and co-operated 
with them in so far as the infringement by them of the appellant’s copyright … in South Africa is 
concerned. By doing so Coetzee himself infringed the appellant’s copyright in the Data Explorer 
program in South Africa.
257
  
Another case decided by our courts in this regard is the Atari258 case. In this case the respondent 
had sold a device which was primarily aimed at making reproductions of the applicant’s copyright-
protected computer games. The applicant argued that the responded instigated or facilitated the 
making of unauthorised copies of the applicant’s computer games by third parties by means of 
selling the device in question and promoting sales of the device by drawing the purchasers’ attention 
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to the device’s capabilities. The court agreed with the applicant in the case and issued an interim 
interdict against the respondent.259 As Dean and Karjiker have observed, “In this instance the 
respondent was held to have infringed copyright even though there was no evidence of any actual 
reproduction of the applicant’s games.”260  
In view of the above, it is clear that an ISP can be found liable for contributory infringement of 
copyright, where users unlawfully upload copyright material such as music videos on the ISP’s 
website, on the basis of aiding and abetting these users to infringe the copyright in the copyright 
material by providing the linking and framing technology that enabled the users to do so. The ISP 
would of course only be liable if it knows or have reasons to believe that assisting others to post the 
copyright material on its website (or to post an embedded link to such music videos) would enable 
them to commit copyright infringement. This would be the case where the primary or direct act of 
infringement (e.g. the posting of the music videos) would have been committed by the users, with 
the ISP only providing the technology to do so. Where however the ISP would itself have posted the 
music videos then if such posting was not authorised, then the ISP would be liable for direct 
infringement of copyright and there would be no question of contributory infringement.  
The form of wrongdoing required on the part of a person who aids and abets the commission of an 
infringing act is intention, i.e. dolus.261 The person must know or have reasons to believe that 
assisting the third party concerned will result in the third party committing copyright infringement. In 
this regard it needs to be understood that dolus does not have to be dolus directus (“direct intention” 
or intention in its grammatical sense) but can also include dolus eventualis (“legal intention”), and 
there are also “different gradations” of wrongdoing that can be inferred from this.262 Dolus eventualis 
involves two components, namely (for current purposes): (i) a cognitive component, which involves 
foreseeing the possibility that the act in question would result in infringing conduct; and (ii) a 
conative or volitional component, which involves recklessness notwithstanding, i.e. recklessly 
accepting that the infringing conduct may take place (and not refraining from the act leading to such 
infringing conduct).263 This means that, to avoid being guilty of contributory infringement not only 
must the ISP show that it had no knowledge and had no reason to believe that providing the linking 
and framing technology would assist users to post infringing copyright content, but it must also show 
that it did not foresee the possibility of this happening. It is submitted that, in many cases it would be 
difficult to prove this. 
(b) Possible Defences available to an Internet Service Provider 
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Although this work is not generally concerned with a consideration of the provisions relating to the 
infringement of copyright, concerned as it is with providing the context within which copyright in 
musical works is protected, it would be useful to briefly consider the defences that an ISP may have 
for either itself embedding copyright material that is found to constitute copyright infringement, or 
aiding and abetting others to do so. In this regard the ISP may make use of two defences, firstly, 
argue that the act concerned was not an infringing act either because no copyright subsisted in the 
work concerned or because the necessary authorisation to use the work was obtained. Secondly, 
the ISP can argue that the act concerned was an act permitted by law because it falls within the 
scope of the exemptions (“limitations and exceptions”) granted in relation to such a work.264  
A defence based on the ground that no copyright subsisted in the work would rely on the argument 
that the claimant did not satisfy all the requirements for the subsistence of copyright in the work, as 
provided for in copyright law. This includes alleging that the work is not an original work, that the 
claimant is not the copyright owner, that there was no reproduction of a substantial part etc. The 
defendant may also claim that he had authorisation to use the work. Authorisation would arise from 
the various ways in which copyright can be disposed of or conferred upon another, e.g. through 
assignment, through the issuing of a licence, through a will etc. A licence can be either an exclusive 
licence or a non-exclusive licence, and may even be an implied / tacit licence. 
Perhaps the issue of an implied licence deserves further attention. An implied licence is essentially a 
non-written contract which can be implied or deduced from the conduct of the parties, i.e. if the 
copyright owner by his conduct gives the impression that he has given permission for the work to be 
used, then an implied licence may be deduced from such conduct.265 The Federal Court of Appeal of 
Canada took this approach in the Warman case (discussed under paragraph 8.4.2.4 above) when it 
held (in the case of hyperlinking), that, because links are at the core of how the internet operates 
and the internet cannot function as intended without them, no infringing communication to the public 
or reproduction takes place through the use of a simple hyperlink and that in fact, the copyright 
owner of a work linked to gives an authorization (in essence an implied licence) to use the work by 
posting it on his or her website.  
It is submitted that the Canadian approach with regard to implied licences in respect of linked works 
is very liberal and would not be applicable to South Africa under the current Copyright system. In 
this regard it has been observed that, under the South African copyright law, “before an implied 
contract can be found by the court to exist it must be convinced that there are relevant facts which 
cannot be interpreted in any other way save that an implied agreement has come into existence.”266 
In this regard it can be said that the fact that linking is an essential part of internet technology does 
not mean that the link must link to a work that is protected by copyright. In South Africa a defence 
based on an implied licence is similar to the defence of abandonment, which is to the effect that a 
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rights holder has, by his conduct (e.g. public utterances) abandoned his right to claim copyright 
infringement.267 In an abandonment defence the onus / burden of proof to prove that the rights 
holder has abandoned or waived his right to claim under copyright is that of the defendant, and this 
onus must be discharged on a balance of probabilities.268 In this regard Dean and Karjiker have 
observed that, “[i]n assessing the probabilities, the factual presumption that a person is not likely 
deemed to have waived his or her rights must be borne in mind.”269 In view of this, it is clear that it 
would not be easy in South Africa (as it seems to be in Canada), to mount up an argument to the 
effect that, because a rights holder has made his or her works available on the internet, he has 
given an implied licence to link to such works. 
Regarding the defence that the act concerned is exempted from being an infringing act because it 
falls within the scope of the limitations and exceptions provided for in the copyright law, this is similar 
to the defence used in the UK-CJEU ruling in the Meltwater case, where the linking and embedment 
of copyright works was seen to be permissible on the basis of article 5(1) of the EU Copyright 
Directive. Article 5(1) of the EU Copyright Directive constitutes a limitation and exception to the 
general rule that reproducing a copyright work without the authorisation of the copyright owner 
amounts to an infringement of copyright. It is of course common cause that the system of limitations 
and exceptions derives from the provisions of the Berne Convention itself – the international 
convention providing international minimum standards for the protection of copyright.270 In South 
Africa limitations are currently provided for in sections 12 – 19B of the Act, which include the fair 
dealing defence. Since however, South African copyright law does not currently have a limitations 
and exceptions provision similar to article 5(2) of the EU Copyright Directive, internet service 
providers could not rely on such a defence in South Africa. In America , where the fair use defence 
is used, this was relied upon in the Ticketmaster Corp case dealt with above, to remove the 
infringing nature of the act concerned.  
8.4.2.6 The Provisions of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act 
A consideration of the impact of technological developments would not be complete without 
commenting on the provisions of the Electronic Communications and Transactions Act (ECTA).271 
The ECTA “makes provision for the recognition and regulation of electronic transactions and media 
in modern commerce … [and] deals with the internet and the legal implications and considerations 
which flow from the use of the internet in modern commerce.”272 Relevant for our present purposes 
are the provisions of Chapter XI (Sections 70 – 81) of the Act, which deal with “Limitation of Liability 
of Service Providers”. “Service Provider” is defined broadly to include “any person providing 
information system services”, thus including website operators, hosting service providers, access 
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providers and virtually anyone who offers information services on the internet. For any service 
provider to be able to benefit from the exemptions granted to service providers under Chapter XI of 
this Act the service provider needs to be a member of an industry representative body (IRB) 
recognised by the Minister of Trade & Industry, and must have adopted and implemented the code 
of conduct imposed by such representative body. Some recognised IRBs include the Internet 
Service Providers’ Association (ISPA), Wireless Access Providers’ Association (WAPA) and the 
Wireless Application Service Providers’ Association (WASPA). 
The service providers that are eligible to obtain exemption from liability granted to service providers 
in terms of Chapter XI are categorised into four groups, namely: (i) those acting as mere conduits of 
information (section 73), (ii) those involved with information caching (section 74), (iii) those involved 
with information hosting (Section 75) and (iv) those involved with the provision of “information 
location tools” (Section 76). “Information location tools” include “a directory, index, reference, 
pointer, or hyperlink”. Under section 77, a person who complains of unlawful activity can, in writing, 
notify the service provider or designated agent of the unlawful activity, setting out the right which has 
been infringed and the location or nature of the infringing material or activity under the control of the 
service provider. The service provider would, upon receipt of the notice, expeditiously remove the 
infringing content or disable access to it. In terms of section 78 there is however no general 
obligation on a service provider to (a) monitor the data which it transmits or (b) actively seek facts or 
circumstances indicating an unlawful activity.  
Additional requirements apply if a service provider wishes to avail itself of the limitation of liability 
provided for in the ECTA. In terms of section 76, limitation of liability would only apply if the ISP:  
(a) does not have actual knowledge that the data message or an activity relating to the data message 
is infringing the rights of that person [who alleges that it does];  
(b) is not aware of facts or circumstances from which the infringing activity or the infringing nature of 
the data message is apparent;  
(c) does not receive a financial benefit directly attributable to the infringing activity; and  
(d) removes, or disables access to, the reference or link to the data message or activity within a 
reasonable time after being informed that the data message or the activity relating to such data 
message, infringes the rights of a person. 
The phrase “data message” as used above is defined as “data generated, sent, received or stored 
by electronic means and includes … a stored record”.273 “Stored record” clearly includes a sound 
recording, and since what is covered in section 76 is “data message or an activity relating to the 
data message”, a music video would also qualify as “an activity relating to [a sound recording]”.   
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It is submitted that the above-mentioned requirements (particularly in respect of (a) and (b)), accord 
with the requirements for contributory infringement dealt with above. If a service provider cannot 
satisfy these requirements it can be said to have known, or to have had reasons to believe that the 
activity it is permitting would give rise to copyright infringement. It would for example be very difficult 
for an ISP to assert, with regard to the embedding of music videos that are later proved to infringe 
copyright, that it was not aware of facts or circumstances from which the infringing activity or the 
infringing nature of the data message was apparent. It needs in this regard to be remembered that 
the requirement of knowing or dolus, (and by extension dolus eventualis) relates not only to knowing 
in the ordinary sense but also foreseeing the possibility of something happening. In view of this, it 
can reasonably be argued that the mere fact that the infringement of copyright works is rife on the 
internet could be seen as placing the ISP in a position where it foresees the possibility that such an 
infringement could happen on its website also, thus making it necessary that the ISP would not 
facilitate (aid and abet) the posting of such videos on its site (by making the linking and framing 
technology necessary to do so readily available for this purpose).  
8.5 Conclusion 
This chapter was concerned with an exploration of the implication of digital technology on the 
protection of copyright works in the digital environment. As highlighted in this work, technological 
developments have presented ongoing challenges for the protection of copyright works. Many times 
the emergence of new, disruptive technology has been seen as threatening the very legitimacy of 
the copyright system. However, starting with the threat imposed upon rights-holders from the advent 
of print technology, which made it easy to copy multiple works, copyright law has, for over two 
hundred years, held out as the ultimate Protector of the interests of authors and other copyright 
owners. 
The advent of digital technology nevertheless ushered in so many problems and disruptions that 
some legitimately believed that this would spell the death knell for the copyright law system as we 
know it. In this regard many voices have been heard, including those calling for a system of “users’ 
rights” to replace the system of copyright in the digital environment. In South Africa this movement 
seems to have gained in ascendancy, as demonstrated by the fierce lobbying that has taken place 
with regard to the Copyright Amendment Bill currently before Parliament. It seems that the users’ 
rights camp has gained the higher ground in the South African environment, with gains such as the 
proposed introduction of a far-reaching exceptions regime undergirded by a US-style fair use 
defence, which, itself, is poised to turn South African copyright law on its head, looking at US law for 
guidance rather than the long-established tradition of relying on English law.  
However, this loss of splendour of the copyright law system is thankfully not the norm everywhere. 
In the European Union it can be said that rather than diminishing in strength, copyright law is poised 
to conquer the mountain of the value gap which became the by-product of the disruption of the 
traditional music value chain. The European Parliament’s support of proposals to amend the EU 
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Copyright Directive in order to adequately protect the interests of rights-holders in a disrupted digital 
environment has awaken the hope that copyright law can, in fact, survive any technological 
onslaught, where the policy makers display a strong resolve to uphold the principle of the protection 
of authors’ rights.  
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Chapter 9: Conclusion  
“The future has several names. For the weak, it is impossible. For the fainthearted, it is unknown. 
For the thoughtful and valiant, it is ideal.” – Victor Hugo 
“Where law ends, tyranny begins.” – William Pitt  
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9.1 Summary 
This thesis was concerned with providing an exposition of the world of music rights protection, with a 
focus on unravelling the meaning of, and the context of the protection afforded to musical works. 
The work sought to do so by properly juxtaposing the copyright protection of musical works within 
the milieu of historical and contemporary developments. It was shown how music has been a 
powerful and gripping force in a period spanning about three centuries, and how copyright law has 
been its strengthening power throughout this period.  
Part 1 of the research was mainly concerned with the historical development of music copyright in 
England and France and later in the USA, and highlighted how music copyright law (and copyright 
law in general) weathered the storms of technological developments by asserting its enduring rights 
and legitimacy, in spite of such challenges. Thus where print technology arose, threatening to 
obliterate the legitimate expectations of rights-holders, copyright law overcame this by asserting its 
print rights. When recording technology sought to assert its dominance, copyright law countered by 
asserting recording rights, i.e. mechanical rights. Film technology was countered by synchronisation 
rights, electrical transcription technology was countered by transcription rights, and the mighty three-
pronged performing right, comprising of the rights of public performance, broadcasting (and / or 
communication to the public) and transmission by diffusion (including cable transmission rights), has 
always contended for royalty payments for rights-holders whenever a form of public performance 
would take place. 
The thesis more importantly also attempted a consideration of the historical development of music 
copyright in South Africa, and in particular how the Imperial Copyright Act shaped modern South 
African music copyright law. Such an attempt has not, in the writer’s awareness, been made before, 
except in the general field of copyright law where the venerable Owen Dean undoubtedly produced 
his magnum opus in this regard. The writer has drawn inspiration from this work and contextualised 
it in carrying out the mammoth task of providing an analysis of the historical development of music 
copyright in South Africa.  
Part 2 is concerned with a contextual consideration of the protection of copyright in musical works in 
the modern era, including a focus in Chapter 8 on a matter fiercely gripping the focus of the music 
industry today, namely the buffeting force of digital technology, instilling a sense of anxiety as to 
whether copyright law will finally succumb to the onslaught of technology. Copyright law has held out 
however, as evident from the tinge of excitement engendered by the news that the European 
Parliament has taken the first step in asserting the rights of rights-holders in the digital market 
space. The section also provided a useful, overdue exposition of the general principles applicable to 
the copyright protection of musical works (Chapter 5) as well as expounding on the legal provisions 
applicable to modern musical copyright in South Africa. A treatment of the important field of 
collective management has then ensured a complete picture and treatment of the subject-matter. It 
is hoped that the reader will be both enriched and empowered by this work and that the work can 
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contribute to the impartation of skills and knowledge in this arcane area of law. It is submitted that 
this work contributes to the body of knowledge in South Africa, in the following ways: 
(1) It instils a conceptual understanding of the bundle of rights relating to the copyright protection of 
musical works, including the sub-rights relating thereto, by providing the historical context within 
which these rights developed; 
(2) It provides a useful contextual analysis of the milieu or “world” of music copyright protection, by 
providing “real life” illustrations of how particular copyright rules and doctrines are applied in practice 
in the music industry. This is done using the explanatory research method and is evident throughout 
the thesis;   
(3) It provides an essential elaboration of the principles of copyright protection with a focus on their 
application to the protection of copyright in musical works. No comprehensive analysis had hitherto 
been done in this regard in South Africa; 
(4) A feature of the thesis is its attempt to contribute to the debate on the decolonisation of 
knowledge by proposing a possible African epistemology of copyright law through the expansion of 
the concept of “work”.1 It is, in this regard proposed that a Constitutional interpretation of the right of 
artistic creativity, while guaranteeing the right to property, would lend itself to the recognition of such 
an expansion of the concept of “work”; and  
(5) It contributes to the current process of copyright reform, by providing a critical analysis of the 
provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 both within the text of the thesis and in the 
discussion immediately following below, and proposing various amendments in this regard. 
In the following section the writer proposes certain recommendations based on an analysis of the 
particular provisions of the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 that have a bearing on the protection of 
copyright in musical works; followed by general recommendations in light of the issues arising from 
the thesis as a whole.  
9.2 Recommendations responding to the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 
This section deals with recommendations based on a consideration of the Copyright Amendment Bill 
20172 and focusses on those provisions that have a bearing on musical works and musical literary 
works (lyrics) and the protection of these rights and the rights-holders thereof. Prior to considering 
provisions where proposals for certain changes are made it is important to hail the development 
arising from the introduction of two important rights poised to position South Africa to be more 
competitive in the digital environment. These are the rights of communication to the public and 
making available, which add to the panoply of rights given to the owner of copyright in musical and 
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literary works under section 6 of the Act. The rights are introduced through the insertion of a new 
subsection (eA) and subsection (eB) under section 6 of the Act (clause 4 of the Bill). These rights, 
which emanate from the WIPO Copyright Treaty of 1996, are crucial to ensure the protection of 
rights-holders and are long overdue. In this regard South Africa is a late-comer in embracing these 
rights. 
The writer also notes the introduction of a distribution right under a new subsection (eC). It is 
submitted however, that though several commentators have agitated for this right during the 
consultation process for the Copyright Amendment Bill, it was not necessary to introduce this right 
because the right is akin to the right of publishing the work already provided for in section 6(b). 
While some jurisdiction term this a distribution right, others term it a publishing right and in each 
case it is concerned with the issuing of copies of works to the public to satisfy the demand of the 
public.3   
9.2.1 Clause 5 – New section 6A(2) 
Clause 5 introduces a new section 6A titled “Share in royalties regarding literary or musical works”. 
The original proposed provisions in relation to section 6A(2) provided that,  notwithstanding any 
assignment of or authorization in respect of copyright in a literary or musical work, “the author shall 
have the right to share in the royalty received for the execution of any of the acts contemplated in 
section 6.”4 This has now been changed to say “the author shall, subject to any agreement to the 
contrary, be entitled to receive a fair share of the royalty received for the execution of any of the acts 
contemplated in section 6.” This is a better, albeit not ideal construction, because it permits 
negotiation between the parties and in this regard preserves the exclusive nature of copyright. 
 
While the moral basis of the original provision was understandable, its legal rationality was dubious 
in that the essence of copyright is that it is a “right of property”, albeit in the form of intellectual 
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property, and ‘[t]he proprietary interest in that object of knowledge is the ownership of it, and is 
called “copyright”’.5 Equating copyright to real rights in corporeal property Slomowitz AJ observes: 
[Copyright] might just as well be called “ownership”, but we have chosen to call it by another name, 
reserving “ownership” as the appellation for the proprietary interest in corporeal things, by way of 
semantic, but not, as I see it, legal, distinction. … Ownership in a thing is … the right, at common law 
at least, subject no doubt to frauds, abuse of the rights of others and possibly abuse of the proprietary 
interest itself, to do what one pleases with the thing to which it relates, to use it, consume it or exploit 
it.
6
 
This is the manner in which copyright is perceived internationally, i.e. as a right of property.7 At the 
core of the right of ownership is unencumbered title. Thus where, using the example of corporeal 
property (“real estate”), the owner of the property says to another, “I transfer full ownership of this 
property to you. However, whenever you use the property, or authorize another person to use the 
property, you need to give me a monthly payment of so much”, then clearly this is not an instance of 
true ownership and instead would be best described as a lease agreement. In the same way it has 
been observed that where the essence of an agreement in respect of copyright is the payment of 
royalties to the author, then such an agreement is more likely to be an exclusive licence rather than 
an assignment of copyright.8 
The problem therefore, with the initial provision in the Bill was the fact that, at the core of the 
proposed section 6A(2) was the mandatory requirement for the assignee to pay royalties to the 
assignor author, which then made the payment of royalties a precondition for the assignment. This 
implied that the assignment would not be valid without an agreement to pay royalties. Doing this 
would amount to imposing conditions on the regime of assignment of copyright that are not 
recognized in international treaty law (whether the Berne Convention or the TRIPs Agreement). The 
provision would thus be at odds with the principle of minimum rights provided for under the Berne 
Convention, which designates the rights of ownership of copyright to be of an exclusive nature. In 
essence what the initial position in respect of section 6A(2) entailed was that it curtailed the right of 
the assignee to enjoy full title of the rights transferred to him or her, by imposing conditions on the 
exercise of the rights, thus in essence reducing the ostensible assignment to a mere licence, albeit 
                                               
5
 Slomowitz AJ, in Video Parktown North (Pty) td v Paramount Pictures Corportion; Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd v 
Shelburne Associates and Others; Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd v Century Associates and Others [1986] 1 All SA 1 (T) 
at 7. Emphasis added. 
6
 Video Parktown North case ibid.  
7
 See for example in this regard Sookman Mason and Craig Copyright 3 and 6, who observe: ‘In order to gain a fuller 
understanding of the term “intellectual property,” it may be useful to approach it in terms of the notion of “property” in 
general. The most important feature of property is that the owner of the property may use it as he wishes; nobody else can 
lawfully use his property without his authorization. … The owner of copyright in a protected work may use the work as he 
wishes, and may prevent others from using it without authorization. Thus, the rights granted under national laws to the 
owner of copyright in a protected work are normally “exclusive rights” to authorize others to use the work, subject to the 
legally recognized rights and interests of others.’ Emphasis added. See also in this regard WIPO Intellectual Property 
Handbook 43, where this position is reiterated.  
8
 See the English decision of Wrenn v Landamore [2007] EWHC 1833 (ch), at para 37. 
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exclusive licence. Another problem with regard to such a provision is that, in terms of the principles 
of national treatment and minimum rights forming part of the Berne Convention, such an imposition 
would only bind assignees who are South African nationals and not those who are foreign 
nationals.9    
This however does not mean that legislation could not, as a general principle, make provision for the 
payment of royalties to authors or stipulate that assignees should pay royalties to authors pursuant 
to an assignment of rights. Such a provision would indeed not be out of the way as it is indeed 
customary and in fact commendable and laudable for assignees to pay royalties to authors. 
However, because copyright is a right of ownership, such provisions should not impose conditions 
that make it difficult for the author to do as he or she pleases or wishes with the work, and 
furthermore for the assignee, being the new owner of the copyright, to likewise do as he or she 
pleases or wishes with the work. It needs in this regard to be acknowledged that, instead of a 
royalty, there are other ways in which the author of a literary or musical work could be compensated 
for the use of the work.10 For example, the author might prefer to receive an up-front payment for the 
work rather than an uncertain future royalty (often called buy-out deals). Such deals are in fact 
prevalent in the production-music (also termed library or mood music) environment, i.e. music for 
use in films, videos, advertising etc; as well as in certain direct film music deals. Often in that 
environment a composer is paid an upfront fee rather than sharing in the “synchronization” royalty.11 
This phenomenon is illustrated by the words ascribed to the US film trailer composer, Mark Petrie:     
US trailer composer Mark Petrie sums it up: “Some of the big libraries in the US buy out the licensing 
income, paying a good upfront fee (like $1000 or more per track). That type of deal was a godsend 
early in my career, when I needed the cash in the short term. These days I’m more willing to take the 
risk and seek deals where I share the sync fees, in lieu of a significant upfront payment.”
12
 
Furthermore, the composer may also wish to selectively give his work for free, in exchange for an 
opportunity to get exposure and other promotional opportunities. Many artists increasingly use this 
method in the wake of the digital revolution, especially at the beginning of their careers. This may 
entail posting their music on social media platforms (e.g. YouTube, Spotify etc.); permitting the use 
of the music in promotional videos or as part of films at film festivals or as part of music 
competitions, etc. Another problem with the initial provision is that it was not only concerned with the 
                                               
9
 This is because foreign nationals are guaranteed the minimum rights of protection provided for in the Berne Convention, 
regardless of the provisions of the national legislation, as the principle of national treatment applies in favour of foreign 
nationals. In this regard it needs to be noted that article 2(6) of the Berne Convention provides that the protection afforded 
by the Convention “operate[s] for the benefit of the author and his successors in title.” Emphasis added. This means that 
where the foreign nationals become assignees of copyright from a South African author, the restrictions on the assignment 
of right (through the imposition of a mandatory royalty provision), would not apply to such foreign nationals. 
10
 This may include compensation “in kind”, such as the grant of certain goods or facilities that the author may need, in 
exchange for assigning the right.  
11
 Despite this arrangement the composer would remain entitled to the royalties paid by collecting societies like SAMRO 
and CAPASSO (i.e. in respect of the mechanical right and the performing right). 
12
 https://www.soundonsound.com/music-business/all-about-library-music-part-2#para4 (date of use: 28 September 2018). 
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assignment of copyright but also extended to other forms of “authorization by the author of a literary 
or musical work of the right to do any of the acts contemplated in section 6”,13 thus including the 
practice of giving music for free for one or other reasons.14 This would have been seriously 
problematic in that if royalties were to be paid every time this was done15 then this could result in the 
users no longer being willing to provide such promotional opportunities to new composers.  
It was thus necessary to amend the proposed section 6A(2) to ensure that both the author, as the 
original owner of copyright, and the assignee, as the new owner of copyright, are able to exercise 
their exclusive rights without any limitation. This means, in the first instance, that the composer is 
not obliged to assign his or her rights, and could grant authorization by way of a licence (whether 
exclusive or non-exclusive). This also means however, that the author should be able to assign his 
or her copyright if he or she so wishes. In this regard, since an assignment is a transfer of ownership 
rights, once a decision is taken by the author to transfer ownership in this regard, ex lege conditions 
cannot be imposed upon this right of ownership. The law would in this regard be contradicting itself 
because on the one hand, it creates a right that by its nature, is a right of ownership with full title, 
while on the other hand it imposes conditions that are inimical to the exercise of such right.16 
Furthermore, doing this would infringe the copyright owner’s freedom of contract, which is now 
viewed within the prism of the Constitution.17  
Parliament need not be concerned that if it permits the unconditional transference of copyright by an 
author through assignment, then the author would be taken advantage of. This is because as 
observed, the constitutional approach to contractual challenges “leaves space for the doctrine of 
                                               
13
 Section 6A(2)(b) of the Bill, as then proposed. 
14
 It could for example be that the author is happy with his or her music being used for free in church or at a charity. 
15
 Although “royalty” is defined as gross profit from the exploitation of the work, it may not always be easy, where the 
exploitation of the music is only one part of the operations of the entity concerned (e.g. where a composer grants 
permission for his music to be used for free at a restaurant, as a promotional strategy) to determine what part of the 
entity’s profit can be ascribed to the use of the music. 
16
 Rather than attempting to tamper with the system of assignment of rights, the Committee could also have considered 
revolutionising South African copyright law by aligning it to the monist system applicable in Germany and other parts of 
Continental Europe, where copyright is seen as being personal to the author and where the moral right of the author is 
intertwined with his economic rights, thus rendering it impossible for the author to transfer this right to another. In this 
regard the following has been observed: “African countries could follow the example of the monist system existing in 
Germany by not splitting the personal (moral) right from the economic right, and on this basis doing away with the system 
of transfer of ownership and replacing it with a purely licensing regime (whether through the use of exclusive or non-
exclusive licences). Thus rather than assigning their copyright to publishers and record companies African artists would 
only license the usage of their works, preferably for shorter, renewable periods.” Baloyi 2014 PELJ at 40. In this regard the 
words of Harms JA in Biotech Laboratories (Pty) Ltd v Beecham Group Plc and Another [2002] ZASCA 11, at para 12, 
commenting on the original form of the Copyright Act 98 of 1978, ring a bell: “The present Act, in its original form, 
attempted to be kinder to authors. The concept of ‘copyright’ was replaced with an author’s right, the ‘ownership’ of which 
vested principally in the author. In this and other regards the object was to move in the direction of Continental law where 
the emphasis is on the rights (moral or other) of the author and not on the economic rights of employers and 
entrepreneurs. The good intentions did not last and hardly a year had passed when the Legislature (by amending s 21) 
reverted, as far as ownership was concerned, to the Anglo-American model where commercial rights tend to reign 
supreme. …”  Emphasis added. Parliament might consider pursuing this course of action again, but the Bill would then 
need to be reconsidered holistically to achieve this objective. 
17
 See the case of Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) where the Constitutional Court provided a constitutional 
interpretation to contractual disputes. 
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pacta sunt servanda18 to operate, but at the same time allows courts to decline to enforce 
contractual terms that are in conflict with the constitutional values even though the parties may have 
consented to them.”19 This, it is submitted, is a better approach (and one that conforms to 
constitutional requirements) than one where the right of ownership and the freedom to contract (both 
constitutionally-protected rights) are tampered with. In this regard the Constitutional Court has held 
that an important constitutional value to consider in determining if contractual terms are to be 
upheld, is the value of fairness in contracting, which is determined by considering whether or not the 
particular contractual term is contrary to public policy.20 In this regard the Court has held that the 
existence of unequal bargaining would be an important consideration in determining whether or not 
the contract was in line with public policy.21 There is therefore adequate remedy for an author who 
would have assigned his or her copyright under circumstances of unequal bargaining. What might 
be needed, and what Parliament could do, is to empower a more-accessible forum, such as the 
Copyright Tribunal, to deal with such contractual disputes. 
In light of the foregoing, the addition of the phrase “the author shall, subject to any contrary 
agreement, be entitled to receive a fair share of the royalty received for the execution of any of the 
acts contemplated in section 6”, is a better and welcome construction.22 In this regard the phrase 
“subject to any contrary agreement” would counter any arguments regarding the curtailment of the 
copyright owner’s exclusive rights to deal with the copyright work as he pleases; as well as, in this 
regard, permit cases where the parties might prefer to agree on an upfront fee rather than a royalty 
or where the work might be used for free for promotional and other reasons. It safeguards the rights 
of ownership and freedom to contract (as the outcome is dependent upon the negotiations of the 
parties), but it does not eliminate the constitutional considerations of “fairness in contracting”, as the 
courts, or any designated tribunal, can still determine if the contract is fair or not, in light of the 
requirements of public policy.    
9.2.2 Clause 5 – New section 6A(3) 
                                               
18
 The doctrine of pacta sunt servanda is the doctrine of the sanctity of contracts; namely the doctrine that contracts, if they 
were entered into with the consent of all parties thereto, should be honoured. 
19
 Barkhuizen v Napier 2007 (5) SA 323 (CC) at para 30. Emphasis added. 
20
 Barkhuizen v Napier id at paras 56; 58 – 59. 
21
 Barkhuizen v Napier id at para 59. In the case Ngcobo J, relying on the case of Mohlomi v Minister of Defence 1997 1 
SA 124 CC para 64, highlighted the fact that the harshness of the provisions under consideration was to be determined 
with due regard to "the realities that prevail in our country" - realities given to us by our history. Quoting from Mohlomi 
Ngcobo J highlights these realities to include the fact that we are '"… a land where poverty and illiteracy abound and 
differences of culture and language are pronounced, where such conditions isolate the people whom they handicap from 
the mainstream of the law, where most persons who have been injured are either unaware of or poorly informed about 
their legal rights and what they should do in order to enforce those, and where access to professional advice and 
assistance that they need so sorely is often difficult for financial or geographical reasons". Ngcobo further observes, 
"Indeed many people in this country conclude contracts without any bargaining power and without understanding what they 
are agreeing to. That will often be a relevant consideration in determining fairness" 
22
 The writer made this submission to the Portfolio Committee as one of a few “technical experts” appointed to advise the 
committee on the Bill. 
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The phrase “or between their representative collecting societies” in the fourth and fifth lines of the 
proposed section requires further interrogation and / or qualification. In this regards it needs to be 
noted that generally, the author and the publisher would be members of the same collecting society. 
Reference cannot therefore, in this regard, be made to “their representative collecting societies”. 
Furthermore, it is usually the default rules of the collecting society (as in the case of SAMRO) that 
would apply if there is no agreement between the author and the publisher (and not the agreement 
between representative collecting societies). In view of this, it is submitted that this provision should 
be amended by (i) putting a full stop after the phrase “subsection 2(b)” in the fourth line of 
subsection 3(a); and (ii) deleting the rest of the sentence in subsection 3(a) and replacing it with this 
sentence:  
Where no agreement exists between the author and the copyright owner or the author and the person 
authorized to use the work as contemplated in subsection 2(b), the author’s share of the royalty shall 
be determined by the rules of the collecting society to which the author or both the author and the 
copyright owner or person authorized to use the work as contemplated in subsection 2(b) belong. 
Having made the foregoing recommendations, a better construction of the proposed section 6A(3), 
would, taking into account the totality of the rest of the proposed amendments (i.e. the proposed 
subsections 6A(4) and 6A(5)), would be the following wording:  
6A (3) (a) The assignment of copyright in a literary or musical work, or any authorization contemplated 
in subsection (2), shall be determined by a written agreement between the author and the assignee 
conforming to the requirements set out in subsection (5) below or such other requirements as may be 
prescribed from time to time. 
(b) Any further assignment of the copyright in the work by the copyright owner or subsequent copyright 
owners, or any further authorizations of the right to use the work pursuant to subsection (2)(b) is 
subject to the agreement between the author and the copyright owner contemplated in paragraph (a) 
hereof, or the order contemplated in subsection (4).   
The rationale for the changes proposed is to eliminate the challenge (including a constitutional and 
Berne non-compliance challenge) that could be mounted on the ground that the changes proposed 
in the new section 6A would curtail the right of ownership and freedom of contract, by putting an 
emphasis on the agreement between the parties and not on the payment of royalties, while 
highlighting the importance of paying such royalties (through the reference, in subsection (3)(b), to 
subsection (4)). 
9.2.3 Clause 5 – New section 6A(4)        
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(a) It is proposed that subsection (4) be amended as follows: 
The author’s fair share of royalty contemplated in subsection (2) shall be as determined by the 
Minister from time to time by publication in the Gazette, after consultation with representatives of the 
affected industry: Provided that where, at any time, no such determination has been made, any 
affected party may refer the matter to the Tribunal for an order determining the author’s fair share of 
the royalty. In making such an order the Tribunal may consider any acceptable practices in the 
industry concerned, and shall consider the constitutional values of fairness and equal bargaining in 
contracting.  
(b) The rationale for the proposed amendment is as follows: It is best practice where contractual 
rates are concerned to ensure that broad consultations with the affected industries take pace prior to 
arriving at an applicable rate. It is proposed here that such a rate shall be determined by the Minister 
after consultation with the applicable industry. In the absence of a strong union culture in the South 
African entertainment industries (as compared to the United States where minimum contractual 
rates are determined through union negotiations), a determination by the Minister on this basis 
would be the most viable alternative. It is only where such a determination is not in place that a 
referral to the Tribunal would then take place.  
9.2.4 Clause 5 – New section 6A(5)        
(a) Section 6A(5)(c) 
The addition of the phrase “to the author” at the end of subparagraph (c) is unwarranted and makes 
the sentence incoherent and should therefore be removed.    
9.2.5 Clause 5 – New Section 6A(7) 
Subsection (7) of the proposed section 6A introduces provisions that make the requirement for a 
mandatory payment of royalties applicable to assignments of copyright made before the 
commencement of the Bill where the copyright work concerned falls within the application of the Bill 
and “is still exploited for profit”.23 This proposed retrospective application of the Bill in this regard is 
problematic because it will have the effect of nullifying existing contracts, if for example such 
contracts made provision for the payment of an upfront fee rather than a royalty, or where 
authorisation was otherwise given by the author in lieu of payment, where the author benefited from 
promotional opportunities or in other instances where the author otherwise gave free use to the 
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 Paragraph (c) does indicate that the requirement for the payment of royalties shall, in such cases, apply in respect of 
royalties received after the Bill becomes law and comes into force. 
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work. It is submitted that such contracts, enacted before the coming into force of the Bill, are binding 
based on the constitutionally-recognised doctrine of the sanctity of contracts (pacta sunt servanda) 
and thus cannot be nullified retrospectively. It is submitted therefore that the changes proposed in 
subsection (7) are unconstitutional. It is acknowledged that the proposed section makes provision 
for an impact assessment to be conducted and for Parliament to approve the process prior to 
implementation, but this would not, in the writer’s view, change the unconstitutional nature of the 
proposed changes. 
9.2.6 Clauses 13 – 20 
These clauses seek to introduce a new set of expansive exceptions and limitations, including the 
controversial introduction in the proposed section 12A of a fair use defence similar to that used in 
the United States and the repeal of the provisions relating to the defence of fair dealing. The most 
pertinent question to ask here is whether the proposed limitations and exceptions under these 
clauses were subjected to the three-step test, as required under the Berne Convention, the TRIPs 
Agreement and other international treaties. In this regard it needs to be reiterated that where the 
minimum rights guaranteed under international treaties are eroded by national law, such erosion 
shall only affect the rights of the nationals of the country concerned, and not those of other countries 
who are members of the same treaty. In this regard the question to ask is why the Legislature would 
be hell-bent on clipping the wings of South African rights-holders, while foreign rights-holders can fly 
like eagles.   
The three-step test was introduced in article 9(2) of the Berne Convention at the Stockholm 
conference of 1967 and provides the following: 
It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union to permit the reproduction of … works in 
certain special cases, provided that such reproduction does not conflict with a normal exploitation of 
the work and does not unreasonably prejudice the legitmate interests of the author.
24
 
This test has been incorporated with minor variations in several intellectual property treaties.25 
Moreover, most of the substantive provisions of the Berne Convention, including article 9(2) were 
incorporated in the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (the TRIPs 
Agreement), in terms of article 9(1) thereof. In the only WTO Panel decision relating to the three-
step test, taken in the year 2000, the Panel set out what is required in respect of each of three steps 
                                               
24
 Article 9(2) of the Berne Convention, 1886 (Paris Act, 1971). 
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 Articles 9, 13, 26(2) and 30 of the TRIPs Agreement, 1995; art. 10(1) and (2) of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (WCT), 
1996; art. 16.2 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT), 1996; art. 13(2) of the Beijing Treaty on 
Audiovisual Performances, 2012 and art. 11 of the Marrakesh Treaty to Facilitate Access to Published Works for Persons 
who are Blind, Visually Impaired and Otherwise Print Disabled (Marrakesh Treaty for the Visually Impaired), 2013. 
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forming part of the test.26 The decision was concerned with whether section 110(5) of the US 
Copyright Act, (which permitted certain commercial establishments such as  bars and restaurants to 
use non-dramatic musical works without paying royalties) satisfied the requirements of the three-
step test provided for in article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement.27 The Panel found that the section 
contravened all three steps in the test and made the following important findings with regard to the 
three steps: 
(a) With regard to the expression “certain special cases” the Panel held that the expression means 
that “the limitation exception in national legislation should be clearly defined and should be narrow in 
its scope and reach.”28 In this regard the word “certain” means that exception or limitation has to be 
clearly defined, giving rise to “a sufficient degree of legal certainty”, while not necessarily identifying 
explicitly every possible situation to which the exception would apply.29 With regard to the word 
“special” the Panel held that this meant that “the exception or limitation must be limited in its field of 
application or exceptional in its scope”, i.e. narrow in both a quantitative and a qualitative sense.30 
On the other hand, the word “case” refers to such considerations as the beneficiaries to which the 
exception or limitation is to apply; the equipment used; the types of works and other such factors.31 
(b) With regard to the expression “not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work” the Panel held 
that its normative connotation implied that, in addition to the forms of exploitation that currently 
generate “significant or tangible revenue”, consideration must also be had to “those forms of 
exploitation which, with a certain degree of likelihood or plausibility, could acquire considerable 
economic or practical importance.”32 An important consideration that the Panel made in this regard is 
the consideration of whether or not the exception or limitation imposed is likely to fuel economic 
competition against the rights-holder, e.g. where the works are exploited not only by those who do 
so because of the existence of the exception or limitation, but also where others are induced to start 
using the works on the basis that the use is now free.33 
(c) With regard to the expression “not unreasonably prejudice the legitimate interests of the right 
holder” the Panel held that one way of looking at the legitimate interests of the rights-holder is to 
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 WTO Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July 2000, DSR 
2000: VIII, p. 3769.  
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 Article 13 of the TRIPs Agreement provides the following: “Members shall confine limitations or exceptions to exclusive 
rights to certain special cases which do not conflict with a normal exploitation of the work and do not unreasonably 
prejudice the legitimate interests of the right holder.” 
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 WTO Panel Report, United States – Section 110(5) of the US Copyright Act, WT/DS160/R, adopted 27 July 2000, DSR 
2000: VIII, p. 3769, at para 6.112. 
29
 Id at para 6.108. 
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 Id at para 6.109. 
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 Id at para 6.110. 
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 Id at para 1.180. 
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 See in particular id at paras 6.183 and 6.186. It is submitted that this observation is particularly relevant when one 
postulate about a case where, for example, a user that is currently paying for the use of a work (e.g. Google in respect of 
the usages of musical works through its YouTube platforms), could, through the introduction of an expansive fair use 
exception, find a basis to stop paying for such uses; or where new technology companies may find an opportunity to “enter 
the space” as a result of the free uses. 
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consider the economic value of the exclusive rights conferred by copyright, while acknowledging that 
legitimate interests are not limited to those with economic value.34 The Panel then found that 
“prejudice to the legitimate interests of right holders reaches an unreasonable level if an exception 
or limitation causes or has the potential to cause an unreasonable loss of income to the copyright 
owner.”35 
The above was highlighted to illustrate that, when subjected to the three-step test in line with the 
interpretation of the WTO Panel in the USA case, the expansive exception and limitations regime 
introduced by the Copyright Amendment Bill 2017 is unlikely to satisfy the requirements of the three-
step test.36 In particular the lack of a proper socio-economic impact assessment of the likely effects 
of introducing such exceptions and limitations, on the affected industries, demonstrates that the 
above-highlighted three-step considerations would not have been taken into account when 
introducing the exceptions and limitations.37 
9.2.7 Clause 13 – the new Section 12B(6) 
(a) The proposed section 12B(6) deserves particular intention, as it controversially seeks to 
introduce into South African copyright law the so-called “first sale doctrine” (also termed the 
“exhaustion of rights” principle), which is a part of American law and has never been a part of our 
law. This proposed introduction is dubbed “controversial” because while the exhaustion of rights can 
be at a local, regional or international level, the section seeks to introduce this doctrine – which 
never formed part of our law – at an international level (“in the Republic or outside the Republic”). 
Furthermore, the scope of application of the doctrine is also befuddled, as reference is made not 
only to “first sale” but to “other assignment of ownership of an assigned original or copy”. Firstly, a 
“sale” is not an assignment and should thus not be equated to such.38 The effect of this new section 
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 Id at 6.227. 
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 Id at 6.229. 
36
 Even those who are inclined to embrace the fair use doctrine are honest enough to voice their doubts regarding the 
doctrine’s adherence to the three-step test. See in this regard Harms 2013 PELJ, at 507 - 508, where the learned former 
Deputy President of the Supreme Court of Appeal observes: “It is generally accepted that our copyright law is outdate, 
more specifically if regard is had to the fact that the Act has not been amended to accommodate the internet age. … In 
particular, one would have assumed that [the Draft National Policy on Intellectual Property, 2013] would at least also have 
dealt with fair use and fair dealing where I prefer the US approach even if it might arguably not be in accordance with the 
three-stage test in the Berne Convention and the TRIPS Agreement. If the US can get away with it, we can too. …” Of 
course Harms’ statement about getting away with non-compliance with the three-step test ought to be viewed as having 
been spoken in jest, because it is unimaginable to think that a former justice of the Supreme Court of Appeals would 
encourage a contravention of the Constitution, which provides in s 39(1) that, in interpreting the provisions of the 
Constitution the courts “must” consider international and “may” consider foreign law. In this case it is clear that the three-
step test is an international law doctrine, while the fair use doctrine is a foreign law doctrine.   
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 Although government officials have often spoken about a socio-economic impact assessment having been done in 
respect of the Bill, industry representatives assert that they have not been properly consulted in respect of this. See for 
example in this regard Hollis https://www.adamsadams.com/south-africas-copyright-law-knife-edge/ (date of use: 28 April 
2018), who refers to a “perceived lack of proper and meaningful stakeholder engagement … with the report under the 
Government’s Socio-Economic Impact Assessment System (SEIAS) not indicating any independent research  - or any 
research at all – on the impact of the Bill, especially its proposed exceptions and the ‘fair use’ clause.” 
38
 In American law the first sale doctrine is concerned with the sale of physical copies of a work; i.e. once the copyright 
owner has released copies of the work to the public, the public is authorised to deal with the copies they bought in 
whatever way, subject to certain exceptions (e.g. the rental of copies of sound recordings is not permitted). Thus the first 
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is that the act of assignment of copyright is deemed to constitute a first sale, thus exhausting the 
rights in the work concerned, which is not only absurd but of serious concern.  
(b) The correct position regarding the first sale doctrine is that only physical copies of a work are 
subjected to the doctrine, not the copyright in the work. The first sale doctrine is concerned with the 
publication of copyright works, that is, the distribution of copies of the work to the public in a 
sufficient amount to satisfy the demand of the public. The doctrine states that once the copyright 
owner has done this, or authorized another person to do so, any person who has bought such a 
copy or who has bought mass copies of the work, may do with such copies whatever he or she 
wants, without the need to obtain authorization from the copyright owner.39 Accordingly, the first sale 
doctrine provided for in section 12B(6) is poorly, incorrectly and dangerously articulated. More 
particularly, it does not make it explicit that the first sale or publication of the work must have been 
authorized by the copyright owner for the doctrine to apply. The essence of this is that even if the 
first sale or transfer of ownership was unlawful, an importer or distributor would still be permitted to 
import or distribute the article without the need to obtain permission from the copyright owner, or the 
need to pay any royalties in this regard.  
(c) Further to the above, the fact that the provision applies “notwithstanding any provisions of this 
Act, the Trademark Act, 1993 (Act 194 of 1993) and the Counterfeit Goods Act 1997 (Act 37 of 
1997)” in essence means that it legalizes not only the importation and distribution, without the 
copyright owner’s authorization, of copyright works, but also legalizes the piracy of copyright works, 
as these Acts have been used so far to combat piracy. With one stroke the provision annuls a body 
of established case law that has made it explicit that the importation and distribution of copyright 
works without the authorization of the copyright owner is unlawful.40 Thus for example, a person can 
import film DVDs (from whatever source, whether the manufacturing of the DVDs constituted 
infringement of copyright or not) or manufacture them himself here in South Africa, and open a 
video-hire shop, without the need to obtain a licence from the copyright owner (or such copyright 
owner’s lawful representative in South Africa). In this regard this would overrule the position adopted 
by our courts in the case of Mr. Video (Pty) Ltd & Others v Nu Metro & Others,41 where such action 
was confirmed to be unlawful. Not only the usage of the film but also that of the underlying works 
                                                                                                                                                              
sale doctrine is concerned with the physical copies of the work and not with the copyright in the work, which remains with 
the copyright owner. See in this regard Moser and Slay, commenting on the first sale doctrine in the United States and 
observing: “The first sale doctrine is based on the idea that ownership of a material object is distinct from ownership of 
copyright.” Moser and Slay Music Copyright Law 102.  
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 As indicated, certain limitations may be imposed, such as the position in US copyright law that the rental of copies of a 
sound recording is not permissible without the authorisation of the copyright owner.  
40
 See example Paramount Pictures Corporation v Video Parktown North (Pty) Limited 1983 (2) SA 251 (T); Video 
Parktown North (Pty) td v Paramount Pictures Corportion; Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd v Shelburne Associates and 
Others; Video Parktown North (Pty) Ltd v Century Associates and Others [1986] 1 All SA 1 (T); Frank & Hirsch (Pty) Ltd v 
Roopanand (A) Brothers (Pty) Ltd [1993] ZASCA 90;  Mr. Video (Pty) Ltd & Others v Nu Metro & Others [2009] ZASCA 
127. 
41
 Ibid. 
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(including musical works) would be deemed to be lawful, since there would have been a first 
distribution of such works (through the usage in the film).  
(d) In light of the above it is proposed that section 12B(6) be amended (i) to make it explicit that the 
doctrine of first sale will only apply where the first sale or publication / distribution was authorized by 
the copyright owner; (ii) to make it explicit that it only applies in respect of physical copies of a work; 
and (iii) to make it explicit that it applies only in respect of certain works. An impact assessment 
would need to be conducted in this regard to determine which works could be subjected to the 
application of the doctrine. For example in US Copyright law the doctrine does not apply in respect 
of the rental of copies of sound recordings, musical works and computer programs. Accordingly the 
following revision of section 12B(6) is proposed: 
6. (a) The first sale or other transfer of ownership of a record or other copy of a work in the Republic or 
certain other designated countries,
42
 by or with the prior authorisation of the copyright owner, shall 
exhaust the right of distribution in the Republic or such other designated countries, and shall further 
exhaust the right of importation into the Republic from such designated countries of any such record or 
copy.  
(b) The Minister shall, by publication in the Gazette, designate the countries where the provisions of 
paragraph (a) shall apply and shall similarly designate the works and acts of exploitation to which the 
provisions of paragraph (a) shall apply. 
Another enigmatic aspect of the first-sale doctrine introduced under the new section 12B(6) is the 
fact that it is expected to apply “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act, the Trademark 
Act, 1993 … and the Counterfeit Goods Act, 1997 …” This interpolation is rather strange and the 
intention is not clear. The effect however is: In one stroke of a pen the provision nullifies, for 
purposes of the first-dal doctrines, crucial provisions of these legislations, in particular those of the 
Counterfeit Goods Act, which have been said to be “complementary to the Copyright Act in 
particular to the criminal provisions of that Act and to those provisions dealing with the seizure of 
goods by the customs authorities.”43 Customs authorities will of course no longer be required to 
seize these goods because their importation will now be permissible (this being exacerbated by the 
fact that the “first sale” is not required to have been authorised by the copyright owner). The fact 
also that this doctrine is to apply “notwithstanding anything to the contrary in this Act”, namely the 
Copyright Act, in essence means that this doctrine, imported from foreign law, has now become the 
supreme doctrine of our copyright law, as every other provision has to be subjected to its operation. 
                                               
42
 It is proposed that rather than pitching the doctrine of exhaustion at the international level, a process of identifying 
particular countries (e.g. African countries or BRICS countries) where the doctrine shall apply should be put in place. 
43
 Dean and Karjiker Handbook of Copyright 1-202. 
411 
 
This is indeed a very worrying development in our copyright law. The clear recommendation in this 
regard is therefore that this should be completely excised from the Bill. 
9.2.8 Clause 13 – New Section 12C(1) 
(a) The proposed section 12C(1) introduces a temporary reproduction exception that mirrors Article 
5 of the EU Copyright Directive.44 Article 5 of the EU Copyright Directive read with Recital 33 thereof 
permits transient reproductions where these form part of and / or complete a technological process 
that produces copies of a limited duration that are thereafter automatically deleted (as in the case of 
browsing and caching). In this regard it needs to be noted that the EU Directive was enacted in 
2001, at the height of the peer-to-peer file-sharing controversies where the illegal downloading of 
copyright works was the main concern of copyright owners in the digital environment. At the time the 
concern was that illegal downloading of copyright works had taken over the physical sales of these 
works, thus affecting the ability of copyright owners to benefit from the usage of their works. In this 
regard the streaming of music was not a major concern yet as its economic value was not yet 
evident. Accordingly it was considered permissible under certain limited circumstances. (b) The 
concern of rights-holders today has shifted from music downloads to what has been termed the 
“streaming revolution”.45 This owes to a decline not only in physical music sales but also in music 
downloads based on the ITunes model.46 With the demise of income from the exploitation of 
physical products of music, and the switch of users’ interests from music downloads to live 
streaming, a provision that permits live streaming without the need for compensation is calculated to 
have a negative impact on the growth prospects of the music industry and will ultimately impoverish 
rights-holders. This is so in particular with regard to subparagraph (a) of the proposed section 
13A(1), which permits reproduction and adaptation “to enable the transmission of the work in a 
network between third parties by an intermediary”. While such transmission was, at the time, the 
exception in relation to the main form of exploitation, it has now become the rule. What is even more 
concerning with the proposed provision is that it does not incorporate provisions similar to article 
5(5) of the EU Copyright Directive, which subject the provisions of article 5(1) of the Directive to the 
three-step test.47 It is submitted that a proper three-step test would result in the conclusion that 
musical works and sound recordings should be exempted from the application of the proposed 
section 12C(1), if the South African music industry is to be given a chance to develop. A similar case 
can be made for the other entertainment sectors in South Africa. Accordingly, if the proposed 
provisions are to remain there must at least be a three-step provision in line with article 5(5) of the 
                                               
44
 2001/21/EC. 
45
 See in this regard Hogan 2015 Colo. Tech. L.J. 131 - 152, who refers to a shift from physical music sales to an ITunes 
download-dominated market and now to a Spotify-dominated music streaming market. Available at  
https://ctlj.colorado.edu/wp-content/uploads/2015/12/v.Final-Hogan-11.19.15-JRD.pdf (date of use: 1 October 2018). 
46
 It has in this regard been reported that streaming has for the first time in 2017 overtaken physical sales and digital 
downloads as the main source of music revenue. See IFPI Global Music Report 2017, available at 
http://www.ifpi.org/downloads/GMR2017.pdf (date of use: 1 October 2018). 
47
 See further in this regard the discussion under paragraph 8.4.2.5(a)(i) above. 
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EU Copyright Directive to counter the harsh effects of the provisions. 
9.2.9 Clause 22(a) and (c) – Proposed amendment to Section 21(1)(c) and introduction of a new 
Section 21(3)  
It is submitted that the amendments proposed in these paragraphs are sound. The current 
provisions of section 21(1)(c) are based on, and mimic the provisions of the now-repealed UK 
Copyright Act of 1956.48 The current UK Copyright Act49 does not contain provisions of that nature 
and thus the ownership of copyright in a commissioned work depends on the terms of the contract 
concluded by the parties.50 The amendments proposed in the Bill are in line with the “minimalist 
approach” adopted in UK case law in relation to the subject-matter.51 
9.2.10 Clause 23(b) – Proposed amendment to Section 22(3) and (4) 
Comments in relation to these sections were made in Chapter 7 above, under paragraph 7.3.2.8. . 
9.2.11 Clause 25 – New Section 22B(8)(b) 
It is understood that the word “person” used in this new section includes a juristic person.52 In that 
case, the section needs to indicate who the liable person shall be where the collecting society is a 
juristic person.  
9.2.12 Clause 25 – New Section 22C 
The use of the expression “indigenous community” here is unfortunate as it can only create 
confusion, especially because this is the first time that the expression is used under Chapter 1A. A 
separate section needs to be inserted to deal with the collective management of indigenous or 
traditional works.  
9.2.13 Clause 25 – New Section 22C(2) 
                                               
48
 Section 4(3) of the Copyright Act 1956 c. 74.  
49
 Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988 c. 48. 
50
 See generally in this regard Garnett Davies and Harbotte Copinger and Skone James 16 336 – 339. 
51
 The minimalist approach is to the effect that, where a decision has to be made as to which of various alternatives should 
constitute the contents of the term to be implied (where there is uncertainty as to whether an assignment of copyright or a 
lesser right was intended), the choice must be for the alternative “that does not exceed what is necessary in the 
circumstances.” The leading UK case in this regard is Ray v Classic FM Plc [1998] FSR 622. 
52
 Although it may be useful, at the beginning of the section, to state: ‘The reference to “person” in this section includes a 
juristic person”, to allay any doubt.  
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It is recommended that the provisions of paragraph (e) should be at the top of the activities to be 
carried out by a collecting society (thus should be dealt with under paragraph (a)) to fully capture the 
sequence of activities, as the negotiation of fees precedes licensing.  
9.2.14 Clause 25 – New Section 22C(3)(c) 
Section 22C(3)(c) provides that a collecting society may “only make payment of royalties to a 
collecting society outside the Republic, if there is a reciprocal agreement regarding royalties in place 
between that country and the Republic.”  
It is submitted that this section introduces reciprocity requirements that are at odds with the national 
treatment and minimum rights principles embodied in the TRIPs Agreement and the Berne 
Convention. In this regard it needs to be recalled that the principles of national treatment and 
minimum rights provide that foreign authors are to be accorded the rights which the laws of member 
countries of the Berne Convention other than the country of such foreign authors’ origin, “do now or 
may hereafter grant to their nationals, as well as the rights specially granted by [the] Convention”.53 
Thus, since South African copyright law accords rights to South African nationals which are 
administered by collecting societies, the foreign nationals of other Berne Convention countries are 
entitled to be accorded the same rights. Reciprocity thus does not apply, as noted by Nodermann: 
… [T]he principle of reciprocity, otherwise extensively applicable in international law, does not hold 
good within the sphere of the [Berne Convention].The principle of national treatment and the principle 
of reciprocity are mutually exclusive.
54
 
Furthermore, it is submitted that, subjecting the payment of royalties to foreign nationals for the 
exploitation of their works in South Africa, to the conclusion of a reciprocal agreement would run 
afoul of the Berne Convention for another reason: namely the fact that it introduces formalities for 
the exercise of rights, which are prohibited under the Berne Convention.55 
9.2.15 Clause 25 – New Section 22D(1) 
                                               
53
 Article 5(1) of the Berne Convention. Emphasis added. 
54
 Nodermann W “The Principle of National Treatment and the Definition of Literary and Artistic Works – Some Remarks on 
the Correlations between Article 5 of the Berne Convention and Article II of the Universal Copyright Convention” 1989 
Copyright Monthly Review of the World Intellectual Property Organization (25:10) 300. 
55
 This is the so-called principle of automatic protection, provided for in art. 5(2) of the Berne Convention. Another principle 
relevant in this regard is the principle of “independence of protection”, also provided for in art. 5(2), which provides that 
“[the] enjoyment and … exercise [of the rights provided for in the Convention] shall be independent of the existence of 
protection in the country of origin of the work.” Thus even if the country of origin of the work concerned does not make 
provision for the collective management of copyright, South Africa would be obliged to extend the benefits of collective 
management to the nationals of such country, on the basis that it does so for its own nationals. See further in this regard 
WIPO Guide to the Berne Convention 33 – 34. See also Van Gompel Formalities in Copyright Law 166 - 168, who 
observes that the rule in relation to the prohibition of formalities also applies in relation to rights that are protectable in 
terms of the principle of national treatment. 
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What section 22D(1) fails to do is that it does not make provision for the ability of the collecting 
society to set aside small portions of collected licensing fees into a reserve fund as part of business 
contingency planning (e.g. the ability to purchase a new rights administration system and the ability 
to ensure business continuity planning and / or disaster recovery). This should be possible with the 
approval of members at a general meeting.56 Provision should also be made for the collecting 
society to set aside some funds for members’ social security needs and / or for cultural purposes.57 
SAMRO currently contributes to a retirement annuity fund and a funeral benefit for its members 
derived from an allocation from royalties. If no provision of this nature is inserted in the Bill, it can 
safely be said that SAMRO will no longer be authorized to make such contributions. 
9.2.16 Clause 25 – New Section 22F(5) 
A welcome change effected in the Bill is the introduction of a mandatory provision under this 
proposed section, requiring the Commission to apply to the Tribunal for the appointment of a 
competent person to assist it with the administration of a collecting society whose accreditation has 
been suspended in terms of subsection 3. Previous provisions of the Bill in this regard did not make 
it mandatory for the Commission to do so, which implied that the Commission could, itself, get 
directly involved with the operations of the collecting society concerned. It was argued then that this 
was an untenable situation in light of the fact that the business of collective management of 
copyright is complex and is not necessarily one which the Commission has expertise in. The 
proposed section now provides that the person appointed must have skills in collective management 
and general administration of rights under the Act; or business rescue, administration or liquidation, 
or “other skills deemed appropriate by the Commission and Tribunal.”58 It is commendable that the 
Tribunal shall have a say in the determination of the “other skills deemed appropriate”.    
9.2.17 Clause 29 – New Section 28(O)(6)     
It is not clear what the objective was to make the provisions of the proposed section 28(O)(6) to be 
considered in conjunction with the provisions of sections 87, 88 and 89 of the Electronic 
Communications and Transactions (ECT) Act, especially in light of the proposed amendments to 
section 27 of the Act, which provide better protection to rights-holders than that provided for in 
sections 87 – 88 of the ECT Act. The two provisions are clearly incompatible. The danger of making 
the provisions of the new section 28(O)(6) to apply interchangeably with the said provisions of the 
                                               
56
 Practice tools 56 and 57 of the WIPO Good Practice Toolkit for CMOs supports such practice where members authorise 
this or if the constitution of the collecting society or legislation permits this. See 
http://www.wipo.int/copyright/en/management/index.html#cmotoolkit (date of use: 01 October 2018).  
57
 The current needle-time regulations make provision for this and permit up to 10% of the amount of annual distributions 
to be used for this purpose. See Regulation 8(5)(c) of the Needle-time Regulations. See also article 12(2) and (4) of the 
EU Directive on Collective Management, where this practice is recognised. Directive 2014/26/EU, available at 
https://ec.europa.eu/digital-single-market/en/collective-rights-management-directive (date of use: 01 October 2018). 
58
 Emphasis added. 
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ECT Act is that infringers may seek to avail themselves to the less stringent penalties provided for in 
section 89 of the ECT Act rather than the harsher provisions under the Copyright Act. In terms of the 
double jeopardy rule, namely the rule that a person may not be punished twice for the same offence, 
the infringer, once he or she had subjected him or herself  to the penalties provided for under the 
ECT Act, cannot again be subjected to the harsher provisions of the Copyright Act. In view of this it 
is recommended that the reference to the ECT Act should be removed by completely deleting 
paragraph (6) of the proposed section 28(O). 
9.2.18 Clause 29 – New Section 28(P)     
Since rights-holders need to be afforded adequate rights in the digital environment to survive, as 
highlighted in Chapter 8, justification must be provided why such rights should be curtailed as 
proposed in this clause, which seeks to introduce exceptions to the rights given to rights-holders 
with respect of the use of technological protection measures. Therefore, the provision should 
specifically state that a circumvention of technological protection measures would only be permitted 
if it complies with the three-step test. 
9.2.19 Clause 33 – Amendment of Section 39 
The numbering in the proposed amendment to section 39 needs to be reviewed. It needs to be 
noted that the Copyright Act in its current form only has paragraph (cA) and does not have 
paragraphs (cB), (cC), (cD) or (cE). These paragraphs were inserted by the Intellectual Property 
Amendment Act 28 of 2013, which has not yet come into force. 
9.2.20 Clause 34 – New Section 39B 
It needs to be noted that the Copyright Act in its current form has no section 39A. Section 39A was 
inserted by the Intellectual Property Amendment Act 28 of 2013, which, as noted, has not yet come 
into force.  
 
9.3 Final Recommendations 
In conclusion, it goes without saying that this thesis has raised a number of issues relating to the 
copyright protection of musical works. The writer’s main motivation and research objective in writing 
this thesis was to unravel the generally-mystified world of music copyright protection, with a focus on 
the protection of musical works, in order to make it easier to approach and deal with the subject-
matter.  A number of issues have come to light in doing so but the most important, in the writer’s 
view, is the lack of any formal programmes in the law relating to music rights protection, or 
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entertainment law in general, at South African universities. The writer made this observation at the 
beginning of his research journey in relation to this thesis;59 several years later, at the finalisation of 
the thesis, it is regrettable that the situation has not changed and may in fact have deteriorated.60 
Ironically, a Google search for entertainment law firms in South Africa yields many results of those 
that claim to provide legal services in this area of law. One wonders where such persons gained 
their knowledge of this area of law, if no university in South Africa offers any courses or programmes 
in this regard. This is further exacerbated by the fact that there are not many entertainment business 
companies in South Africa where an aspirant entertainment lawyer can gain experience – which is 
another way in which a lawyer may gain experience in this regard. 
The above-mentioned developments do however, highlight the fact that there is a growing demand 
for entertainment law services from members of the public, which in itself is a good thing as it is an 
indication that the industry is growing. In light of the foregoing, the need for universities to introduce 
programmes in this area of law has become urgent. This will prevent the problem that Du Plessis 
has highlighted when he refers to a prejudice that may befall songwriters, arguing that this “may not 
lie in the ability of the courts to make a proper ruling, but in the inability of counsel to argue their 
cases.”61 In light of this the following general recommendations are made: 
(1) University law schools, especially those offering courses in Intellectual Property Law in general 
and Copyright Law in particular within their LLB programmes, should start thinking seriously about 
introducing modules in either Entertainment Law, in which studies in Music Copyright will form an 
integral part; or rather introducing a stand-alone module in Music Law or Music Copyright Law. The 
prerequisite for such a module would be a general module in Copyright Law or Intellectual Property 
Law (in which Copyright Law is a component); and, where the module offered is a module in Music 
Law, Contract Law may be another prerequisite. Such a module would ideally be offered as an 
elective module in the final years of the LLB degree; 
(2) In addition to the above, law schools should think thinking seriously about introducing focused 
postgraduate research in the field of Entertainment Law, which would encompass the sub-fields of 
Music Law; the Law relating to the Film and Television Industries (which could also include aspects 
of Animation and Gaming); the Law relating to Literary Publishing and the Law relating to Theatre / 
Dramatic Works.  These can be offered as part of an LLM degree, which can be preceded by a 
Postgraduate Certificate specialising in say, one of these areas, followed by a Postgraduate 
Diploma offering two of these courses. Those having either a Postgraduate Diploma would then 
receive credits for the LLM, which itself can be comprised of three modules from those mentioned 
above, with a short dissertation comprising the final module. An alternative, in line with the scope of 
                                               
59
 See Chapter 1 of this thesis generally. 
60
 In Chapter 1 the writer made reference to the fact that at one stage both the University of Johannesburg and the 
University of Cape Town offered short courses on Entertainment Law. These courses seem to have now been completely 
phased out however. 
61
 See Du Plessis 2007 TSAR 2 330 and generally ; also Du Plessis 2007 TSAR 1, generally. 
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this thesis, would be to develop an LLM module on Music Copyright Law and offer it as a 
specialisation in the university’s existing LLM in Intellectual Property Law; 
(3) Further to the above universities can also offer short-learning, NQF 5 or 6  level programmes on 
Entertainment Law in general or Music Law in particular, which can be offered in conjunction with 
industry. This can, for example, include SAMRO and other important industry bodies within the 
South African entertainment industry. There is possibly no better way to inculcate practical skills in 
relation to the entertainment industries than forging relationships with the main industry players, 
which can create opportunities for students through internships, workshops etc. University law 
clinics can also partner with the law school in this regard to provide opportunities through the use of 
moot court competitions and the law clinic’s Street Law programmes;62 and  
(4) Finally, as a way of broadening skills in this regard and as part of programmes aimed at assisting 
judges in the adjudication of intellectual property disputes, universities can forge relationships with 
the South African Judicial Education Institute (SAJEI) formed in terms of the South African Judicial 
Education Institute Act,63 in terms of which such programmes can also include sections relating to 
the adjudication of cases arising from the entertainment industries in general and the music industry 
in particular, especially with regard to issues such as the use of expert witnesses, the admissibility of 
evidence and the determination of questions around the originality of copyright works. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
62
 This model of forging relationships with the industry has been used successfully in the United States and has 
undoubtedly contributed to the impartation of skills to many entertainment law practitioners in the United States. See for 
example in this regard the Fashion, Arts, Media & Entertainment Law Centre (FAME) at the Benjamin N. Cardozo Law 
School of Yeshiva University, available at https://cardozo.yu.edu/programs-centers/fashion-arts-media-entertainment-law-
center-fame (date of use: 23 July 2019). 
63
 Act 14 of 2008. 
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